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CHAPTER I
THE HYPOTHESIZED PRIMARY CAUSES OF
ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY

.'

Remember the days of old, consider the years of many generations, ask thy Father and he
will recount it to thee, thy
elders, and they will tell thee.
--Deuteronomy, 32:7

'

Father Edward Flannery (1965) commented in his introduction to The Anguish of the Jews that
Christians, even highly educated ones, are all but totally
ignorant of it--except for contemporary developments.
They are ignorant of it for the simple reason that antisemitism does not appear in their history books. Histories of the Middle Ages--and even of the Crusades--can
be found in which the word "Jew" does not appear, and
there are Catholic dictionaries and encyclopedias in
which the term "anti-Semitism" is not listed. (Introduc~ion, p. xi).
The present author, some twenty years later would
add that Jews as well (specifically the present young adult
generation) know little of the unfortunate circumstances which
have befallen their ancestors throughout recorded history.
Accordingly, a fixation, common among Jewish people today
is to focus almost exclusively on the Nazi-German holocaust
while bypas~ing

millennia of savage persecution.

In the

opinion of the author, this semi-obsessive perspective perpetuated repeatedly by Jewish organizations and institutions
1
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has inadvertently created an atmosphere of self-pity, helplessness and emotionally-directed behavior.

Its repetitive

nature may, in fact, become somewhat repulsive to the younger
generation of Jew and Gentile alike, whose perception of the
Jewish people is at variance with the depiction of the Jew
as a totally helpless and hopeless individual.

It is the

author's opinion that such shortsightedness is unable to
deal with the problem adequately, and needless to say, any
--

' ·• constructive plan of action following therefrom is doomed
to failure.

This is not to imply in the least that the

beastiality of the German people during World War II deserves
a respite from condemnation, but only that the attempted
genocide carried out by one of the most "civilized" nations
in the twentieth century was no more (albeit in an extreme
form) than the progression of an ongoing millennia old social
cancer.

Accordingly, it is the opinion of the author that

only through a broad historical analysis can anti-Jewish
hostility be properly understood.
The above is not to imply that there exists a dearth
of literature on the subject, but only that the information
is not widely known either in America or in Israel.

A further

and probably more serious problem concerns the type of historical analysis heretofore presented.

Since world War II

there have been several serious English works (e.g., Flannery,
1965; ~rosser

&

Halperin, 1978; and Ruether, 1979) which

have presented histories of anti-Jewish hostility with all
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its bloody consequences, but have done little more than to
delineate historical facts while concomitantly inciting horror
and indignation toward those responsible for carrying out
such atrocities.

Their intent in exposing such activity

was apparently in order to prevent further occurrences.
However, it is the author's opinion that their writings (as
conclusive works) are substantively inadequate for the following two reasons:

(1) anti-Jewish hostility has taken

various forms and has been perpetrated by considerably different ideological entities throughout hi story, and therefore
without a cohesive theory delineating a common underlying
cause, Jews may be too preoccupied searching out Nazis and
condemning Christianity today to effectively deal with the
contempozary threats facing Jewry, and

(2) criticism and

moral exhortations cannot be expected to change peoples'
attitudes and actions (regardless of the emotional sincerity
exhibited by the respective writer) but ironically may produce
further frustration in the potentially hostile non-Jewish
population which paradoxically could bring more Jewish suffering in its wake (the "blaming the victim" effect).
Correspondingly, the only seemingly constructive
way to deal with the problem is through logical and unambiguously directed activity based on solid theory and experience.
Unfortunately, the above writers have failed on both counts.
An

exc~ption

to the rule is Prager and Telushkin (1983) who

unlike the others have developed a theory which is histori-
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cally consistent, but in the opinion of the present author
is philosophically and psychologically shallow, and their
strategies to combat the malady appear unrealistic and possibly harmful.

For example, their historical-universal reason

for Jew-hatred is specifically Jewish (unlike other theorists
who postulate economic, social, psychological or political
explanations for the problem and whose theories may be superimposed on any distinctive ethnic or racial minority).

In

· ·' a word , their explanation is Judaism itself, but their exposition of Judaism's "threat" appears incomplete.

In fact

their primary social-psychological emphases may be interpreted
as bordering on the authors' own ethnocentric biases.

For

example, their claim that anti-Jewish hostility is in great
part because Jews have been better educated, less habitually
intoxicated, more charitable with one another, less prone
to crime, and have had a more stable family unit than their
non-Jewish neighbors is dubious, for these factors may be
more a result of anti-Jewish hostility than a direct cause
thereof.

In addition, their primary solution is that Jews

accept the challenge of spreading ethical monotheism to the
world (not

necessarily~to

convert but to teach).

Ironically,

the authors themselves express the contradiction that it is
"the ultimate cause of antisemitism (i.e., the perception
that Judaism stands for something more ethically lofty) which
must be fulfilled in order to end antisemitism" (p. 191)?1
It must also be mentioned that several social scien-
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tists have developed overall theories of anti-Jewish hostility
(as will be seen in Chapter III) but these theories are mostly
ahistorical in nature and cannot deal, on their unilevel of
analysis, with historical anti-Jewish hostility (i.e., their
theories are at best dubious when superimposed on various
cultures and times).

In contrast to these above types of

analyses and theories, the present author has attempted to
develop a theory, firmly rooted in history, which lends itself
· to empirical analysis and concrete strategies (for combating
this social malady) following therefrom.
In the present paper, the term anti-Jewish hostility
is used in lieu of the more commonly applied "anti-Semitism"
to denote antipathy toward the Jewish people.

This is because

the term anti-Semitism is a misnomer (Flannery, 1965).

The

word Semitism comes from the name Shem, who was Biblically
one of Noah~s three sons.

therefore, according to the Bible

(and assuming that all three sons were equally proli fie),
approximately one-third of the world's population today should
be inhabited by Shemites (or Semites).

In practice, anti-

semitism has been used exclusively to denote anti-Jewish
hostility, and directed against a people who account for
less than 1 percent of the total world population.

The term

anti-Semitism was originally coined in Germany in the 1870s
to purposely signify a "racial" enmity toward Jews in lieu
of the "dated" religious prejudice engendered in the past.
According~y,

if the term anti-Semitism was to be employed
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in the present study, the author would be implicitly furthering a myth rooted in anti-Jewish hostility.
In order not to lose the reader at this point (and
throughout the lengthy historical analysis which ensues) it
is important that the author spell out in the beginning the
direction and unorthodox approach taken in the forthcoming
analysis.

...

Prior analyses of historical anti-Jewish hostility

are in general theoretically monolithic, varying only in
their emphasis on detail and the particular era(s) of analysis.

The factual horror-stories told by these various

writers have aptly depicted the lowly state of humanity
throughout the ages, but have failed in describing the uniqueness of anti-Jewish hostility.

Their main topic is ostensibly

Jewish suffering, yet their emphasis focuses primarily on
the non-Jewish antagonists (i.e., their savagery).

These

writers do not appear interested in portraying anti-Jewish
hatred per se but rather the universal message of man's inhumane treatment of his fellow man.

Jews are seen as quali-

tatively replaceable by other persecuted minority groups
such as Blacks, Women, the American Indian, etc., and only
by virtue of the intensity and extensiveness of their suffering do they embody the most complete paradigm from which to
portray humanity's sadistic nature.

In other words, anti-

Jewish hostility is not considered different in kind from
other forms of group-hostility, and lessons to be derived
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are not and never intended to be specifically Jewish but
rather universal in content and application.
It is the opinion of the present author that it was
specifically this a priori intention of admonishing the world
(arbitrarily via the Jewish experience) which precluded the
analysis of anything exclusively Jewish.

In contrast, the

present author declares at the outset his disinterest in

...

detailing man's universal active enmity towards his fellow
man (a cursory reading of most contemporary newspapers would
illustrate the same), but rather to inquire into the unique
and specific nature of anti-Jewish hostility.

As predicted

(as will be seen in the following pages) by asking the question "What is fundamentally different about anti-Jewish hostility?" as opposed to the implicit question asked by most
writers which is "What has been the general state of prejudice
thro'ughout the ages?" the answers also turn out to be distinctly different.

Where other writers present a sad commen-

tary on humanity, in which Jews are 1 i ttle more than arbitrary
stimuli on whom frustration and contempt is heaped, the present analysis will attempt to interpret the anti-Jewish process
as something distinctively Jewish.

Where most other writers

attempt to derive universal lessons from history (which are
hoped will benefit all persecuted minority groups) the present
study attempts to derive Jewish specific lessons which may
serve universal ends (i.e., for both majority and minority
populations).

8

Aspect No. 1
Following from the above, it is little wonder why
writers fail to see the following unique aspects of antiJewish hostility.

The first aspect deals with Jewish longev-

ity and resilience.

Better put, the question is not why

Jews have been attacked so savagely throughout four millennia,
but rather how they continued to remain a distinct people

...

under the most unbearable and ironic of circumstances (and
most of the time in a foreign land).

All other peoples

throughout history have relinquished their national and/or
religious identity (when given the opportunity to do so) to
become one with the powerful majority population (small seclusive sects which have little to no interaction with the majority culture may be exceptions to this rule).

Only the Jewish

people amidst untold discrimination and persecution have
reta'ined their own language, religion, national consciousness,
and civil laws for over three thousand years, while simultaneously becoming an integral part of the larger society.
The question "why the Jews suffer?" is less than profound
for many minority groups throughout history have been targeted
scapegoats.

The present study, in contrast, asks how and

why the Jews have remained a separate people in spite of
the brutal consequences of being distinct?
Aspect No. 2
· A second aspect which differentiates the

per~ecution
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and discrimination of Jews from that of most other minority
groups (e.g., Blacks, Women, etc.), and is likewise overlooked
by historians and social scientists, is the differential
origins of discrimination

when it comes to Jews as opposed

to other minority groups.

Historically, most other minority

groups who have suffered never had a choice to do otherwise.
They were never given the choice to be assimilated as equals
into the majority culture. (For example, Blacks when taken

...

from Africa were not given the option to be like their white
Christi an or Arab Moslem captors or else accept slavery.
For them slavery was the only viable "option.")
In contrast, the Jews always had a chance to become
one with the majority.

In certain lands this opportunity

was abrogated (e.g., Nazi Germany) but even in these lands
the possibility of total assimilation had at one time
existed.

Not only had Jews the opportunity to totally assimi-

late, but they were quite often the primary focus of the
ruling power

(whether national or international) who went

to great lengths in their attempt to totally assimilate them.
It was always after-the-fact when Jews refused to totally
relinquish their identity did discrimination and persecution
follow in its wake.
Hence, by failing to

~istinguish

between the anti-

Jewish process and other anti-minority group processes we
are,

i~deed,

learning about the barbarous hi story of mankind,

but little concerning specific anti-Jewish activity.

In
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fact, by lumping the anti-Jewish process with others we are,
in effect, leading the serious student astray, and blocking
any understanding that the anti-Jewish phenomenon may be a
process quite different in kind from others..

In essence,

by failing to discriminate between the process of anti-Jewish
hostility and others, the historians and social scientists
are, at best, describing the symptoms (which may be portrayed
as universal in kind) while blatantly ignoring the differences
in origin (which may smack of particularism or even racism
to some "enlightened" Western thinkers).
Aspect No. 3
A third interesting and unique aspect which follows
from the first

(and therefore writers who do not speak of

the first aspect will inevitably fail to emphasize the third
aspect) concerns the particular form of Judaism which has
maintained itself throughout millennia.

Although through

history there have been several different forms of Judaism
(e.g., Sadducees, Nazarenes, Karaites, etc.), and in each
of their respective eras these groups have suffered as intensely as the one form of Judaism that has consistently
survived (i.e., Oral Law Judaism which has been called during
different eras Pharisaical Judaism and Orthodox Judaism) only
one group has consistently throughout the ages, in different
lands and cultures, kept the spark of Judaism alive.

Whereas

other Jewish groups throughout hi story have claimed to be
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the most modern, or truthful form of Judaism in whose destiny
it was to replace the "antiquated" or

"corrupt~

tradition, their claims were never actualized.

Oral-Law

When a par-

ticular epoch in hi story ended so did the various "adaptable" forms of Judaism.

The only group to survive through

every age and culture was

~he

group which claimed that its

detailed interpretation of the Bible (i.e., the Oral Law)
was, in addition to the Bible (i.e., the Five Books of Moses),
· handed down to Moses from G-d.

The other transient forms

of Judaism never claimed that their interpretation of Scripture was transmitted uninterruptedly from Moses to their
respective era, but claimed (in the negative) that the Oral
Law tradition (as embodied in the Talmud today) was man made.
The corollary of their claim was obvious, if the scholars
could make up their own intepretations, why should other
Jewish groups be prevented from doing the same.

Irrespective

of their claims, these so-called man-made interpretations
(i.e., the Oral Law) continued to lead the Jewish people in
every era and culture whereas the other movements' interpretations never survived past a cul tu re or two (as viable leg islation for the Jewish people to live by).
This point becomes all the more important when Jewish
continuity becomes an integral factor in interpreting the
anti-Jewish phenomenon.
someth~ng

It dispels the myth that there is

inherently super-tenacious or super-obstinate about

the Jewish people per se.

It shows that only the Jewish
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people following the Oral Law, which unlike all other minority
groups under the same circumstances, have astoundingly preserved their distinct identity.

This fact should not be taken

lightly for if one of the unique aspects of anti-Jewish hostility is specifically the longevity of the Jewish people,
and if this longevity is exclusively a function of Oral Law
tradition, then the serious student is obligated to investigate the sustaining force of the Oral Law (as embodied today
in the Talmud).

Needless to say most other writers who have

seriously investigated the anti ... Jewish phenomenon never seem
to discern the above relationship between anti-Jewish activity
and the Oral Law tradition.
Because the Oral Law tradition will be talked about
throughout the dissertation a short summary describing its
origins and legislation will be presented here.

The rationale

behind this short presentation is that although many people
are familiar with the Bible, the Oral Law interpretation of
it is little known among modern American Jewry, and even
less so in the non-Jewish world.
The Talmud (Gi ttin 60B) which is today the embodiment
of the Oral Law expresses the above thusly:

"the Holy One,

Blessed be He, did not establish His covenant with Israel
except by virtue of the Oral Law."

(Translation mine.)

Support for the claim that there was detailed legislation .given together with the Written Law (i.e., the Bible),
and more specifically the Five Books of Moses)

is that it
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is difficult, if not impossible, to make tangible-pragmatic
sense of the Written Law without an accompanying interpretation.

For example, there are many terms in the Bible which

are undefined, the term "work" in Sabbatical law (Exodus,
31:14) or the term "slaughtering" in the dietary laws of
Kosher (Deuteronomy, 12:21) are undefined and only via the
oral Law are these concepts elucidated in order that they
may be practically applied. In addition, there are basic
legal concepts and institutions, the existence of which is
'

assumed by the Bible, but which are not further explained.
For example, without previously specifying the formal institution of marriage and divorce, the Bible (Deuteronomy, 24:14) states that a husband cannot re-marry the wife he has divorced, if in the meantime she has been married to another
man.

Only via the Oral Law are Biblically assumed concepts

thoroughly defined.
A story is related in the Talmud (Shabbos, 31A) about
a non-Jew who approached the two leading Sages of the time
individually (Hillel and Shamai who were the heads of the
Jewish Supreme Court some 2,100 years ago) and inquired of
one "How many Divine bodies of legislation are there?"

He

(the Sage) replied, "two, the Written Law and the Oral Law."
The non-Jew retorted, "the Written Law I believe in but the
Oral Law I don't believe in, convert me on the condition
that I _accept only the Written Law," the non-Jew was immediately escorted out.

He then approached the other Sage and
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made the same request, the Sage immediately started teaching
him the Hebrew alphabet.

When the new convert returned the

next day he (the Sage)started teaching him the alphabet in
reverse order.

The convert exclaimed, "but yesterday you

taught me the opposi tel"

The Sage replied, "you see that

you must rely on me even on this, then rely upon me also with
respect to the Oral Law."

(I.e., there must be a certain

reliance upon authority before anything may be learned.)
The Oral Law (as its nam.e designates)

was passed

down orally from generation to generation by the leading
Sages and their Sanhedrin (i.e., the Jewish Supreme Court
comprising 71 of the greatest scholars of the generation),
and uninterruptedly disseminated to the Jewish people in
the Land of Israel and the Diaspora (Maimonides, 1972).
When the Roman empire prohibited the Sanhedrin from convening,
the ~ask of teaching and clarifying the Oral Law was placed
upon the various Sages and their educational institutions
(i.e., in their Yeshiva).

In light of the fact that there

was no longer any real central legislative authority in Israel
together with the ongoing persecution and dissemination of
the Jewish people throughout the Roman and Persian empires,
various versions of Oral Law legislation began to proliferate (this proliferation of opinions concerned only the
minute details of the Law, but in Jewish Law any deviation,
however small, was considered a deviation from the will of
G-d), and there was great fear that the true Law would soon
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be forgotten.

Although the law (Talmud, Gittin 60B) pro-

hibiting the public writing of the Oral Law had been in effect
for 1,400 years the need to put it down in writing became
irreversibly evident in the times of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (approximately 200 C.E.), so the Sages of the time decided that
in order to preserve .Oral Law legislation one of its laws
(i.e., the prohibition of publicly writing it down) had to
be uprooted.
The public redaction of the Oral Law which became
better known as the Talmud (i.e., comprising both the Mishna
and Gemara) began in the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi (218

c. E.) in the Land of Israel and was sealed in the form of
the Talmud Bavli in Babylonia (500 C. E.).

The Sages and

their students collected, sorted, and redacted the ocean of
literature known as the Oral Law tradition.

In light of

the fact that there were differences of opinion on many of
the laws, which was a direct outgrowth of the persecution
and dispersion during the Roman conquest, the Sages refused
to accept the responsibility of throwing out any authoritative
legislative opinion.

They therefore entered all the various

opinions into the Talmud.

These multiple opinions are usually

followed by heated dialectics, aimed at discerning the most
valid of the various opinions.

In addition to legislation

of Sinatic origins (i.e., Laws considered given to Moses by
G-d) . the Talmud is also replete with Rabbinic legislation
which are in most cases protectives, which guard against
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the transgression of Sinatic legislation.

People well versed

in the Talmud today are usually able to differentiate between
sinatic legislation and the many Rabbinic enactments.
The emphasis placed upon the spiritual quality of
oral Law teachers, and not merely on the quality of their
teaching is a distinctive feature of traditional Judaism
(Talmud Sukkah 28A).

It is also given as a reason for why

it was prohibited to write down the Oral Law (Sefer Ha'Ikarim,
· 1960).

The writing down of the law enables any scholar,

whatever his bias to present himself as an interpreter and
teacher of the Oral Law.

On the other hand, when the Law

is handed down orally it is unlikely that teaching would be
accepted from anyone whose character is not such as to make
his tradition reliable (Schimmel, 1971).

The Talmud itself

(Hagigah, lSB) states "If the teacher is similar to an angel
of G-d they should seek the Law from him and if not, they
should not seek the Law from him."

(Translation mine.)

It is the opinion of the present author that the
many Jewish groups which deviated from the Oral Law tradition
did not do so out of intellectual honesty, but rather out
of an emotional desire to be "free" (like the non-Jews who
are not obligated or expected to follow the demanding Jewish
Law), and only afterwards rationalized their deviation into
something seemingly positive. Accordingly, it becomes comprehensible why most of these Jewish groups accepted the Divinity
of the Written Law while negating that of the Oral Law.
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The written Law is general and ambiguous (i.e., when it comes
to the specification and application of the Laws) and can
be easily manipulated to fit the lifestyle of the manipulator.

The Oral Law in contrast, although dynamic in the

sense that it can and has been adaptable in every society
throughout history has concretely defined limits, and is
detailed enough to make it virtually impossible to accept

...

its Divine origins and still act according to one's impulses
and desires.
The present author believes that a true understanding
of anti-Jewish hostility is only possible when viewed historically.

Only by delineating common anti-Jewish themes

and objectives throughout history (in addition to those mentioned above) does the anti-Jewish phenomenon appear to take
on an unique identity of its own.

Therefore, in the following

pages a rather lengthy historical analysis will be presented
in an attempt to locate common themes and components of the
phenomenon.

In brief, the historical analysis is undertaken

with the intent of locating the primary cause of anti-Jewish
hostility.
Chapter II in the present manuscript deals with the
hypothesized secondary causes of anti-Jewish hostility which,
as will be seen, represent a phenomenological-historical
interpretation of the phenomenon.

Chapter III presents the

hypoth~sized tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility which

are posited as psychological in nature.

At the conclusion
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of each of the three chapters a general plan will be presented
for investigating empirically the hypotheses following from
each of the respective chapters.

v,

Chapters IV,

and VI

present the methodology, results, and discussion, respectively
of the dissertation's empirical investigation, and at the
conclusion of Chapter VI a theological perspective on the
origins of the problem will be discussed.
The Development of a Nation and Egyptian
Anti-Jewish Hostility

' t

The advent of the Jewish nation began with one man
Abraham the Ivri

(the Hebrew)

in the seventeenth century

B.C. E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973).

The Mid rash (Bereshet

rabbah) states that the word Ivri means "on the other side"
where the idol worshipping population at that time was figuratively on one side, and Abraham through his philosophical
genius and unflinching ethical behavior stood on the other.
Abraham suffered both persecution (Midrash:

Bereshet rabbah)

and exile (Genesis 12:1) because of his spiritual convictions.

He bequeathed his revolutionary philosophy and life-

style (with its concomitant responsibilities)

to his son

Isaac and sent Ishmael away at the urgings of his wife Sara
Which was afterwards justified by G-d Himself
21:12).

(Genesis

Isaac then passed the tradition along to the younger

of his two sons Jacob (whose name was later changed to Israel)
who th~n passed it down to his twelve sons who later became
the Twelve Tribes of Israel.

Because of sibling jealousy
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the sons of Jacob sold their brother Joseph into slavery in
which state he was brought down to Egypt (Genesis 37: 28).
Joseph miraculously became great in Egypt and eventually
attained the status of second in command (Genesis 41:43-44).
He also singlehandedly saved the people of Egypt and other
peoples from starvation and simultaneously procured for
Pharaoh enormous wealth (Genesis 47:14-26).

Because of the

famine, which had also swept the Land of Canaan at that time,
· ·' Jacob and his whole family came to Egypt where they were
reunited with Joseph.

Pharaoh, quite graciously, granted

to Jacob and his sons the best of Egypt, the fertile land of
Goshen (Genesis 47:6) to dwell in as free men.
In Egypt,
(Exodus 1:7)

Jacob's family grew by leaps and bounds

and within a relatively short period of time

developed into the Hebrew nation.

Within eighty years after

the Hebrews had entered Egypt with the passing of Joseph
and his brothers

(Miller, 1968), they began to adopt for

themselves several Egyptian customs
(Ezekiel 20: 5-7).

The Midrash

(i.e.,

(Tanch.uma)

to assimilate)

states that they

became ardent cosmopolitans, and that their presence was
felt at all great cultural events of the time.

Although

the Hebrews were rapidly assimilating into Egyptian society
(the most sophisticated society in the world at the time)
the Midrash (Mekilta; Pischa) relates two distinctive behaviors of the Hebrews which helped to prevent their

total

assimilation, (1) they retained their Hebrew names, and (2)
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they retained their Hebrew language.
Suddenly, the new ruler of Egypt seemed struck by a
sense of paranoia (a

comm~n

theme running throughout Jewish

history) , "Lest they multiply and endanger the land" (Exodus
1:10).

(Translation mine.)

In light of the fact that Egypt

was considered a progressive land of culture and orderly
rule a flagrant decree to subjugate the people of Joseph
(who had saved them from starvation) would have been a black
··mark against the progressive nature of its leaders (Hiller,
1968).

Therefore, Pharaoh and his advisors attempted an

alternative plan of action.
wisely with them"

Pharaoh said:

(Exodus 1:10).

"Let us deal

The Talmud (Sotah, llA)

relates that he began his scheme by appealing to the Hebrew's
patriotism by requesting their help in building his storehouse-cities.

The children of Israel fell into the trap,

and worked diligently (Hidrash rabbah) for the system which
Joseph had originally instituted (Genesis 41:35).

Gradually,

the Hebrew volunteers were pressed into service until they
found themselves unable to break loose.
To the dismay of Egypt, Israel began to increase in
proportion to the oppression (Exodus 1:12).

The Egyptian

Plan to uproot the Hebrew's stubborn national identity via
slavery proved unsuccessful.

The Hebrew tradition initiated

by Abraham and predicated on ethical monotheism with its
ultima~e

fulfillment realized only in the Land of Canaan

(i.e.,the land of Israel before the Jews arrived there as a
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nation) as promised to Abraham (Genesis 17:8), was too strong
a bond for even Egyptian bondage to sever.

Egypt then im-

plemented its second stage of attack, physical back-breaking
labor

(Exodus 1: 13).

If national identity could not be

totally obliterated through forced labor, then bone-crushing
demands were to be implemented in order to crush the spirit,
creating in effect, national misfits.

Apparently this second

stage of action was also unsuccessful for Pharaoh then com. manded the murder of all male infants at the time of delivery
(Exodus 1:16).

When the Hebrew midwives shrewdly refused

to carry out Pharaoh's command he openly decreed that every
newborn Hebrew boy was to be cast into the river
1:22).

(Exodus

Pharaoh's three-level strategy of oppression (1)

discrimination and subjugation,

(2) spirit crushing physi-

cal persecution, and (3) extermination was to be the prototype
for all subsequent anti-Jewish activity throughout history.
There are also other strong similarities between
Egyptian anti-Jewish hostility and those that followed.
Jews in Egypt were extraordinarily successful before their
oppression.

One of their founding fathers (Joseph) was second

only to Pharaoh (Genesis 41: 43-44)
·Egyptian populace (47:25).

and was revered by the

For instance, when Joseph's father

Jacob died, all of Egypt was in a state of mourning for
seventy days (50:3).

Pharoah himself, gave the Hebrews the

finest .land in Egypt, and offered them positions of prestige
(Genesis 47:6).

For the first eighty years of their sojourn
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in Egypt the Hebrews were successful and prosperous and only
afterwards were they bitterly oppressed.

In other lands

too, Jews would always succeed (when given the opportunity)
only to be oppressed in the end.
If the Hebrews would have completely assimilated
into Egyptian society (as small groups, who are given the
opportunity, consistently do in every great culture or society), or had they not been so successful, the Egyptian oppression would probably have been greatly attenuated or may
never have occurred.

The threat of a distinctly success-

ful and dynamic non-Egyptian population burgeoning in the
midst of Egypt (the cultural center of the world) was ostensibly the cause of Pharaoh paranoia, for there is no intimation from any historical source that the Hebrews were any less
loyal to the ruling Egyptian government than their indigenous
Egyptian counterparts.

As will be seen, this common theme

characterized by a successful entry into mainstream society
without a concomitant complete disassociation from anything
distinctively Jewish has proved overwhelmingly threatening
to many of the Jews' non-Jewish hosts throughout history.
It is also important to repeat the distinction between
Jewish oppression and most other types of minority group
oppression as mentioned above.

As discussed above other

targeted minority groups throughout history were commonly
thought of as inferior and were therefore discriminated
against.

The Jews, in contrast, were always prime targets

23

for assimilation and only after they remained "stif £-necked"
and refused to totally comply did discrimination and persecution follow.

What began as a self-imposed desire to be sepa-

rate but equal turned into a universally accepted antipathy
toward Jews.

Following therefrom, it is not difficult to

understand why .the persecution of Jewish populations throughout history has transcended in scope and intensity the persecution of other minority groups.
.'

Another common theme which pervades Jewish history
is that the people of Israel's chief antagonists (e.g., Egypt,
Assyria, Babylonia, Greece, Rome, etc.), after having ventilated their wrath, were eventually always conquered by yet
another up and coming national power.

Most of these oppres-

sive powers retained their identity only through the annals
of history, and others retained some semblence of identity
while becoming virtually impotent internationally, but none
ever reclaimed its former political status in world affairs.
Ironically the only nation (i.e., the Jewish nation) which
has ever risen to become a key player on the international
scene repeatedly throughout millennia (usually without even
living in its own land) is the very nation the great powers
of the world have so assiduously attempted to destroy.
Again, ancient Egypt can be seen as the prototype
for the above theme.
sidera~le

After the Egyptians had wreaked con-

suffering on the Hebrews, the ten plagues befell

Egypt where all water turned to blood (Exodus 7:20), a plague
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of frogs invaded their homes (Exodus 8:2), lice overran the
land (Exodus 8:13), and a mixture of fierce beasts ravaged
the country (Exodus 8:20).

After that, pestilence destroyed

the livestock (Exodus 9:6), sores broke out pervasively on
men and animals alike (Exodus 9:10), a hail of terrible violence descended upon the land (Exodus 9: 23), clouds of locusts
came in as never before witnessed (Exodus 10:14), an intense
tangible darkness covered the land for three days

(Exodus

10:22), and finally every first-born Egyptian man and animal
in the land perished in one night (Exodus 12: 29).

Three

days after the Hebrew exodus, the Egyptians pursued them
and in consequence were drowned in the Red Sea (Exodus 14:
27).

Egypt was ruined, for five hundred years until the

days of Solomon Egypt was not heard from (Miller, 1965),
and it played no critical part in the history of nations
thereafter.
Before moving chronologically onward the historicity
of the above event demands intellectual affirmation for many
scholars in both the physical and social sciences alike,
tend to ignore religious sources, as if science and religion
(in any form) are mutually exclusive.

This rule is usually

accepted as gospel (or perhaps more appropriately termed
the dogma of scientism, as not to be confused with the scientific method) in academia and perforce precludes any viable
integr~tion of the two.

The above phenomenon is a poignant

case-in-point of how this seemingly provincial perspective
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of scientism may create an impasse in understanding the
"world's greatest hatred."

According to the above analysis,

to omit the episode in Egypt because it is based on Biblical
and Talmudic sources would

b~

to omit the prototype for all

subsequent discrimination and persecution directed against
the Jewish people.

This type of thinking is so prevalent,

that despite the fact that the historicity of Egyptian persecution has never been disproven by nonbiblical sources (Prager
··'et al., 1983), the present author has not found one secular
source on anti-Jewish hostility which gives more than a paragraph (in passing) to the happening in Egypt.
The lack of direct Egyptian documentation does not
disprove the persecution and subsequent miraculous emancipation from Egypt, for both democratic and particularly totalitarian governments have been known to historically emphasize
(or invent) their "glorious" past and to minimize (or negate)
embarrassing or incriminating events.

For instance, after

World War II despite the vast pictorial and eyewitness evidence, the testimony of tens of thousands of survivors, and
the confessions of thousands of perpetrators, dozens of books
and articles have and continue to be published which, deny
the Holocaust (Prager et al., 1983; Cawley, 1985).
This lack of perspective when dealing with anti-Jewish
Phenomena becomes all the more salient when one remembers
that both traditional Christianity and Islam have never contested the above events in Egypt (with its subsequent culmina-
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tion at the mountain of Sinai).

On the contrary, both tra-

ditional Christianity and Islam are wholly dependent on the
historical veracity of the above phenomenon, and invoke it
as one of the most convincing proofs of the existence of
G-d and His relationship to the social world of men and
women.

These religions taken together embrace over a billion

people representing the majority of what we call today the
"civilized world"

(Cohen, 1984).

Without this historical

" foundation all three religions turn into human fabrications,
or as Karl Marx, the "great emancipator" put it "the opiate
of the masses."
The episode in Egypt when viewed objectively appears
to satisfy most (if not all) of the criteria needed to validate an authentic historical event.

An event claimed attested

to by some six hundred thousand adult men (Numbers 2: 32),
in addition to women, children, and the aged which changed
the way of life of a nation and eventually of the whole world
would seem impossible to smuggle into the annals of history
for all time.

Similarly, we accept as fact that there was

a king called Alexander the Great or a Roman legislator called
Cicero because it is almost impossible to introduce fictitious
public figures or mass events into recorded history.

This

logic is corroborated by the fact that the people who witnessed the miraculous events were not members of a primitive
servil~-type

tribe, but rather a stiff-necked individualized

type people.

In fact there are many accounts in the Bible
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(e.g., Exodus 16:3; 17:1; Numbers 14:22) of the Hebrews'
contentious attitudes and rebellious actions.

However, among

all the Israelites' varied criticism10 and skepticism there
is never a question concerning the authenticity of the events
in Egypt, which is frequently referred to in the Pentateuch
(e.g., Exodus 6:6, 20:2; Deuteronomy 5:6).
Further corroboration for the above event is its
highly unflattering description of how the Jewish nation
·' developed.

A nationally proclaimed hi story claiming to have

evolved via slavery is not to be easily dismissed.

Based

on the psychology of political entities which tend to exaggerate their past in the opposite positive direction, the
history of the Jewish people based on the Bible is to be
seriously considered.

A further support (as mentioned above)

is that immediately after the recorded Exodus from Egypt,
the ·great Egyptian culture and society came to an abrupt
halt, and was not to be heard from until some several hundred
years later (Miller, 1968).
A major reason why historians are reluctant to deal
with Biblical history in any depth may be a consequence of
the pseudo-science known as Biblical criticism, which was
introduced in Germany in the early nineteenth century.

In

brief, this criticism denies the historical accuracy of the
Bible and claims multiple authorship at various stages in
histor~.

Their criticism, in most part was based on the

Hegelian thesis that civilization had advanced from the prim-
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i tive stage, and as it moved westward advanced to a higher
stage until it reached its apex in Hegel's Germanic Culture.
Accordingly, Israel's Bible and her hi story were reconstructed
to fit this chauvinistic mold.

Everything was neatly arranged

I

in logical progression, and the religion of Israel was depicted having developed gradually from a primitive idolatry
to the advanced monotheism of the prophetic period (Feldman,

..

1965).
'

Unfortunately for these scholars, their elaborate
intellectual edifice was crumbling as quickly as it was being
built.

The first telltale sign came in 1887 when the Tel

El Amarna letters were discovered.

The letters revealed

a well-developed culture in the ancient Middle East as early
as the fourteenth century B.C.E.

It portrayed a world quite

advanced in intellect, commerce, trade and diplomacy, and
demonstrated that Israel's history (originating with the
Jewish Patriarchs) began long before the times of Moses (Feldman, 1965).

Since then, the maturing science of Biblical

archaeology with its base in Israel has made literally hundreds of discoveries which corroborate the times and happenings cited in the Bible (e.g., Keller, 1956; Negev, 1972).
In addition to these atheoretical archeological discoveries which substantively upset the philosophical basis
of Biblical criticism, Universities in Israel have attempted
over th.e last several years to examine the literary foundation
of Biblical criticism.

The entire book of Genesis ·(in its
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original Hebrew form) was put into a computer, and based on
grammatic, textual, and overall literary form the computer
concluded

(contrary to Biblical criticism)

that the book

was most probably put together by a single author (Spiegler, 1982) •
In spite of the evidence suggesting the contrary,
the "established conclusions" of Biblical Criticism have
become part of the intellectual baggage acquired by the aver... age college graduate (Kapustiri, 1978).
modern scholar

(G. Mendenhall)

Paradoxically, as one

has pointed out concerning

the liberal adherents of Biblical criticism that "it is at
least a justified suspicion that a scholarly piety toward
the past, rather than historical evidence, is the main foundation for their position" (Kapustin, 1978, p. 438).
A final reason why many social scientists may shy
away' from Biblical support is that secular academia, predicated on the ideals and objectives of the Englightenment,
represents in its original form a severance from the dogmatism
of organized religion.

Although a severance seemed to be

in order in 1 ight of the many barbarous activities legitimized
in the name of G-d, an academia (based on the scientific
method) ostensibly seeking truth which blatantly avoids the
psychological, social, political, and historical ramifications
of a religious perspective is itself dogmatically ignoring
the most powerful social phenomenon known to man.

Accord-

ingly, the historian's avoidance of the Biblical account in
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ancient Egypt, in its relationship to subsequent anti-Jewish
activity seems to poignantly reflect this bias.

Ironically,

despite historians' passing gesture to it, very few historical
facts have as much logical and empirical support as does
the Jewish experience in ancient Egypt.

The event in Egypt

is seen as representing the prototype for all successive
anti-Jewish oppression which implies a common theme throughout

...

history (something that other historians or social scientists
have seemingly never been able or willing to locate).
Most historians and social scientists when evaluating
anti-Jewish prejudice skip over the following 750 years (from
approximately 1290-540 B.C.E.) of history following the
Israelite exodus from Egypt to the Jewish sojourn in Persia.
The most probable explanation is that during this time period
the Hebrew nation was an independent nation with its own
government, religion, and land.

It therefore, not unlike

other political entities fought numerous wars, conquered
and was conquered, and was eventually expelled from the land.
At a superficial level this course of events has nothing to
do with anti-Jewish hostility, which in its classic form portrays a virtually helpless but distinctive minority group
residing among (or adjacent to) the non-Jewish majority population.

This superficial description appears inadequate for

reasons to be discussed later (see Discussion, Chapter VI),
but suffice it to say that according to this paradigm the
Present Communist and Arab-world gang-up on the state of
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Israel would not be considered a variant form of anti-Jewish
hostility.
Before proceeding to the more classical forms of
anti-Jewish hostility it is important to mention two historical facts whose relevance to the understanding of this phenomenon will hopefully become clearer further on.

One, the

many nations or tribes which warred against Israel during
this 750 year period (e.g., Amalelites, Cannanites, Philis.. tines, Assyrians, Babylonians, etc.) have all been lost to
oblivion.

There is no group of people today (or for that

matter over the last 1,400 years) who can definitively claim
descent from these tribes and nations, and needless to say
their religious, governmental, and political institutions
are, at best, kept alive in the historical annals of antiquity.

Two, at approximately 928 B.C.E. (Encyclopaedia Ju-

daica, 1973) the Jewish Kingdom was severed.

The northern

Kingdom was called Israel (and comprised ten of the twelve
tribes of Israel), and the southern Kingdom was called Judah.
Between 722-720 B.C.E.

(Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973) the

northern Kingdom (Israel) was conquered by the powerful Assyrian nation, and its people were deported en masse to various regions of the Assyrian empire.

These Israelites of

the northern Kingdom descended from the same ancestors, and
had the same historical tradition as their brothers in Judah,
and ye~ after their expulsion were lost to antiquity (via
assimilation like their ancient international counterparts
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as discussed above).

This point becomes all the more impor-

tant when discussing Judah's (i.e., the two remaining tribes
together with the priestly tribe of Levi)

staying power

throughout millennia amidst tremendously adverse conditions.
Persian Anti-Jewish Hostility
The land of Judah was eventually captured by the
great Babylonian empire, and with the destruction of the
Temple in Jerusalem in 5 86 B. c. E.
1973)

(Encyclopaedia Judaica,

the remaining Israelites were deported en masse to

Babylonia.

This group of Jewish people (unlike their northern

counterparts) did not totally assimilate
society.

into Babylonian

Even after the mighty empire of Babylon fell to

the Media-Persia empire, the conquered Jews living in the
conquered land remained voluntarily distinct.
imp~sed

This self-

distinctiveness almost brought upon them a genocide

more heinous than the one originally attempted in Egypt.
This voluntary distinctiveness was used against them
by the

infamous Persian prime minister Haman.

In short,

Haman claimed that the Jews refused to adopt the ways of
the empire, and were undermining the king's authority, and
therefore needed to be utterly destroyed

(Ester 3: 8-9).

The Talmud (Megillah llA) relates the King's favorable predisposition to Haman's plan, and consequently an official
edict was declared concerning
3: 12-1"3).

The Bible

(Ester 3: 5)

its implementation (Ester
also reveals the reason
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for Haman's unbridled hostility.

Mordecai, the leader of

the Jews at the time, refused to bow down to Haman who wore
an idol around his neck.

Mordecai's obstinacy tore Haman

apart internally (Ester 3:5, 5:13), and attempted genocide
was the logical consequence.

Fortunately for the Jews,

Haman's pl an backfired (see Biblical Book of Esther) and
following his demise Mordecai the Jew succeeded him as prime
minister of the Persian empire (Ester 10:3) •

.. ·'

As in Egypt the Jews' refusal to be totally subjugated
like the other subjects of the empire infuriated the ruling
power.

When attempts to break the Jewish spirit by estranging

them from their traditions (Midrash; Yalkut Shemoni) proved
unsuccessful, the only recourse left for these tyrants (or
m'ore appropriately, these self-proclaimed deities) was to
annihilate the Jewish collective body.

Consequently, the

Jewish people continued to persevere in their already "antiquated" traditions, and in their relationship to the Land
promised them forever by G-d (Genesis, 17: 8; Exodus, 6: 8;
Jeremiah, 7: 7; Ezekiel, 28:25).

In contrast, the Persian

empire was totally dissolved along with its indigenous type
of religion(s), form of government, and societal mores.
Greek Anti-Jewish Hostility
After the seventy year Babylonian-Persian exile the
Jews were permitted to return to their land and build their
Temple· once again.

In 332 B.C. E. (Encyclopaedia Judaica,
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1973), Alexander (the Great) of Macedonia with his 40,000
soldiers attacked and defeated the larger Persian army, and
conquered much of the land previously governed by Persia
including the land of Israel.

Alexander showed favor to

the Jews allowing them to continue their autonomous rule in
the land, and even extended their borders, adding to it three
zones that had previously belonged to the Samaritans under

. ..

Persian rule (Scherman & Zlotowitz, 1982) •
Alexander's ambitions were cultural as well as military.

He expected that the various segments of his newly

founded Macedonian empire would mingle and evolve a common
civilization and way of life, modeled after the highly progressive Hellenic culture.

The dissemination and influence

of the Hellenic spirit brought in its wake libraries, scientific research, and technological advancement (Mason,
1968).

Unfortunately, as time went by this progressive spirit

degenerated into an intensification of idol worship with
its usual concomitant corruption of morals (Scherman et al.,
1982).
For 150 years Greek civilization and Jewish culture
(based on the Oral Law) were able to coexist, but with the
advent of Antiochus IV (175 B.C.E.)
badly strained.

the relationship became

Antiochus IV believed himself to be divine,

and ordered all people under his rule to erect statues of
him i~ their temples, and to prostrate themselves before
his image.

He physically imposed Hellenic culture, and would
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not tolerate the Jewish unwillingness to become Hellenized.
consequently, he gave orders that Judaism must be destroyed
(Grayzel, 1968).

He called for the cessation of sacrificial

service in the Temple, and in its place temples were to be
set up everywhere where hogs and other non-suitable animals
were to be sacrificed.

He also commanded that the Jewish

Temple in Jerusalem be converted into a pagan temple (Miller,
1968).

The observance of the Sabbath and Festivals, the

·"dietary laws, circumcision, the laws of family purity, and
others were singled out for prohibiton.

All copies of the

Torah were to be burned and anyone found possessing these
books would be executed.

Even to profess one's Jewishness

was punishable by death (Scherman et al., 1982).
This form of anti-Jewish oppression was distinctly
different from the attempted Persian genocide.

In Persia

the ,Jewish body was to be annihilated, while under Greek
rule the Jewish spirit was to be dismembered.

Nevertheless,

according to the Egyptian archetype both Persian and Greek
forms of anti-Jewish hostility follow a common pattern.
The pattern begins with an innocuous attempt to foster total
Jewish assimilation into the majority culture.

When Jewish

separatism obstinately continues (in some manner or form)
the Jewish lifestyle and/or presence is seen as a competitive
threat and relentlessly attacked.

Accordingly, both the Per-

sian and Greek empires (like their predecessor in Egypt)
enacted unbearably harsh legislation in their attempt to
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deal with this Jewish "backward" type of philosophy and lifestyle which was said to be "contaminating" the "progressively
minded" majority population.

And both forms of oppression

(i.e., of body and of spirit) were used in Egypt some one
thousand years prior.
Antiochus (like his predecessor) did not succeed in
uprooting the Jewish spirit or collective body.

Mattisyahu

the Hasmonean, with his five sons led a relatively small
·· group of militarily undisciplined zealots against the vastly
superior Syrian-Greek army and miraculously prevailed
(Josephus, 1970).

(This victory in behalf of the Jewish

spirit is celebrated today and better known as Chanukah.)
Roman Anti-Jewish Hostility
During the next hundred years the Land of Israel
(better known as Judea) was ruled by an independent Jewish
government (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973), but the Roman Eagle
was concurrently conquering the already severed Greecian
empire

(Josephus, 1970).

In 63 B.C.E. the Roman general

Pompey was invited, by the Jews of Judea, to intervene in a
civil war that was taking place among the Jews themselves.
Unfortunately for the Jews, Pompey did not leave after helping
to quell the internal strife, but ended up conquering the
land in a battle which exacted tens of thousands of Jewish
lives

(Scherman et al.,

1982).

Once again the sovereign

state of Judea was reduced to an autonomous vassal state,
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but this time under the auspices of the mighty Roman empire
(Josephus, 1970).

Theoretically, the Jewish people should

have been able to live peaceably under Roman rule, despite
economic hardships and loss of national self respect, as
they did for a time under both Persian and Greek rule (Scherman et al., 1982).

Although possible, it did not work out

that way for the spirit of unity and independence was a constant irritation to the Roman proconsuls governing Judea
(Scherman et al., 1982).

Rome made many attempts to fully

integrate Judea into its vast empire, but each attempt to
erase Jewish national identity was countered by a stronger
Jewish resistance.
When Rome realized that Jewish separatism (i.e.,
national identity) was not to be easily uprooted via peaceful
methods other more forceful tactics were implemented. Following therefrom, the Roman proconsul Gabinus decided to abolish
the spiritual core of the land which was the Sanhedrin (i.e.,
the Jewish Supreme Court).

He reasoned that by stripping

the Court of all its powers the people would be lost, and
would consequently become as docile and submissive as other
conquered nations under Roman jurisdiction (Scherman et al.,
1982).

This strategy was unsuccessful for the driving force

Of Judaism (i.e., the Oral Law tradition) which propelled
and directed the High Court was continually being propagated
by the_ scholars

(i.e., the Pharisees), and was still the

lifeblood for most of the people.
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The years between 60 B.C.E, to 70 C.E. proved a perilous period for the Jewish nation.

The Romans were unrelent-

ing in their efforts to subjugate toe minds and bodies of
the people under their dominion, and the Jewish nation proved
equally as obstinate in their refusal to be completely taken
over.

This set the stage for many brutal battles between the

two nations in which literally hundreds of thousands of Jews
were slaughtered (Encyclopaedia Judica, 1973), and reached
· • its climax in the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem (70

c. E.)

•

In addition to the slain, many more were taken captive

before the Jerusalem siege.

Tens of thousands were sold

into slavery, sent to toil in ships and mines, or presented
as gifts to non-Jewish cities adjacent to Judea to fight
against wild animals in their amphitheatres.

Cities and

villages were burnt and destroyed either in the course of
,the war or afterwards as acts of revenge and intimidation
(Encyclopeadia Judaica, 1972).

The tortures inflicted on

the Jews in order to compel them to transgress their Oral
Law tradition reached an apex of barbarity (Josephus, 1970).
Not contented with the above destruction the Romans searched
out the Jewish families said to be descended from the house

Of David in order to eradicate the last remnant of hope for
the restoration of the Davidic Kingdom (Scherman et al.,
1982).
As uncanny as it may seem, the Jews al ready protacted
appearance in the annals of history was far from over.

Al-
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though several Jewish sects which had broken from the Oral
Law tradition had been abandoned, the scholars were busily
rebuilding the Jewish nation.

Their revived communal life

was reconstructed outside of Jerusalem in Yavneh.

Unfortu-

nately again for the Romans, the scholars reawakened the
people's national spirit as well.

During the ensuing sixty

years (70 C.E. to 130 C.E.) Jews started buying up and cultivating the land of Judea once again.

They flocked once again

to Jerusalem in the hope of rebuilding the Temple under the
jurisdiction of Hadrian the Roman emperor. However, within
a relatively short period of time Hadrian abandoned his plan
of rebuilding Jerusalem as a Jewish city, and instead decided
to continue its construction as a pagan Roman city (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973).
Within that sixty year interval the Jewish people
had consolidated their resources and under Simeon bar Kosiba
succeeded in liberating the whole of Judea, which for a very
short three year period came under independent Jewish rule
(Encyclopaedia Judaica, 1973).

But, once again the Roman

empire prevailed destroying 985 of Judea's most important
settlements.

Hundreds of thousands of Jews were once again

killed and according to the Talmud on the ninth of Av (the
summer of 135 C.E.), the anniversary of the destruction of
both the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem, the last
strong~old

(Bethar) was captured (Ta' ani th 26B).

The Romans,

determined not to make the same mistake, massacred large popu-

40
lations, laid the land waste, sent great numbers of Jews
off to slave markets, and under Hadrian launched an all-out
war against the study and observance of Jewish law.

Jews

were forbidden to live in Jerusalem, and in order to blot
out all reference of the Jews' relationship to the Land of
Israel (Judea), changed its name to Syria Palaestina.
The Roman empire eventually faded from history and
its indigenous and conquered populations adopted (or were
forced to adopt) new political leadership fostering foreign
ideologies, novel individual and group mores, and untried
innovative religions.

Ironically, its fierce little opponent,

the people of Israel, continued as before (and even flourished
in an intellectual, spiritual, and communal sense) as a distinct civilization based exclusively on the Oral Law.

An-

other, almost miraculous, phenomenon is that the Land of
Israel

(Syria Palaestina) after being laid waste by Rome

was to remain neglected for the next l, 750 years (despite
Arab propaganda to the contrary) , was never to become a sovereign or even autonomous separate political entity (until
the creation of the modern State of Israel in 1948), and
continued to be the lifeblood (together with the Bible and
Talmud) of the Jewish people throughout its 1,800 year sojourn
in the Diaspora.
A descriptive example to support the above point comes
from M~rk Twain in his The Innocents Abroad, who after visiting Palestine in 1867 described it as:
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• • • [a] desolate country whose soil is rich enough,
but is given over wholly to weeds--a silent mournful
expanse • • • • A desolation is here that not even imagination can gr ace with the pomp of 1 i fe and action. • • • We
never saw a human being on the whole route • • • • There
was hardly a tree or a shrub anywhere. Even the olive
and the cactus, those fast friends of a worthless soil,
had almost deserted the country.
(Davis, 1984, p. 10)
Another example comes from a Report of the Palestine
Royal Commission which quotes an account of the Palestine
Maritime Plain of 1913:
The road leading from Gaza to the north was only a summer
track suitable for transport by camels and carts • • • no
orange groves, orchards, or vineyards were to be seen
until one reached Yabna village. • • • Houses were all
of mud • • • • The sanitary conditions in the village
were horrible. Schools did not exist • • • • The western
part, towards the sea, was almost a desert • • • • Many
ruins of villages were scattered over the area, as owing
to the prevalence of malaria, many villages were deserted
by their inhabitants.
(Davis, 1984, p. 10)
The British Government's Director of Development,
Louis French, wrote in 1931 concerning the Arab inhabitants
of Palestine:
We found it inhabited by Fellahin who lived in mud hovels
and suffered severely from the prevalent malaria • • • •
Large areas • • • were uncultivated • • • • The Fellahin,
if not themselves cattle thieves, were always ready to
harbor these and other criminals. The individual plots
• • • changed hands annually. There was little public
security, and the Fellahins lot was an alternation of
pillage and blackmail by their neighbors, the Bedouin.
(Davis, 1984, p. 10)
In short, in almost supernatural terms, the flowering and
populating of the land took place before the Jews were expel led en masse, and its regeneration occu'rred only with
the massive return of the Jews to the region in the twentieth
century.
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Although Jewish suffering at the hands of Rome was
much more intense than the oppression meted out by the other
previous empires, Roman persecution does not deviate in kind
from the Egyptian anti-Jewish paradigm discussed above.
The irrepressible desire to mold the Jewish people to be
and act like the ruling power became the catalyst for oppression aimed at destroying the Jewish national identity and
the unique Jewish spirit.

Despite the fact that hundreds

• ·· of thousands of Jews were slain in battle or savagely massacred, Rome's objective never seemed to be the eradication
of the Jewish collective body.

Rather, these methods were

used exclusively as a means to break the distinctive Jewish
national identity and spirit.
For the next 1,800 years (i.e., from 135 C.E. to
the establishment of the modern Jewish state in 1948) Jews,
together with their Oral Law traditions wandered, literally,
around the world.

Jewish wandering was usually precipitated

by fierce spiritual and physical persecution or by forced
expulsion.

A partial understanding of the Jewish 1,800 year

exile is reflected in the many lands from which they were
expelled in light of their refusal to totally assimilate.
In the third century (C.E.) they were expelled from
Carthage (North Africa), in the fifth century from Alexandria
(Egypt) ,in the sixth from provinces in France, and in the
sevent~

from the Visigothic empire.

In the ninth century

they were expelled from Italy, in the eleventh from Mayence

43

(Germany), in the twelfth from France, the thirteenth from
England, the fourteenth from France, Switzerland, Hungary,
Germany, and in the fifteenth from Austria, Spain, Lithuania,
Portugal, and Germany.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries Jewish populations were expelled from Bohemia,
Austria, Papal States, the Netherlands, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Oran (North Africa).

In the eighteenth and nine-

teenth centuries they were expelled from Russia, Warsaw
· · (Poland), and Galatz (Romania).

In the twentieth century

all Jews living in Nazi-controlled areas were relocated as
a step to, Hitler's Final Solution, and in 1948, in order
to escape severe anti-Jewish persecution, hundreds of thousands of Jews escaped with their lives (while leaving their
possessions behind) from the lands of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria,
and Iraq (Grosser et al., 1978).
Christian Anti-Jewish Hostility
The next epoch of anti-Jewish hostility which lasted
for approximately 1, 500 years (from approximately 400 C. E. to
1900) was probably the most unfortunate and unforgettable
oppression the Jews had experienced heretofore.

Unfortunate,

because the non-Jewish world never had a chance to objectively
study and learn from the psychological, sociological, and
Philosophical systems embodied in the Oral Law tradition
(the Talmud).

Unforgettable, because the group perpetrating

this oppression was a direct outgrowth of Judaism itself,
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and when all the auxillary manifestations (which came about
only after the foundations were set)

are removed, may be

justifiably called a form of Judaism not too distinct from
other historical Jewish groups who had broken with the Oral
Law tradition (the main difference was that the other groups
died out whereas Christianity became a non-Jewish religion).
This new form of religion (i.e., Christianity) centers
in the person of Jesus Christ.
·'Christian but a Jew.

Jesus, however, was not a

It appears historically that Jesus

had no intention of breaking with Judaism· and that he would
have been profoundly shocked to know that his works and teachings would become the basis for rejecting Judaism (Lamprecht,
1955).

Being that Christianity in its Pauline form is based

on the spirit of the Jewish Law while rejecting the letter
of the Law, the remarks in Mathew 5:17-18 would not have
spuriously been attributed to Jesus if they were not true:
Think not that I am come to destroy the Law, or the
prophets:
I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill.
For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass,
one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the
Law, till all be fulfilled.
Any orthodox Jew of today following the precepts of
Oral Law Judaism would feel right at home with the above
statements.

There is no doubt that Jesus did break with

the Sages in his interpretation of the fundamental significance of the Law, but he was at best a revolutionary force
Within, not against, Judaism.
Matthew 15: 24:

This is seen, clearly,

in

"I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the
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house of Israel [i.e., as their Messiah]."

Similarly the

Apostles, the group of disciples chosen by Christ to preach
his Gospel were Jewish and their message (in the beginning
at least)

was directed exclusively at the Jewish people.

only after the great majority of Jews, led by the scholars,
refused to accept their brand of Judaism did they then preach
to the non-Jewish Roman population.

Other movements in Juda-

ism had sprung up over the centuries (particularly during
" the great Roman persecutions which were right before and
after the destruction of the Temple) , but none had succeeded
in swaying Jewish popular opinion (for any lengths of time)
from the Oral Law tradition as communicated and passed down
by the scholars in each generation.
The Jewish Christian movement, unlike the others,
when confronted with Jewish mainstream resistance turned to
the non-Jews, but their relationship to Judaism was still
far from severed.

The Founding Fathers of Christianity (i.e.,

the Apostles) were split on the desired relationship to Oral
Law Judaism, and two schools of thought (i.e., the Petrine
and Pauline doctrines) hotly competed to become the official
dogma of the up and coming Catholic Church (Ruether, 1979;
Gager, 1983).

The accepted argument is that the Petr ine

(as advanced by Peter) school of thought rigorously advocated
a Judaized Christianity where both Jew and Gentile would be
Obligated to observe the Law, whereas the Pauline doctrine,
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which eventually prevailed, called for a complete abrogation
of the Law.
Al though this has been the accepted argument for
millennia it has recently been called into question by John
G. Gager

(1983) who brings strong support to justify his

claim that the Pauline doctrine of Christianity had been
considerably doctored by later Church Fathers, who desirous
to wean the people from any Judaizing influence recreated a
·· Paul totally antagonistic to Pharisaical (Oral Law) Judaism.
Gager concludes that Paul's real intent was to propagate
the message of Torah (based on the Oral Law) for Jews and
Christ for Gentiles, but that the consequence of any positive
Judaizing effect on the new burgeoning religion was too
threatening for the later church fathers to handle, and demanded to be wiped out in-toto.
The importance of the above cannot be over-estimated
for it expresses the in extricable relationship of Christianity
in its pure form via both the Petr ine and. Pauline schools
of thought to mainstream (Oral Law) Judaism.

The difference

being that this new sect of Jews (and only later Gentiles)
believed that Jesus was the Messiah, and although they did
make inroads among Jews, the great majority refused to accept
Jesus as the Messiah.

According to Gager both Petrine and

Pauline doctrines, which lay at the foundation of true Christianit_y as propagated by Jesus and his Apostles are not inherently anti-Jewish, but ironically philo-Jewish in their
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relationship to Jewish Law (Peter) and benevolently tolerant
of the Pharasaic Oral Law system (Paul).

It was only after

the Apostles, when Christianity in the second and third centuries began to sev'er itself completely from Judaism did
total intolerance of Judaism and the Jewish people begin
(Flannery, 1965; Gager, 1983).

The early Church Fathers (as

distinct from the Petrine and Pauline doctrines) while trying
to consolidate Christianity and formulate one official church
··'dogma, viewed the Judaizing influence in Christianity

(as

fostered by Christians not Jews) as an intolerable competitive
threat.

This was especially true all the while a viable

Jewish people following their own traditions existed (Flannery, 1965).

To uproot the Jewish tradition from Christianity

meant to uproot Christianity, but to accept it as legitimate
meant to shed doubt on the Church's role as the new Israel.
The only alternative was to claim that the Church had. replaced
the old Israel because of the latter's "grievous sins," and
particularly the abomination of Deicide (Flannery, 1965).
Only through conversion could Jews redeem themselves in this
world and the next.

It appears that it was this total sev-

erance of Christianity from Judaism which eventually supplied
the justification for the ensuing discrimination, persecution,
and massacre of Jews in the name of Christianity.
Before proceeding further, it is important to briefly
•

note Judaism's view of Christianity for the point is not
Often made in discussing Christian anti-Jewish hostility,
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and when discussed is oftentimes misleading.

The Church's

gui 1 t for the oppression of Jews from the four th century
onward (after it had become the state religion of Rome) is
sometimes mitigated by relating individual and local Jewish
hostility towards Christians during the first and second
centuries.

This approach is misleading for the Jewish perse-

cution of "Christians" (which is infinitesimally insignificant
to the latter's persecution of Jews) was not aimed, by any
stretch of the imagination, at the Church.

This was rather

the result of infighting among Jews themselves as to which
movement in Judaism was to prevail.

This was not an unusual

occurrence in Judaism (especially at that critical period
in time) where historically other Jewish movements (e.g.,
Hellenists, Sadducees), who claimed parity or even the right
to succeed the "antiquated" Oral Law tradition, went to battle
(both figuratively and literally) against the scholars and
their adherents, and which at times had bloody consequences.
However, Oral Law Judaism's view of Christianity as
a legitimate religious creed for non-Jews is completely different.

Not only is the Oral tradition tolerant of other

monotheistic religions, but states explicitly that all nonJews, obeying the seven general commandments (e.g., prohibition against killing, stealing, etc.) handed down to the
sons of Noah have a portion in the world to come (Talmud,
Tracta~e S~nhedrin).

In addition, several of the greatest

Talmudic scholars throughout history (e.g., Moses Nachlnonides)
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have explicitly stated that Christianity {the very religion
in whose name the Jewish people have endured untold oppression)

is a permissible religion for non-Jews, and may be

conceived as a positive phenomenon "in fulfillment of G-d's
ultimate purpose" {Kaplan, 1979).

Paradoxically, as is the

case with most of Jewish history, the above Pauline doctrine
(as reevaluated by Gager (1983]) seems to be a near perfect
fit

(i.e., Oral Law Judaism for Jews alongside a Gentile

'··population embued with the Christian spirit).

Unfortunately

for the Jewish body and Gentile soul this perfect fit never
actualized, and only their total differentiation based on
the "despicable" Jewish character in concert with the Jewish
"heinous" type of lifestyle regulated the relationship between
the two.
The pattern of Christian anti-Jewish hostilities
reflects the pattern of oppression mentioned above in relation
to Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Rome and only in its intensity
and extensiveness may qualify as a different form of oppression.

The general themes of anti-Jewish hostility discussed

above are all present here:
1.

The Jews refuse to assimilate (i.e., convert) into
the ever-growing Christian empire.

2.

The Church feels threatened and reacts accordingly.

3.

This reaction takes two of the three forms mentioned
above:
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A.

the attempt to uproot any positive national identity via ghettoization or expulsion,

B.

the attempt to break the distinctive Jewish spirit
via bookburning (specifically the Talmud), forced
conversions, and monetary and physical persecutions,

4.

The continuity and flowering

(in the intellectual

and spiritual sense) of Oral Law Judaism.
>.

According to Grosser and Halperin (1978), during the
early Christian period (325-500) after Christianity had been
adopted as the official state religion of Rome:
A.

Christians were forbidden to interact with Jews.

B.

State policy restricted the political and civil rights
of Jews.

C.

Jews were forbidden to live in Jerusalem.

D.

Marriage between a Jew and Gentile was punishable
by death.

E.

Forced conversions were carried out, and

F.

Sporadic Christian mobs attacked Jewish quarters
and synagogues.

The Dark Ages (500-1000) ushered in a new era of Christian
anti-Jewish hostility. In light of political instability at
the time of what was the Eastern and Western halves of the
Roman empire the Church proved to be the major unifying and
stabil~zing

force.

Jewish settlements, at the time, existed

throughout the Empire in virtually every province and city.
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Although Jews were declared enemies of the state for refusing
to convert to Christianity the hostility at this time seems
to be an elitist phenomenon with an absence of popular antiJewish feelings.

Support comes from the almost constant

and repetitive royal and Church decrees commanding the faithful and lower clergy to refrain from interacting and from
maintaining friendly relations with Jews (Grosser et al.,

..

197 8).

It is also important to note the gradual development
of Christian anti-Jewish hostilities at this point, for it
mirrors the above Egyptian paradigm.

During the early Chris-

tian period (325-500) activity was limited to discrimination
in which the Jewish national identity was severely threatened.

The Land of Israel could no longer be called a Jewish

state (except in the minds of the Jews themselves), and their
civil, economic, political, and even marital rights were
significantly restricted, making them totally dependent on
the arbitrary whims of the ruling power.

The refusal to

convert brought in its wake greater oppression where the
primary objective was no longer to break the Jew's sense of
national identity, but rather to break his Talmudic spirit
rendering him maleable to Christian influence.

Forced con-

versions, confiscation of land, childnapping, and prohibitions against observing the precepts of the Oral Law were
some of the more salient forms of persecution used to destroy
the people's distinctiveness.

52

Following therefrom, when this plan of action failed,
the body of the Jew became endangered.

Although there does

not appear to be any direct decree issuing from the Church
to annihilate the Jews, the random torture and slaughter of
literally hundreds of thousands of Jews during the Crusades
(1000-1348), the Black Death (the Bubonic Plague) (1348-1357),
the Inquisition (1366-1500), and the Eastern European pogroms
(seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) in the name of Chris' · · tian i ty (Grosser et al., 197 8) seems to belie the declared
objective of spreading Christianity throughout the Jewish
world.
More astonishing than the brutal persecutions wrought
on the Jewish people was their superhuman tenacity to persevere.

While Christianity was losing its political clout

with the formation of nation-states in the latter part of
the Middle Ages and was being internally ruptured by the up
and coming Protestant movement, the Jews in their poverty
and total insecurity were turning out Talmudic scholars and
literature which most contemporary Talmudic scholars consider
vastly superior to the Jewish scholarship of today.

(For

example, present day Talmudists would be seriously hampered
in understanding Talmudic literature if it were not for these
medieval commentators who in light of their scope of knowledge
from primary Talmudic sources were able to explain and clarify
the intricacies and dialectics of Talmud to future generations.)
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Muslim Anti-Jewish Hostility
Islam was the second major religion to spring forth
from Judaism (Prager et al., 1983), but as distinct from
Christianity, its founder was not a Jew and it was not originally a Jewish sect.

Islam, like Christianity had a uni-

versal mission to save the world, but in contrast to Christianity was armed with the sword of the state almost at its
inception (Grosser et al., 1978).
'

..

With the advent of Islam in the seventh century C.E.
there was a large Jewish population in Medina where the first
Muslim community was established (Prager et al., 1983).
Muhammad, the founder of Islam, was greatly influenced by
Jewish reli.gious practices and ideas (Flannery, 1965).
is mentioned in the Quran (The Muslim scripture)

Moses

over one

hundred times and presents the predominant figure in it
(Prager et al., 1983).

In the Quran (Sura 46:11) Muhammad

writes "Yet before it was the Book of Moses for a model and
a mercy; and this is a Book [i.e., the Quran] confirming."
Muhammad also adopted the Jews' founding Father Abraham as
the new faith's founding father, and in complete disrespect
for the Hebrew Scriptures from which he based his new religion, inserted Ishmael as one of the Hebrew Patriarchs
(Baidawi on Sura 2: 27)

1

and subsequently traced his own

geneology through Ishmael to Abraham.

Muhammad also granted

legiti~acy to Christianity and although he denied the divinity

of Jesus, he accepted the Nazarene as the last of the Hebrew
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prophets while considering himself the Messenger of G-d and
"the Seal of all the Prophets."

Paradoxically while accepting

most of the narratives of the Hebrew Bible he accused the
Jews of deleting from the Bible predictions of his coming
(Katsh, 1962).
According to Abraham Katsh (1962)

'

..

Muhammad never intended to establish Islam as a new religion.
He considered himself the rightful custodian
of the Book sent by Allah (G-d) to "confirm" the Scriptures.
It is for this reason that in the beginning he
saw no difference between Judaism and Christianity and
believed that both Jews and Christians would welcome
him.
It is only later, when he realized that he could
never gain support from either of them, that he presented
Islam as a new Faith.
(Introduction, p. 10)
For example, in the early days Muhammad's followers prayed
in the direction of the Jew's holy city, Jerusalem, and observed the most solemn Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur.

Only

when Muhammad concluded that the Jews were unwilling to accept
him as their prophet did he substitute Mecca for Jerusalem,
and the Fast of· Ramadan for Yom Kippur (Prager et al., 1983).
It is important to note that Judaism was not intolerant of
Islam as a viable monotheistic faith for non-Jews

(as was

the case concerning Christianity), but only rejected Islam
as a subs ti tut ion for the over two thousand year old tradition
of Oral Law Judaism.
The consequence of the Jews' rejection of Islam was
almost inevitable.

No group could validate Muhammad's claims

as cquld the Jews, and no group could so seriously undermine
his claims as the Jews could.

As a result Muhammad turned
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against them.

His hostile reactions concerning the Jews'

rejection of him and his teachings were then recorded in
the Quran, giving Muslims throughout history divinely based
antipathy towards Jews everywhere (Prager et al, 1983).
In response to the Jewish refusal to convert, the Jewish communities in the area of Medina were attacked and either
slaughtered or forced to migrate.

The Jews 1 iving north of

Ka ibher were besieged by the Army .of Islam and the siege
· · was eventually 1 i fted in exchange for tribute.

After Muham-

mad's death the Kaibhar Jewish commuity was expelled and
the northern Arabian peninsula was purged of all infidels
(Grosser et al., 1978).
Although there were periodic physical persecutions,
mass expulsions, and massacres of Jews in the name of Islam
from the eighth through the nineteenth century (Grosser et
al.,· 1978)

in Muslim dominated lands, the primary focus of

Muslim anti-Jewish hostility was one of political subjugation,
social humil ia ti on, and off ic:: ially decreed religious inferiori ty (Peters, 1976).

Islam's anti-Jewish activities focused

almost exclusively on Jewish independence.

Jews and Chris-

tians were able to physically exist in Muslim lands as "people
of the book" as opposed to pagans who would have to choose
Islam or the sword.

They were also officially allowed (though

not always in practice)

religious freedom,

them to continue their Oral Law tradition.

thus allowing
Thus it appears

that Islam did not feel the need to attack the Jewish spirit
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via religious persecution or to annihilate the Jewish collective body.

Islam only required that Jews and Christians

alike be relegated to inferior positions in society in order
to retain a secure position as the true religion.
Official Islamic legislation which delineated the
restriction of liberties and conditions of life, for Jews
and Christians, were proclaimed in the seventh-century Covenant of Omar (Muhammad's successor) which if transgressed was
·• punishable by death.

According to the Covenant, Jews were

compelled to wear a distinctive costume with a ribbon, and
a yellow piece of cloth as a badge, they were not permitted
to perform their religious practices in public, or to own a
horse; they were forbidden to drink wine in public; and they
were required to bury their dead without allowing their grief
to be heard by Muslims.

I slam' s law decreed the 1 ightest

of penalties for killing a non-Muslim, and the testimony of
a non-Muslim against a Muslim was considered invalid.

As

payment for being allowed to live, the non-Muslim paid a
special head and property tax.

These and other harsh res tr ic-

tions of the Covenant were carried down through the centuries,
and implemented with varying degrees of cruelty depending upon
the particular Muslim ruler

(Peters, 1976).

The guiding

Principle of Islam's treatment of Jews and Christians was
(and is)

tha.t Islam dominates and is not to be dominated.

Once non-Muslims were willing to forfeit the civil liberties
enjoyed by the Muslim majority they were able to physically
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and even spiritually exist, but once Jews would receive equal
status in Muslim dominated territory, and needless to say,
once they would forge their own independent state in the area,
the Jewish "threat" would become overly intimidating and
unbearable.
This is what actually happened in the twentieth century with the mass immigration of Jews back to their historic
homeland.

The "demeaned subjects" had the impudence to claim

·• independence over "Muslim land."

As Yehoshafat Harbabi, a

leading scholar of the contemporary Arab world put it:

"A

Jewish state is incompatible with the view of Jews as humiliated or wretched" {Prager et al., 1983, p. 123).

All the

while Jews and Christians were subjugated to Muslims in the
Middle East, Islam could claim (via extensive rationalizations) superiority as the true faith, which had displaced
. the ~lder monotheistic creeds.

With the advent of Israel

as an independent Jewish state the foundations of Islam were
shaken.

The "inferior" somehow prevailed casting serious

doubt on the legitimacy of Islam, and with each successive
Muslim defeat the tension became that much greater.

Conse-

quently, Muslim anti-Jewish hostility has reached such proportions over the last sixty years that today it is not only
three million Israeli Jews who are endangered but, in light
of Arab fanaticism, the entire world.
According to the above historical account it was not
out of some utilitarian strategy manipulated to foster uni-
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fication that Khomeini in his book Confronting Israel proclaimed:
Oh brothers! Let us not regard this holy and sacrificial war as a war between Arabs and Israel. Let us
regard it as a war of all Moslems together against Jews
and their leaders. It is the responsibility of all the
Islamic governments with their peoples, with all their
forces, and potential to aid and support Fedayeen (guer illas) on the lines of fire.
(Davis, 1984, p. 133)
The similarities between Muslim anti-Jewish hostility
and those preceding it are clearly visible.

Judaism was

·· considered a serious competitive threat to Islam from its
inception.

At the outset Jews (and Christians) obstinately

refused to accept the majority religion even amidst harsh
persecution and discrimination.

Also, the type of anti-Jewish

(or in this case anti-non-Muslim) hostility was one of the
three forms delineated above, where strict limitations of
civil liberties and a total negation of Jewish statehood
(i.e., nationalism) were diligently enforced.

Although re-

ligious and physical attacks have been constant since the
early part of the twentieth century, the attacks are not
targeted specifically at the Jewish body or religion (as
distinct from Christianity), but rather at Jewish statehood
which is anathema to any G-d fearing Muslim.
Another common theme present here is the tenacity
of the Jewish people.

Athough it appears almost anticlimatic

when placed vis a vis Jewish pertinacity prior to Islam,
the remarkable perseverance of the Jews can al so be seen
here when compared to Christian communities residing in
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Middle East "Mus! im territory."

As mentioned above Mus! im

anti-Jewish legislation also applied to Christians.

However,

whereas Jewish communities often flourished (in spiritual
I

terms), few

Christian communities even managed to survive

amidst Muslim hostility.

The above is often lost sight of

when favorably comparing Islam's anti-Jewish hostility with
Christian activity, but the conversion to Islam of nearly
every pre-Islamic Christian community in the Mus! im world
·' bears testimony to what the Jewish people endured under Muslim
oppression (Prager et al., 1983).
Russian and Communist Anti-Jewish Hostility
Just as many scholars in the world of science today
hold on almost religiously to the basics of Darwin's theory
of evolution, [though plagued today with more problems than
it had when it was originally formulated

(Marcell, 1978;

Goldman, 1978; Spetner, 1978)), many also implicitly believe
in the tenets of social Darwinism, which loosely speaking
stresses an evolution of progress in the social realm as
well (Mason 1968).

Both in Europe and America with the advent

Of the industrial revolution, a promising economic order
via capitalism, political upheavals ushering in democracy
and socialism, and all pervaded by a spirit of enlightened
liberalism, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were to
be a positive turning point for mankind.
the Jews it turned in the wrong direction.

Unfortuately for
For the .Jew the
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nineteenth and particularly the twentieth century would wreak
the likes of discrimination, persecution, and massacre heretofore never experienced.
From almost the beginning of Russia's history, a
tradition of autocracy and devotion to Eastern Orthodox Christianity shaped a policy of suspicion toward European influence
and specifically toward Judaism (Flannery, 1965).

This dis-

trust was heightened, almost to the point of paranoia when
·' Poland was partitioned in the late eighteenth century.

Russia

then became governor over the largest body of Jews in the
world.

Almost simultaneously with their admission into the

new empire Jews were restricted to live only in the newly
won provinces, the "Pale of Settlement" (Flannery, 1965).
Even within the Pale itself, Jews suffered severe economic
restrictions, extra taxes, and other hardships.

For example,

in 1808 the Czar, Alexander I issued an edict for the expulsion of the Jews from the villages and countryside and approximately a half million were driven like cattle into the
cities and left in the open squares (Grosser et al., 1978).
Alexander's successor Nicholas I introduced hundreds
Of disabling laws curbing Jewish activities and went further
than his predecessors, who in most part only stripped the
Jews of their civil liberties to live, own land and work
Where and as they pleased.

Nicholas I determined to complete

the Russification of the Jews attacked the Jewish spirit by
forcibly conscripting Jewish youths of twelve and even nine
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to an extended military service of twenty-five years

(the

twenty-five year obligation did not begin until the boy turned
eighteen).

These boys were brought to the farthest outpost

of the empire, and beaten and tortured in an effort to "persuade" them to convert to Russian Orthodoxy (Flannery, 1965;
Grosser et al.,

1978).

When Nicholas failed to break the

Jewish Or al Law spirit (i.e., they obstinately refused to
convert)

he turned his attention to Jewish education.

He

·· decreed that Jewish children were only to go to special Jewish
schools where Talmud was not to be taught, and where Judaism
was taught according to - Russian Orthodoxy (Flannery, 1965;
Grosser et al.,

1978).

Nicholas eventually abolished the

state schools, for conversion was not being achieved.
A third type of Russian anti-Jewish activity was
initiated in 1881, when Czar Alexander III, under the influence,of his chief advisor Pobedonstsev, formulated his "antirevolutionary program" with its primary target Russian Jewry.
The Jewish problem was to be simply solved, one-third was
to emigrate, one-third was was to die, and one-third was to
convert (Flannery, 1965).

On Easter of 1881 the massacres

commenced and over a twenty-five year period

(1881-1906)

thousands of Jews were murdered while tens of thousands were
left maimed and destitute (Grosser et al., 1978).
In 1915 Grand Duke Sergei,. Commander-in-chief of
Russia's military, relocated 600,000 Jews to interior Russia.
Approximately 100,000 Jews died from exposure or starvation
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during the relocation (Grosser et al., 1978).

In 1917, during

the Russian Revolution massacres of Jews were organized and
implemented by the Ukranians and the Whites.

In the Ukraine

200,000 Jews were slaughtered, and 300,000 children were
left homeless and orphaned.

During the Revolution and the

ensuing civil war Jewish civilian populations were accused
by both sides as being members of the opposing forces, and
were accordingly dealt with.

During this period it was con-

. sidered a mercy to be killed outright instead of gradually
being tortured to death.

Parents were forced to watch the

torture of their children, and children of their parents.
Jewish women were subjected to obscene acts and mutilation
before they were granted the privilege to die

(Grosser et

al., 1978).
It was within the above context that the Russian
people collectively "converted" to Marxism and set out, like
their predecessors to bring salvation to the world.

Para-

doxically, the pious Russian populace, metamorphosed almost
overnight from devout religionists into progressive communists
(i.e., the transition from Eastern Orthodoxy to Communism
over a relatively short period of time did not appear particularly overbearing).

The Jews, on the other hand, remained

"infamously" Jewish.

The only real change was that while the

Pre-revolutionary chauvinistic Russia attacked only those
Jews r~siding within the borders of the Russian empire, the
Marxist Russia would strike at Jews everywhere.
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As depicted above the Jewish presence appeared too
intimidating for Russian governments of the nineteenth century
to peaceably cohabit with, and their paranoia was blatantly
transparent.

With the inception of the Marxist doctrine,

the Russian government needed no longer to fear the indignation and repulsion of the Western world for oppressing Jews.
They were now universalists, furthering the idealism of one
of the century's greatest thinkers, and like a chapter out
· · of a fiction novel, the ideology just happened to be inherently anti-Jewish.
Karl Marx, a Jew, whose father had him baptized at
the age of six in order that he should not have to suffer
from anti-Jewish oppression (Prager et al., 1983) became
the new legitimizing force aimed at uprooting and destroying
the Jewish "cancer."

Karl Marx, who descended from a long

list of distinguished rabbis (McLellan, 1973), but who knew
little of the Oral Law tradition argued against emancipation
for the Jews until they abandon their "exclusive religion,
morality, and customs" (Rotenstreich, 1983).
Marx theorized that the role of economics had been
the key determinant in the development of human history •
. He believed that world peace could be achieved once man would
restructure the economic order (Fisch, 1984).

Therefore,

When he wrote in his book On the Jewish Question:
It is from its own entrails that civil society ceaselessly
the Jew. • • •

en~enders
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Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no
other god may exist • • • •
The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the trader, and above all of the f inane ier.

. . As. soon as society succeeds in abolishing the empir i-

cal essence of Judaism-huckstering and its condi tions--the
Jew becomes impossible, because his consciousness no
longer has an object. (Bottomore, 1964, pp. 36-40)
he irrevocably set the stage for hostility toward Jews in
all lands his theories were accepted.
Marxist nations today attack the Jewish people via
•" all three anti-Jewish strategies mentioned above.

They at-

tempt to break Jewish national ism by defining Zionism as "a
reactionary movement • • • which denies the class struggle
and strives to isolate the Jewish working masses from the
general struggle of the proletariat" (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 1952, p. 144 in Prager et al., 1983).

The Soviets

continue on this line of strategy in associating Zionism
with, Nazism, and ever since the Six-Day War in 1967, the
Soviet media has consistently referred to the Jewish State
as a Hitlerian state (Prager et al., 1983).

In addition,

requests by Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel are fraught
with hardships ranging from losing one's job, to an extended
prison term, to exile in Siberia.
Concomitantly, the Soviets have been continually
attempting t,o destroy the Jewish Oral Law spirit.

Synagogues

are seized and converted into Communist Youth Clubs.
and

re~igious

teachers are imprisoned.

Rabbis

All forms of Jewish

education are barred, and the teaching of the Hebrew language
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is outlawed (Fisch, 1984).

Their attempt to annihilate the

Jewish collective body is more indirect today, but equally
as contemptible as their other anti-Jewish activities.

They

do this by providing untold amounts of organizational and
military training together with sophisticated military hardware to Israel's most hostile Arab adversaries, while these
adversaries openly call for the complete liquidation of
Israel.

Although it is tempting to say that the Soviet

· · Union's opposition to Israel is based primarily on Israel's
form of government together with its close ties to the United
States, the fact that Soviet verbal and active antagonism
toward Israel has immeasurably exceeded its opposition to
other American allies seem to imply otherwise.
After describing both Muslim and Marxist's sources
and type of anti-Jewish hostility, it is interesting to note
an overt historical contradiction.

Following from the above

analysis it should have been clear that any effort to create
a third Jewish commonwealth in the Middle East would be met
with zealous and unrelenting opposition from both Muslim
and Marxist camps.

If the people of Israel posed a dire

threat in a stateless and powerless condition, how overwhelm. ingly intimidating they would be when living independently
in their own land.

Although these logical consequences should

have been foreseen, they were not.

In fact, Theodore Herzl,

the father of "modern" Jewish nationalism (and also a Jew who
knew little of Oral Law Judaism), and his successors d.eclared
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throughout the decades preceding the establishment of Israel,
that the creation of a Jewish homeland was the only effective
response to anti-Jewish hostility (Grayzel, 1968).

With

all due respect to the Founding Fathers, modern history tends
to support the above analysis that not only has a Jewish
state failed to reduce anti-Jewish hostility, but it may be
argued that the founding of Israel has actually exacerbated
the already precarious Jewish predicament.
German Nazi Anti-Jewish Hostility
Theoretically, the juxtaposition of Soviet leftist
ideology with Nazi rightwing fanatacism appears absurd.

Is

it logically possible (barring war-time alliances) for two
radical movements which are ideologically at opposite ends
of the spectrum, and accordingly anathema to one other claim
as their most inherent enemy the same seemingly innocuous
Jewish people?

More ridiculous, it seems, is that each move-

ment casts on the Jews the guise of the other.

Soviet left-

ists have often referred to Jews as Nazi collaborators and
Israel as a Hitlerian state (e.g., Will, 1979; Kochan, 1967),
and Nazis have often referred and continue to refer to Jews
everywhere as Communists (e.g., Anti Defamation League, 1982).
According to the present historical analysis this
apparent contradiction is no contradiction.

Just as the

Russian incapacity to tolerate Judaism in all its various
forms predated communism, so to did Hitler's pathological
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hostility toward Jews predate Nazi rightwing ideology.

Both

movements merely bequeathed to their adherents an ideological
base, from which to "justify" the persecution and mass slaughter of Jews.
Hitler's paranoia of Jews was unusually blatant from
the start.

Hitler's Nazism was not an independent movement

which gradually incorporated into it anti-Jewish dogma once
Jews and their Judaism were deemed intolerable.

Rather,

'the foundation of Hitler's Nazism was specifically Aryan
superiority over the Jew and the threat of the "Jewish
peril."

As early as the 1920s he called for the el imina-

tion of the Jews who were "contaminating" the "Aryan race"
(Goldberg, 1981) •
In Mein Kampf, which Hitler wrote while in prison
in 1923-1924, he blamed the defeat of Germany in World War
I on the "Marxist leaders," and argued that had "twelve or
fifteen thousand of these Jews who were corrupting the nation
been forced to submit to poison gas," the mill ions of deaths
at the front "would not have been in vain" (Dawidowicz, 1975,
p. 3).

In Hitler"s twisted mind Jew-hatred came first, and

only afterwards was Nazi racial ideology required to justify
his "final solution."

For example, neither the Japanese nor

the Arabs were denigrated by the so-called racially ideological Nazis

(both were Nazi allies)

(Prager et al., 1983).

According to Hitlerian logic the racial impurities disseminated by Jews were the Jews'

subversive value system and
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alien ideas.

As Hitler put it, "the Jews speak German, but

they think Jewish" (Prager et al., 1983, p. 153).
In truth, the "racial" war of Hitler was
against the Jew.

focused

Most everything Hitler did in the political

arena centered around the Jews.

Hitler's first political

speech as well as his last will and testament contained
charges against the Jews.

Even the swastika represented

for Hitler the battle between the "pure" Germanic race and
· the "inferior" Jew.

In writing about the Nazi flag, he said

the swastika symbolizes "the mission to struggle for the
victory of the Aryan man and at the same time the victory
of the idea of creative work, which is eternally anti-Semitic
and always will be anti-Semitic"

(Goldberg, 1981, p. 207).

Albert Speer, one of Hitler's ministers wrote in Spandau:
The Secret Diaries that Hitler was capable of tossing off
quite calmly, between the soup and the vegetable course, 'I
want to annihilate the Jews in Europe'"

(Goldberg,

1981,

p. 207).
Fan ta st i c

as it may seem, the Nazis under Hitler

did not necessarily attack Jews in order to achieve power,
but it can be argued that their drive for power was primarily
propelled by their passion to destroy Jews
1975).

(Dawidowicz,

For example, late in the war when the Nazis were

being defeated, German troops were deliberately taken from
Allied Fronts in order to continue the mass murder of Jews.
In 1944, when the Germans needed every one of their trains
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in order to evacuate Greece, not one train was diverted from
those taking Jews to death camps.

And, while addressing

the German people for the last time in 1945, Hitler proclaimed:
Above all I charge the leaders of the nation and those
under them to scrupulous observance of the laws of race
and to the merciless opposition to the universal poisoner
of all peoples, international Jewry. (Davidowicz, 1975,
p. 28)

The insanity of Hitler abetted by a pervasive anti" Jewish prejudice worldwide (Morse, 1968; Gilbert, 1975) set
the stage for the unprecedented massacre of 6, 000, 000 civilian
Jews, in a war which consumed close to 50,000,000 people.
In the authors opinion, Hitler's ultimate desire (in brief,
making himself god) was aptly expressed in a simplistic but
revealing Nazi youth song that went "Pope and Rabbi shall
be no more.

We want to be pagans once again.

ing to churches.

No more creep-

We are the joyous Hitler Youth.

not need any Christian virtues.

we do

Our leader, Adolf Hitler,

is our Savior" (Prager et al., 1983, p. 160).
There is one minor inconsistency in the present analysis when super imposed on the Nazi German era.

The apparent

Problem seems to be Hitler's explicit intent to exterminate
the Jewish people from the outset.

He, unlike his predeces-

sors, made no initial attempt to break the national identity
of the Jew, and also neglected any attempt to uproot the
Jewish Oral Law spirit.

This particular deviation is unusual

for as illogical as it may seem, Hitler's war of "race" was
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based on the unbiological differences in mentality he discerned between the German Jew and the German non-Jew (Prager
et al., 1983).

Although the German anti-Jewish legislation

did follow this pattern (i.e., [l] discrimination and subjugation, [2] physical and religious persecution, and ( (3] total
annihilation), it was clear from the start (or it is clear
now) what Hitler's original intentions actually were.
Hitler's almost immediate intention to annihilate
.. the Jews without going through the above general process is
not necessarily problematic, and may in fact, lend support
to the analysis.

As with other anti-Jewish movements dis-

cussed above, Hitler found the Jewish people's failure to
totally assimilate (in mind as well as body)
threatening.

unbearably

This Jewish threat throughout history (as dis-

cussed above) has taken three forms:

(1) Jewish nationalism,

(2) Jewish Oral Law tradition, and (3) the Jewish physical
presence, and anti-Jewish hostility was always directed
against one or more of these three forms.

Hitler's immediate

intent to annihilate the Jewish Collective Body was possibly
because that was what tangibly remained of the Jewish phenomenon in twentieth-century Germany.
In the one hundred years preceding Hitler the newly
created Jewish Reform movement succeeded in stripping the
Jewish masses in Germany of any separate national consciousness,

~ased

on the Jewish relationship to the Land of Israel.

It is important to note that the Jews unflinching relationship
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to the Land of Israel made them voluntary sojourners in
strange lands for 1,800 years.

The national and international

movements of the world attempted to uproot this "insolent"
nationalism by severely restricting Jewish civil liberties
(for a subjugated people in a strange land is a far cry from
independent nationalists) but failed.

In contrast, the Reform

movement totally severed its relationship to the "antiquated"
Middle East wasteland, and endeavored in body and soul to
·· become as German (or even more-sol) as the Gentile Germans
themselves.
The Reform movement in Judaism also denied the Divine
origin of the Oral Law, and therefore its observance was
not binding.

Jews were finally "free" to flex their intel-

lectual muscles in the great universities of Europe.

Without

Talmud and its concomitant tradition of observance the historical Jewish spirit and character were also lost.

Without

a trace of Jewish nationalism and stripped of any direct
Talmudic influence the Jews absurdly still posed for Hitler
a competitive threat.

Hitler's paranoia of the Jewish col-

lective presence seemed to find no respite unless all Jews
were annihilated.

In the end the Hitlerian monster died out,

while his crippled and badly beaten arch adversary lived on
to create an independent state in the Land of Israel.
Putting the Pieces Together
Just as the subtitle states, in this subsection an
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attempt will be made to explain the above historical analysis
in order that a parsimonious, and unambiguous theory may
emerge.

Before proceeding further it should be emphasized

that even without the following interpretations, the present
historical account has gone two steps further than most
others.

One, consistent themes throughout hi story have

brought all major periods of anti-Jewish hostility together,
and two, the anti-Jewish process is depicted as existing from
the inception of Jewish nationhood in ancient Egypt.

Irre-

spective of the above novelties several questions still demand
explication before the above historical analysis can be considered a legitimate theory of anti-Jewish hostility.

It

is the author's opinion that the major questions still needed
to be addressed are:
1.

Conceptuallly, what are the social-psychological
dynamics underlying the above historical processes?

2.

What is the significance of the three target areas
(Nationalism, Torah, and Collective Body) which powerful movements throughout history have so diligently
attempted to destroy? and

3•

Is there any empirical method to test the above theoretical analysis or must it be accepted exclusively
on the basis of history?
1.

Social-Psychological Dynamics

Conceptually what are the social-psychological dy-
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namics underlying the above historical process?

As depicted

above the primary catalyst of anti-Jewish hostility was Jewish
distinctiveness and the psychological threat it posed to
national and international movements whose objective to
totally dominate ran counter and collided with Jewish separatism.

Two political and/or religious entities claiming

"chosenness" (albeit in highly disparate ways) are, by definition, contradictory and throw doubt, from external and
· · internal sources alike, on the true nature of the entities
involved.
In order to bring the world over to their way of
thinking these anti-Jewish movements were psychologically
pressured to crush all forms of resistance.

As John Horrocks

(1966, p. viii) put it, "Social norms that support group selfconcepts of superiority or nuture group awareness of inferiori ty 'lead only to intergroup hostility."

If the activities

and goals of the interacting groups conflict, then the character i sties attributed 'to the competing group are invariably
negative and derogatory (Sherif, 1966).
Unfortunately for these self-proclaimed deities the
Jewish nation (with its Oral Law lifestyle) was not like
other nations and refused to die.

All the while the Jewish

Presence existed (sometimes as free men, and other times as
veritable slaves) the declared supremacy of the various movements was brought into question and absolute dominion was
psychologically withheld.

Accordingly, in order to foster
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a sense of political and/or spiritual security these various
movements throughout history attempted to completely eliminate
'I

Jewish distinctiveness.
This obstinate Jewish distinctiveness was already
documented by Josephus in the first century of the common
era when Jews were being relentlessly persecuted by the great
Roman empire.

He wrote:

• • • they have a passion for liberty that is almost
unconquerable, since they are convinced that G-d alone
is their leader and master. They think little of submitting to death in unusual forms and permitting vengeance
to fall on kinsmen and friends, if only they may avoid
calling any man master (Permutter, 1982, p. 54).
This "in terolerable" distinctiveness was also expressed by Adolf Hitler some 1,900 years later:
It is true we are barbarians that is an honored title
to us.
I free humanity from the shackles of the soul,
from the degrading suffering caused by the false vision
called conscience and ethics. The Jews have inflicted
two wounds on mankind; circumcision on its body and "conscience" on its soul. They are Jewish inventions. The
war for domination of the world is waged only between
the two of us, between these two camps alone; the Germans
and the Jews. Everything else is but deception (Scherman,
1985, p. xiv).
As demonstrated above it was this self-motivated
Jewish distinctiveness which lay at the foundation (or better
put, the primary cause) of historical anti-Jewish hostility.
·This perspective is supported by Muzafer Sherif (1966) who
contends that the primary cause of inter-group conflict is
not "displacement of individual aggressive tendencies, individual ignorance,

individual observation, or experience
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with members of .the despised group" but rather it is a primary
outgrowth of competition among groups.
If Jews would have totally assimilated into the majority cultures like most other conquered people (who had
the chance to do so) then by definition, they would not have
suffered as a minority group.

Other discriminated-against

groups (e.g., women, Blacks under Arab and White dominion,
t

le..

American Indians, etc.) were not as fortunate as the,\Jews
' for they lacked the capacity to physically mingle without
being detected.

These groups, in light of their distinct

physical characteristics were forced to remain, to some extent, separate.

The Jews, in contrast, could have totally

integrated without being detected.
The Jewish competitive threat was that they, logically
speaking, could have totally assimilated into all of the
above societies and yet, irrespective of their vast cultural
interaction, most often refused to totally disavow their
Jewish identity.

This unusually adamant refusal to be one

with the ruling or majority population inevitably created
intergroup competition, which (according to the present analysis) brought in its wake much Jewish suffering.

And,

when this competition was based, loosely speaking, on the
concept of "ultimate truth" the di scr imina tion and persecution
became understandably more intense.
As Muzafer Sherif (1966), based on much·experimentation and analyses of intergroup processes concluded:
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• • • intergroup conflict has shown that neither
cultural, physical, nor economic differences are necessary
for the rise of intergroup conflict, hostile attitudes,
and stereotyped images of out-groups. Nor are maladjusted, neurotic, or unstable tendencies necessary conditions for the appearance of intergroup prejudice and
stereotypes.
The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile
and aggressive deeds • • • was the existence of two groups
competing for goals that only one group could attain,
to the dismay and frustration of the other group. (p. 85)
2.

..

Significance of Target Areas

The second question, "What is the significance of
the three target areas (i.e., Nationalism, Torah, and Collective Body) which powerful movements throughout history have
so diligently attempted to destroy?, follows from the first.
If the inherent competitive nature of Jewish distinctiveness
lay at the core of anti-Jewish hostility, then an attack
against the Jews should be, in effect, an attack against
those Jewish components most responsible for creating and

·maintaining divisiveness.
All the while a relationship is perceived between
the Jewish people and their distinctive (albeit universal)
G-d, conflict and tension is maintained.

The logical means

of dealing with the competitive Jewish threat was to destroy
those components which most emphasize this perceived relationship.

In the author's op in ion it was not fortuitous that

anti-Jewish movements throughout history have attacked (1)
Jewish nationalism, (2) the Jewish Oral Law spirit (as embodied ·in the Torah and Commandments), and/or (3) the Jewish
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collective Body individually or in combination.

For it is

these three components which seem to represent the source
of Jewish distinctiveness

(i.e., the relationship of the

Jewish people to their G-d).
Anti-Jewish movements throughout history have seemingly detected the sources of Jewish distinctiveness and
have focused their attacks accordingly.

The first strategy

usually employed (as discussed above) is an attempt to break
Jewish separatism (which is a direct by-product of Jewish
nationalism). 'This is accomplished by expelling the Jews
from the Land of Israel, by prohibiting their return, and
by denying them the same civil liberties granted to the rest
of the population.

By denying the Jews the usual liberties

granted to others, they are in effect, relegated to vassal
status where their communal existence becomes totally dependent on the arbitrary whims of the ruling power.

This

type of treatment should theoretically create a servile type
of people, far and irreversibly removed from the status of
independent nationalists, and a seemingly easy prey to assimilate.

When Jewish distinctiveness obstinately remains intact

the strategy focuses next on the Jewish spirit via pillaging,
childnapping, rape, torture, and prohibitions against the
study of Talmud and the observance of the Laws following
therefrom.

When this eventually fails the only remaining

alternative is to destroy the Jewish collective presence in
toto.
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The following paragraphs will attempt to explain,
via traditional Jewish sources, the perceived significance
(both for the Jew and Jew-hater alike) of (1) Jewish nationalism,

(2) the Jewish Oral Law spirit, and (3) the Jewish

presence which competitve movements throughout history have
attempted to eradicate.
Jewish Nationalism
The following are examples of the relationship between
the Land of Israel to the people of Israel according to the
Jewish tradition.
1.

Nearly two-thirds of the Oral Law, as we have

it today embodied in the Talmud deals with the Land of Israel
(Wasserman, 1963).

This fact becomes all the more prominent

when understood that the Talmud, like no other literature,
has literally molded Jewish individual and communal existence
during the Jews' 1,800 year sojourn in the Diaspora.
2.

One of the leading Talmudic scholars of the thir-

teenth century (Moses Nachmonides) wrote in his Hosafot to
Sefer Hamitzvot:
The commmandment is that we should inherit the land given
by G-d, exalted be He, to our forefathers Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob and that we should neither let it fall to any
of the other nations nor let it grow into a wasteland •
• • • This is a positive commandment for all time unto
eternity.
It is obligatory on each and every one of
us, even in times of exile and dispersion, as evident
from many places in the Talmud. (Yaakobi, 1984, pp. 4748)
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3.

"For the Lord has chosen Zion; He has desired it

for His habitation" (Psalms 132:13).
4.

"A Land [The Land of Israel] which the Lord thy

God cares for; the eyes of the Lord thy God are always upon
it" (Deuteronomy 11:12).
5.

If I forget thee, O Jerusalem,
Let my right hand forget her cunning.
If I do not remember thee,
Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth;
If I do not set Jerusalem
Above my highest joy. (Psalms 137:5-6)

6.

"Everyone who lives in the Land of Israel is

..

similar to someone who has a G-d and every Jew who dwells
elsewhere is similar to one who hasn't a G-d as it is written
(in Leviticus 25:38).

'To give to you the Land of Canaan,

to be for you G-d'" (Talmud, Ketuboth llOB) •

(Translation

Kaplan, 1979)
7.

"Even after one dies it is important to be buried

in the Land of Israel because of its holiness, for everyone
who is buried in the Land of Israel is as if buried under
the altar of the Temple" (Talmud, Ketuboth lllA).

(Transla-

tion Kaplan. 1979)
8.

Probably the most important detail in understand-

ing the relationship between the Jews and the Land is to
· point out their (unprecedented) active relationship to the
Land over their 1,800 year period (135
~-

c.E.

to 1948) of ex-

The adherents of Oral Law Judaism (the only form of

Judaism with any semblance of longevity) whether in neighbor-
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ing Persia, or in warm Italy or Spain, whether they found
homes in cold Eastern Europe, found their way to North America, or came to 1 ive in the southern hemisphere where the
seasons are reversed, celebrated the Land of Israel's seasonal
change.

They prayed for dew in May and for rain in October.

on Passover, they ceremonioulsy celebrated the liberation
from Egyptian bondage, the original national establishment
in the Promised Land.

They prayed three times daily facing

·' Jerusalem, and requested in each prayer to be brought back
to Israel with all the exiles.

They asked for the rebuilding

of Jerusalem after eating bread, and made explicit mention
of their exile, their hope, and their belief in the return
to the Land during weddings as well as deaths.
9.

A further remarkable phenomenon concerning Jewish

existence {irrespective of contemporary Soviet and Arab propaganda calling the Jewish mass movement to the Middle East
illegitimate), is that Israel is the only country on earth
today that is inhabited by the same nation, with the same
religious culture (i.e., the Oral Law tradition), speaking
the same language as that which lived in it some 3,200 years
ago (despite two great exiles where the last one extended
1, 800 years) •
The Jewish Spirit
The following is an attempt to explain the significance ·of the Torah (a term oftentimes used to denote both
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the Written and Oral Law) which Jewish antagonists have so
diligently tried to
1.

u~root

via traditional Jewish sources.

According to the Talmud

(Shabbos SBA), G-d' s

purpose in creation required that Israel accept the Torah.
If not, all creation would have lost its reason for being,
and would have ceased to exist.
2.

..

The Torah is the only means through which the

Jews can fulfill His purpose in creation (Rabbi Yehuda Halevi,
in the Kuzari, 1964).
3.

In Deuteronomy (6:24-25), "The Lord commanded

us to do all these statutes • • • for our good always."
4.

The main immediate benefit of following the Torah

is spiritual, bringing the per son closer to G-d ( Zohar Acharey
Mot).

Each law acts as nourishment for the soul, strengthen-

ing it, and increasing a person's spiritual fortitude (Talmud,
Yoma 39A).
5.

The many laws associated with daily life serve

to teach self discipline (Maimonides, 1960).
(Avodah Zarah SB)

The Talmud

states "when Israel is occupied with the

study and practice of the Torah they master their desire,
and are not mastered by it."
Numbers (15:39)

It is similarly expressed in

"You shall remember all G-d's commandments

and keep them, and not stray after your heart or after your
eyes, by which you are led astray" (translation Kaplan, 1979).
6.

Torah Law acts as a survival mechanism, enabling

Judaism to remain vital even through the harshest persecutions
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(Halevi in the Kuzar i).

Only the Jewish people who have

followed the complete Torah (Written and Oral) have existed
throughout history, while a single generation's lapse has
led to major spiritual (and physical) debilitation (Kaplan,
1979) •
7.

The Torah sets limits through which a Jew can

fulfill G-d's purpose while living in a world that is essentially hostile to it.

Through the Torah, one can be part

.. of the world, and at the same time, dedicated to the spiritual
(Talmud, Berakoth 35B).
The Jewish Collective Body
1.

In Jeremiah (2:3) the people of Israel are seen

as G-d' s ambassadors to the world:
Lord;

"Israel is holy to the

the first fruits of his increase:

all that devour

him shall be held guilty; evil shall come upon them."
2.

According to the Jerusalem Talmud (Taanith 2:6),

the Jewish people are to be the ones to continuously represent the fact of G-d's presence in the world.
3.

In Isaiah (43:10),

Israel is seen as having a

mission to bear witness to G-d's existence "You are my witnesses • • • and My servant whom I have chosen."
4.

In Isaiah (59: 21) G-d made a covenant with Israel

that they would continue to be the bearers of His word for
all time.

s.

Isaiah (42:4)

"[Israel) shall not fail nor be
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crushed until he has rectified the world,

for the islands

await his teachings" (translation Kaplan, 1979).
6.

Isaiah

(51:~6)

"I have put My words in thy mouth,

and I have covered thee in the shad ow of My hand, that I
may plant the heavens and lay the foundations of the earth,
and say to Zion, Thou art my people."
7.

The people of Israel are traditionally portrayed

as having the incessant mission of proclaiming G-d' s teachings
" to the world.

The objective is not to convert anyone to

Judaism with the burden of carrying out the 613 commandments,
but rather to inform the peoples of the world G-d's universal
message as it is stated in Isaiah (42:6):

"I, G-d, have

called you in righteousness • • • and have set you up as a
covenant of the people, for a 1 ight to the nations" ( translation Kaplan, 1979).
8.

Israel is thus seen as being the means through

which G-d' s essence becomes more strongly revealed in the
world.

It is thus written, "[to] give strength to G-d is

the duty of Israel His pride"

(Psalms 68:35)

(translation

Kaplan, 1979).
Before proceeding onward it is important to explain
in brief the concept of "Chosen People."

The concept has

negative connotations in contemporary western society for
it smacks of racism with all its ugly manifestations

(the

very type of attitudinal and behavioral set the Jews have
suffered so tragically from).

In truth the Jewish concept
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of "chosen" is quite different in thought and in deed from
the many groups in history who have relegated to themselves
the title of chosen (in one form or another).
In contrast to most other groups, the Jewish meaning
of chosen has considerably mare to do with obligations than
it does with benefits.

The Bible makes it clear that man

was created to emulate G-d's righteousness on earth.

At

first, all of mankind was chosen for this task but early
· man failed and allowed corru.ption and violence to predominate
over justice and kindness.

Thereafter punishment for failure

was to be on a national rather than universal level.

In

addition, according to the Bible, G-d chose one nation who
were to act as G-d' s model nation on earth whose purpose
was to demonstrate to mankind how to individually and collectively conduct themselves (Gervirtz, 1980).
According to Biblical and Talmudic sources the people
chosen for the above purpose were the descendents of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob.

Abraham agreed to a pact with G-d which

was considered a guarantee that Abraham's descendents would
receive Divine favor provided they followed G-d's teachings
as expounded in the Written and Oral Law.

These commitments

meant that Jews had to meet many obligations not required
of others.

They were expected to maintain a higher level

of moral purity and their self-control and devotion to a
spiritual ideal would be more severely tested than others.
Jews who did not live up to the standards set by the Written
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and Oral Law would be causing a lessening of G-d's esteem
in the eyes of mankind, and would be held directly accountable
for such behavior.

In return for their allegiance to G-d's

Law, the Jews would become an extraordinarly propserous nation.

They would play a positively unique role in the history

of the world, and would acquire a homeland brimming with
Divine favor (Gervirtz, 1980).

..

3.

Empirical Support

The final question addressed in this section is:
Is there any empirical method to test the above theoretical
analysis, or must it be accepted solely on the basis of history?

The present author is of the opinion that the theory

can be empirically tested, and all that is required is a
little imagination without going beyond the conceptual limits
of the above theory.

The conceptualized anti-Jewish paradigm

portrayed above is that of a totalitarian world power attempting to dominate mankind both physically and spiritually,
and therefore seeing in the Jewish presence a formidable
competitor.

But this paradigm is not an absolute, and without

deviating from the theory we could generalize and say that
any movement whether non-Jewish or Jewish whose legitimacy
Cand

therefore existence)

is implicitly challenged by an

inherently competitive Jewish presence should feel the need
to strike out against this presence, as it is manifested in
Nationalism, Torah, and/or Collective Body.

The forms of
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attacking Jews and Judaism has changed over the ages but
the process (according to the present theoretical analysis)
has been consistent.

In addition, it has not been a random

variation of Jews throughout history who have consistently
presented this competitive threat, but rather one group (i.e.,
Oral Law or Orthodox Judaism) which has obdurately maintained
a continuity throughout millennia.

Therefore,

it seems

reasonable in the upcoming comparisons to posit Oral Law
· (Orthodox)

Jewry as a

true manifestation of Judaism (this

does not necessarily imply that other Jewish groups are illegitimate, but only that this millennia-old group is, beyond
suspicion, representative).
Following from the analysis any movement whose legitimacy is seriously threatened by the Jewish presence would
perforce (1) attempt to sever Jewish nationalism, (2) attempt
·to break the Jewish people's bond to the Torah, and (3) attempt to destroy the Jewish collective body, each strategy
by itself or in combination.

One way to test empirically

the above analysis is to locate a group whose basic ideology
puts it in direct conflict with present day Oral Law Judaism,
and to empirically investigate if this group
leaders)

is to some extent,

or explicitly)
Cl) Land,

fostering

(i.e.,

their

(whether implicitly

the severance of the Jewish people from the

(2) The Torah, and/or (3) the annihilation of the

Jewish Collective Body.

There does seem to be movements today

Whose legitimacy is threatened by the Jewish presence and

87

whose activity may lend itself to measurement.

According

to the theory, these movements should follow a pattern of
activity similar to those historical anti-Jewish movements
discussed above.
The groups posited today as distinctively

anti~Jewi

are ironically two contemporary Jewish movements.

sh

Reform

and Conservative Judaism are depicted in the subsequent analysis as fitting the present study's theoretical anti-Jewish
profile.

Although superficially these movements appear to

have little in common with classical anti-Jewish hostility
the following pages will attempt to explain the theoretical
relationship between them and their non-Jewish counterparts.
The Reform movement in Judaism originated in Germany
in the early nineteenth century, and was transported to
America during the large German immigration, which began in
the 1840s.

In the last half of the nineteenth century it

appeared evident that the future of Judaism in America would
be Reform (Sklare, 1983).

The Conservative movement in

Judaism is an American phenomenon originating as a reaction
to Reform Judaism which it deemed as "too Reform" (Liebman,
1983), and this brand of Judaism eventually achieved primacy
(i.e., numbers of constituents)
II.

in America after World War

Today these two movements constitute a major percentage

of American Jewry.

Although with seemingly different phi-

losoph~es both movements deny the binding authority of the

Oral Law, and claimed from their inception the unadaptability
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of Oral Law (Orthodox) Judaism in America (Sklare, 1983;
Liebman, 1983).

They declared themselves legitimate alterna-

tive forms of Judaism, and although they never called Oral
Law Judaism illegitimate, they deemed it outdated, an anachronism that must change with the times.

They pictured their

types of Judaism as succeeding the antiquated Oral Law tradition, and leading the Jews of America and elsewhere through
the Space Age and ages to come.

..

Reform and Conservative Judaism are posited in the
present analysis as competing with Oral Law Judaism for the
allegiance of the Jewish people.

It is this theoretical

competitive factor which would place these groups conceptually
on par with other anti-Jewish groups throughout history.
The competitive nature of these Jewish groups is not obvious
for their purported intent at their inception was not to aggressively displace Oral Law Judaism (as other anti-Jewish
movements have explicitly declared)

but rather to provide

for the Jewish people, particularly in America, a viable
and adaptable modern form of Judaism.

They allegedly were

not attempting to uproot traditional Judaism, but rather to
Provide a positive spiritual experience for Twentieth-Century
American Jewry who could "obviously" not adapt the American
lifestyle to Oral Law Judaism.

Therefore, there was appar-

ently no conflict of interests and no real competition, for
these ~odern movements were presumably not competing with
Oral Law Judaism but rather attempting to save those millions
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of Jews who, without a viable alternative would have left
Judaism completely.
Accordingly, these movements should not be depicted
as competing with Orthodoxy, but rather as complementary
forms of Judaism whose purported goals did not conflict with
oral Law Judaism.

According to their claims, they were not

trying to sever the Jews' relationship with traditional Judaism, but were rather attempting to save those Jews who presumably could not adapt.

Although this was their claim,

the following three arguments present evidence which tends
to support the theory that these movements (i.e., the leaders
of the movements) were more interested in breaking with traditional Or al Law Judaism than they were in providing Amer ica.n
Jewry with a positive spiritual experience.
1.

Their claim to succeed Oral-Law Judaism was based

on the alleged inability of traditional Judaism to adjust and
adapt to the American way of life.

Historically, in complete

contradiction to their claim (as delineated above) the only
Jewish movement to ever adapt (i.e., adaptation as a viable
contemporary Jewish entity within the majority non-Jewish
population) to all types of cultures and societies throughout
history was the very same so-called unadaptable form of Judaism known as the Oral Law tradition.

Therefore, either the

Reform and Conservative leaders were ignorant of Jewish history or_ else the claim was a trumped up canard used to rationalize their break with tradition.

The spuriousness of their
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claim is so glaring that it is amazing how so few writers have
taken these movements to task on it.

(In fact, literally

millions of Jews in the post World War II period seemingly
accepted their claim as fact.

The argument that Reform and

conservative leaders' understanding of history was different
than the understanding previously introduced implies that
the transition from Central and Eastern Europe to America
was qualitatively more pronounced than Jewish migrations in
the past.

It is the author's belief that to assume that

the mass Jewish immigration to America was more diverse in
type than, for example, the Jewish mass migration from Judea
to Babylonia or from Babylonia to Spain, Spain to Western and
Central Europe, or from Western and Central Europe to the
Slavic lands of Russia appears historically unfounded.
2.

The second argument which casts serious doubt

on the Reform and Conservative leaders' original intention
concerns the "at tempt" made by these leaders to adapt the
tenets of traditional Judaism to the new American lifestyle.
Even if we do credit. the Reform and Conservative leaders
with an abysmal

ignorance of Jewish history, the question

still needed to be asked is how much of an effort was made,
and how many generations of Jews in America had passed before
these leaders concluded that traditonal Oral Law Judaism
was passe and unadaptable.
is nil.

The answers to both questions

Support for the above argument is based on the number

Of Jews residing in America during the turn of the century.
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In 1880, and 1900 the percentage of Jews in America was approximately 5 and 15 percent respectively of what it was in
1972.

This astonishing growth rate was on account of the

mass immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe (Gartner, 1983).
The mores and language of America was completely foreign to
these immigrants whose primary (and sometimes only) thought
was to provide their families with food and shelter.

In

essence their lifestyle was and remained primarily Eastern
.. European and the only thing that tangibly changed was their
new residence.

It was their children, the first generation

of Jews en masse born in America who had the first opportunity
to create an optimal synthesis between traditional Judaism
and the American way of life.

(The number of Jews who arrived

from Germany in the 184 Os was insignificant in comparison
with the number of Eastern European Jews who arrived at the
turn of the century.

In addition, these German Jews brought

with them the religious "tradition" of Reform Judaism.)
This opportunity was never capitalized on,

for

the first

generation-born Jews in America, who started raising families
of their own immediately preceding and following World war

II, followed the Reform and Conservative leaders' claim concerning the unadaptability of traditional Judaism.

In es-

sence, this was the first generation of Jews in America who
had the opportunity to test Oral Law Judaism's resilience,
but in~tead accepted their mentors' ahistorical and non-empirical claims concerning the "dated" Judaism of their fore-
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fathers.

Further statistical support for the above anal-

ysis is that from 1940 to 1968 the total number of Jewish
families in America affiliated with the Reform movement grew
from 59, 000 to 260,000

(Schwartzman, 1971), and over the

same span of time the conservative movement grew even faster
(Sklare, 1983).
3.

Reform and Conservative Judaism are not too dis-

similar from other Jewish sects in the past (e.g., Saduccees,
' Bitosim, and Karaites)

whose objective (which was fully

realized only after the damage was done) was to abrogate
the binding authority of the Oral Law in order to free themselves from the "antiquated" and restraining precepts of
their forefathers.

Officially, both Reform and Conservative

Judaism do not "believe" that the Oral Law was given by G-d,
and in regards to the Written Law (the Pentateuch) there is
a variation of opinion within the groups themselves.

This

denial of the Divine nature of the Oral Law (and to a lesser
degree the Written Law) should not be taken lightly for it
implies ( 1) that the redactors of the Talmud (the Sages)
~

(to suggest that Reform and Conservative leaders knew

ancient Jewish history better than the Sages who lived 1,500
to 2,200 years prior, is ludicrous) when they officially
stated that the Oral Law was given by G-d (e.g., Talmud Tractate Shabbos 31A, Tractate Berochot SA, and Tractate Gittin
60B) , and that some or most of the multiple places throughout
the Pentateuch where it states "And G-d spoke to Moses" (and
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other varied introductions with the same expressed meaning)
is a fabrication.

(To claim that these statements are open

to interpretation like other more obscure passages in the
Talmud and Bible is to deny objective communication among
people, and in a sense objective reality), and (2) that the
millions of Jewish men, women, and children who were savagely
raped, pillaged, tortured and murdered throughout hi story
only because they believed the Oral .and Written Law were
given by G-d were dead wrong.
The present author is not claiming to support or
refute the Reform and Conservative leaders' assertions on
the above point, but is rather attempting to illustrate the
crucial implications of their seemingly benign ideology.
In essence, to "save" Jewish souls from completely assimilating they did not need to deviate so substantively in religious perspective. However, to intentionally sever the Jewish
people's relationship to the Oral Law tradition this strategy
of perspective was of utmost importance.
In light of the above, it may be argued that Reform
and Conservative leaders were more intent on breaking with
the Oral Law tradition (and replacing it with their own form
Of Judaism) than they were with developing an intellectuallyhonest form of Judaism in America.

In fact, their call to

break with traditional Judaism (by positing and emphasizing
its "u~daptabili ty")

seems to be inextricably intertwined

With the firm establishment of their own movements; which
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is not dissimilar, in procedure, from anti-Jewish movements
throughout history.
It is important to remember that American Reform
and Conservative Judaism are products of nineteenth and twentieth-century America, whose "justification" in breaking
with Oral Law tradition was that it was deemed unadaptable
to contemporary life in America (Sklare, 1983; Liebman,
1983).

Following therefrom, the Oral Law tradition in 1985

America should be a dying breed (if at all still in existence), and in contrast 1 the more "modern" Reform and Conservative movements should be the dynamic forces propelling
American Jewry today.

However, if the present hypothesis is

correct the reverse (concerning present day young adult Jewish America who are, in the vast majority of cases, first
and second generation American born) may be occurring.

he

present study's first empirical analysis is to pit Reform
and Conservative claims against the arguments presented
above.

Simply speaking, if these movements' assertions are

correct, then the affiliation of second generation Americanborn Jews should support their claim.

In short, second gen-

eration American-born Jews should have significantly abandoned
the "outmoded" and "unadaptable" Oral Law tradition.

Con-

versely, if their claims were originally specious, with the
ulterior intent of displacing Oral Law Judaism, then traditional Judaism should be in the process of adapting itself
to American society (as it has done in every culture through-
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out millennia).

[See Figure. 1 where four groups differ-

entiated on the variable of religious affiliation are compared
on (1) rate of inter-movement increase or decrease over one
2..eneration, and

-

(2)

overall growth rate over one genera-

tion.]
In addition, if these two Jewish movements are truly

complementary forms of Judaism only interested

in saving

Jews who seemingly cannot adapt Orthodoxy to the American
· scene, then they themselves should be growing (or at least
maintaining themselves).
ent theory,

In contrast, according to the pres-

if these movements are not complementary but

rather competing for Jewish supremacy, in which their original
objective was more to wean Jews from the Oral Law than to
create something spiritually positive themselves, then their
movements should have had difficulty in maintaining themselves
over the last genera ti on (i.e., lack of positive spirituality
should produce a lack of commitment among their respective
Jewish constituencies).

[See Figure 1]

Other Hypotheses to be Tested Empirically
According to the present theoretical analysis the
Orthodox (Oral Law) presence should represent a competitive
· threat to Reform and Conservative Judaism.
its popularity, wealth, or power

Not because of

(it is probably least in

all three categories), but its continuous presence is seen
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A.

Differences In Maintenance Among Jewish Religious Groups
in America

Independent Variable

Dependent Variables

Jewish Religious Group
Affiliation:
A.
B.

Non-Affiliated
Reform
Conservative
Orthodox (Oral Law)

c.
o.

B.

1. Inter-Movement
Rate of IncreaseDecrease Over One
Genration
2. Overall GrowthRa te Over One
Generation

Differences in Relationship to the Land of Israel

Independent Variable

Dependent Variables

Jewish Religious Group
Affiliation:

1. Intention to
settle in Israel

A.
B.
C.
D.

Non-Affiliated
Reform
Conservative
Orthodox

2. Number of Visits
to Israel
3. Attitudes
towards Israel
4. Knowledge of
Arab-Israeli
Conflict

c.

Differences in Fundamental Knowledge of Judaism

Independent Variable

Dependent Variable

Jewish Religous Group
Affiliation:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Non-Affiliated
Reform
Conservative
Orthodox

Figure· 1.

1. Level of Fundamental and El emen tar y Knowledge
of Judaism

Diagramatic Representation of Variables Under
Empirical Investigation for Chapter I
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as silently challenging the legitimate nature of the two other
Jewish religious movements.
Obviously the threat of Oral Law Judaism cannot be
dealt with in the same manner as in the past (via non-Jewish
movements), for they would perforce, be proclaiming their
own illegitimacy.

Their level of attack must be considerably

more concealed, but (according to the theory) equally as
desperate as their precedessors.

Following therefrom, they

·· should attempt to attack Jewish nationalism and/or the Torah
in order to quell the Oral Law (Jewish) competitive threat.
They logically would not strike out against the Jewish collective body for they would be reducing their own potential
constituency (which apparently contradicts their purpose in
being), but by significantly reducing the Jewish people's
relationship to the Land and/or knowledge of Torah, would
in effect, be suppressing the competition and concomitantly
be given the opportunity to legitimize their own gods (i.e.,
by rewriting the traditional laws of antiquity they have in
essence established for themselves new gods).
Correspondingly, the ideologies of both the ·Reform
and Conservative movements today officially emphasize their
tangible positive relationship to the Land of Israel.

For

example, on the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding
of the Hebrew Union College (The Reform movement's institution
for training American rabbis)

in 1975 the Reform movement

issued their statement of principles called the Centenary
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perspective and proclaimed in connection to the Land and
state of Israel

. ·'

we are privileged to live in an extraordinary time, one
in which a third Jewish commonwealth has been established
in our people's ancient homeland. We are bound to that
land and to the newly reborn State of Israel by innumerable religious and ethnic ties. We have been enriched
by its culture and ennobled by its indomitable spirit.
we see it providing unique opportunities for Jewish selfexpression. We have both a stake and a responsibility
in building the State of Israel, assuring the security
and defining its Jewish character. We encourage aliya
(immigration) for those who wish to find maximum personal
fulfillment in the cause of Zion (Rosenthal, 1978, pp. 6970) •

The Conservative movement 1 ike its Reform counterpart
has also declared officially its inexorable relationship to
the Land of Israel.

For example one of its founding fathers

Solomon Schechter was active in the Zionist Organization of
America and was a delegate at several Zionist congresses
and conventions.

As early as 1928 the Conservative Rabbinical

· Assembly at its annual convention pub! icly called for support
of colonists in Palestine and aid to the Zionist movement
(Rosenthal, 1978).

Rabbi Robert Gordis (1978) one of the

leading proponents today of the Conservative movement writes:
In particular, no other aspect of Jewish experience is
even remotely comparable to the impact of the people
and the State of Israel in rekindling the "spark of the
Jew" in the hearts of our youth the world over.
In a
world that has seemed to vow death and destruction for
the Jewish people, Israel has given us a new gift of
life.
(p. 100)
The affinity to the modern secular state of Israel
should_be all the more intense among Reform and Conservative
constituencies in that Israel's official policy, like their

99

own, is not bound (in the great majority of situations) by
oral Law tradition (although approximately 20 percent of
the state could be described as Oral Law adherents).

Accord-

ingly, there should be no significant differences among the
adherents of the three movements concerning their relationship
to the Land of Israel.

However, according to the present

theory, any movement whose

leg~timacy

is threatened by the

Jewish "phenomenon" as reflected in (1) national ism,
·' Torah, and (3)

(2)

the Jewish presence would perforce, strike

out at one or more of the phenomenon's components.

If the

Reform and Conservative movements are truly competitive (and
not complementary)

forms of Judaism, then these movements

should be psychologically pressured to sever any real relationship their adherents may have to the Land (even if it
contradicts their official platform).

Following therefrom,

the present study expects to find a significantly weaker
relationship among adherents of Reform and Conservative
Judaism than among their Oral Law counterparts.
It should be mentioned at this point that the type
of data collected in the present study (irrespective of outcome) are not sufficient to conclusively support the above
hypothesis (alternative interpretations will be discussed
in Chapter VI, Conclusions).

However, these data are neces-

sary to support the hypothesis, and conversely sufficient to
refute it (i.e., if Reform or Conservative adherents have
as strong or stronger a relationship to the Land as their
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oral Law counterparts, then the present theory's validity
is seriously suspect).

[See Figure 1 where four groups dif-

ferentiated on the variable of religious affiliation are
compared on (1) intention to ever settle in Israel, (2) visits
to Israel,

(3) attitudes towards Israel, and (4) knowledge

of the Arab-Israeli conflict.]
Jewish Education (The Torah)

..

Jewish education is another area where the official
platforms of all three movements converge.

In theory, all

consider a broad Jewish education to be a highly important
aspect of Judaism.

For example, in the Guiding Principles

of Reform Judaism, which was accepted by the Reform movement
in 193 7, its emphasis on Jewish education was clearly asserted:

"The perpetuation of Judaism as a living force de-

pends upon religious knowledge and upon the education of
each new generation in our rich cultural and spiritual heritage" (Schwartzman, 1971).
The Conservative emphasis on Jewish education was put
down very succinctly by Rabbi Robert Gordis (1978)

in his

Seven Principles of Conservative Judaism in Principle No. 4:
Jewish knowledge is the privilege and duty of every
Jew, not merely of the rabbi and the scholar. A Hebrewless Judaism that has surrendered to ignorance and has
ceased to create new cultural and spiritual values, is
a contradiction in terms, and must perish of spiritual
anemia. The regular study of Torah on whatever level
is incumbent on every Jew, a supreme commandment second
to none.
(p. 217)
Although officially all three movements encourage the
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strengthening of the Jewish spirit via Jewish education,
according to the present theory this should not be realized
in practice.

If Reform and Conservative Judaism are psycho-

logically forced to uproot the traditionally competitive
Jewish presence, their "best interests" would be served (contrary to their official platforms) by uprooting traditional
Jewish knowledge.

Following therefrom, the present study

hypothesizes that the followers of Reform and Conservative
· • Judaism wi 11 be significantly less knowledgable about fund amental and elementary Judaism than their Oral Law kin.

(It

is important to emphasize that here also these data collected
are not sufficient to conclusively support the present hypothesis, but are sufficient to refute it.) [See Figure 1
where four groups differentiated on the variable of religious
affiliation are compared on the level of fundamental and
elementary Jewish knowledge.]
In conclusion, the above historical analysis has
helped delineate the reoccurring process of anti-Jewish hostility, and in consequence a theory has been developed which
lends itself to empirical support.

The theory as yet, falls

short for it only describes the primary root cause of the
malady, without explaining how or why the common people,
the masses, have turned against the Jews so vehemently
throughout the ages.

It appears farfetched to compare the

masses' motivation to the motivation of the leaders.
Historically, the common people's savage at tacks
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against Jews seem to be motivated by constant misinformation
and slander about Jews and Judaism.

The primary catalyst

remains the Jewish "threat" but lies and their dissemination
seem to be needed in order to push the masses into action.
Slander about Jews and Judaism would then be considered a
secondary cause of anti-Jewish hostility affecting the
masses.

Without the masses' assistance the leaders' efforts

to destroy the Jewish phenomenon would be greatly hampered.
In the following two Chapters the hypothesized secondary

(Chapter II) and tertiary (Chapter III) caus,es of

anti-Jewish hostility will be explored.

It is important to

keep in mind that in exposing the multiple lies used against
the Jewish people throughout history we are indirectly lending
support to the above theory.

Lies are only necessary when

truth is too embarrassing or unbearable to utter, but paradoxi'cally, the more lies, the clearer the truth actually
becomes.

CHAPTER II
THE HYPOTHESIZED SECONDARY CAUSES OF
ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY
Several theories have been advanced to explain the
phenomenon of anti-Jewish hostility.

According to Gordon

·Allport (1954), in his book The Nature of Prejudice the theorist usually selects for special emphasis one of six approaches to explain the forces operating in the formation
of prejudice.
torical,
namic,

(2) sociocultural,

(5)

approach.

These six general categories are:
(3) situational,

phenomenological, and

(6)

(1) his-

(4) psychody-

the stimulus object

Although the present analysis cannot claim that

all of the above categories are theroetically and simultaneously operative in the etiology of anti-Jewish hostility,
it may be able to integrate most of these theory types if
depicted hierarchically.
analysis a primary factor

According to the above historical
in the etiology of anti-Jewish

hostility could be considered psychodynamic in nature.

The

Jewish "competitive threat," as explained above is usually
created by the anti-Jewish movements' unrelenting drive to
totally dominate (both physically and spiritually) in which
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the Jews' relationship to their G-d (as specifically manifested in three forms)

p~esents

a formidable impasse.

It is interesting to note the correspondence between
the above historical analysis and the widely acclaimed psychodynamic interpretation of prejudice which focuses on the
"Authoritarian" personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950).

Regarding some features which char-

acterize the authoritarian character type Erich Fromm (1941)
· · writes:
• The most important feature to be mentioned is the
attitude towards power. For the authoritarian character,
there exists, so to speak, two sexes: the powerful ones
and the powerless ones. His love, admiration and readiness for submission are automatically aroused by power,
whether of a person or an institution. (pp. 44-45)
Maslow (1943) further corroborates the above historical analysis by postulating the basic philosophy or worldview. of the authoritarian personality.

He states:

Like other psychologically insecure people, the authoritarian person 1 ives in a world which may be conceived
to be pictured by him as a sort of jungle in which man's
hand is necessarily against every other man, in which
the whole world is conceived of as dangerous, threatening,
or at least challenging, and in which human beings are
conceived of as primarily selfish or evil or stupid.
To carry the analogy further, this jungle is peopled
with animals, who either eat or are eaten, who are either
to be feared or despised. One's safety lies in one's
own strength and this strength consists primarily in
the power to dominate. (p. 46)
T.

w.

Adorno (1950) further interprets the dynamics

of the relationship between the "Authoritarian" personality
and hostility toward the Jewish people in reference to the
Jews' "intolerable" instituted separateness.

He elucidates
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in the following the "Authoritarian" personality makeup:
• • • they are highly projective and suspicious. An affinity to psychosis cannot be overlooked:
they are
"paranoid."
To them, prejudice is all-important:
it
is a means to escape acute mental diseases by collectivization, and by building up a pseudoreality against
which their agressiveness can be directed without any
overt violation of the "reality princple." Stereotypy
is decisive: it works as a kind of social corroboration
of their projective formulae, and is therefore institutionalized to a degree often approaching religious be1 iefs • • • • In order to confirm to each other their
pseudoreality, they are likely to form sects, often with
some panacea of "nature," which corresponds to their
projective notion of the Jew as eternally bad and spoiling
the purity of the natural.
Ideas of conspiracy play a
large role:
They do not hesitate to attribute to the
Jews a quest for world domination, and' they are 1 ikely
to swear by the Elders of Zion (an early twentieth century Czarist Russian forgery alleging a Jewish conspiracy
to control the world).
(p. 765)
According to Sanford, Adorno, Frenkel-Br.unswick,
and Levinson (1950):
• • • hostility that was originally aroused by and directed towards ingroup authority is displaced unto out9roups • • • the authoritarian must, out of an inner
necessity, turn his aggression against outgroups.
He
must do so because he is psychologically unable to attack
ingroup authorities.
(p. 233)
The above statements when super imposed on the present
problem implies that it may not be Jews or Judaism per se
that so frustrates the ruling power, but rather their inab i 1 i ty

(and

the frustration which follows therefrom)

create the'ir desired form of society.

to

In essence, it seems

to be their own failure to create a smoothly running society
which then breeds discontent among the masses, and correspondingly calls into question their divine authority which
so disturbs and frustrates these leaders.

To forcefully
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and explicitly silence the questioning within their own group
would be to openly cast doubt on their self-proclaimed divinity.

This ultimate frustration is then best displaced on

some out-group, whose antagonistic nature is not too dissimilar in kind from those disturbing "voices" within their own
fol lowing.

In addition, attacking the out-group would be

more easily rationalized as something positive and may in
the process help to create an artificial unification among
members of the in-group.

In consequence, this hypothesized

unification based on some external "competitive threat" may
help suppress internally any physical or spiritual challenge
that may arise.
On a secondary level, the ways and means by which
these leaders have been able to foster general animosity
towards Jews has been via the simple but vile tactic called
slander.

It is the author's opinion that only through the

incessant propagation of malicious lies have leaders succeeded
in directing the anger of the masses at Judaism and at the
Jew.

According to the above categorization then, the second-

ary causes of anti-Jewish hostility would be phenomenologicalhistorical in nature.

Phenomenological in the respect that

a person's prejudiced behavior proceeds immediately from
his view of the situation confronting him, and his reactions
to the world correspond to his definition of that world (Allport, 1954) •.
tions,

The propagation of misinformation, misconcep-

and outright lies have precipitated anti-Jewish
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activity consistently throughout history (Flannery, 1965).
As Josef Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda expert and leading
proponent of the Big-Lie tactic claimed, "If a lie is repeated
often enough, it will come to be perceived as truth" (Cohen,
1984, p. 22).

In fact, according to the research done over

the last twenty-five years, negative stereotyping has often
been found to be related to anti-Jewish prejudice (Bettelheim
& Janowitz, 1964; and Quinley & Glock, 1983).

It is historical in the sense that a continuous bombardment of anti-Jewish slander over the centuries has seemed
to set the stage for subsequent slander and its bel ievabili ty.

Correspondingly, just as present-day slander needs

the support of prior slander in order to effect the desired
results, so do present truths need the staunch backing of
prior truths.

Therefore before describing the present propa-

ganda being used against the Jewish people today it is important to note their historical antecedents.

Accordingly,

the following exposition will attempt to reveal several general-historical forms of slander oftentimes used to wreak
havoc on the Jews, and only afterwards will attempt to describe contemporary slander and its potentially dire consequences.

At the conclusion of this chapter an empirical

study will be presented with the proposed objective of studying (with the hope of effectively countering) the anti-Jewish
propag~nda

programs of today.

It may be difficult for some people to accept the
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premise that truth can be so totally manipulated.

On a common

sense level it may sound absurd that large populations of
individuals throughout history have literally believed that
"up is down and down is up" w):}en it comes to Jews.

In order

to make the following anti-Jewish exposition more believable
the slander heaped on another target group (the United States
of America) will be briefly described.
In his address to the Assembly of Captive European
· Nations (September, 1984), Constantine Visoianu, Former Ministe:tM'of Foreign Affairs of Rumania stated:
The United States is one of the very rare guiltless
powers. America has set free territories that were under
its jurisdiction; it has assisted in the liberation of
many nations; it has helped almost every country you
can name to save its independence and to restore its
economy.
In one way or another the United States has
displayed a generosity that is without parallel in history.
Now let us look at Soviet Russia. That country has
set at nought every treaty it has ever signed; it has
violated every principle of international law; it has
never ceased working by subversive means to overturn the
political order and to destroy the independence of other
countries; it has, most notably of all, subjugated by
force nine countries of Europe, each of which has an
impressive record of freedom and independence.
It can
be asserted without hesitation that Soviet Russia's aggressions are ummatched both in number and in scope.
And yet the United States is criticized and suspected
throughout the greater part of the world, whereas Soviet
Russia has become the champion--if you please--of antiimper ial ism and anti-colonialism, and the defender of
the independence of states (Dunham, 1961, pp. xiii-xiv).
From 1960 to 1980 the powerful Soviet propaganda machine, which is rigorously deployed throughout the world,
religiously disseminated "information" which consistently
accused the United States of exploiting the developing world,
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e,romoting the Cold War, opposing Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks

(SALT), etc.

(Shultz

&

Godson, 1984).

The United

states, not unlike the Jewish people throughout history, is
not the Soviet's scapegoat but rather the Soviet's most formidable adversary.

America represents one of the last real

threats standing between Soviet Russia and total world domination.

It is within this context that a brief (non-exhaus-

tive) historical review of slander used against the Jewish
· · people beg ins.
Ancient Egyptian and Persian
Anti-Jewish Teachings
Consistent with the historical analysis in Chapter
I, the propagation of misinformation concerning Jews originates in ancient Egypt.

It should be reemphasized

that

only 80 years before Pharaoh (King of Egypt) began offering
his "reasons" for enslaving the Jews (Miller, 1968), Joseph
the son of Jacob (Israel) had singlehandedly saved Egypt
from ruination.

In addition, Jewish tradition relates how

the Hebrews had made themselves integral features of cosmpolitan Egypt (Midrash-Tanchuma), and also their patriotic activity in respect for Pharaoh himself (Talmud-Tractate Sotah
lla).

Despite the above setting, Pharaoh, emperor of the

most powerful and cultured nation of the world (during that
particular time period) and self-proclaimed divinity (MidrashShemot rabbah) declared:
Behold, the people of the children of Israel are too
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many and too mighty for us [they had arrived eighty years
earlier with no more than seventy males 1; come let us
deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come
to pass, that, when there happens any war, they will
join our enemies, and fight against us (Exodus 1:9-10).
Haman (the prime minister of the vast empire of Persia), with the explicit intent of totally annihilating all
of Jewry, convinced King Achasverosh with the following argument:
There is a certain people scattered abroad and dispersed
among the people in all the provinces • • • and their
laws are diverse from those of every people, neither
keep they the king's laws, therefore it profiteth not
the king to suffer them (Ester 3:8).
The speciousness of Haman's argument is that according to
the Laws themselves, there is "an obligation upon all Jews
to follow the civil laws of the ruling country in which they
reside (Talmud, Tractate Gittin lOB).
Greek and Roman Anti-Jewish Propaganda
Hecataeus of Abdera, a Greek historian of the early
third century B.C.E. in an account of Jewish origins asserted
that Moses "in remembrance of the exile of his people, insti tuted for them a misanthropic and inhospitable way of
life" (Reinach, 1895).

Manetho, an Egyptian priest and his-

tor ian, embroidered the story by describing how the Jews,
who were in "actuality" Egyptian lepers and diseased, were
expelled by the Egyptian king and led by Moses who taught
them impudently "not to adore the gods"

(Reinach, 1895).

The themes of leprous origins and misanthropy were rarely
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absent from Greek and Roman anti-Jewish literature (Flannery,
1968).

It is important to note that the allegation of mis-

anthrophy was also employed against the early Christians
(Flannery, 1968).

Democritus, in his On the Jews, following

his predecessors, claimed that Jews adore the golden head
of an ass and, according to the historian Suidas, charged
that "every seven years they capture a stranger, lead him
to their Temple, and immolate him by cutting his flesh into
small pieces" (Reinach, 18 95).

The infamous "ritual murder"

libel was born which (in various forms), was to be used
<ti'

against the early Christians and again against the Jews from
the twelfth century on.

This ritual murder libel would even-

tually leave an untold trail of Jewish blood in its wake
(Flannery, 1965).
According to Flannery (1965) Roman fabrications concerning Jews can be traced back to Cicero in 59 B.C.E.

Oc-

casion to display his feelings was presented in a trial for
the defense of a Roman official Flaccus who had despoiled
the Jewish treasury.

"Their kind of religion and rites,"

he stated
has nothing in common with the splendor of the empire,
the gravity of our name, and the institutions of our
ancestors • • • and, conquered and enslaved, how little
the immortal gods care for them (Flannery, 1965, p. 19).
The full realization of Roman anti-Jewish slander was expressed well by Tacitus.

According to this celebrated his-

torian· Jews descended from lepers expelled from Egypt, and

112
followed a band of wild asses out of the desert.
repugnant origins the Jewish rites were derived.

From

the~e

According

to Tacitus Jews worship the ass, which is "consecrated in
Jewish temples."

They abstain from pork in remembrance of

their leprosy, an affliction to which the pig, Tacitus
thought, is subject.

Their use of unleavened bread on Pass-

over symbolizes the food they stole in Egypt, their Sabbath
represents the day on which they escaped and to which in
their indolence became attached.

The other institutions of

theirs are "sinister, shameful, and have survived only because
of their perversity" (Flannery, 1965).

It is interesting

to note that as Christianity became more and more differentiated from Judaism in the second and third centuries they
were likewise fanatically accused by Roman writers of ritual
murder, infanticide, sexual perversion, worshipping an ass,
and cannibalism (Grosser et al., 1978).
Christian Anti-Jewish Propaganda
Christian anti-Jewish slander, consistent with the
above historical description of Christian anti-Jewish hostility (see Chapter I), does not appear to lay at the base
of Christianity.

It seems that the most vicious and destruc-

tive vilification of Jews by the Church came about decades
(and possibly even centuries) after Jesus and his Apostles
had laid the foundations of Christianity.

Only after Chris-

tianity had severed its integral relationship to Judaism
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did Pontius Pilate, known throughout history for his ruthlessness, become vindicated in his execution of Jesus (Goldberg,
1979).

Accordingly, early Gospels do not single out the Jews

in general as at fault for the crucifixion, but the last in
the series of Gospels to be written down does, and ironically
turns out to be the most anti-Jewish and pro-Roman of the
Gospels (Goldberg, 1979).

Hence, Pontius Pilate, the Roman

ruler, is sympathetically portrayed in deferring to Jewish
· · · pressure, a deference he failed to exhibit in his other dealings with the Jews (Goldberg, 1979).

This image of the Jew

as Christ killer (until of course, he or she converts) became
the foundation and progenitor for multitudes of ritual murder,
desecration of the Host, and Jew as Devil charges.

These

libels continued for 1,500 years and accounted for countless
occurrences of pillage, rape, torture, and slaughter (Flannery, 1965; Grosser et al., 1978; Ruether, 1974; and Trachtenberg, 1943) •
In light of the injury the portrayal of the Jew as
Christ killer has wreaked, a brief exposition of its inaccuracy is deemed necessary.

First, crucifixion was never a

Jewish form of punishment.

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 49B) spe-

cifically describes the legal forms of capital punishment,
and crucifixion is not one of them.

This was a Roman form

of punishment, used by Romans to kill enemies of the state.
In fact, during the siege of Jerusalem, the Romans crucified
as many as five hundred Jews a day (Goldberg, 197 9) •

As
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for the alleged influence of the Pharisees (i.e., Oral Law
adherents) on the Roman ruler to carry out the crucifixion,
the English churchman James Parkes in his book Anti-Semitism
writes concerning the Christian Clergy:
With sublime indifference to the evidence of the Synoptic
Gospels themselves (which contain no mention of the Pharisees in the events of the arrest, trial, and death of
Jesus) they lay the blame for the crucifixion on Pharisaic
shoulders (Goldberg, 1979, p. 55).
The Catholic Church in 1965 finally put to rest much
· of this destructive falsehood with its statement on the Jews
issued by the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council.

According

to The Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to NonChr istian Religions it was offically declared that the crucifix ion of Jesus
cannot be charged against all the Jews, ~ithout distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today. Although
the Church is the new people of G-d, the Jews should
not be presented as rejected or accursed, as if this
followed from the Holy Scriptures (Goldberg, 1979,
p. 57).

Vatican II finally broke the long-standing theme of Jewish
collective and eternal complicity in the crucifixion of
Christ, but in the process much immeasurable destruction and
suffering was wrought.
Muslim Anti-Jewish Propaganda
Unlike Christianity, the negative stereotype of the
Jew in Islamic literature is as old as the religion itself.
In fact, one need not go further than the Ouran (i.e., Islam's
sacred texts believed to contain the revelations made by
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Allah to Mohammad) to understand. Islam's official stereotype
of the Jew (and Christian) which has given rise to severe
oppression over the centuries.

Not only has Islamic dogma

led to a life of degradation and insecurity for Jews in Muslim
lands (as depicted above in Chapter I), but since the inception of Israel in 1948, has been used to justify the ongoing
attempt to liquidate the Jewish state.
Muhammad charged the Jews with falsifying their Bible
· by deliberately omitting the prophecies of his coming.

And when a book came unto them from G-d, confirming the
scriptures which were with them, although they had prayed
for assistance against those who believed not, yet when
that came into them which they knew to be from G-d, they
would not belief therein: therefore the curse of God
shall be on the infidels (Quran:
in Grosser et al.,
1978, p. 376).
In several other places in the Quran Muhammad speaks
unabashedly about the "vile disbelieving" Jews.

"•

• • they

brought on themselves indignation on indignation; and the
unbelievers shall suffer an ignominous punishment" (Quran:
in Grosser et al., 1978, p. 376).
They are smitten with vileness wheresoever they are
found; unless they obtain security by entering into a
treaty with G-d [i.e., convert to Islam] • • • and they
draw on themselves indignation from G-d, and they are
afflicted with poverty. This they suffer, because they
disbelieved the signs of G-d, and slew the prophets unjustly; this because they are rebellious, and transgressed
(Quran: in Grosser et al., 1978, p. 376).
"Thou shall surely find the most violent of all men
in enmity against the true believers to be the Jews, and
the

id~laters"

(Quran:

Grosser et al., 1978. p.

37~).
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Muhammad also declared that Jews, as their Christian
counterparts, were not true monotheists, a charge he supported
by claiming

that the Jews believed the prophet Ezra to be

the son of G-d.

..

"The Jews say:

• God assail them!

Ezra is the son of God'

How they are perverted!" (Quran

9:30) ."

Russian and Communist Anti-Jewish
Propaganda
The father of Marxist ideology and modern Communism
was Karl Heinrich Marx (1818-1883).

Marx's father had con-

verted to Christianity before Karl's birth in order to retain
his law practice (forbidden to Jews under the new Prussian
laws), and baptized his children so that they would not have
to suffer from further anti-Jewish legislation.

It was into

this identity negating world that Marx was born (Prager et
al.,

1983).

The poisonous anti-Jewish rhetoric sowed by

the great "emancipator" was to set an intellectual precedent
which would be subsequently manipulated to "justify" the
ongoing Communist oppression of Soviet Jewry, and denunciation
of Jewry worldwide.
On the Jewish Question Marx writes:
Let us consider the real Jew: not the Sabbath Jew
• • • but the everyday Jew.
Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion,
but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real
Jew.
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
need, self interest. What is the worldly cult of the
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
Very well: then in emancipating itself from huckster-
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ing and money, and thus from real and practical Judaism,
our age would emancipate itself • • • •
We discern in Judaism, therefore, a universal antisocial element of the present time, whose historical
development, zealously aided in its harmful aspects by
the Jews, has now attained its culminating point, a point
at which it must necessarily begin to disintegrate.
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews
is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism • • • •
Money is the jealous god of Israel, beside which no
other god may exist • • • •
The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation
of society from Judaism (emphasis added).
(In Fisch,
1984, pp. 173-174).
Lest the reader believe that Russian anti-Jewish

.'

slander originated with the advent of the Russian revolution,
it is important to note other vile misinformation Russian
governments had previously disseminated.

The infamous govern-

ment instigated pogroms (1881-1906) which destroyed hundreds
of Jewish communities (Grosser et al., 1978) was blamed (by
the Czarist government)

on Jewish "exploitation" of the

peas.ants, and on Jews as Christ-killers (Flannery, 1965).
The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion the forgery of the century was the handiwork of Czarist Russia (Flannery, 1965).

The Protocols first appeared in 1905 printed

by the government press and were alleged to be extracts from
the 1897 world Zionist Congress in Basel which dealt with
plans to conquer the world that date back to King Solomon
in 929 B.C.E.

In essence, the Protocols were claimed to be

a series of lectures on plans and techniques for subjugating
the

worl~

and establishing a Jewish world state (this alleged

Jewish· conspiracy was similar to its medieval forerunner,
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where the Jews were held responsible for the Black Death
in their "attempt" to destroy all of Christendom) •

Despite

the Protocols' exposure as a crude forgery they received
excited attention throughout Europe and beyond, and reached
their peak of influence in Nazi Germany (Flannery, 1965).
During the Russian revolution (1917) and subsequent
Civil War it is estimated that over 250,000 Jewish civilians
perished.

These civilians were slaughtered primarily by

the Ukranians and the Whites who were convinced of the Jewish
communist nature (Grosser et al., 1978).

It is interesting

to note that these "avid Marxist-Communist" Jews according
to the Russian Whites, were none other than the same "exploiting capitalists," as described in length by Marx himself.
Nazi Anti-Jewish Propaganda
The foundation for most (if not all) of the pathological lies used by Nazi Germany to "justify" the annihilation of six million Jews can be found in Hitler's Mein Kampf.
Mein Kampf, which Hitler wrote in 1923-1924 while serving a
prison term, was an attempt by Hitler to put his ideas together in the form of an autobiography, ideological doctrine,
and party manual all in one.

The following are excerpts

from Mein Kampf taken from Lucy Davidowicz's (1975) classic
The War Against the Jews which vividly describe, along with
the ludicrous lie's, Hitler's unrelenting paranoia of the
Jewish.presence.
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The effect of Jewry will be racial tuberculosis of
nations. (p. 21)
If the Jews were alone in this world, they would
stifle in filth and offal. (p. 24)
Concerning democracy, he stated "only the Jew can
praise an institution which is as dirty and false as he himself" (p. 26).
"The Jewish doctrine of Marxism," Hitler contended,
rejects "the aristocratic principle of Nature."

The goal

· of Marxism "is and remains the destruction of all non-Jewish
national states."

Marxism itself, Hitler believed "system-

atically plans to hand the world over to the Jews" (p. 26).
It is the inexorable Jew who struggles for his domination over nations. No nation can remove this hand
from its throat except by the sword. Only the assembled
and concentrated might of a national passion rearing up
in its strength can defy the international enslavement
of peoples. Such a process is and remains a bloody one.
The Jew would really devour the people of the earth,
would become their master.
,
The international world Jew slowly but surely
strangles us.
The Jew destroys the racial foundations of our existence and thus destroys our people for all time.
(p. 211)
Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance
with the will of the Almighty Creator:
by defending
myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of
the Lord. (p. 220)
On April 15, 1945, after six million Jews had been
systematically slaughtered, Hitler gave his last military
order:
For the last time our mortal enemies the Jewish Bolsheviks
have launched their massive forces to the attack. Their
aim is to reduce Germany to ruins and to exterminate
oui people. (p. 223)
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Contemporary Anti-Jewish Propaganda
Although the Western world (both Jews and Christians
alike)

would probably like to believe that the propaganda

process against Jews is no longer a serious problem, the
post World War II period has brought with it a new wave of
virulent propaganda aimed at vilifying the same milleniaold target group.

However, this time the allegations are

not directed against a highly vulnerable mi nor i ty group,
and this time the group is not seen as craftily attempting
to undermine society.

Rather, today the allegations are

directed against a powerful majority population (the Jews
of Israel), a group portrayed by Communist and Arab-Muslim
propagandists alike, as savagely and imperialistically subduing and attempting to eradicate an entire Palestinian Arab
nation.

The primary platform for disseminating this vile

slander is none other than the beacon of "Fraternity," and
"good will toward men"

itself, the United Nations (Givet,

1982; Seidman, 1982).
Israel's former chief delegate to the United Nations,
Yehuda Blum, while addressing the United Nations general
assembly succinctly asserted:
In this building [U.N. J, Southern Yemen, East Germany,
or Afghanistan are democracies. In this building, Libya,
Vietnam, and Iraq are peace loving states. In this building, Cuba is a non-aligned country. In this building,
the Soviet Union is the leader of an alleged peace camp,
and any challenge in this regard is always refuted by
the representatives of Budapest, Prague, Kabul, and Warsaw, who can testify to the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions.
In this building, the Arab aggressors who
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are ganging up on my country since its establishment as
an independent state, and who openly profess their desire
to see it disappear from the face of the earth--are proclaimed as victims of aggression, and Israel, the target
of their sinister design, is branded an aggressor. (Seidman, 1982, p. 5)
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former

u.s.

ambas-

sador to the United Nations, wrote in an article for The
New Leader in November, 1979:

..

It would be tempting to see in this propaganda nothing
more than bigotry of a quite traditional sort that can,
sooner or later, be overcome. But the anti-Israel, antiZionist campaign is not uninformed bigotry, it is conscious politics. We are dealing here not with the primitive but with the sophisticated, with the world's most
powerful propaganda apparatus--that of the Soviet Union
and the dozens of governments which echo it. Further,
this fact of world politics creates altogether new problems for those interested in the fate of democracies in
the world, and of Israel in the Middle East. It is not
merely that our adversaries have commenced an effort to
destroy the legitimacy of a kindr.ed democracy through
the incessant repetition of the Zionist-racist lie. It
is that others can come to believe it also. Americans
among them. (Gi vet, 1982, pp. xii-xiii)
Former United States ambassador to the United
Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick seemed to sum it up when she
declared:
The Holocaust did not begin with building gas chambers. It began with uttering evil words, with defamation. The United Nations, today, is following the same
path by poisoning the atmosphere with hatred against
Israel, Zionism, and Judaism. (Seidman, 1982, p. vii)
In the present author's opinion, the more sophi sticated Arab propaganda themes, based on scholarly written
Pro-Arab English literary works (which are currently disseminated in the West), goes something like the following:
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At the onset of the British mandate of Palestine
there was close to three-quarters of a million Arabs
living in Palestine who had been on the land since time
immemorial. The land of Palestine was a land flowing
with milk and honey adorned with beautiful mountains
and luxurious valleys; the rocks producing excellent
water; and no part empty of delight or profit. The Palestinian people were a socially, culturally, politically,
and economically identifiable people whose language and
religion were Arabic and Islam respectively. The Palestinian people are a people with an indissoluble bond to
the land.
Contrary to the popular view, Zionism is not rooted
in the history and culture of the Jews.
It is a very
recent movement. Palestine was revered, as it has always
been in Judaism, but only in a purely religious, not a
political sense. Zionism is a product of the modern
age. It represents the translation of diasporan religious
orientation into a secular ideology inspired by the political thought of Gentile Europe. The crucial advantage
eventually achieved by Zionism in Palestine resulted
from the identification of the movement with the historical phenomenon of Western imperialism as it expanded
and consolidated its dominance over the Afro-Asian world
during the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
What the Zionists had failed to buy, they eventually
expropriated when they announced the establishment of
the State of Israel. The Palestinian Arabs fled their
homes and possessions for fear of death. The terrorism,
made convincing by local measures, to which the Israelis
resorted in order to clear the Arabs out was the prime
motivating force behind the Palestinian exodus. The
Israelis, by force of arms, accomplished within little
more than a year what decades of Jewish migration had
failed to do, namely, to effect a complete demographic
transformation of Palestine. Except for the extermination
of the Tasmanians, modern history recognizes no cases
in which the virtually complete supplanting of the indigenous population of a country by an alien stock has
been achieved in as little as two generations.
It is a very sad commentary that there is such an
avoidance or ignorance of the existence today of about
four million Muslim and Christian Arabs who are known
to themselves and to others as Palestinians. In order
to mitigate the presence of large numbers of natives on
a desired land, the Zionists convinced themselves that
these natives did not exist, then made it possible for
them to exist only in the most rarefied forms. This is
not only the policy of the Zionists toward the native
Arabs, but also the policy of Israel toward its Arab
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colonies, and the true character of the Israeli occupying
forces on the West Bank and Gaza after 1967 (Abu-Lughod,
1971; Said, 1979).
The above reconstruction of history has been taken
up and embellished by Third World leaders of all kinds, by
the ,Chinese, by the Soviet Communist Bloc, by many "progressive" Europeans and by United Nation officials.

In the United

States elements of the Left, "liberal" Clergy, Reform Rabbis,
Jewish university students, and even alienated Israelis have
·· all been spokespeople promoting and disseminating a similar
historical account as the one depicted above (Guttman, 1975).
A major problem in attempting to expose current and
popular propaganda themes is that while they are in vogue,
any efforts to uproot the prevailing misconceptions are themselves depicted as fabrications politically serving the other
side.

For example, trying to convince the European populace

of the Middle Ages that the Jews were not responsible for
the Black Death, and that the Jews themselves were drinking
from the same supposedly poisonous wells would probably have
been a very difficult task.

In Nazi Germany, explaining

to the German people that Hitler's accusations and hostility
toward Jews were based on little more than the man's pathological hatred would probably have been totally futile.
In 1 ike fashion, attempting to explain the Palestinian problem
in a light which completely contradicts the Arab and Soviet
versions would, at best, appear to many Americans (Jews in-
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eluded) as a second biased version of the same historical
phenomenon.
Unfortunately, historical accuracies usually only
surface after the issues have lost political and social import.

Historically for Jews, it is usually only after the

destructive consequences that, in retrospect, the untruths
behind the tragedy are revealed.

In light of this social-

psychological reality the author will not attempt to portray
·· the pro-Israeli version of the Palestinian problem as factual,
but will call the pro-Israeli version simply the pro-Jewish
version.

In the present author's opinion the pro-Jewish

version of the Palestinian refugee problem could read something like the following:
The land called Israel today was governed by its
own inhabitants only during the periods of Jewish sovereignty (i.e., there never was an independent or even
autonomous Palestinian Arab nation). The Land of Israel
'was depopulated and laid waste by the Romans (second
century C.E.) in which condition it remained until the
mass Jewish immigrations began in the latter part of
the nineteenth century. Jewish presence on the Land
(albeit as a minority) has been continuous during the
Jews 1,800-year period of exile. This presence was maintained despite consistent discrimination and persecution
usually perpetrated by the Arabs of the region.
Only after the Jews had started cultivating and building up the land did the great majority of Arabs immigrate
in order to find work. This Arab immigration process
was fostered by the British government who stringently
upheld the Jewish immigration quota (despite British
cognizance of the fact that masses of Jews were being
slaughtered in German dominated territories), but were
flagrantly negligent when dealing with Arab immigrants.
Israeli independence was declared in 1948 and the infant
state was immediately attacked by six Arab states from
without in conjunction with the Arab army from within.
Many Arabs were urged by their Muslim leaders. outside
the Land to leave until victory was assured. After the
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..

victory they were to return to gather in the spoils.
Only when the Jewish forces began to prevail, and panic
overwhelmed the hostile Arab population (for two basic
reasons: · (1) their own malicious propaganda concerning
Jewish "savagery" which had been used in the past to
incite Arabs against Jews now worked against them and
created a mass panic, and (2) they were familiar with
their own forms of brutal revenge and failed to comprehend
another type of justice) did Arab leaders begin commanding
their people to stay put. Ironically the embryonic Jewish
government in several cases also urged the Arab populace
to remain in their places via radio and leaflets.
The less than 600,000 Arabs that left the land were
then refused citizenship in all the surrounding Arab
lands except Jordan. They were instead placed in refugee
camps where a great bulk of them still remain today,
some thirty-seven years later I The 160, 000 Arabs who remained, are full Israeli citizens today.
Conversely,
during approximately the same time period some 800,000
Jewish refu ees fled their homes and ossessions from
Arab
ands after facing increased discrimination and
persecution.
They (i.e., the approximate 600,000 who
came to Israel),
in contrast, were immediately given
Israeli citizenship.
Two generations of Arab refugees in the Arab refugee
camps have been fed continuous hate propaganda regarding
Israel. They have also been indoctrinated on their glorious national and cultural Palestinian past which, historically speaking, never was.
The product of living
.in these camps with their "unique" educational process
has been the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). The PLO is little more than an international terrorist organization backed by Saudi Arabia
and the Soviet Union, with its prime objective being
the liquidation of the State of Israel (Davis & Deeter,
1982; Peters, 1984).
The logical consequences in adopting one of the above
versions are more profound than most people believe.

Belief

in the pro-Arab version which bestows legitimacy on the Palestinian national movement and creates genuine sympathy for
the Palestinian cause while simultaneously condemning Israeli
"racist"

an~

"imperialistic" actions is potentially the

"moral'' justification needed to carry out a future genocide.
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Looking at the conflict from a secular perspective, American
weaponry in the hands of the Israelis is the factor most
responsible in preventing the Arab eradication of Israel.
This opinion becomes more clear when one realizes the virtually unlimited monetary and military (via Arab Oil States
and the Soviet Union respectively) resources the.Arab states
have at their disposal, in their relentless attempt to totally
annihilate the Jewish State of Israel.

'.

It is the author's opinion that the American public's
abandonment of Israel on "moral" grounds (i.e., via the proAr ab version of the Palestinian problem) could lead to a
world supported Arab attack against a completely isolated
(both economically and militarily) Israeli people.

An Arab

victory may not mean a small state for the Palestinians,
for both King Hussein of Jordan and the PLO have declared
that Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan (Davis et
al., 1982), but it would mean the total eradication of Israel
as officially canonized in the Palestinian National Covenant
of 1968.

Even a position of indifference adopted by the

United States (based on the middle-of-the-road belief that
a symmetry of truth and non-truth exists in both versions)
could also produce seriously harmful consequences for the
Jewish state.

In effect, this apathy or neutrality would

be pitting Israel'against Arab money and Soviet armaments.
Consistent with the pro-Arab version is that the
Palestinian refugee plight lays at the heart of the more
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general Arab-Israeli conflict.

This theme is regularly ex-

pressed by Arab leaders (e.g., Hussein, 1982; Johnson, 1982;
Muller, 1982).

The. implications of this seemingly innocuous

theme is that the Arab States of the Middle East are not
directly inimical to the Jewish State of Israel, but rather
their hostility reflects the injustice done to their Palestinian brethren by the Israelis.

The tacit corollary of

this theme (at least the one circulated in the Western world)
·· is that once the Palestinians have their own small state,
the Arab nations would then recognize Israel's right to exist.
The pro-Jewish version of the Palestinian refugee
plight does not depict the refugee problem as the source of
the conflict, but rather as a result of it (Davis et al.,
1982).

For example, in 1937 the British government recom-

mended a tripartite partition of Western Palestine (Eastern
Palestine had already been severed by Britain in 1922 and
comprises the Arab state known today as Jordan) which would
entail a small Jewish state, a larger Arab state, and a continued British Mandate over the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area,
with a corridor to the sea.

The Palestinian Arab leaders

unflinchingly rejected the proposals.

The pro-Jewish version

would also cite the fact that six Arab states (in 1948) to9ether with the Arab population from within, attempted to
destroy the State of Israel before there ever was a refugee
Problem.

In addition, when the United Nations voted to par-

tition Palestine giving both Jews and Arabs approximately
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half the land in 1947, the Arab world unanimously refused
another opportunity to form a second independent Palestinian
Arab State (the country of Jordan being the first).

Pro-

Jewish proponents also cite the fact that while the country
of Jordan had sovereignty over the West Bank from 1948 to
1967 no attempt was ever made to establish a second independent Palestinian Arab State in the area.

Jordan, in fact,

annexed the west Bank making it officially part of Jordan.
In addition, the belief that the Arab nations have initiated
four wars with Israel in behalf of the Arab refugees seriously
contradicts other activity of theirs in the region.

For

example, from the inception of the problem in 1948 to the
present, none of the Arab nations, except one, have been
willing to grant the Arab refugees citizenship.

This is

despite the Arab's vast oil resources, their limited populations, and their total area which comprise 640 times more
land than the State of Israel.

By refusing to absorb the

refugee population, they have in effect, forced them to remain
in their

wretc~ed

refugee camps.

Jordan, the only country

to grant the refugees citizenship, showed its "love" for
the refugees in 1970-1971.

During that period, King Hussein's

army slaughtered thousands of civilian refugees and forced
20,000 others to flee to Lebanon (Muller, 1982).

-.

According to the pro-Jewish version, the Arab States
themselves created the Arab exodus from the land.

They have

also deliberately maintained them in refugee camps to be

129
used as political and military pawns.

The claim that the

Palestinian plight is at the heart of the conflict is seen
as no more than a powerful propaganda ploy used to cast aspersions on the Jewish State while concealing the Arab and
Muslim States' ultimate objective, which is the total eradication of Israel.

To advocates of the pro-Jewish version,

this would constitute another form of the Big Lie tactic
with the potential of producing another Jewish holocaust •
. . By repeatedly emphasizing Israel Is guilt for the Palestinian
problem in conjunction with the problem's key position in
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab States and their allies
ostensibly purge themselves of any reproach or responsibility.

They are seemingly undeserving of reproach and bear

no moral responsibility regarding their continual active
hostility toward Israel, or for their terrorist tactics directed against pro-Israeli Western targets, for Israel has
"stolen" their brethren's land, "subjugated" its people, and
therefore has in effect, "forced" the poor Arab refugees to
remain in their deplorable condition over the last thirtyseven years!
By way of contrast it is interesting to note that
the number of refugees throughout the world in 1982 totaled
more than 10 million, including well over 2 million African
refugees, 1 million Asians, and the 2.6 million Afghans fleeing Pakistan.

Yet that figure was significantly reduced

from the number reported two years prior in 1980 where 12.6
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million refugees, including 6 million Africans and 2 million
Asians were reported.

As the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees reported "communities,

institutions, cities

and nations have generously opened their doors to refugees"
(Peters, 1984).

Ironically, the "peace-loving" Arab-Muslim

nations seem to be an exception to the rule when dealing
with their own people.
The United States Committee for Refugees noted that
more than a million Indochinese refugees were resettled between 1975 and 1981.

That report also made mention that

among those African refugees recorded, "substantial numbers
of the refugees • • • are 'settled in place.'"

To be "settled

in place" or "resettled in a third country" is considered
by the United Nations as a "durable solution" for the Indochinese, the Africans, and in fact all the world's refugees
(Peters,, 1984), unless the refugees happen to be Arabs vying
for the Land of Israel.
Unlike the Afghans, or the Ethiopians, or the Vietnamese, or the Cambodians, the Arabs largely went to places
only a few miles from where they left.

Most of the Arab

"refugees" who fled still remained within "Palestine."

Yet,

it is the Arab refugee problem toward which the United Nations, the media, and consequently the public focus the great
majority of their attention (Peters, 1984).
Unfortunately for the Jews the pro-Arab version, in
one form or another, is the version adopted by most of the
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world today (not unlike other popular anti-Jewish propaganda
circulated in the past).

The Communist bloc, the Third World

bloc, and even the majority of Western European nations (as
represented by the European Economic Community) all hold
Israel responsible for the ongoing Palestinian refugee
plight.

Following therefrom, they have also adopted the

Arab thesis that the refugee problem is at the core of the
conflict (Seidman, 1982).
The ingenuity of Arab propaganda is that while the
world accepts the assertion that the Palestinian plight is
the core issue (and is therefore caught up in attempts to
force Israel's hand at making territorial concessions) the
assertion (much less the tangible actions to accompany it)
concerning Arab responsibility for the refugee plight never
becomes an issue.

In other words, if the pro-Jewish version

is correct, the energy, the money, and the time spent for
what the vast majority of the world believes (or at least
rationalizes) is a humanitarian and altruistic endeavor may
be the very foundation for another Jewish holocaust.
It should be reemphasized at this point that pro-Arab
advocates (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1971; and Said, 1979) have their
own "irrefutable facts" and interpretations of the Arab-Palestinian refugee problem which when presented alone also appear
quite convincing.
of

vil~

However, in light of over three millenia

slander (with its horrid consequences) used repeatedly

against Jews and Judaism, several thoroughly documented his-
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torical facts which are conspicuously missing (or are blatantly misrepresented)

in scholarly pro-Arab works, and the

fact that the pro-Arab version is the version most often
accepted and presented throughout the world today (e.g.,
united Nations), the present author feels little compunction
in presenting a seemingly biased portrayal of the Arab-Israeli
conflict in general, and the Arab-Palestinian refugee problem
in particular.
At present, the United States is Israel's closest
ally.

As stated above, without American weaponry Israel

would probably not be able to contend with its Arab neighbors
and their allies.

Although public and congressional support

for Israel has been strong over the last ten years (Kessler
&

Schwaber, 1984), Arab propaganda has started to make inroads

via the mass media and among senior government officials.
The American news media's latent "sympathy" for the Arab
cause surfaced during Israel's 1982 invasion into Lebanon.
During the three- to six-month interval immediately following
the intial invasion, the news media of television, newspapers
and magazines seemed to unite in a holy war aimed at condemning the State of Israel.

Gross exaggerations of casual ties,

fatalities, and displaced persons were a common phenomenon
during this period.

Scenes of wanton destruction juxtaposed

to Israeli war-like activities were shown nightly on national
television despite the tenuous relationship between the two
(Muravchik, 1983).
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A salient example of this type of biased news coverage
was reported by Ilya Gerol, a correspondent for The Citizen
daily newspaper of Ottawa, Canada.

Mr. Gerol visted Lebanon

a few months after the outbreak of the war.

The following

are excerpts from his article in The Citizen dated October
30, 1982.

..

With a group of other Western correspondents, I
crossed the Israeli-Lebanese border expecting to see
destroyed cities, burned villages and other signs of
fierce battles. Like everyboy in the Western world, we
arrived there after watching daily reports from Lebanon
via NBC, CBS or ABC.
NBC commentator John Chancellor, only a few days
before my departure for the Middle East, was talking
about the destroyed cities of Sidon and Tyre. The films
of destroyed houses, falling bombs, the sounds of screams
and fear were shocking indeed. Who would have doubted
Chancellor's statements about tens of thousands of
civilian victims and cities being in ruins during the
first weeks of the Lebanon conflict.?
Those were my thoughts when I arrived in the city
of Tyre. For the first few minutes after driving through
the streets it looked as if we had missed our road and
were maybe even in a different country.
There was no destruction.
The cafes were full of
people, schools were operating, stores were open and
Lebanese policemen regulated the traffic. We asked one
policeman how to get to the mayor's office. "It's just
around the corner," he said. "Not far from Television
Alley."
Later the mayor showed us "Television Alley"--the
only street where several blocks had been destroyed by
bombs. He said: "All 11 destroyed buildings were occupied by the PLO headquarters and offices."
The mayor was very busy.
After our conversation,
he had to accompany a new group of television crews to
the same famous alley to film the "total destruction"
of Tyre.
I asked an ABC man:
"How did you manage to
make a picture of apocalyptic destruction out of only
11 ruined houses?
"We just had to film them from different angles," was
the answer.
Another example demonstrating the media's a priori
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intent to condemn Israel may be seen in its coverage of the
Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres.

In early Septem-

ber, 1982, 460 people (425 of them were adult men) were killed
by Lebanese Christian units.

The nation's four leading

dailies (i.e., the Los Angles Times,

the New York Times,

the Washington Post, and the Christian Science Monitor) devoted nearly 8,000 column-inches of news copy to the massacres, focusing primarily on Israel which, at worst, had
only indirect responsibility.

Yet, the same four newspapers

allocated only 6,000 column-inches of news space to the combined coverage of the ten bloodiest massacres of the past
decade in which a total of over three mill ion men, women
and children were put to death.

Furthermore, the word

~

sacre appeared at least 99 times in headlines related to
Sabra and Shatilla while showing up in just 24 headlines
pertaining to the other ten massacres combined (C.O.M.A.,
1983) •
Probably the mass media's most demonstrated bias
had to do with its failure to report the Israeli invasion
in its historical context.

It is the opinion of the author

that had Americans known about the PLO bombings of civilian
targets in northern Israel (Davis et al., 1982), PLO terrorist
attacks against Jews and non-Jews throughout the world (Merar i, 1983), the PLO 's massive stockpiling of arms in southern
Lebanon (Mendel, 1982), the PLO's official platform to liquidate the State of Israel (Palestinian National Covenant,

135
1968), the PLO's terrorizing of Lebanon from 1975 to 1982
(Britain Israel Public Affairs Committee, 1982), and the
PLO's use of large civilian populations as human barricades
against the advancing Israelis (Tal, 1982) that public support
for Israel would probably not have dropped to a ten-year
low (Kessler et al., 1984).
Notwithstanding much anti-Israeli sentiment in the
American news media (by Gentile and Jew alike) possibly buttressed by the power of Arab monies, the question of how
these media giants who argue so vociferously and self-righteously for their prerogatives under the First Amendment,
could collectively so pervert such explicit realities demands
interpretation.

An inkling to the process, which sheds much

light on the above question, is furnished by Zeev Chafets
(1985), Director of the Israeli Government Press Office, is
his book Double Vision.

The following excerpts should help

to significantly clarify the media's biased coverage of happenings in the Middle East.
During the past decade no reg ion in the world has
been more important to the United States than the Middle
East • • • • And yet, despite the torrent of media coverage
and commentary, surprisingly little is actually known
about the reg ion. (p. 17)
This has a great deal to do with the fact that:
American journalists in some parts of the Arab world have
been the victims not only of exclusion but of physical
intimidation.
The Syrians, the Palestine Liberation
Organization, and to a lesser extent, some other Arab
regimes have practiced terror as a tool of news management.
They have subjected unfriendly reporters to
threats, harassment, assault, and even murder. (p. 19)
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As John Kifner of the New York Times once wrote (in
February, 1982): "To work here [in Beirut] as a journalist
is to carry fear with you as faithfully as your notebook.
It is the constant knowledge that there is nothing you
can do to protect yourself, and nothing ever happened
to any assassin. In this atmosphere a journalist must
decide when, how, and even whether to record a story."
(p. 51)
The decision to practice self-censorship is often
humiliating and many reporters justify it to themselves
by rational iza ti on. "Faced with undefined threats, 11 says
Mort Rosenblum, "reporters may inadvertently withhold
sensitive information by convincing themselves that their
perfectly reliable sources are not good enough." (pp. 51-

..

52)

'

To work in Beirut one needed the help and sponsorship
of the PLO. Bill Marmon put it this way: "The PLO was
able to play on the willingness of journalists to meet
it more than half way. Generally in the Arab world it
is necessary, to an extent unknown in Israel or the West,
to prove you are a friend, and you try to do this to
the extent possible without totally sacrificing your
integrity. I did it myself. Often you must have a patron.
He's crucial, and sometimes that relationship
comes at the expense of hard hitting journalism." After
a while, though, the pretense of friendship and sympathy
can ripen into the real thing! There is a sort of contract you make with organizations like the PLO--and they
are skillful at extracting a good price from the press.
One way it's done is through the "I'm a Friend, you should
talk to me" kind of arrangement.
You know, you tel 1
the guy, I'm pro-PLO and anti-Israel, that sort of thing.
The problem is that once you start that, some people
really begin to believe it." (p. 78)
If the press in Beirut was not reporting fully out
of a fear of Arab reprisal, then Israel was being forced
to fight the war for western public op in ion with one
hand tied behind its back. People who knew little about
the PLO's operations in southern Lebanon or its connections with international terrorist groups or about the
internal situation in Syria often found Israel's concern
about these matters "paranoid" and its attempt to deal
with them overreactive. Moreover, when Israel tried to
point out what was happening in Lebanon or Syria, its
arguments had little credibility--after all, people
reasoned, there were plenty of American and European
reporters in Beirut who would surely be aware of a Palestinian "mini-state" in south Lebanon if one existed,
or.of large-scale massacres in Syria. (p. 93)
Another disquieting phenomenon to advocates of the
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pro-Jewish version is that important American government
officials today seem to be accepting, to a significant extent,
the Arab version of the Palestinian problem.

For example,

United States Presidents Carter and Reagan have both
expressed, with only slight variation, the claim of the PLO
leader, Yasser Arafat, that the main issue of the Arab-Israeli
conflict is the Palestinian problem (Peters, 1984).

Former

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Charles Percy, stated that "there is no real basis of lasting
peace without resolving the Palestinian problem."

The Arab

mayor of Bethlehem told reporters that Percy had agreed that
the Palestinian issue was the crux of all problems in the
region (Chicago Tribune, 1981).

Former Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger and the current Secretary of State George
Shultz have both expressed the urgent need to settle the
Palestinian refugee problem as a major step in resolving
the Arab-Israeli conflict (Sancton, 1982; Smith, 1982), and
Vice President George Bush in his 1984 nationally televised
vice presidential debate lectured to Congresswoman Ferraro
on the core issue of the Mideast conflict, of course "the
Palestine problem."
As emphasized

above (via the pro-Jewish version)

the thesis which depicts the resolution of the Palestinian
Arab plight as a precursor to an Arab-Israeli peace treaty
is based on fundamentally untenable assumptions.

As the

Arab leaders shifted (after the six-Day War in 1967) from
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outraged proclamations calling for .the total destruction
of Israel to sympathetic rhetoric in behalf of the Palestinians, the adjusted approach granted a rationalization to
those already opposed to the existence of a strong Jewish
state, and blurred general understanding of the Arab world's
role in the conflict.

The peculiar aspect of the above phe-

nomena unique to the present study is that (according to
the pro-Jewish version) once again the Jews are victimized
by propaganda based on misconceptions and distortions.

Once

again, the group most responsible for propagating this misinformation is the same group which has publicly declared
its intention of eradicating a large Jewish population.
And, once again the great majority of the surrounding population (this time the entire world) accepts most of the assertions at face value.

(This assertion is most aptly repre-

sented by the United Nation's General Assembly adoption [November, 1975) of the resolution which labeled Zionism as a
form of "racism and racial discrimination."

The vote was

72 to 35 with 32 abstentions.)
The Objectives and Hypotheses Following
from Chapter I I
Arab propaganda directed against the Jewish State
of Israel has achieved a new level of sophistication and
credibility in the Western World today
1984).

(Kessler et al.,

Pro-Jewish organizations in America have endeavored

to counter this propaganda process by attempting to explain
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to both Jewish and Christian audiences alike, the irrationality of Arab allegations.

It is the opinion of the present

author that these accusations and defensive elucidations by
pro-Arab and pro-Jewish factions respectively, over crucial
Middle-East issues are, in the long run, only to the detriment
of the Jews in Israel.

The reason being that it creates an

image of mutual culpability which will become increasingly
more difficult to diffuse as time goes by.
This symmetry of blame in the context of a virtually
inexhaustible supply of Arab petrodollars, continued Western
dependency on Arab oil, and the threat of a nuclear war resulting from tension in the Middle East will inevitably weaken
public support that has, in the past, been based on perceptions of Israel's moral and ethical superiority.

Unless

Jewish organizations offensively initiate programs to explain
the pro-Jewish version of the Mideast conflict, support for
Israel in the United States may begin to dissipate at a rapid
pace.
However, in order to educate the public, it is first
necessary to recognize what the public does and does not
know.

Thousands of dollars are allocated by Jewish organiza-

tions yearly to ascertain the American public's perception
and attitudes toward Israel (e.g., Gallup 1973-1983), but
little money, if any, is allocated to measure the public's
level ~f knowledge concerning the broader Arab-Israeli conflict.

Being that knowledge about Jews and their activities
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bas been found to significantly correlate with the public's
perception and attitude toward them (Quinley et al., 1983),
the present study will attempt to measure the American public's general awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
then to correlate what people know about the conflict to
their attitudes toward Israel.

[See Figure 2].

Consistent with the above discourse concerning the
news media's coverage of the Middle East, the author expects
to find that the American public knows little concerning
several fundamental and crucial Middle East issues.

Based

on the assumption that misinformation is correlated with attitudes, the public's level of knowledge on the above key issues
are expected to correlate significantly with attitudes toward
Israel.
A second goal of the present study will be to address
the relationship of attitudes toward Jews to attitudes toward
Israel.

This association has been theoretically advanced

and argued against (e.g., Forster & Epstein, 1974; Pilzer,
1981), but hard data to empirically support or refute the
relationship is conspicuously lacking.

The present study

will attempt to test this relationship empirically.

[See

Figure 2]
Although according to the historical analysis presented in Chapter I, which portrayed the attack against Jewish
nationalism as an integral aspect of anti-Jewish hostility,
a more empirical measurement which would correlate attitudes
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A.

Attitudes Towards
Israel.

News Media
Usage

. T.

Knowledge and
Attitudes
Perceptions of 1--~~~~~~~~ Towards
Arab-Israeli
Jews
Conflict
The above diagram can be understood by positing each box as
a variable and each arrow as a relationship between variables. The dull side of each arrow represents the causative
variable, whereas the sharp side represents the effected
variable. For example, Knowledge and Perceptions of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict are hypothesized as producing an effect
·· on Attitudes Towards both Jews and Israel, and is inversely
depicted as being effected by News Media Usage.

B.

Corn arison of Various Ma azines and Their H othesized
E ects
Jewish non-Oral
Law Based
Hag

Pro-PLO
Magazine

Tine

American
News
Magazine

Jewish
Oral-law
Based
Magazine

Anti-Israel • • • • • • • • • Neutrality • • • • • .Pro-Israel
The above diagram depicts the hypothesized effects different
magazine-types are to produce in the general non-Jewish population. For example, the Pro-PLO Magazine and Oral-Law based
Magazine are hypothesized to produce an inverse polarization
of opinions towards Israel. The two other magazines are
depicted as producing rnodrately pro-Arab opinions.

Figure 2.

Diagrammatic Representation of Variables Under
Empirical Investigation for Chapter II
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towards Jews with attitudes towards the Jewish state is deemed
necessary.

In essence,

if attitudes towards Jews were not

related to attitudes towards Israel the above historical
analysis which posits the inextricable relationship between
the two would be seriously challenged.

Inversely, if a re-

lationship is detected then the above historical analysis
is further supported.

If a significant relationship is found,

reactions towards Israel should not be viewed as reactions
·· towards just another political entity, but rather towards
something specifically Jewish in nature.

Consequently,

application any educational campaign on behalf of
would

in

Israel

then need to take into account the "Jewish factor"

when planning its educational strategy.
A third objective concerns the news media.

Although

the propagation of misinformation is not deemed the primary
cause of anti-Jewish hostility,

it is seen as the vehicle

most often used to express such attitudes.

In light of the

role slanderous material and misinformation has played historically in both the expression and cause
nature)

of anti-Jewish hostility,

news media will be investigated.

(secondary in

the effects of various

The effect these news media

have on individuals will be experimentally tested
present study.

in the

Four magazines seen as representing American,

Arab, Jewish Secular, and Jewish Religious (Oral Law) orientations
ogy)

will be content analyzed (see Chapter IV, Methodol-

concerning

their portrayal of the Palestinian Arab
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refugee problem.

Subsequently, the perceptual effect these

seemingly different magazines have on the American non-Jewish
and non-Arab public will be compared and analyzed.
In light of the negative coverage Israel received
during its invasion into Lebanon in June, 1982, it is hypothesized that the magazine representing mainstream America,
and needless to say the Arab sponsored magazine, will portray
the Arab Palestinian problem, given a latitude of variation,
in consonance with the Arab version as discussed above.

In

addition, the effect these two magazines have on the public's
perception of Israel should be significantly more negative
than the effect produced by a Jewish religious magazine.
Furthermore, according to the above theory (see Chapter I),
the Jewish secular magazine, indirectly echoing the philosophy
of Reform and Conservative Judaism, should be no less hostile
toward Israel nor less sympathetic for the Arab refugee plight
than its American counterpart (i.e., If the Reform and Conservative movements have in practice attempted to sever the
Jewish relationship to Israel, then the magazine following
their lead should represent more an American orientation
than a Jewish one).

[See Figure 2)

CHAPTER III
THE HYPOTHESIZED TERTIARY CAUSES OF
ANTI-JEWISH HOSTILITY
Although an attempt has been made to interpret and
elucidate the primary and secondary causes of anti-Jewish
hostility there still remains at least two serious problems
which need to be addressed before the theory can claim any
semblance of completeness.

The first problem is based on

common sense while the second is based on empirical support.
It is the author's belief that although the two problems
are distinctly different in type, their solution is one and
the same.
The first problem simply asks:

How could the cog-

nitive process of slander (albeit malicious and vile) motivate
large populat.ions throughout history to pillage, torture,
and murder literally millions of innocent Jewish men, women
and children?

we all, at times become recipients of negative

misinformation about various minority groups, but unrestrained
and brutal violence is not necessarily a direct corrolary
of misinformation and perception.
problems, asks the question:

The second of the two

How does the present theoretical

analysis interpret the various theories which posit the rel a144
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tionship between pathological-type variables and anti-Jewish
prejudice without dogmatically ignoring or denying their
existence, particularly when these alternative theories are
ernpir ically based?
In the author's opinion a parsimonious resolution
to the above questions can be made by temporarily leaving
the theoretical realm of prejudice and entering that of
gession.

~

More specifically, the drive theory of aggression

as defined by L. Berkowitz (1978) may be implemented to explain away both of the above problems.

Berkowitz suggests

that various adversiveexternal conditions (e.g., frustration,
harsh physical conditions, or loss of face) serve to arouse
a strong motive to engage in aggressively directed behavior,
and that this drive, in turn, leads to the performance of
overt assaults against others.

Several experiments (e.g.,

Green, 1968; Berkowitz, Cochran, and Embree, 1981) have empirically corroborated the claim that negative affect from
almost any source can produce an aggressive drive.

Therefore,

individuals who are suffering pain (in a potentially unlimited
number of ways) may be predisposed to attack and harm other
individuals simply because of the discomfort or displeasure
they are experiencing.
Berkowitz (1978) also suggested some of the stimulus
characteristics which are associated with the target recipients, and which prepare them as ready stimuli for this seemingly arbitrary automatic aggressive response.

He states:
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My guess is that these characteristics involve associations with two types of events: with earlier painful
incidents or with prior reinforcements for aggression.
Thus, a potential target will be attacked more strongly
than it otherwise might have been to the extent that it
is associated with aversive experiences, while other
objects can intensify the violence that is performed if
they are connected with positive reinforcement for aggression. (p. 703)
Historically, Jews have seemed to fit Berkowitz's
stimulus paradigm throughout millennia.

In light of the

vile and treacherous misinformation religiously disseminated
about Jews (as depicted in Chapter II) by the leaders (with
the avid assistance of the intelligentsia) in most anti-Jewish
epochs, the non-Jewish perceptual association of Jews should
be, at best, disturbing.

The perception of the Jew as Christ-

killer, as the exploiter of the masses, or as the heretic
par-excellance are images that evoke aversive experiences
whether vicariously or otherwise.

In addition, the positive

reinforcement achieved by doing the "will" of G-d (plus the
added bonus of pillage and rape) has probably made the ruthless slaughter of Jews by aggressively driven individuals
highly appealing.
Correspondingly, it is no secret that many mass killings of Jews by the non-Jewish masses were
growing frustration and pain.

pr~~_p_i

tated by

For example, the exploitation

of the Ukrainian peasants by the Polish nobility in the seventeenth century brought in its wake retaliation against the
Poles.

During this retaliatory period 100,000 to 500,000

Jews were savagely tortured and massacred (Grosser et al.,

r
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1978).

Accordingly, the German peoples' understandably great

frustration after their defeat in World War I, and temporary
loss of nation al self-respect accompanied by economic disaster
would be considered in the previous theory as Ber:kowi tz' s
aggressive-drive-component which only required an adequate
stimulus object upon which to aggress.
According to the above exposition the original two
problems (stated in the beginning of the present chapter)
· may be resolved by positing tertiary causes of anti-Jewish
hostility.

The first of the two problems is resolved by

postulating media ting variables (i.e. I Berkowitz Is aggressiondrive hypothesis)

which would be the key in interpreting

how highly negative perceptions are transformed into overt
aggression.

The second problem is equally interpretable.

These aggression-type tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility
may be those suggested by the empirically based theories
mentioned above, but as yet untouched in the present analysis.

In essence, the present theory postulates that the

more frustrated or in pain the individual is (for any number
of reasons, some of which will be discussed below) the more
tangibly affected he or she will be by Big Lie propaganda .•.
-·
,,.

_.---~·"'"

Therefore, the forthcoming approaches and theories which
Allport (1954) and others would describe as viable theories
of prejudice are depicted in the present theoretical context
as

not~ing

more than theories which have identified various

aggression-arousing mediating variables, which indirectly
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throughout history have become part of the overall prejudice
process.

The following pa tho logical-type variables to be

discussed represent the variables investigated in the present
study and are not meant to be theoretically exhaustive.
The primary reason these variables were selected (other than
their hypothesized relationship to anti-Jewish prejudice)
had to do with their facile implementation in a telephone
interviewing setting.
The Sociocultural approach of prejudice emphasizes
cultural causation.

One theory of this type contends that

the predisposition toward prejudiced behavior is heightened
during tr ansi ti on periods of changing societal conditions.
Rapid social change may be accompanied by a loss of predictability in life, accelerated disruption of social structure,
and an abrupt diminution of preexisting social values.

This

disintegration of societal structure and values in times of

---

social change has been called anomie and has been found to
-"~

correlate significantly with anti-Jewish attitudes (Hoge &
Carroll, 1975).

Individuals in society suffering from anomie

are predisposed to feelings of anxiety and insecurity, and
in short, heightened emotional stress.
Another general approach formerly used to describe
the direct causes of anti-Jewish hostility is the Situational
approach.

This approach may be differentiated from the socio-

cultural perspective in that it deals exclusively with the
current forces (as opposed to the development of these forces)
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impinging on the individual and society.

It is proposed by

several social scientists (e.g., Ettinger, 1969; Parsons,
1980) that threatE; <>! economic, politic al, and military di sas-

-ter

reinforce anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior.
-·

The fear

of a serious up and coming economic, political, or military
crisis which the individual is not directly in control of,
is conceived as a disturbing and frustrating experience.'
Bettelhe im and Janowi tz (1964) have interpreted these aggressive-type attitudes and actions as reflecting a regressive
response, which enables the individual to combat insecurje
feelings threatening his or her emotional well being.
A different and more individual type approach is
the Psychodynamic approach.

These types of theories contend

that prejudicial attitudes and behavior are a reflection of
the individual's personality traits, in contrast to the historical and social points of view mentioned above.

A popular

theory of this type is the frustration theory of prejudice
(which is also known as the scapegoat theory).

The theory

posits that when the cause of frustration is either too intimidating or obscure, people often redirect their hostility
against an available, identified group unlikely or unable to
fight back.

The fact that the group is innocent of the evils

which have befallen the frustrated individual or .group is
irrelevent (Meyers, 1983).
Another psychodynamic variable found related to
prejudicial attitudes and behavior is the individual's sense
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of identity (Rosenman, 1977; Tumin, 1971).

It is hypothesized

that those who fail to achieve an effective personal identity
may be predisposed to promote discriminatory behavior in
their attempt to establish a "solid" sense of self.

In light

of the fact that traditional paths for establishing a sense
of identity through, for example, one's occupation or religion
have become less readily available, the individual may seek
to secure this sense-of-self in various ways, including the
· · path of aggression.

Acts of aggression (whether verbal or

physical) may temporarily block a diffusion of self by projecting on others unacceptable tendencies residing within
the unstable individual himself (Bettleheim et al., 1964).
It also reduces anxiety, for it suggests to the person or
group that he or they are better than others.
In the present empirical analysis the several variables mentioned above will be measured, and their relationship
to attitudes toward both Jews and Israel will be examined.
[See Figure 3]
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1.

Sociocultural Approach
A.
B.

2.
Israeli
Attitude _., ,
~-.......
·· Scale
"'

Situational Approach
A.
B.

c.
3.

Demographics
Anomie

Political Threats
Military Threats
Economic Threats

Jewish
Attitude
Scale

Psychodynamic Approach
A.
B.

1. Life Satisfaction
2. Purpose in Life
Ego Strength

The three rectangles in the middle and arrows jutting out
from. each represent (1) The three theoretical approaches
discussed above, (2) the variables utilized in the present
study which represent each approach, and (3) the hypothesized
relationship of these variables to attitudes towards Jews
and Israel. For example, two variables represent the Psychodynamic Approach in the present study. The Life Satisfaction
Scale, and the Purpose of Life Test were used to represent
the frustration theory of prejudice , and the Ego-Strength
Scale was implemented to represent the individual's sense
of identity. All scales were hypothesized as being related
to both the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales.
Figure 3.

Diagrammatic Representation of Variables under
Empirical Investigation for Chapter III

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
The present project was carried out in two stages
in which at each stage a distinct population was examined.
Therefore, the present chapter is divided into two studies
· (one study for each stage)

and is presented in the order

which represents the above theoretical analysis.
Study No. I
A.

Participants

A sample of 811 Jewish adults (over twenty-one) from
Chicago proper participated in the present study.

Three-

fourths of the respondents were randomly selected from the
Chicago city phonebook on the basis of "Distinctively Jewish
Names."

This sampling procedure is commonly used when con-

ducting surveys of Jewish populations, and no differences
have been found between Jews with commonly Jewish names and
those without (Cohen, 1983).

In the present study seventy

common Jewish names were taken from Kaganoff's (1977) A Dictionary of Jewish Names and Their Hi story, and only those
names which had, at least, sixty listings in the Chicago
telephone book were randomly sampled from.
152
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Approximately 200

(one-fourth) of the participants

were randomly drawn from mailing lists of all large orthodox
(Oral Law) Jewish organizations in the city of Chicago.
These lists were said to cover anywhere from 80 to 100 percent
of all Orthodox Jewish household in Chicago.

The reason

for this deviation in procedure was because Orthodox households in Chicago account for less than 10 percent of the
city's total Jewish population and a relatively large sample
of Orthodox (Oral Law) Jewry was crucial for the present
empirical analysis.

In light of the fact that the mailing

lists comprised a vast majority (if not all) of the Orthodox
households in the city, comparisons among the Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox were seen as representing valid comparisons among the three populations.
In any case, the comparison between Orthodox Jews and
others is only superficial for not all people who consider
themselves Orthodox

a~e

consistent followers of the Oral

Law tradition (although it could be assumed that the great
majority do follow the tradition).

The only way to reliably

differentiate between Oral Law adherents and others was to
construct a Religious Observance Scale, and the only effective
and acceptable way to obtain a large and representative sample
of Oral Law adherents was to sample a population, which in
name at least, represented the Oral Law tradition.

In addi-

tion, because many telephone numbers were on more than one
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mailing list, all numbers were fed into a computer which
subsequently deleted all duplicates.
B.

Materials

In this study all participants received the same
demographic, knowledge, behavioral, and attitudinal questions.

The following types of questions and scales consti-

tuted the complete questionnaire.
1.

The Israeli Attitude Scale.

Items were constructed

by the present author in conjunction with Professors
Edwards and Bryant from Loyola University of Chicago.
The content of the scale in part is based on antiIsraeli literature currently being disseminated in
.the United States.

In addition, thirty people from

Chicago proper were randanly sampled and asked (by
telephone) their thoughts and feelings concerning
the State of Israel.

Their comments together with

the above literature formed the content base from
which 20 items were then developed.

These 20 items

were administered to 75 undergraduate students from
Loyola University of Chicago.

The eleven items with

the highest item-total correlation then underwent
factor analysis with varimax rotation.

The remaining

nine items which loaded highest on two factors produced a Cronbach alpha of .83.
2.· The Mideast Knowledge Scale.

Twenty original items
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were produced by the present author based on historical and contemporary literature.

These 20 items

were then sent to four Jewish activists who were
considered to have some level of expertise on the
subject.

The four activists were asked to study

the questions, and to delete any questions they
thought were inappropriate and/or add those they felt
were missing.

Professors Edwards and Bryant were

also involved in the refinement of the original 20
items.

A 17-item scale was then developed based on

the comments and criticisms of the above.

These

items were then distributed to the 75 undergraduates
from Loyola University of Chicago and underwent the
same type of statistical analyses as above.

Based

on the analyses, 8 items produced a Kuder-Richardson20 reliability coefficient for dichotomous response
categories of .69.

In the light of the difficulty

in reaching a consensus of scholarly opinion concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, Middle East historical
and current-day information as presented by Peters
(1984), and Davis et al. (1982) were chosen as references from which to score the present Mideast Knowledge Scale.
3.

The Religious Observance Scale.

These questions were

devised by three Orthodox Rabbis, and were piloted
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on 15 respondents in order to weed out any ambiguity
in interpretation.

The Kuder-Richardson 20 reliabil-

ity coefficient for dichotomous response categories
was • 91 when computed for 546 participants.

In addi-

tion, when correlated with movement identification
(i.e., Non-affiliated, Reform, Conservative, Orthodox coded 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively) the obtained
concurrent validity coefficient was .84.
4.

The Jewish Information Scale:

These questions were

devised by two Orthodox Rabbis and one religious
school teacher, with the objective of broaching several fundamental Jewish subjects in the most elementary manner possible.

The questions were then

piloted on the above 15 respondents.

The KR-20 was

computed for 637 respondents and a reliability coefficient of .92 was obtained.
5.

Demographic Questions:

Questions concerning educa-

tion, religious affiliation, and family tree information were constructed by the present author and
piloted on the above 15 respondents.
6.

Attachment to the Land Questions:

Questions con-

cerning the participant's behavioral relationship
to the Land of Israel were constructed by the present
author and piloted on the above 15 respondents.
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The complete survey instrument used in Study No. 1
is presented in Appendix
C.

c.

Procedure

The present data were collected at the Bernard Horwich
Jewish Community Center of Chicago where two rooms and ten
telephones were obtained for a period of four weeks.

The

telephones were the property of the Jewish United Fund of
Chicago who generously donated their services for the above
prescribed period of time.
The interviewing took place five nights a week (Sunday
through Thursday) from 6:30 P.H. to 9:30 P.H.

Twenty young

men and women with university degrees or presently working
on their degrees underwent training (given by the author)
before the actual

proce~s

of collecting data began.

Coding,

key punching, and verification procedures were done by several
of the above interviewers in an effort to significantly limit
any experimenter bias effect.

Accordingly, managerial work

was also carried out by trained personnel other than the
author himself.

(See Figure 4, flow chart representing the

present study's major variables.)
Study No. II
A.

Participants

A sample of 400 non-Jewish and non-Arab adul tsl (ages
lJews and Arabs were screened out from the present
study i'n order to obtain data from a seemingly disinterested
population.
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was also carried out by trained personnel other than the
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Group Maintenance
Drop-Out Rate
Overall Growth Rate
Relationship to Land
Synagogue
Affiliation
A. Non-Affiliated
B. Rform
c. Conservative
o. Orthodox

Religious
Observance
Scale

Intention to Settle
in Israel
No. of visits to
Israel
Attitudes towards
Israel
Mideast Knowledge
Jewish Knowledge
Elementary Knowledge
of Judaism

Figure 4.

Flow Chart Representing Major Variables Examined
in Study No. 1.
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twenty-five and over)l was randomly selected from the city
of Chicago proper to participate in a telephone research
survey.

The selection process was executed via random digit

dialing according to computer-generated sets of random numbers.
B.

Materials

In the present survey, the same demographic, knowledge, and attitudinal questions were asked of each respondent.

The following types of questions and scales constituted

the complete questionnaire.
1.

Demographic Questions.
Asking Questions

2.

Questions were taken from

(Sudman & Bradburn, 1982).

Political, Economic, and Military Two-Item Rating
Scales.

These scales were constructed by the present

author in conjunction with Professors Edwards and
Bryant from Loyola University of Chicago.
3.

Media Usage Questions.

These questions were con-

structed by the present author in order to locate
the public's primary sources of Middle-East information.
4.

Life Satisfaction Scale, by Converse and Robinson
(1965).

The authors "found a correlation (Kendall's

lA general effort was made to sample from the general
working class population.
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Tau)

of .59 between reported satisfaction at one

time and satisfaction reported in an interview four
to six months earlier."

In addition, consistent

relationships between life satisfaction and other
psychological variables (e.g., social adjustment
and personal competence) were found.
S.

The Thomas-Zander Ego Strength 6-Item Guttman Scale,
by Thomas and Zander (1960).

'.

The authors found a

.71 test-retest correlation.
6.

Anomie Measure, this 4-item anomie scale was implemented by Bryant and Veroff (1984).

Two of the items

were adapted from comparable items in Srole (1956).
7.

An Abridged Purpose-in-Life Test.

The present author

distributed the Purpose-in-Life test (Crumbaugh,
1968) to 75 undergraduate students from Loyola University of Chicago.

The 10 items with the highest

item-total correlation were then selected from the
original 20-item scale.

These 10 remaining items

underwent factor analysis in which only one factor
was extracted precluding further rotation analysis.
A Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .87 was
then obtained for four of the most heavily loaded
items.

In addition, response categories were modified

for telephone usage.

161
8.

The Jewish Attitude Scale:

Twenty items were selected

from Levinson and Sanford's (1944) Anti-Semitism
Scale, Selznic and Steinberg's (1969) study on AntiSemi tism in Contemporary America, and from the Harr is
Poll (1975) of Attitudes of Americans Toward Jews.
The 20 items were administered to 75 undergraduate
students from Loyola University of Chicago.

The

eleven items with the highest item-total correlation
then underwent factor analysis with var imax rota ti on.
Eight of the remaining items with the highest loadings
on factor one produced a Cronbach alpha coefficient
of .90.

Two additional items from Selznic et al.

(1969) were eventually added onto the scale.
9.

The Israeli Attitude Scale (see Study No I)

10.

The Mideast Knowledge Scale (see Study No. I)

11.

Paragraphs and Questions on the Arab-Palestinian
Refugee Problem.

Four sets of eight sentences each

were developed, which attempt to reflect how four
seemingly different magazines portray the Arab-Palestinian refugee plight.

The four magazines were chosen

because they represent four dissimilar orientations.
The news magazine representing America (based on
national circulation), and the magazine representing secular (i.e., non-Oral Law) Jewish America (based
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on a survey of over 800 Jews) were both content-analyzed for their portrayal of the Palestinian plight.
Over 80 percent of the weekly issues of both magazines
from June, 1982 to January, 1983 were content-analyzed.

The less than 20 percent not analyzed was

in light of the fact that some of the American magazine issues could not be located, and some of the
Jewish issues were missing a table of contents.
The reason this time period was chosen was that it
represented the first six months of the Israeli invasion in to Lebanon.

During this period, the American

mass media was said to have collectively censured
the State of Israel (Muravchik, 1983).
Articles in the two weeklies mentioned above were
analyzed via their table of contents.

Anything in their

table of contents intimating, however slightly, an IsraeliArab conflict was thereupon studied and categorized.

The

Arab-Palestinian problem was divided (on an a priori basis)
into ten categories and any paragraph (regardless of length)
relating to one of the ten categories was then recorded.
The categories were found to conceptually exhaust all references to the Arab-Palestinian problem.

The ten categories

were:
1. Jewish right or connection to the land
2. Arab right or connection to the land
3. Arab mistreatment of Jews
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4. Israeli mistreatment of Arabs

s.

Origins of Jewish Middle-East refugees

6. Origins of Arab-Palestinian refugees
7. The Jewish

(Middle-East) refugee present condition
(sympathetic)

a.

The Jewish (Middle-East) refugee present condition
(unsympathetic)

9. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present condition (sympathetic)
10. The Arab-Palestinian refugee present conditon (unsympathetic)
After the number of paragraphs for each of the ten categories
was tallied, the percentage of paragraphs for any given category in relation to the total number of paragraphs was then
calculated.

For example, if there was found a total of 100

paragraphs which discuss the Arab-Palestinian problem as
defined by the ten categories above, and if Category I had
10 paragraphs, then Category I would comprise 10 percent of
all that was found (for that magazine) on the Arab-Palestinian
problem.

Subsequently eight sentences were constructed ac-

cording to these percentages.

For example, if for any given

magazine 100 percent of all. its paragraphs were located in
the first four categories and these paragraphs were evenly
distributed among categories (i.e., 25 percent each), then
its eight-sentence representation would be comprised of two
sentences for each of the four categories.
this

p~rticular

represented.

Obviously, in

case, the other six categories would not be

The other two magazines used in the analysis

164
were a pr:o-Arab monthly (recommended by the PLO office in
Chicago), and a religious

(Oral-Law based) Jewish weekly

(the most widely circulated English-speaking Jewish magazine
in the world).

The same type of 8-sentence construction

was done for these magazines as descr: ibed above, but the
process of analysis was a little different.
was the time period of analysis.

One difference

Issues of the pr:o-Ar:ab maga-

zine were studied from June, 1982 (as above) to August, 1984.
This was due to the 1 imi ted number of issues available dur: ing
the above specified six-month interval.

Another discrepancy

in procedure was that a random sample of ten issues only was
used for analysis in contrast to the fir:st two magazines,
wher:e the gr:eat majority of issues wer:e analyzed.

The ra-

tionale was that the portrayal of the problem by each of
these two magazines would be so apparent fr:om the very beginning, that a more extensive analysis would be useless.
rationale proved to be accurate.

This

The final deviation in

procedure had to do with the religious Jewish magazine.
This magazine had no specified table of contents, so in order:
to conduct the analysis the present author inspected each
issue, page by page, studying the captions of all articles
(instead of the table of contents)

for each of the issues

under analysis.
A reliability check was then carried out on 36 percent
of all material analyzed.

The reliability check was done

by a male accountant with a Bachelors degree from Northwestern
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university.

The accountant did not independently begin to

analyze the material until he and the author reached a consensus on ten consecutive paragra,phs, taken from magazine
articles not relevant to the analysis proper.

Dividing the

number of paragraphs agreed upon by the total number of paragraphs analyzed, the present analysis had a reliability ratio
of • 83.
Each respondent in the study was read eight sentences
over the telephone representing the view portrayed in one
of the four

types of magazines, as explained above.

The

respondent was then asked several questions on the Arab-Palestinian problem, and was urged to answer based only on the
eight sentences he/she had just heard.

The complete survey

instrument used for both the experimental and correlational
aspects of the present study may be found in Appendix D.
C.

Procedure

The present study entailed both a correlational research design and a controlled experiment which were both
part of a single telephone interview.
In the correlational part of the interview, the attitude questions and scales used in the survey fac il i ta ted
the investigation of situational, psychodynamic, and sociocultural variables, in an attempt to measure their relationship to attitudes toward Jews and Israel.

As discussed in

Chapte'r III, one hypothesized sociocultural factor producing
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prejudice is anomie (i.e., the disintegration of societal
structure and values).

The 4-item anomie scale implemented

by Bryant and Veroff (1984) was employed in the present study
to measure this variable.
The situational emphasis in explaining prejudice
deals with the current forces impinging on the individual.
Fear and insecurity concerning threats of economic, political,
or military disaster are seen as reinforcing anti-Jewish
attitudes and actions.

In order to empirically test this

relationship, the author constructed one-item rating scales
for each of the above variables.
Two psychodynamic approaches mentioned above (see
Chapter III) postulate that frustration and a fragmented sense
of self predispose the individual to prejudicial thinking
and action.

The present study has attempted to measure in-

dividual frustration via the Life Satisfaction Scale (COI\Verse
et al., 1965), and by the author's abridged and modified
Purpose in Life Test (Crumbaugh, 1968).

The Thomas-Zander

Ego Strength Scale (Thomas et al., 1960) was employed to
investigate the individual's sense of identity, and as the
above variables, was studied in its relationship to attitudes
toward Jews and Israel.

In addition, several demographic

variables (e.g., Age, !!.£,! 1 Gender, etc.) were examined in
their relationship to attitudes towards Jews, attitudes towards Israel, and level of Mideast knowledge.

The phenomen-

ological approach was investigated via the Mideast Knowledge

167

scale, direct questions on various Arab-Palestinian Issues,
and Media Usage in their relationship to attitudes towards
Jews and Israel.
During the experimental phase of the interview all
respondents participated in an experiment where four distinctly different types of magazines were manipulated.
were:

(1) a popular American news magazine,

They

(2) a secular

(non-Oral Law based) Jewish magazine, (3) an Arab-oriented
magazine, and (4) a religious (Oral Law based) Jewish magazine.
Eight sentences representing one of the four magazine's portrayal of the Arab-Palestinian problem was read over
the telephone.

Subsequently, all respondents were asked the

same questions regardless of the news source being represented.

Subjects were urged to base their responses exclu-

sively on the sentences just read.
In summary, in the experimental part each respondent
listened to one of the four news-source representations concerning the Arab-Palestinian problem, and was then questioned
on the perceptions the sentences evoked.

(See Figure S,

flow chart representing the present study' s major variables.)
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Figure S.

Flow Chart Representing Major Variables Examined
in Study No. II

CHAPTER V
RESULTS

Chapter 1 Hypotheses and Results
The statistical analyses conducted to test the stated
hypotheses in Chapter

I

were based on an all-Jewish sample

· · of 811 respondents (see Methodology for sampling procedures) •
A.

The following demographics are presented here

in order to give the reader some understanding of the sample
used in the upcoming analyses.
Gender
Male
(N=407) = 50%
Female (N =4 04) = 50 %
Synagogue Affiliation
Reform (N = 80)
Conservative (N=ll4)
Orthodox (Oral Law Judaism)
Non-Affiliated (N•324)
Other (N =4 9)
Born in

u.s.

Yes (N=702) = 87%
No (N=l04) • 13%
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= 10%

= 14%
(N =2 31) = 3 0 %

= 41%

=

6%
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Age
= 47%
21 to 40 (N=370)
41 to 54 (N=ll4)
= 14%
55 and over (N=309) = 39%
Formal Education Level
Last Grade Completed
= 18%
12 and under (N=l41)
Some College or Vocational School (N=l83) = 23%
• 23%
Bachelors Degree (N=l79)
Some Graduate School (N=67)
= 8%
Masters Degree (N=l29)
= 16%
*Doctorate Degree (N=97)
= 12%
B.

The analysis in Chapter I attempted to show his-

torically that the anti-Jewish phenomenon is different (both
quantitatively and qualitatively) from other minority group
experiences.

According to the historical analysis the primary

attack against the Jews is not against the Jews per se, but
rather against what they have represented.

This representa-

tion, was seen as manifesting itself in three Jewish-core
components.

Accordingly, primary attacks against Jews were

seen as attempts to uproot (1) the Jewish people's relationship to the Law, and/or (2) the Jewish people's relationship
to the Land, and/or (3) the Jewish collective body.

It was

theorized that historical anti-Jewish movements (i.e., the
leaders of the movements), whose explicit or implicit ideologies were competitively threatened by the "Jewish presence"
(as manifested in one or more of the above components, were
*In the present study a Law degree was considered a
doctorate degree.
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psychologically pressured to eradicate this "presence" by
attacking one or more of its three core components.
It was also explained that there has been only one
form of Judaism (i.e., Oral Law Judaism, which is known today
as Orthodox Judaism) which has persevered throughout millennia, and that this variable of longevity has been a major
factor in creating an atmosphere of anti-Jewish activity
(i.e., if Jews would have assimilated like other groups that
had the opportunity, they would obviously not have suffered
as Jews).

Given the above, Orthodox Judaism was posited in

the forthcoming analysis as a true representation of Judaism
(not to suggest that other Jewish movements are illegitimate
in light of their lack of longevity, but only that this millennia-old group is, beyond suspicion, representative).
The groups posited in Chapter I as potentially antiJewish (anti-Jewish in the respect that the nature of Oral
Law Judaism poses a competitive threat, and that this threat
has been challenged historically by attacking one or more of
the above three components) were the Reform and Conservative
Jewish movements in America.

The present study's first em-

pirical analysis was to investigate the reliability of the
claims made by Reform and Conservative Judaism concerning
the unadaptability of Orthodox Judaism.

According to their

claims, the younger generation of American Jews (ages 21 to
40) should have significantly abandoned the "outmoded" Oral
Law tradition.

In addition, if these two contemporary Jewish
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movements are not inherently competitive (and therefore their
prime objective would not be to wean the Jewish masses from
the Oral Law tradition), but rather true complementary forms
of Judaism then their respective constituencies should, at
the very least, be maintaining themselves (i.e., any contemporary positive expression of spirituality should be able
to maintain itself over one generation).
Group maintenance over one generation was computed
in the following ways:

(see Methodology Study No. 1 for

sampling and questioning procedures).
1.

All 811 Jewish respondents were asked what type

of synagogue they and their children and/or grandchildren
(over the age of 20) belong to.

A cross-tabulation based on

the religious affiliation of parents to that of their children
(between the ages of 21 to 40 years old) was then computed.
The percentages in Table 1 stand for the affiliation-scatter
of children whose parents were affiliated with any one movement.
An example of how Table 1 is to be understood can
be seen in the following description of parents who are presently affiliated with the Reform movement:

94 parents who

had children between the ages 21 to 40 were affiliated with
the Reform movement.

Of their children (between 21 and 40)

61% today are non-affiliated, 21% affiliated with the Reform
movement, 12% affiliated with the Conservative movement, 3%
affiliated with the Orthodox movement, and 3% affiliated

173

TABLE 1.--Parent-Child Intergroup Moyewent
Children's Reli2ious
(N=253)
*NA

Affiliation

(N=44)
R

(N=84)

83%

4%

3%

7%

=

97%

R
61%
Parents
(N=94)
Religiious
Affiliation
47%
c
(N=l82)

21%

12%

3%

=

97%

8%

35%

8%

=

98%

17%

3%

2%

76%

=

98%

NA
(N=92)

0

c

(N=l64)
**Total

0

(N=l 73)
*NA = Non-Affiliated
R = Reform
C = Conservative
O = Orthodox (i.e., Oral Law Judaism)
**Respondents and children belonging to other Jewish
religious movements were deleted in the present analysis.
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with other Jewish religious movements unspecified in the
present table.
The one-generation affiliation differential between
children between the ages of 21 and 40, and their parents,
based on responses of parents and grandparents was:
Non-Affiliated=
Reform
=
Conservative
=
Orthodox
=

+175%
- 53%
- 54%
- 5%

These percentages were obtained by dividing the number of children presently affiliated with one of the four
groups by the number of parents presently affiliated with
one of the four groups.

For example, 44 children (between

the ages of 21 and 40) are presently affiliated with the
Reform movement as opposed to 94 parents who are Reform affiliated.

By dividing the number of children (44) by the

number of parents (94) the nummer .47 (or 47%) is obtained
which represents the movement's maintenance level over one
generation.

In more understandable terms we can say that the

movement has decreased 53% (as represented above) over one
generation (i.e., 100% - 47% = 53%).

By using the same for-

mula for the non-affiliated groups we obtain 253 • 92

= 2.75

(or 275%), and in order to depict the pure rate of increase
we subtract 100% (or 92) from the above equation and obtain
a one-generation increase of 175% (as represented above).
2.

When examining inter-group movement from the

perspective of the child between the ages of 21-40 (i.e.,
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instead of basing the statistics on what parents and grandparents knew about their children and grandchildren, the
following statistics were based on what children knew concerning their parents' religious affiliation) the following
cross-tabulation was obtained:
*TABLE 2.--Child-Parept Interaroup Moyeroent
Children's
(N=l55)
NA

Reli~ious

(N=2 3)
R

(N=36)

c

Affiliation
(N=l29)
Total

0

NA
(N=34)

77%

0%

3%

18%

=

98%

R
(N=73)

69%

22%

4%

3%

=

98%

51%

5%

25%

18%

=

99%

15%

1%

2%

75%

=

93%

Parents
Religious
c
Affiliation (N=ll4)
0

(N=l30)
*Respondents in Table 2 were mutually exlusive of
those in Table 1, In addition, chances that the same parentchild relationship was being tapped twice ~as insignificantly
slight.
Table 2 is to be read in the following manner:

155

respondents (ages 21 to 40) claimed to be non-affiliated,
23 affiliated with the Reform movement, 36 affiliated with
the Conservative movement, and 129 affiliated with the Orthodox movement.

Of their parents, 34 were non-affiliated, 73

were Reform, 114 were Conservative and 130 were Orthodox.
Of the 34 parents said to be (or had been if deceased) nonaffiliated 77% of their children remained non-affiliated,
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0% became Reform, 3% became Conservative, and 18% became
orthodox.
The one-generation differential between children
(21-40 years old) and their parents based on the responses
of the children was:
*Non-Affiliated = + 356%
Reform
= - 68%
68%
Conservative
= Orthodox
= - 1%
3.

When both above samples were pooled in which

the number of children

= 916,

the change over one generation

was:
Non-Affiliated • + 224%
Reform
• - 60%
Conservative
= - 59%
Orthodox
= - 3%
For example the number of children (ages 21 to 40)
who were non-affilaited in the two tables were 253 and 155
respectively.

The sum of these numbers {i.e., 253 + 155

=

408) divided by the number of non-affiliated parents in the·
two tables (92 and 34 respectively) produced a quotient of
3. 24

(408 • 126 = 3. 24).

In order to calculate the pure

rate of increase, 100% (or 126) was subtracted from the above
equation and a one-generation increase of 224% was obtained
(as represented above).
In brief, the Non-Affiliated Group was the most productive over the last generation (+224%) whereas both the
*These percentages were computed in the same manner
as in Table l.
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Reform and Conservative movements' appear to have substantially
diminished (-60% and -59% respectively).

The Orthodox move-

ment over the last generation appears to be maintaining itself
(-3 %) •

4.

The maintenance of any group is not exclusively

dependent on the inter-generational drop-out rate.

It is,

in addition, dependent on the birth rate of its members together with converts from other religions.

Because the con-

version rate to Judaism today is trivial only the birthrate
among the four groups will be compared in the following analyses.

The birthrate of respondents ages 55 and over were

compared.

The birthrate of these middle-aged to elderly

Jews is seen as representing another criterion for judging
the maintenance of the various groups over one generation:
TABLE 3.--Differential Birth Rate Respooaents 55 and Over
(N=l22)
(zero)
Non-Affiliated= 203 (No. of Children) • 2.1 (replacement)=.79
122
(level)
(N =50)
Reform

85
= so • 2.1

(N =65)
Conservative

=

(N =61)
Orthodox

= 149
"6T.

144
65 • 2.1

F = 7.85, df (3,294), p

= • 81

= 1.05

2.1 • 1.16

< .001.

When differential birthrate was taken into account
together with inter-group movement (based on the pooled sample
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of children ages 21-40 [N•916]) the change over one generation
has been:
Non-Affiliated = + 177%
Reform
= - 68%
Conservative
= 57%
Orthodox
= + 13%
For example, the pooled rate of increase over one
generation for the Non-Affiliated group was 224%.

When the

birthrate of the Non-Affiliated group was taken into consideration the overall increase over one generation was 177%
(i.e., 224% x .79 = 177%).

In light of the differential

birthrate among the groups the Non-Affiliated group has increased 177% over one generation, the Reform and Conservatiuve
have decreased -68% and -57% respectively and Orthodoxy appears to be on the increase (+13%).
C.

According to the theoretical analysis in Chapter

I, Orthodox Judaism was hypothesized as representing a competitive threat to both Reform and Conservative Judaism.
If (according to the hypothesis) the Reform and Conservative
movements are genuinely competing with Orthodox Judaism,
then these movements should be psychologically pressured to
break any real relationship their adherents may have to the
Land of Israel (notwithstanding their official claim to the
contrary).

Accordingly, the present statistical analyses

expected to find a significantly weaker relationship among
adherents of Reform and Conservative Judaism than among their
Orthod·ox counterparts.

It was already mentioned in Chapter

179
t that the following findings (regardless of outcome)

are

not sufficient to unequivocally support the hypothesis, but
they are considered sufficient to refute the hypothesis.
The criterion for measuring respondents' relationship
to the Land was based primarily on two behavioral indices,
and on a secondary level of importance on respondents' attitudes towards the Jewish state together with their general
level of Mideast knowledge.

According to Biblical and Tal-

· mud ic sources (as expressed in Chapter I) the Jewish relationship to the Land is not some intangible ideal, but

rath~r

the concrete desire of actually living and being there.
Therefore the first index in measuring the Jewish
people's relationship to the Land was to ask:
If things in the

u. s. remain as they are, do you

have any real intention of ever settling in Israel?
Results to the above question (N=788) when compared according
to synagogue affiliation were:
TABLE 4.--Inten)ion to Settle in Israel
Synagogue Affiliation
(N=318)
NA
Intention to
Settle in Israel

(N•79)

(N•113)

R

c

(N=221)
0

Yes:

8%

1%

7%

51%

No:

92%

99%

93%

49%

F = 84.26, df (3,727), p < .001.
According to the above table, the percentages of
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Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Conservative respondents who
had the intention of someday settling in Israel were 8%,
1%, and 7% respectively.

In contrast, the percentage of

orthodox Jews (51%), who intended to someday settle in Israel
vastly exceeded the other three groups.
When Non-Affiliated, Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox synagogue affiliations are coded 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively and then correlated with the *10-item Jewish Religious
Observance Scale (N = 676)
obtained.

an r

statistic of • 79 was

This extremely strong relationship was expected

in light of the fact that, officially, Orthodox Judaism assumes the binding authority of all the Laws, Conservative
Judaism less so, Reform Judaism advocates less ritual observance than Conservative, and Non-Affiliated is as its name
implies non-binding, and non-advocating.

The religious

observance group breakdown can be seen in Table 5.
In order to conceptually simplify and methodologically
economize the statistical analysis an **Abridged 3-item (items
2, 3, and 7) Observance Scale was constructed which produced
a KR-20 reliability coefficient of .93

(N • 800) and cor-

related .90 with the larger 10-item Observance Scale.

These

particular three items were chosen because (1) they repre*On an N of 546 the Jewish Observance Scale produced
a Kinder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient of .91.
**The higher the scaled score the more observant the
individual.
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TABLE 5,--Jewish Obseryance Scale

(N•79)

(N•ll4).

R

1.

37%
63%

1%
99%

9%
91%

91%
9%

8%
92%

5%
95%

31%
69%

96%
4%

10%
90%

92%
8%

91%
9%

100%
0%

81%
19%

69%
31%

80%
20%

99%
1%

48%
52%

61%
39%

40%
61%

1%
99%

67%
33%

87%
13%

5%
95%

Do you fast on Tish Ab av?
Yes
No

8.

99%
1%

Do you eat pork?
Yes
No

7.

75%
25%

Do you fast on Yon Kippur?
Yes
No

6.

56%
44%

Do yo believe in G-d?
Yes
No

5.

(N=322)
NA

Do you keep Kosher?
Yes
No

4.

0

Do you refrain from driving on Saturday?
Yes
No

3.

(N•231)

Do you refrain from eating bread and bread products on
Passover?
Yes
No

2.

c

1%
99%

8%
92%

Do you believe in a "world to come" after one dies in
this world?
Yes
No

16%
84%

39%
61%

92%
8%

34%
66%
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(N =7 9)
R

(N=ll 4)

c

(N=231)

(N=322)

0

NA

9. Do you believe that the Bible was given to the Jews
by G-d?
Yes
No

38%
62%

70%
30%

46%
54%

97%
3%

10. Do you attend Synagogue services weekly?
Yes
No

21%
79%

*ll. [FOR MEN ONLY]
Yes
No

(N=38)
3%
97%

*12. [FOR WOMEN ONLY]
Yes
No

(N=42)
48%
52%

22%
78%

73%
27%

4%
96%

Do you put on Tefillin daily?
(N=68)
6%
94%

(N=l 74)
6%
94%

(N=96)
90%
10%

Do you light Sabbath candles?
(N=4 7)
60%
40%

(N=l35)
99%
1%

(N=l48)
18%
82%

*This item was not part of the 10-item scale for it
pert,ained exclusively to only one of the genders.
sented the three highest item-total correlations among the
ten items, (2) in light of their extremely high reliability
coefficient, and (3)

in light of the strong relationship

between the three-item scale and the total observnce scale.
An interesting property of this abridged scale was that 86%
of all respondents either observed all three religious activities or none at all.

Therefore in order to accentuate the

following differences while still representing the vast
majority of these data (i.e., 86% of it) only these two groups
in the forthcoming analysis will be shown.

However, a Pear-
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son's r Statistic and the probability level representing these
entire data (i.e., all levels of the Jewish observance variable) will be presented as well.
When comparing respondents who observe all of the
above three religious activities with those who do not observe
any of the three we are, in effect, comparing the Orthodox
group against the others combined.

For example, 85% of all

Orthodox respond en ts were found to observe all three religious
activities, whereas among the Non-Affiliated, Reform, and
Conservative only 5%, 0%, and 5% respectively observed all
three.

Conversely, the percentages of Non-Affiliated, Reform,

and Conservative respondents who do not observe any of the
three were 87%, 93%, and 67% respectively.

In contrast,

only 3% of Orthodox respondents reported not to observe any
of the three.

Accordingly, separating respondents into the

above two groupings (i.e., those that observe all three and
those that do not observe any of the three) re presents a
slightly finer delineation between Oral Law adherents and
non-Oral Law adherents than the distinction produced by comparing Orthodox adherents with the other three groups separately.

In other words, Oral Law adherents are specifically

Jews who observe the Oral Law, and therefore by comparing
Jews who keep the Laws with Jews who do not, we are in effect,
creating a purer comparison between Oral Law adherents and
non-Oral Law adherents.
When the Intention to Settle in Israel variable was
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correlated with the Abridged Observance Scale (N•763) results
were r

=

.53, p

<

.001.

When the comparison presented in

Table 6 was analyzed, results were:

r

=

.55, p

<

.001.

TABLE 6.--Intention to Settle in Israel CII)
Do Not Observe

Observe all
Three (N=222)

II

Any (N=453)

5%
95%

54%
46%

Yes
No

The above results demonstrate that the more observant
the individual is the more inclined he/she will be to someday
settle in Israel.

For example, 54% of Oral Law adherents

(as defined by observing all three religious activities)
intend to someday settle in Israel whereas only 5% of nonOr al Law adherents (as defined by not keeping any of the
three observances) intend to someday settle in Israel.
The second index used to measure the relationship to
the Land, albeit more indirect than the first but nevertheless
a tangible-behavioral criterion, was based on the number
of visits to Israel.

Although two blatant confounding vari-

ables appear to favor the Reform and Conservative constituencies on this index (they are:

(1) Being that a trip to

Israel is very expensive, the wealthier of the constituencies
should have greater opportunities, and

(2)

the following

questions did not inquire into the lengths of stay, which
would not take in to account the many Orthodox ind i.v iduals
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and families who spend extended periods of time in Israel)
the comparisons were still carried out.
The first question asked was:
1.

Have you ever visited Israel?

TABLE 7.--Visits to Israel CI>
Synagogue Affiliation
(N•80)

(N=323)
NA
Have you
Ever
Visited
Israel

(N•ll3)

R

c

58%

Yes:

37%

61%

No:

63%

39%

42%

(N=227)
0

83%
17%

According to Table 7 the percentage of Orthodox Jews
(83%) who have ever visited Israel appears to significantly
exceed the other three groups.

In addition, the percentages

of Reform and Conservative Jews who have ever visited Israel
(61% and 58% respectively) seem to significantly exceed the
percentage of Non-Affiliated Jews.
The second question asked was:
2.

How many times have you visited Israel?

Results based on the total sample (N=802) are shown in Table

B.
Using the Non-Affiliated group as an example, Table
8 may be understood according to the following description.
The mean number of visits to Israel per person for the NonAffiliated group was .75.

In addition, when the number of
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TABLE 8,--Number of visits to Israel
Non-Affiliated (N=323): Mean = .75; 1st Quartile= O, 2nd
Quartile = O, 3rd Quartile • 1 (Range was from 0 visits to
19 visits)
Reform (N=80): Mean= 2.53; 1st Quartile= O, 2nd Quartile
= 1, 3rd Quartile = 2 (Range was from O visits to 38 visits)
Conservative (N=ll3): Mean = 1. 27; 1st Quartile = O, 2nd
Quartile • 1, 3rd Quartile = 2 (Range was from 0 visits to
25 visits)
Orthodox (N=227): Mean = 2. 89; 1st Quartile= 1, 2nd Quartile
= 2, 3rd Quartile= 3 (Range was from 0 visits to 50 visits)
F = 18.42, df (3,739), p < .001.
visits per person was broken down into quartiles the following
results were obtained.

Starting from the least number of

visits to Israel and working upward the maximum number of
visits for any one person in the Non-Affiliated group in
the first quartile (i.e., the first 25% of all Non-Affiliated
respondents) was

o.

In the 2d quartile (50% of all Non-Af-

fil iated respondents) the maximum number of visits per person
remained O, and in the third quartile (75% of all Non-Affiliated respondents) the maximum number of visits per person
was 1.
Six individual comparisons between the four groups
were then implemented.

The following comparisons were found

significant at the .005 level:
1.

Non-Affiliated (Mean= .75) vs. Reform (Mean= 2.53)
t = -4.03, df (739), p < .001

2.

Non-Affiliated (Mean .75) vs. Orthodox (Mean= 2.89)
t = -7.00, df (739), p < .001
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3.

Conservative (Mean = 1.27) vs. Orthodox (Mean = 2.89)
t = -4.00, df (739), p < .001.
Although the mean number of visits between Reform

and Orthodox respondents did not significantly differ, there
did seem to be a substantial difference when quartiles were
compared.

The possibility that a few very high numbers had

arti fie ially inflated the Reform group's mean was investigated
by

deleting all respondents who had traveled to Israel 11

or more times.

Over 98% of all respondents had visited Israel

10 times or less so the deletion of less than 2% had little
effect on the individual Ns.
A one-way analysis of variance produced:
F = 39.19, df (3,725), p < .001.
When individual comparisons were subsequently done the following comparisons were found significant at the .005 probability
level.
(N=219)
(N=322)
Orthodox (Mean = 2.31) vs. Non-Affiliated (Mean = .69)
t = -10.72, df (725), p < .001
(N=219)
(N==76)
Orthodox (Mean= 2.31) vs. Reform (Mean= 1.24)
t = -4.68, df (725), p < .001
(N=219)
(N=ll2)
Orthodox (Mean = 2.31) vs. Conservative (Mean = 1.05)
t = -6.27, df (725), p < .001.
According to the individual contrasts above, the
Orthodox group has visited Israel significantly more times
than the other three groups.

In addition, there did not

appear to be any significant difference among the othe·r three
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groups themselves (i.e., after the maximum number of visits
to Israel had been truncated to 10).
When the variable Have You Ever Vi sted Israel was
related to Oral Law adherence (i.e., respondents who observe
al 1 three religious activities vs. respondents who do not
observe any of the three) results were:
TABLE 9.--yisits to Israel (II)
Observe All
Three (N=229)
Have you ever
Visited
Israel

Don't Observe
Any (N=458)

Yes:

86%

43%

No:

14%

57%

According to the above table the percentage of Oral
Law adherents who have at one time visited Israel is twice
as large as the percentage of non-Oral Law adherents who
have ever visited Israel (i.e., 86% to 43%).
When Number of Visits to Israel was then correlated
with the Abridged Observance Scale, results were r = .41, p

< .001.

Following therefrom, the breakdown between respon-

dents who observe all three activities and respondents who
do hot keep any is presented in Table 10.
Results show that the more religiously observant
the individual is, the more often he/she will ever likely
visit Israel.

In addition, Oral Law adherents have visited

Israel.significantly more (M = 2.98) than non-Oral Law adherents (M

= 1.06).
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TABLE 10,--Number of visits to Israel (II)
Observe All Three (n•229)
Mean • 2. 98
(Range was from 0 to 50 visits)
1st Quartile • 1
2nd Quartile • 2
3rd Quartile == 4

r

=

Don't Observe Any (N=458)
Mean = 1.06
(Range was from 0 visits to 38 visits)
1st Quartile == 0
2nd Quartile = 0
3rd Quartile • 1
.43, p < .001
The following two variables (i.e., Israel Attitude

Scale and the Mideast Knowledge Scale) were deemed secondary
in importance when evaluating the relationship between American Jews to the Land of Israel in 1 ight of the variables'
intangible and overly general nature.

Intangible in the

respect that attitudes and knowledge concerning Israel may
demonstrate an interest in the Jewish State, but are far
removed from the traditional relationship (which all three
religious movements ostensibly advocate) Jews throughout
history have ma in ta ined.

Overly general in the respect,

that a positive Jewish identity (regardless of movement affiliation)

should by itself predispose the individual to

positive attitudes and a heightened interest in the modern
state of Israel.
Theoretically, positive attitudes and knowledge concerning

the secular State of Israel should be innocuous and

non-threatening to the Reform and Conservative movements.
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Furthermore, the attitude and knowledge scales address specifically the modern secular State of Israel, and not necessar ily the traditional relationship between the Jewish people
and the Land of Israel (this distinction may appear to be
too fine, but in reality this distinction is consistently
expressed in many Orthodox circles).

Therefore it would not

be surprising to find strc:>nger positive attitudes and a
heightened awareness concerning the secular State of Israel
per se, among Reform, and Conservative adherents than among
their Orthodox counterparts.
Individual mean scale scores for the *Israel Attitude
Scale in the upcoming analyses have been categorized in the
following manner:
1.00
1.50
2.50
3.50

to
to
to
to

1.49 =Strong Negative Attitudes
2.49 = Somewhat Negative Attitudes
3.49-= Somewhat Positive Attitudes
4.00
Strong Positive Attitudes

=

The significant individual contrasts (i.e., p

< .005)

among the four groups based on separate variance estimates
were:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Conservative (M=3.63) vs. Non-Affiliated (M=3.46)
t = -4.12, df (238), p < .001
Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Non-Affiliated (M=3.46)
t = -9.42, df (547), p < .001
Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Reform (M=3.54)
t = -4.75, df (118), p < .001
Orthodox (M=3.75) vs. Conservative (M=3.63)
t = -3.08, df (183), p < .002

*Based on a N of 637 the Israel Attitude Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .72.
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TABLE 11,--Israel Attitude Scale
*Israel Attitude Scale (SCI)
overall
Frequency

(N=809)

Strong Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Positive Attitudes
Strong Positive Attitudes

0%
2%
29%
69%

Non-Affiliated (N=324)
Strong Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Positive Attitudes
Strong Positive Attitudes

0%
5%
41%
54%

Reform (N=80)
Strong Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Positive Attitudes
Strong Positive Attitudes

0%
0%
40%
60%

Conservative (N=l13)
Strong Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Positive Attitudes
Strong Positive Attitudes

0%
1%
26%
73%

Orthodox (N=230)
Strong Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Positive Attitudes
Strong Positive Attitudes
F = 27.63, df (3,743)

I

p

<

0%
0%
12%
88%

.001.

*The full 9-item scale with individual response
breakdown among groups can be found in Appendix A.
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According to the above comparisons Orthodox adherents
have significantly more positive attitudes' towards the modern
state of Israel (Mean= 3.75) than do adherents of the other
three groups.

These results become all the more pronounced

when one realizes that the scale, which was originally designed for a non-Jewish population, seemed to produce a ceiling effect in the Jewish sample.

The Conservative group

also produced significantly more positive attitudes towards
Israel (Mean= 3.63) than did the Non-Affiliated group (Mean

= 3.46).
When the Israeli Attitude Scale is correlated with
the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) the resulting r = .29,
p < • 001.

When the Abridged Scale was then dichotomized

results were:
TABLE 12.--Israel Attitude Scale CIIl
Observe All Three (N=233)
Strong Negative Attitudes
= 0%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes = 0%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes = 15%
Strong Positive Attitudes
= 85%
Don't Observe Any (N=460)
Strong Negative Attitudes
= 0%
Somewhat Negative Attitudes = 3%
Somewhat Positive Attitudes = 38%
Strong Positive Attitudes
= 59%
r = .30, p < .001
According to the above the more religiously observant the individual is the more positive attitudes towards
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the modern state of Israel he/she is likely to have.

Cor-

respondingly, the Oral Law adherents had significantly more
pro-Israel attitudes than did non-Oral Law adherents.

For

example, 85% of Oral Law adherents registered strong positive
attitudes towards Israel whereas only 59% of non-Oral Law
adherents produced strong positive attitudes towards Israel.
The following variable was Mideast Knowledge Level.
Table 13 represents the breakdown in scores among the four
groups.
TABLE 13.--Mideast Knowledse
*Mideast Knowledge Scale (N = 811)
Overall
Frequency:

0-2
3-4
5-6
7-8

correct
correct
correct
correct

NA (N=324)
9%
i'7%
40%
24%

R (N=BO)
0-2
3-4
5-6
7-8

F

= 12.23,

5%
28%
43%
25%

correct
correct
correct
correct

C (N=ll4)

5%
25%
44%
26%

5%
23%
42%
30%

0

0-2
3-4
5-6
7-8

correct
correct
correct
correct

(N=231)
1%
15%
45%
39%

df (3,745), p < .001

*Based on an N of 637 the Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability coefficient was .47. The full 8-item scale with
individual response breakdown among religious groups can be
found in Appendix A.
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The significant individual constrasts (i.e., p

<

.005) among the four groups were:
1.
2.
3.

Orthodox *(M=l.74) vs. Non-Affiliated (M=l.64)
t : 5.89, df (745) I p ( .001
Orthodox (M=l.74) vs. Reform (M=l.65)
t : 3.39, df (745) I p ( .001
Orthodox (M=l.74) vs. Conservative (M=l.66)
t = 3.37, df )745), p < .001

According to the above comparisons, the Orthodox group seems
to have significantly greater knowledge of Mideast happenings
than the other three groups.

No significant differences

(i.e., p < .005) were found when the other three groups were
compared with one another.
When the **Mideast Knowledge Scale was correlated
with the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) the resulting
= .22, p < .001.

~

When the Observance Scale was then dichoto-

mized results were as shown in Table 14.
According to the analyses below, the more religiously
observant the individual is, the more Mideast knowledge he/she
is likely to have.

In addition, Oral Law adherents' level

of Mideast knowledge was significantly greater than the level
of Mideast knowledge registered by the non-Oral Law group.
For example, only 16% of Oral Law adherents obtained a score
*The maximum range of mean scores went from 1.00
(none correct) to 2.00 (all correct).
**The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable
the individual.
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of 50% or less whereas 35% of non-Oral Law adherents scored
50% or less.
XABLE 14.--Mideast Knowledae Scale (II)
Observe All Three (N=234)
0-2
3-4
5-6
7-8

correct = 2%
correct = 14%
correct = 43%
correct = 41%

Don't Observe Any (N=461)
0-2
3-4
5-6
7-8
r

=

correct
correct
correct
correct

=

8%

= 27%
= 43%
= 23%

.24, p < .001

D.

A solid Jewish education is another area where

the official platforms of all three movements positively
conv~rge

(see Chapter I).

Officially, all three movements

consider a strong fundamental Jewish education highly important.

Although officially they encourage the strengthening

of the Jewish spirit via Jewish education, according to the
theoretical analysis presented in Chapter I this should not
be realized in practice.

If Reform and Conservative Judaism

are internally pressured to uproot the traditionally competitive Jewish presence, their "best interests" would be served
by uprooting traditional Jewish knowledge among their respective constituencies (to implicitly uproot Jewish knowledge
from among other constituencies would be virtually impossible,

196
and therefore any attempt would be highly impracticable).
Following from the theoretical analysis in Chapter I, the
forthcoming statistical analyses expected to find that Jews
affiliated with the Reform and Conservative movements are
significantly less knowledgeable about fundamental and elementary Judaism than are Jews affiliated with Orthodox Judaism.

As in prior analyses, the *findings presented below,

regardless of outcome, are not sufficient to conclusively
support the above hypothesis, but are considered theoretically
sufficient to refute the hypothesis.
**The index for measuring Level of Fundamental Jewish
Knowledge was a set of ten questions (see Methodology for
scale construction details) which covered the areas of Jewish
history, Jewish holidays, Bible, Talmud, Prophets, Prayer,
and Hebrew Language in the most elementary and superficial
manner the scale's authors could conceive.

Based on a N of

546 the scale produced a Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability
coefficient of .91.

The following results in Table 15 were

based on a N of 805.
The percentages of Non-Affiliated, Reform, and Conservative respondents who obtained scores of 25% correct or
lower were 72, 58, and 48 respectively.

In contrast, only

*See Append ix A for other comparisons among the
four groups.
**A comparison among groups on all ten questions
can be found in Appendix A.
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TABLE 15. --Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale
R

NA (N=323)
0-2
3-5
6-8
9-10

72%
16%
7%
5%

F

58%
30%
11%
1%

Correct
Correct
Correct
Correct

c (N=ll2)

0

48%
31%
16%
5%

0-2
3-5
6-8
9-10

= 241.26, df (3, 742)

I

~N =80 ~

(N=231)

Correct
Correct
Correct
Correct

7%
10%
25%
58%

p < .001

7% of Orthodox respondents scored 25% or lower.
Correspondingly, the percentages of Non-Affiliated,
Reform, and Conservative respondents who obtained scores of
90% correct or higher were 5, 1, and 5 respectively. In contrast, 58% of Orthodox respondents scored 90% or higher.
Six individual comparisons between the four groups
were then made.

The following comparisons were found signif-

icant at the .005 probability level.
1.

Conservative *(Mean• .33) vs. Non-Affilated (Mean= .23)
t = -3.66, df (742), p < .001

2.

Orthodox (Mean • .80) vs. Non-Affiliated (Mean = .23)
t = -25.81, df (742), p < .001

3.

Orthodox (Mean • .80) vs. Reform (Mean = .28)
t = -15.83, df (742), p < .001

- 4.

Orthodox (Mean = .80) vs. Conservative (Mean = .33)
t = -15.83, df (742), p < .001.

*The maximum range of mean scores was from
correct) to 1.00 (all ten correct).

.oo

(none
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The above data demonstrate the vast differences in
level of elementary Jewish knowledge between the Orthodox
group and the other three.

In addition, there appears to

be no substantial differences among the mean scores of the
three other movements.

[Although a statistically significant

difference was obtained when the Conservative group was compared to the Non-Affiliated group, in actuality the slight
difference between their extremely low mean scores (.33 to
· .23) attenuates any serious implications of the difference
between the two.]
When the Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale was correlated with the Abridged Observance Scale (N=763) the resulting r = .77, p < .001.

When the Observance Scale was

then dichotomized results were:
TABLE 16.--Elewentary Jewish Kpowledae Scale CIIl
Observe All Three
0-2
3-4
5-6
7-8

Correct
Correct
Correct
Correct

(N=233~

= 4%
= 9%
= 23%
• 64%

Don't Observe Any (N=458)
0-2
3-4
5-6
7-8
r

= .81,

Correct = 69%
Correct = 22%
Correct = 9%
Correct = 1%

p < 001

· According to the above analyses, the more religiously
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observant the individual is, the greater his or her knowledge
of elementary Judaism will be.

In addition, Oral Law ad-

herents' level of elementary Judaism was vastly greater than
the Jewish knowledge elicited by the non-Oral Law group.
For example, only 13% of Oral Law adherents scored SO% or
lower, while an extremely large 91% of the non-Oral Law group
scored SO% or lower.
Chapter 2 Hypotheses and Results
The statistical analyses conducted to test the stated
hypotheses in Chapter II were based on an American non-Jewish,
and non-Arab sample of 400 respondents (see Chapter IV,
Methodology for Sampling and Interviewing Procedures).
A.

The following demographics are presented here

in order to give the reader some understanding of the sample
used in the upcoming analyses.
Gender (N=397)
Female
Male

= S3%

= 47%

Race (N=396)
White
Black
Other

= S7%

= 36%

=

7%

Religion (N=396)

Age (N=381)

= 46%
= 1S%

2S to 40
41 to S4
SS and Over

Catholic
Protestant
Other

= 39%

(N=396)
Country of Citizenship
U.S.A •.
Other

= 98%
= 2%

= 49%
= 32%

= 19%

(N=3 96)
Born in U.S.
Yes
No

= 92%

=

8%
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*Primary Country of Ancestors (N=238)
Ireland
Germany
Poland
Italy
England
Sweden
Other

• 17%
= 17%
• 14%
= 8%
= 6%
= 6%
= 32%

Last Year of Formal Education Completed (N=387)

= 13%
Grade l thru 11
High School Degree
= 27%
= 26%
Some College
= 16%
Bachelors Degree
Some Graduate School
= 5%
Masters or Doctorate Degree = 12%
Individual 1984 Income Before Taxes (N=366)
Less
Less
Less
Less
Less
More

than
than
than
than
than
than

$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$30,000
$50,000
$50,000

= 37%
• 10%
= 13%
= 20%
= 16%
= 3%

Employed or Retired (N=368)
Employed or Retired
Unemployed

= 82%
= 18%

*Only white respondents were asked country of .ancestors.
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*Occupational Status Level (N•213)
Value

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

=

•

•

=
=

=
=
=

•

=

=

=

=

•

3%
16%
5%
10%
24%
5%
1%
1%
3%
3%
21%
2%
3%
1%
4%

*The higher the value the lower the occupational status level
as devised by Otis Dudley Duncan's "A Socioeconomic Index
for All Occupations" (Backstrom & Hursh-Cesar, 1981).
B.

The following analysis attempted to measure the

American public's general awareness of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to correlate this awareness with attitudes toward
Israel.

Consistent with the discourse in Chapter II (con-

cerning the American news media's coverage of the Middle
East), the author expected to find the public's lack of information about various fundamental and crucial Middle East
issues substantial.
1.

Eight questions were constructed (see Methodology

for details) with the intent of measuring the public's general
knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
were~'

work

o~ly,

False, or Don't Know.

Response categories

This implies that by guess-

respondents should have scored on the aver age

50%, which would be represented as an individual score of
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4 1 and an approximate 50% breakdown would have resulted for

each of the eight items separately.
The actual frequency breakdown for the total scale
was:
N=400
0
3
5
7

to
to
to
to

Median

2 correct = 41%
4 correct • 38%
6 correct = 18%
8 correct = 3%

= 3;

Mean = 2.94

According to the above figures 79% of all respondents
received a score of 50% or less.

These scores, as predicted,

imply that the public's knowledge of relatively recent events
in the Middle East is extremely limited.
The following is the 8-item Mideast Knowledge Scale
with the response breakdown for each item.
spo~se

The correct re-

for items 4, 7, and 8 is True and the correct response

for the other five items is False.
Middle-East Knowledge Questions (N=400)
1.

Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over the
last 300 years until the creation of Israel.
Is this
true or false?
True

2.

= 37%

False = 28%

Don't Know= 36%

From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948,
thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the
Jewish settlers. Is this true or false?
T •

35%

F •

32%

DK

= 33%
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3.

Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of Jewish
nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true or false?
T

4.

F

= 36%

DK

= 40%

Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State
of Israel have spent over three times the amount of money
in military equipment than Israel has. Is this true or
false?
T

s.

= 25%

= 41%

F

= 25%

DK •

34%

Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting record
in the United Nations has shown a strong connection between itself and the United Startes.
Is this true or
false?
T

= 40%

F

= 24%

DK

= 36%

~

6.

Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that
it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle-East enemies put together. Is this true or false?
T =

7.

F

= 48%

DK

= 29%

Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been openly
dedicated to the destruction of Israel.
Is this true
or false?
T =

8.

23%

40%

F

= 37%

DK

= 24%

In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth of
the land identified by the League of Nations as Palestine. Is this true or false?
T

= 45%

F •

15%

DK

= 41%

For instance in item No. 1, 28% of all respondents answered
correctly while 37% had misinformation, and another 36% had
lack of information.

In total, 73% of all respondents did

not know that Palestine was !!,2! an independent Palestinian
state over the last 300 years.
Based on the theory that misinformation is correlated
with attitudes, the public's level of Mideast knowledge was
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hypothesized as
toward Israel.

correlating significantly with attitudes
In order to examine this relationship an

Israel Attitude Scale was constructed

(see Chapter IV,

Methodology) and was then correlated with the above 8-item
*Mideast Knowledge Scale.

Based on a N of 234 the Israel

Attitude Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of • 76.

The Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=400) produced

a Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient of

.ss.

Several attempts

were made to bring up the .SS reliability coefficient (via
deletion of items, factor analysis, and alternate coding
strategies) but all proved unsuccessful.
The Pearson Product-Moment correlation (based on an
N of 360) between the two scales resulted in a correlation
of .26 where p < .001.

Although equivocal (in light of the

small reliability coefficient) there does appear to be a
significant relationship between the two, but the actual
strength of that relationship needs to be further investigated
pending a more reliable Mideast Knowledge Scale.

Tentatively,

it does appear that attitudes toward Israel may be significantly enhanced if the public were more factually aware of
fundamental Mideast issues.
In light of the Mideast Knowledge Scale's relatively
weak reliability coefficient (.SS) all eight items were cor*In the present and forthcoming correlational analyses
the eight-items were coded in the following manner:
1 =
Incorrect (irrespective of whether the value was based on
misinformation or lack of information), and 2 •Correct.
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related individually with the Israel attitude scale.

Of

the eight items, four turned out to be significantly related
(i.e., p < .005) to the Israel scale.

They were:

N=370
*Item
Item
Item
Item

l;
2;
3;
6;

r
r
r
r

= .22,

p
p
.24, p
.33, p

= .24,

=
=

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

It is important to note that the first three items (i.e.,
items 1, 2, and 3) deal with the Palestinian Arab's historical
relationship to the Land and/or to the Jewish people.

In

addition, an incorrect response to Item 6 bespeaks an abysmal
knowledge of Mideast issues, and particularly this item correlated highest (.33) with attitudes towards Israel.

Accord-

ingly, this item more than any other seems to reflect the
relationship between lack of information and negative attitudes towards Israel.

c.

Another objective of the study was to examine

the relationship between attitudes towards **Jews with attitudes toward Israel.

Based on an N of 360 the Pearson Prod-

uct-Moment Correlation produced an r of .57, p < .001.

This

finding implies a very strong relationship between attitudes
towards Jews with attitudes towards israel in which 32% of
the variance was accounted for (i.e., r2

= .32).

These data

*See pp. 202-3, which presents each item in full.
**Individual items on the Jewish and Israel attitude
scale with their response breakdown can be found in Appendix
B.
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support the theory that there does exist a real and integral
relationship between the above two variables.
D.

The final objective in Chapter II was to study

the news media and its relationship to attitudes and information towards and about Israel.

The first media question was:

What is your primary source of news about International
Affairs?
The closed-ended response breakdown was:
(N=395)

Radio
Television
Newspapers
Magazines
Other

= 10%
50 %
= 28%
= 11%
= 2%
=

When these five response categories were compared
(via Analysis of Variance) on both The Middle East Knowledge
Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale no significant differences
(i.e., p > .005) were found.
Another news-media question asked was:
From which local channel do you get most of your international news and information?
The closed-ended response breakdown was:
(N • 211)
Channel 2
Channel 5
Channel 7
Channel 9
Channel 11
Other
When

~hese

= 32%
= 12%
• 48%
5%

=

•

=

2%
1%

six response ca·tegories were compared on both
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the Middle-East Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale
no significant differences were detected.
A third news-media question was:
From which TV news person do you get your largest amount
of international news?
The

op~n-ended

response breakdown was:
(N

= 116)

Dan Rather
Ted Koppel
Walter Jacobson
Peter Jennings
Other

= 23%
= 15%
= 13%
= 15%
= 35%

When a general comparison was made, no significant differences
were found on either the Middle-East Knowledge Scale or on
the Israel Attitude Scale.
A fourth question was:
From which newspaper do you get your largest amount of
international news?
The open-ended response breakdown was:
(N

= 92)

Chicago Tribune
= 47%
Chicago Sun-Times • 39%
Other
• 14%
When these three response categories were compared on both
the Mideast Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale
no significant differences were found.
The final news media question was:
From which magazine do you get most of your international
news?
The open-ended response breakdown was:
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(N

= 4 7)
= 47%

Time
NeWsweek = 23%
Other
• 30%
When these three categories were then compared on both the
Mideast Knowledge Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale no
significant differences were detected.
E.

In the forthcoming analysis the content and per-

ceptual effects of four news periodicals were examined. Periodicals representing American, Arab, Jewish Secular, and
Jewish Religious (Oral Law) orientations were content analyzed
(See Chapter IV, Methodology) with regards to their portrayal
of the Palestinian-Arab refugee problem.

Subsequently, the

perceptual effect these seemingly different periodicals have
on the non-Jewish, non-Arab American public were compared
and analyzed.

Samples from three of the periodicals (i.e.,

Amer.ican, Jewish secular, and Jewish religious) were drawn
from issues dated anywhere between June 6, 1982 and December
31, 1982.

It was believed that during this seven-month period

the American news media devoted much time and space to the
Lebanese invasion in general, and the Arab-Palestinian problem
in particular.

Issues of the Arab periodical were drawn

from publications dated between June, 1982 and August, 1984.
In light of the negative news coverage Israel received
during its invasion into Lebanon, it was hypothesized that
the

pe~iodical

representing mainstream America, and needless

to say the Arab periodical, would portray the Arab-Palestinian
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problem, given a latitude of variation, significantly less
pro-Israel than the Jewish religious periodical.

Accordingly,

it was also predicted that these two magazines would produce
significantly less positive perceptions of Israel, than perceptions evoked via the Jewish religious periodical.

In

addition, according to the theoretical analysis discussed
i~

Chapter I, the Jewish secular magazine, depicted as in-

directly echoing the philosophy of Reform and Conservative
Judaism, should be no less hostile towards Israel, nor less
sympathetic for the Palestinian Arabs than its American counterpart.
The following ten categories were used to contentanalyze all of the news literature compared in the present
analysis.
Categories
I.

II.
III.
IV.

v.
VI.

Jewish right or connection to the land.
Arab right or connection to the land.
Arab mistreatment of Jews.
Israeli mistreatment of Arabs.
Origins of Jewish Middle-East refugees.
Origins of Arab-Palestinian refugees.

VII.

The Jewish Middle-East refugee present condition
(sympathetic).

VIII.

The Jewish Middle-East refugee present condition
(unsympathetic).

IX.

The Ar ab-Palestinian refugee present condition ( sympathetic).
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x.

The Arab-Palestinian refugee present condition (unsympathetic).
The category breakdown for each periodical was then

done according to (a) Number of paragraphs in each category,
(B) Percentage of paragraphs for any given category in relation to total number of paragraphs, and (C) Number of sentences per category allocated to each 8-sentence set based
on the above percentages.
TABLE 17. -Septence Breakdoo fgr tbe foµr cer iodisals

1. Secular American Periodical:
Category
I II III
A. No. of Par agra?ls 6 i2 6
B. Percentage
5 11 5
c. No. of Senten::es 0 1 0

IV

V VI VII VIII IX X

19

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0 104 5
0 46 2

0

0

0

0

0 *12

0

0 11
1
0

0

0 30 0
0 28 0
0
2 0

22
2

2. Secular Jewish Periodical:
A. No. of Par agra?ls 2 18 28 71
B. Percentage
1 8 12 31
c. No. of Senten::es 0 0 1 3

3. Pro-PLO Periodical:
A. No. of Paragra{ils 3 24
3 22
B. Percentage
c. No. of Sentences 0 2

1 37
1 36
0 3

o

oocr~o

4. Reli2ious Jewish Periodical:
A. No. of Paragra{ils 25 2 82 0 **l **3
B. Percentage
15 1 51 0 1 2
c. No. of Senten::es 1 0 5 0 0 0

0
0

0
0

600
5 0

4 0

0 11 38
0 7 23
0 0 2

*Pro Arab
**Pro Israeli
After a reliability coefficient of .83 was obtained
for 36% of all material analyzed, the following four sets
of sentences were constructed.

The vast majority of.wording
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was taken directly from the respective magazines themselves.
Arab Magazine
A Jewish professor stated that the Israeli army has committed
atrocities against the Palestinian people.
The racist character of Zionism is amply manifested in Israel's imperialistic and settler-state policies.
During Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army trampled
on its victims destroying everything in its pa th and unleashed
on Beirut a rain of death and destruction.
The Palestinians have been victims of extermination, persecution, and indifference since 1948.
Most of the world's governments today have come to recognize
that the Palestinian problem is the root-cause of the ArabIsrael i conflict.
The Jews have displaced the Palestinians from their land
via abominations.
Jews have no real Biblical justification for building a Jewish
State in Palestine.
The po 11 s have shown that the American people think that
the Palestinian struggle to return to their land is justified.
American News Magazine
President Carter said that the continued deprivation of Palestinian rights by the Israelis is contrary to moral and
ethical principles of both the U.S. and Israel.
The Israelis arranged for the Christian militiamen to enter
the Palestinian refugee camps in 1982 where there were very
bloody consequences.
Senior American officials feel the necessity for solving
the Palestinian plight on the West Bank.
An Israeli victory in Lebanon did not settle the issue of a
place for the Palestinaians to live.
Because the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO,
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suffered defeat in Lebanon, the moderate policies of Yasser
Arafat may be rejected for more ruthless tactics.
The Arab leaders of the Middle-East have called for the creation of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem
as its capital.
The leader of the PLO Yasser Arafat has unflagging energy and
absolute determination to regain a homeland for his people.
The Lebanese President stated that the Palestinians should
be allowed to live in peace and freedom with self-determination in their land.
Jewish Secular Magazine
Israel will never ob ta in the security it wants by using force.
The Israeli government has tried to destroy the Arab political
elite in the occupied territories by ousting mayors, closing
universities, and restricting the circulation of literature
in the Arab-dominated areas.
Many governments throughout the world have held Israel responsible for the massacre of Palestinian civilians in the
Palestinian refugee camps.
According to the u.s. State Department, there are 4,300,000
Palestinians scattered around the world.
The European Parliament Assembly has expressed solidarity
with the Palestinian people.
The Arabs call for a Palestinian State represented by the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO.
The moderate Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt,
are troubled by the Palestinian plight.
A PLO leader who surrendered to the Israelis said that he
was ashamed of its terrorist tactics.
Jewish Religious (Oral-Law) Magazine
The State of Israel is the historic homeland of the Jews.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, is an unpr inci~led terrorist organization.
The PLO has vied for the total liquidation of Israel.
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PLO operations in Lebanon up to 1982 was the center for international terrorism worldwide.
Up until 1982, Israel's northern border has been consistently
bombed by PLO terrorists.
Since June of 1981 to December of 1982, a total of 150 terrorist attacks have been made against Israel by the PLO.
The President of Lebanon said, in Paris, that Arafat, the
leader of the PLO, is the cause of the Palestinian's problems.
Jordan is the key obstructionist in settling the Palestinian
refugee problem by not admitting that his state is actually
Palestine.
Eight fixed-response questions followed the reading
of each set of sentences (the questions may be found in Append ix D).

The eight questions (N=348) based on the readings

produced a Kuder-Richardson 20 coefficient of *.69.

The

mean for the 8-item scale was 1.53 with a standard deviation
of • 317 (the higher the scaled score the more pro-Israel
the responses, the minimum possible mean score was 1 and
the maximum possible mean score was 2).
An analysis of covariance, comparing the four periodicals on the subsequent eight questions while controlling
for differences attributed

to~'

Toward Israel, was then done.

Age, Gender, and Attitudes

A highly significant F sta-

tistic of 28.23, df(3,339), p < .001 resulted.
Version:

(N=84)
American;

Mean:
Adjusted Mean:

1.51
1.51

.;
'

(N=88)
Jewish Secular
1.45
1. 46

*Attempts to bring up the reliability coeffic.ient
via deletion of items and factor analysis were unsuccessful.
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(N=86)
Arab

(N=90)
version: Jewish Religious;
Mean:
Adjusted Mean:

1.76
1.75

.

1.38
1.38

;
I

Subsequently, the six possible individual comparisons
were statistically analyzed.

The following contrasts repre-

sent only those which produced statistically significant
differences (p < .005).
Significant Contrasts

'.

Jewish Religious-Arab
: t=-7.49, df(369), p<.001
Jewish Religious-Jewish Secular: t•-5.84, df(369), p<.001
Jewish Religious-American
t=-8.65, df(369), p<.001
According to the above mean scores, the mean value
as predicted, of the Jewish religious periodical (M•l. 76)
represented the most pro-Israel of the four periodicals.
The Arab magazine produced the most anti-Israel responses
(M=l.38), and the American and Jewish secular magazines produced mean scores of 1.51 and 1.45 respectively.

After in-

dividual comparisons were implemented, only differences between the Jewish religious periodical and each of the other
three magazines proved statistically significant.
Afterwards, four questions (three of them taken directly from the eight questions asked at the end of each
respective reading) were asked at the conclusion of the interview in order to examine the carryover effect of the readings •.

With the four readings posited as the independent

variable; F

= 1.94,

df(3,351), p

> .005.
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In addition, the Israel Attitude Scale (which was
also administered at the end of the interview) was examined
concerning the readings' effect on it.

Again, with the four

readings posited as the independent variable; F
(3,374), p

>

=

2.25, df

.005.

In conclusion, it appears that the results were
specifically a function of the readings themselves, and had
1 i ttle to do with the respondents' prior attitudes.

Cor-

respondingly, the effects of the readings were shortl ived
which was probably a function of the repetitive nature of
the directions given.

For instance, immediately preceding

the readings respondents were told to base their responses
only on their understanding of the sentences.

In addition,

they were told that the sentences they were about to hear
"come from an actual magazine which does not necessarily
represent the real situation."

Immediately following the

reading of the sentences they were told again to base their
"answers only on the sentences" they "just heard and !!.2!. on
any prior knowledge or attitudes" they might have.

To further

affirm the directives, respondents were asked to respond
only according to t;he readings on each question (e.g., "According to what you heard who is to blame for the continuing
Palestinian refugee probelem.

Is it • • • ) .*

*Other incidental statistics pertaining to the above
readings and questions thereof can be found in Appendix B.
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Chapter 3 Analyses and Results
The forthcoming analyses deal with variables which
are commonly depicted as factors directly involved in promoting prejudice.

However, in the present theoretical context

they are viewed as aggression-arousing mediating variables
which have only indirectly become part of the overall prejudicial process.

The following social-psychological variables

have been shown in the past to correlate significantly with
anti-Jewish prejudice (see Chapter 3--Tertiary Cause of AntiJewish Hostility).

In the present study these variables

have been analyzed in relation to attitudes towards both
Jews and Israel.
F.

The disintegration of societal structure and

values in times of rapid social change has been coined anomie
and has been found to correlate significantly with anti-Jewish
attitudes (Hoge et al., 1975).

Individuals suffering from

anomie are seen as being prone to feelings of anxiety and
insecurity, in short, heightened emotional stress which may
predispose them to hate propaganda against Jews or any other
group who happens to be the target of the respective propaganda.
The 4-item Anomie Scale, as implemented by Bryant
and Veroff (1984), produced in the present study a Cronbach
Alpha reliability coefficient of .65 based on a N of 382.
No

sig~ificant

relationship (i.e., p

> .005) was registered

between the Anomie Scale and the Israel Attitude Scale· (N=360,
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r

=

.14).*

However, a significant Pearson Product-Moment

Correlation (r • .25, p < .001) was obtained when correlated
with the **Jewish Attitude Scale (N=360).
Despite the fact that the scale's reliability coefficient was a bit below the usual minimal-level of acceptance
(i.e., .70), a small but substantive relationship does appear
to exist between the Anomie and Jewish Attitude Scales.

In

other words, the emotional stress brought about by anomie
could be seen as a contributing factor promoting anti-Jewish
attitudes, and to a lesser and non-significant extent, antiIsrael attitudes.
G.

It has been advanced that threats of economic,

political, and military disaster reinforce anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior (e.g., Ettinger, 1969; Parson, 1980). Fear
of an economic, political, or military catastrophe, which is
out of the individual's personal control, was depicted (see
Chapter III) as a potentially disturbing and frustrating experience.

Theoretically, this fear was conceptualized as

predisposing the individual to hostile-type attitudes and
actions directed against vulnerable individuals or groups.
In the present analysis a ***6-item Opinion-Fear
*The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.
**The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.
***The higher the scaled score the more negative the
attitude.
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Rating Scale was correlated with both the Jewish and Israel
attitude scales.

The 6-item scale based on a N of 361 pro-

duced a Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient of .76.

Re-

sul ts were:
1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N-=360), r = -.17, p = .001
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=360), r = -.22, p < .001.
The 6-i tem scale was then broken down into two 3-i tem
scales which conceptually represented (1) Fear of an impending
economic, military, or political crisis, and (2) Opinions
concerning impending economic, military, or political crises.
Based on a N of 361 (for both scales) the Fear Scale produced
a Cronbach Alpha of .72, and the Opinion Scale produced one
of • 5 9.

when these scales were then correlated independently

with the Jewish and Israel attitude scales results were:
*3-Item Fear-Crisis Scale
1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=360), r = -.13, p > .005)
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N =3 60) , r = - • 17, p = • 001
*3-Item Opinion-Crisis Scale
1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=360), r = -.17, p = .001
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=360), r • -. 21, p < • 001
*The higher the scaled score the more negative the
attitude.
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As discussed above and corroborated in the present
analysis

t~ere

does seem to be a significant correlation

between respondents' perceptions of an impending national
crisis and attitudes towards both Jews and Israel.

In other

words, the apprehension and/or frustration created by perceived impending crises is seen (according to the present
analysis)

as a contributing factor promoting anti-Israel,

and to a lesser extent anti-Jewish attitudes.

However, after

a multiple regression analysis was performed in which both
the Israel and Jewish scales were simultaneously regressed
on the 6-item Opinion-Fear Rating Scale only the Israel
Scale's partialed correlation obtained *significance.

Beta

values were:
Israel Attitude Scale= -.19, p = .002
Jewish Attitude Scale= -.07, p > .05
This implies that the relationship between Attitudes toward
Jews and the Opinion-Fear Scale may be primarily a function
of the relationship between the Israel Attitude Scale and
the Jewish Attitude Scale.
The complete 6-item scale was, in addition, broken
down into three 2-item scales which conceptually represent
*In the present analysis as well as other forthcoming
mutliple regression analyses where Beta values are examined,
the level of significance usually employed in both studies
(i.e., p <.005) was lowered to .OS in light of the Beta statistic's inherent nature, whose value may be considerably
reduced because of the possibility confounds or collinearity
among independent variables.
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(1) Military Crisis Scale,
(3) Political Crisis Scale.

(2) Economic Crisis Scale, and
Based on a N of 361 for all

scales the Military Crisis Scale produced a Cronbach Alpha
of .59.

The Economic Crisis Scale and the Political Crisis

Scale produced Cronbach Alphas of .62 and .47 respectively.
When the above scales were correlated with the Jewish and
Israel attitude scales results were:
*2-Item Military Crisis Scale
1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=320) I r = -.13, p > .005
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=320) I r = -.20, p < .001
*2-Item Economic Crisis Scale
1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=320) I r = -.13, p > • 005
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=320) I r = -.15, p > • 005
*2-Item Political Crisis Scale
1. Jewish Attitude Scale
(N=320), r = -.19, p = • 001
2. Israel Attitude Scale
(N=320), r = -. 22, p < .001
According to the above analyses, the perceived impending crises found to be related to attitudes towards Israel
are more of a military and political nature than they are
*The higher the scaled score the more negative the
attitude.

221

economic.

When related to attitudes towards Jews, only those

of a political nature proved to be significant (although
the differences between the political r and the other r's
are probably not significant).
H.

The frustration (scapegoat) theory of prejudice

postulates that when the cause of frustration is either too
intimidating or obscure, people often redirect their hostility
against an available, identified group unlikely or unable
to fight back.

The present analysis attempted to measure

individual frustration via the *Life Satisfaction Scale (Converse et al., 1965), and the abridged and modified (for telephone usage) 4-item *Purpose in Life Test (Crumbaugh, 1968).
The Life Satisfaction Scale (N=353) did not significantly correlate (i.e., p > .005) with either the Jewish
(r

= .06)

or Israel (r

= .OS)

attitude scales.

However the

4-item Purpose-in-Life Test, which produced a Cronbach Alpha
of .56 (N=358), correlated significantly with both the Jewish
and Israel scales as demonstrated below:
1. The Jewish Attitude Scale
(N =3 60)

1

r •

• 221 p (

• 0 01

2. The Israel Attitude Scale
(N =3 60 ) 1 r • • 15 1 p • • 0 04
Although the above relationships were statistically significant, the fact that the scale's reliability coefficient
was only .56 throws a damper on the reliability of the
*The higher the scaled score the more posi t.i ve the
attitude.
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results.

However, based on the above exploratory analysis

it does appear that the lack of meaning (purpose) a person
experiences in life (and consequently the more existential
frustration) the more inclined he/she may be to

anti-Jewish

and/or anti-Israel activity.
In Chapter 3 the hypothesis was presented that an
individual who fails to achieve an effective personal identity
may be predisposed to prejudicial behavior in an attempt to
establish a stable sense of self.

The Thomas-Zander Ego

Strength Scale (Thomas et al, 1960), was employed in the
present analysis, and like the above variables was studied
in its relationship to attitudes towards Jews and Israel.
Based on a sample of 370 the *7-item Ego-Strength
Scale produced a reliability coefficient of only .40 (deleting
itern(s) and factor analysis proved unsuccessful in substantially inreasing the reliability coefficient).
Jewish (r

= .06)

nor Israel (r

=

Neither the

.12) attitude scales were

significantly correlated (i.e., p > .OOS)with the Ego-Strengh
Scale, but pending a more reliable measurement the results
are, at best, inconclusive.
In light of the Ego-Strength Scale's inadequate reliability coefficient, all seven items individually were subsequently correlated with both the Jewish and Israel scales.
Of the seven i terns, two i terns turned out to be significantly
*The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.
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correlated (i.e., p < .005) with the Jewish Attitude Scale,
and none of the seven items correlated significantly with
the Israel Attitude Scale.

Correlations for the two Ego

strength Items (Items No. 1 and 2 in the Scale) were:
Jewish Attitude Scale
Ego Strength Item No. 1 (N•361)
r = .16, p = .002
Ego Strength Item No. 2 (N•369)
r = .21, p < .001
Israel Attitude Scale
Ego Strength Item No. 1 (N=361)
r = .10, p > .005
Ego Strength Item No. 2 (N=369)
r = .13, p > .005
To repeat, as can be seen from the above, both Ego-Strength
Items 1 and 2 correlated significantly (.16 and .21 respectively) with the Jewish Attitude Scale, while neither of
the two items were found to be significantly related to the
Isra'el Attitude Scale.
Two simultaneous-multiple-regression analyses were
then implemented in which all the psychological variables
mentioned above (in addition to Level of Formal Educati<:>n)
were regressed on both the Jewish and Israel attitude scales.
Results were:
1. Jewish Attitude Scale (N=370)
Independent Variables
Anomie Scale
Ego-Strength Scale
Life Satisfaction Scale
Abridged Purpose in Life Scale

Partial Correlations
.15,
-.05,
-.05,
.20,

p
p
p
p

<
>
>
<

• 006
.05
.05
.001
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-.10, p <

opinion-Fear Rating Scale
Level of Formal Education

.os

< • 02

.14, p

Multiple R • .36, p < .001
2. Israel Attitude Scale (N=367)
Independent Variables

Partial Correlations

Anomie Scale
Ego-Strength Scale
Life Satisfaction Scale
Abridged Purpose in Life Scale
Opinion-Fear Rating Scale
Level of Formal Education

.02, p
.04, p
-.os, p
.11, p
-.19, p
.09, p

Multiple R

= .28,

>
>
>
>
<
>

.os
.os

.os
.os

.001

.os

p < .001

Based on the above, it does appear that various
social-psychological variables are independently associated
with attitudes towards Jews.

The present analysis supports

prior research which has shown that the more emotionally
disturbed, frustrated, or fearful the individual, the more
pred~sposed

he/she may be to develop anti-Jewish attitudes.

It should also be made clear that although a substantial
relationship has been detected (R • .36, which indicated
that 13% of the variance is accounted for) the great majority
of the variance (i.e., 87%) is still unexplained.

In other

words, the above social-psychological variables should not
be considered more than minor contributions in the overall
etiology of anti-Jewish attitudes.
In examining the beta values it was found that the
variables (i.e., Anomie, Purpose in Life, and Opinion-Fear
Scale) ·which were significantly correlated with the. Jewish
scale in bivariate relationships remained significantly cor-
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related in a multivariate analysis.

This implies that the

four significant correlations (i.e., the three scales above
plus Level of Formal Education) are independently associated
with attitudes towards Jews.
Not only was the Multiple R less for the Israel attitude scale than it was for the Jewish scale (i.e.,

.28

and .36, respectively), but five of the six beta values failed
to reach the .OS level of significance.

The only variable

found to correlate significantly both separately, and after
the par ti al ing process was the 6-i tem Opinion-Fear Ra ting
Scale.
I.

According to the phenomenological approach to

prejudice (Allport, 1954)

individuals' prejudiced behavior

proceeds immediately from their view of the situation confronting them, and their reaction to the environment corresponds to their def ini ti on of that world.

As depicted

in Chapter II misperceptions of Jews and Judaism have historically precipitated anti-Jewish activity.

Furthermore

(as shown in Chapter II), the most virulent anti-Jewish (antiIsrael) propaganda currently being propagated concerns the
Arab Palestinian refugee problem.

According to the discussion

in Chapter I I, the propaganda which bestows legitimacy on
the Palestinian "national" movement and arouses sympathy
worldwide for the "palestinian cause" while simultaneously
castin9 aspersions on the "racist" and "imperialist" nature
of the Jewish state, was conceptualized as providing the
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"moral j us ti fication"

(in the eyes of the world)

for the

implementation of another Jewish holocaust.
In light of the above, four questions pertaining
specifically to the Arab Palestinian refugee problem were
asked of all respondents.

A KR-20 reliability coefficient

was computed for the four items *(N=l54) and resulted in
• 3 9.

Various combinations of these four i terns failed to

substantially increase the reliability coefficient (the highest reliability coefficient based on a scale of items 1 and
2 was .50).

It was therefore deemed necessary to correlate

each i tern separately with both the Jewish and Israel attitude
scales.

In the following analyses each i tern will be presented

in full.
**Item No. 1 (N=219)
"In your op1n1on, who is to blame for causing the Palestinian
refugee problem. Is it Israel or the Arabs"?
Jewish Attitude Scale; r
Israel Attitude Scale; r

= .18,
=

p > .005
.39, p < .001

Item No. 2. (N=237)
"In your op1n1on, who are the rightful inhabitants of the
land which today is called Israel and before 1948 was called
Palestine. Are the rightful inhabitants the Arabs or the
Jews"?
*Many respondents were unwilling to answer these 4
i terns in 1 ight of their inherent nature which demanded either
a pro-Israel or pro-Arab response (i.e., there were no middle-of-the-road response categories).
· **Coding procedures for Items 1, 2, and 4 were:
Pro-Arab response • l; Pro-Israel response • 2
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Jewish Attitude Scale; r = .19, p
Israel Attitude Scale; r = .25, p

=
<

.003
.001

*Item No. 3 (N=275)
"The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would
be resettlement in Israel, Jordan, or some other place"?

> .005
< .001

Jewish Attitude Scale; r = .06, p
Israel Attitude Scale; r = .22, p
Item No. 4 (N=297

"In your opinion, is the Palestinian Refugee Problem, the
underlying and central problem, in the Arab-Israeli cOii='
flict?"
(The implicit response categories were Yes or No.)

< .001
< .001

Jewish Attitude Scale; r = .32, p
Israel Attitude Scale; r = .35, p
According to the above, all four

items correlate

significantly with the Israel attitude scale, but i terns l
and 4 in particular, correlate most highly (.39 and .35 respectively)

with attitudes towards Israel.

These results

impl'y that perceptions of the Arab Palestinian refugee problem
may play an

important part in the formation of attitudes

towards Israel.
The Jewish attitude scale correlated significantly
(p

<

.005) with items 2 and 4.

However, the relationship

between the the Jewish scale and item 2 appears to be more
an artifact of the relationship between attitudes towards
~with

attitudes towards Israel.

This was seen by simul-

*The coding procedure for Item 3 was: Resettlement
in Isr~el = l; resettlement in Jordan or some other place =
2.
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taneously regressing both scales on Item 2.
Dependent Variable:

Results were:

Item 2

Independent Variables

Beta Values

Jewish Attitude Scale
Israel Attitude Scale

.oa,

p

• 20, p

> .os
< • 007

When the same analysis was done on Item 4, results were:
Dependent Variable:

Item 4

Independent Variables

Beta Values

Jewish Attitude Scale
Israel Attitude Scale

.17 I p ( • 02
.25, p < .001

Although a considerable amount of the Jewish scale's variance is accounted for when the Israel scale is introduced
into the equation, enough remains to imply that the Jewish
attitude scale is independently related to Item 4.
J.

The following statistical analyses examine several

demographic variables in their relationship to (1) Attitudes
towards Jews, (2) Attitudes towards Israel, and (3) Knowledge
of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
1. Independent Variable:*
Dependent Variables:

Primary Country of Ancestors
Jewish Attitude Scale;
F ::: l.70, df(6,222)

I

p

> .os

Israel Attitude Scale;
.97, df (6,222), p >.OS

F ==

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
F == .96, df (6,231), p >.OS
*Black respondents were not asked country of ancestors.
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Based on the above analyses, the variable of primary
country of ancestors does not appear to significantly differentiate on attitudes towards Jews,

Israel, or Mideast

Knowledge.
2. Independent Variable: Occupational Status (N=200)
Dependent Variables:

Jewish Attitude Scale;
r = -.07, p > .OS
Israel Attitude Scale;
r
-.11, p > .OS

=

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
r = -.11, p > • 5
The variable of Occupational Status does not appear to be
significantly related to attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or
Mideast Knowledge.
3. Independent Variable:
Dependent Variables:

*Religion
Jewish Attitude Scale;
F = .70, df(2,381), p >.OS
Israel Attitude Scale;
F • l.S2; df(2,371), p >.OS
Mideast Knowledge Scale
F = 2.65, df(2,393), p >.OS

The variable of Religion does not appear to significantly
differentiate on attitudes towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast
Knowledge.
4. Independent Variable:
Dependent Variables:

Individual Income for 1984.
Jewish Attitude Scale (N=320)
r
.13, p >

=

.oos

*Jews and Arabs were initially screened out in the
present study.
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Israel Attitude Scale (N=320)
r •

.oo!

.18, p •

Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=320)
r

= .15,

>

p

.o

5

The variable of Individual Income for 1984 does not appear
to significantly differentiate on attitudes towards Jews,
or on Mideast Knowledge, but was significantly correlated
with attitudes towards Israel.

However, there does not seem

to be significant differences among the three r's.
5. Independent Variable:

Dependent Variables:

*Are You Employed or Retired,
(Yes or No)?
(N=J3G)
Jewish Attitude Scale;
r •

.68,

>

p

.oos

Israel Attitude Scale;
= .03, p > .oos

r

Mideast Knowled6e Scale;
r •

-.oi,

p

> • os

The variable of Are You Employed or Retired,

(Yes or No)?

does not appear to be significantly related to attitudes
towards Jews, Israel, or Mideast Knowledge.
6. Independent Variable:

Dependent Variables:

Age (N=320)
Jewish Attitude Scale;
r

= -.oi,

p

> .os

Israel Attitude Scale;
= .17, p = .oo3

r

Mideast Knowled~e Scale;
r = .OS, p > .o
*Direction of coding was:
or Retired = 2.

Unemployed = l; Employed
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The variable Age does not appear to be significantly related
to attitudes towards Jews or Mideast Knowledge.

However,

there does seem to be a slight but significant relationship
between Age and Attitudes Towards Israel.

The direction of

the relationship implies that the older a person is the more
pro-Israel he/she is likely to be.
*Gender (N=360)

7. Independent Variable:
Dependent Variables:

Jewish Attitude Scale;
r •

.64,

>

p

.oos

Israel Attitude Scale;
= -.14, p > .005

r

Mideast Knowledge Scale;

= -.06,

r

p

> • os

The variable of Gender does not appear to be significantly
related to attitudes towards Jews, Israel or Mideast Knowledge.

However, there does seem to be a slight non-significant

relationship between Gender and Attitudes Towards Israel.
The direction of this relationship implies that males may
have stronger pro-Israel attitudes than females.
8. Independent Variable:
Dependent Variables:

Formal Education Level (N=360)
Jewish Attitude Scale;
r = .27, p < .001
Israel Attitude Scale;
r

= •18,

p

= •OOl

Mideast Attitude Scale;
r

= .18,

p

= .002

The variable Formal Education Level appears to correlate
*Directional key:

Male

= l;

Female

= 2.
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significantly with all three of the above scales.
9. Independent Variable:
Dependent Variables:

*Race
Jewish Attitude Scale;
(N=341)
r = .19, p

< .001

Israel Attitude Scale;
(N=336)
r
.16; p

=

= .003

Mideast Knowledge Scale;
(N=352)
r

= • 04,

p

> • 05

The variable Race does not appear to be significantly related
to Mideast Knowledge.

However, Race did correlate slightly

but significantly with attitudes towards both Jews and
Israel.

White respondents were found to be more pro-Jewish

and pro-Israel than their Black counterparts.
However, after a multiple regression analysis was performed in which both the Jewish and Israel scales were simultaneously reressed

on~

only the Jewish Scale's partialed

correlation proved significant (Beta values were:

Jewish

Scale= .17. p < .008; and Israel Scale= .06, p > .OS).
This suggests that the relationship between Race and Attitudes
towards Israel is primarily a function of the relationship
between Attitudes towards Jews with Attitudes toward Israel.
K.

Two simultaneous-multiple-regression analyses

*In light of the fact that the third racial group
"Other" had a N of only 23, and because of its heterogeneous
character, only tqe racial groups of White and Black were
compar~d in the following analyses.
Coding for ~ was
Black = 1, and White = 2.
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were then implemented where the demographic variables of
Gender, Age, Race, and Education were regressed on all three
scales.

Results were:

1. Dependent Variable:

Jewish Attitude Scale (N=341)

Independent Variables

Beta Values
.06, p > .OS
-.02, p > .os
.ls, p < .007
.22, p < .001

Gender
Age
Race
Education
Multiple R
The two variables

= .29,

p < .001

and Education) which were signif-

(~

icantly correlated with Attitudes Towards Jews in bivariate
relationships remained signficantly correlated in the above
multiple correlation analysis.
2. Dependent Variable:

Israel Attitude Scale (N=336)

Independent Variables

Beta Values
-.14,
.13,
.17,
.16,

Gender
Age
Race
Education
Multiple R

= .31,

p

p <
p <
p =
p =

.01
.02
.001
.003

< .001

Three of the above four variables were found significantly
correlated with Attitudes Towards Israel in bivariate relationships, and remained significantly correlated in the above
multivariate analysis.

The variable

Gender, which failed

to reach the .oos level of significance in its bivariate
relationship with the Israel scale reached significance in
the above multivariate analysis after the significance level
was lowered to • OS.
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3. Dependent Variable:

Mideast Knowledge Scale (N=3S2)

Independent Variables

Beta Values
-.10, p > .OS
p > • OS
.02, p > .OS
.23, p < .001

Gender
Age
Race
Education
Multiple R

= .26,

p < .001

The one variable (Education) which was found significantly
correlated with the Mideast Knowledge Scale in a bivariate
relationship remained significantly correlated in the above
multivariate analysis.
L. The following interaction effects failed to reach
the .OOS level of significance on each of the three dependent
variables (i.e., Jewish Attitude Scale, Israel Attitude Scale,
and Mideast Knowledge Scale).
1.
2.
3.
4.

Race x Age
Race x Gender
Race x Education
Race x Income
s. Education x Gender
6. Education x Age
7. Gender x Age
8. Race x Education x Age
M.

In conclusion, four simultaneous mul tiple-regres-

sion analyses were conducted in which most of the above psychological and demographic variables were regressed on both
the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales.
each scale were implemented.

Two analyses for

The first analysis combined

most of the demographic variables and all of the psychological
variab~es

(except for the Arab-Palestinian issue questions).

The second analysis included the four Arab-Palestinian issue
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~uestions.

The reason for this rather awkward strategy was

that by integrating one or more of the 4 Arab-Palestinian
Items into the analyses the N was substantially reduced.
Therefore, in order to maximize the N while not deleting
th~

Arab-Palestinian items (in light of the significant cor-

relation between these items and both scales) it was deemed
necessary to carry out both types of analyses.

Results were:

TABLE 18.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Jewish
Attitude Scale (N=306)
Independent Variables

Beta Values

Race
Mideast Knowledge Scale
Ego-Strength Item 2
Age
Gender
Religion
Life Satisfaction Scale
Ego-Strength Item 1
Income
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale
Anomie Scale
Purpose in Life Scale
Education

.12,
.12,
.10,
-.04,
• 02 I
• 01,
-.10,
• 08 I

--,

-:. OS,
.10,
.19,
• 10,

p = .os
= • 04

p
p

> .os

p >

p

.os

> .os
>. OS
> .os
> .OS
> • OS
> .os
> .os

p
p
p
p
p
p
p = • 003
p > .os

Multiple R • .41, p < .001

In Table 18 in which the Jewish scale was simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic and psychological variables previously discussed, and where N=306, the
multiple R

=

.41

(p < .001).

This means that 17% of the

scale's variance was accounted for by the thirteen variables
in the_ equation.

The three variables which remained inde-

pendently related (based on the probability level of .OS or
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less) were Race, the Mideast Knowledge Scale, and the abridged
Purpose in Life Scale.

The five other variables (i.e., Edu-

cation, Anomie scale, Opinion-Fear scale, and Items 1 and 2
of the Ego Strength scale) which proved to be slightly but
significantly correlated in bivariate analyses, but failed
to achieve significance in the above analysis was probably
due either to confounds or to error variance engendered by
the thirteen independent variables, or to a combination of
the two.

This point becomes clearer when one recognizes

that many of the psychological and demographic variables
correlated significantly (albeit their correlations were not
strong enough to assume multi-collinearity) with one another,
and yet the differences between their significant bivariate
correlations and their insignificant Beta values were not
too dissimilar.

For example, Ego-Strength Item 1 correlated

significantly (r

= .16)

insignificant (Beta

=

in a bivariate equation, but proved

.08) when twelve other variables were

entered into the analysis.
In Table 19 in which the Jewish scale was simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic variables and
all of the psychological variables previously discussed (and
where N=l33), the mutliple correlation (R) obtained was .53
(p < .001).

In this analysis, when the four Arab-Palestinian

Issue Items were included, the Multiple R was significantly
increased, and the proportion of the Jewish scale's variance
accounted for, by these seventeen variables, was 28%.

Al-
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TABLE 19.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Jewish
Attitude Scale CN=l33l
Independent Variables
Arab-Palestinian Item 4
Religion
Arab-Palestinian Item 3
Age
Gender
Arab-Palestinian Item 2
Education
Ego-Strength Item 1
Mideast Knowledge Scale
Life Satisfaction Scale
Ego-Strength Item 2
Arab-Palestinian Item 1
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale
Purpose in Life Scale
Income
Anomie Scale
Rase
Multiple R

= .S3,

Beta Values

.Is, p > .os
-.13, p > .os
.18, p = • 03
.09, p > .OS

--,
.17,
.05,
• 07,
.03,
-.12,
.16,

p

.19, p
-- ,
.07,
.07,
-. 04,
•

> .OS

> .os
> .05
p > • 05
p > .05
p > .05
p > .05
p
p

p

p
p
p
p

=

.03

> • 05
> .05
> .05
> • 05
> .OS

p < .001

though the proportion of variance accounted for in the present
analysis was considerably greater than in the prior analysis
(Table 18), the amount of variance unaccounted for (i.e.,
72%), was still substantially large.

In this analysis the

Arab-Palestinian Issue Items 1 and 3 only, remained independently related to the Jewish attitude scale.
In Table 20 in which the Israel Attitude Scale was
simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic and
psychological variables in the study and where N=302, the
Multiple R was .47 (p < .001).

In other words, 22% of the

scale's variance was accounted for by the present thirteen
predicting variables.
nifica~tly

Most of the variables which were sig-

correlated with the Israel scale in bivariate

analyses remained significantly correlated (i.e., p

< .OS)

238
TABLE 20.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Israel
Attitude Scale CN=302l
Independent Variables

Beta Values

Race
Purpose in Life Scale
Mideast Knowledge Scale
Age
Gender
Religion
Ego Strength Item 2
Ego Strength Item 1
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale
Income
Life Satisfaction Scale
Anomie Scale
Education

p
p
p
p
p
--, p
• 07 I p
• 06, p
-.13, p
• 01, p
-.oa, p
• 04 I p
• 04 t p
.10,
.16,
• 21,
• ls,
-.16,

> .OS

= • 007
< .001
< .006
< .006
> .OS
> .os
> .OS
= • 02
> .os
> .os
> .os
> .os

Multiple R = • 4 7 t p < .001

in the present multiple correlation analysis.
to the rule were the variables

~'

Exceptions

Education, and Income

which in the present analysis failed to reach the .OS level
of significance.

(The interpretation rendered above for

the slight discrepancy between bivariate analyses previously
described and Beta values in table 18 is equally appropriate
in the present context.)
In Table 21, in which the Israel scale was simultaneously correlated with most of the demographic variables
and all of the psychological variables discussed above (and
N=l34), the Multiple R was .66 (p < .001).

Accordingly, 44%

of the scale's total variance was accounted for in the present
analysis.

However, in spite of the significant increase

from the prior analysis in Table 20, the amount of variance
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TABLE 21.--Multiple Regression Analysis on the Israel
Attitude Scale CN=l34l
Independent Variables

Beta Values

Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item
Religion
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item
Age
Gender
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item
Education
Ego Strength Item 1
Mideast Knowledge Scale
Life Satisfaction Scale
Ego Strength Item 2
Arab-Palestinian-Issue Item
Opinion-Fear Crisis Scale
Purpose in Life Scale
Income
Anomie Scale
Race
Multiple R = .66, p

4
3
2

1

.15, p < .os
--, p > .OS
• 21, p = • 005
.18, p = .02
-.14, p > .os
.13, p > • 05
-.os, p > .os
• 04, p > • 05

.17, p < • 03
-.06, p > .os
-.01, p > .os
.27, p

-.12,
.14,
.09,
.03,

<

.001

p > .os
p > .os
p >.OS
p > .os

-- , p

> • 05

< .001

sti 11 undetermined was 56%.

The five variables which re-

tained a significant independent relationship with the Israel
Attitude scale were Items 1, 3, and 4 of the Arab Palestinian
Issue Items, the Mideast Knowledge Scale, and Age.
The considerable change in predictor values once
the Arab-Palestinian Issue Items were entered into the equation (for both the Jewish and Israel scales) suggests that
several of the variables.may be artifacts of the relationship
between perceptions of the Arab-Palestinian problem and atti tudes towards both Jews and Israel, 2.! that the respondents
who answered either pro-Arab or pro-Israel to these· i terns
(as mentioned above, other responses to these items were
discarded) were a distinctly different subgroup.

In light
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of the difficulty in conceptualizing the relationship between
the Arab-Palestinian items and the other psychological and
demographic variables, it appears more likely that a distinct
subgroup produced the difference in models.

This subgroup

seems to be affected (i.e., concerning attitudes towards
both Jews and Israel) almost exclusively by their perceptions
and information level (i.e., the phenomenological approach)
of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
When the two scales' set of predictors are compared
(i.e., without the Arab-Palestinian Items in the equation)
some differences, but many more similarities appear.

For

instance, the Beta values of nine of the thirteen predicting
variables in the equation do not appear to be significantly
differentiated on the two scales.

The Beta values of three

of the remaining four predictors (i.e., Age, Gender, and
the Opinion-Fear Rating Scale) reached significance in relation to the Israel scale, but not in relation to the Jewish
attitude scale.

The Mideast Knowledge Scale was independently

related to both the Jewish and Israel scales (.12 and .21
respectively), but its relationship to attitudes towards
Israel appears significantly greater.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The final section of this manuscript is divided into
four major sections.

The first three sections present a

review and discussion of the hypothesized primary, secondary,
and tertiary causes of anti-Jewish hostility based on the
studies' major empirical findings.

In each of the three

sections, when applicable, the subject matter of alternative
interpretations, limitations of study, significance of the
findings, and direction for future empirical work will be
addressed.

The final section will deal with the broader

implications of anti-Jewish hostility based on a synthesis
of the dissertation's historical and empirical analyses.
Chapter I Conclusions
As portrayed in Chapter I the primary catalyst of
anti-Jewish hostility was Jewish distinctiveness and the
psychological threat it posed to national and international
movements whose objective to dominate ran counter and collided
with Jewish separatism.

In order to bring the world over

to their way of acting and thinking these movements were
obligated to crush all forms of resistance.
241

Unfortunately
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for these psychologically intimidated movements the Jewish
nation (with all its Oral Law ramifications) was not like
the other nations and refused to be extinguished.

All the

while the Jewish presence existed (sometimes as free men,
and other times as veritable slaves) the declared supremacy
of the various movements was brought into question and absolute dominion was perforce withheld.

Accordingly, these

movements in order to foster a sense of political and/or
spiritual security attempted throughout history to eradicate
Jewish distinctiveness.
This process of eradication has taken three general
forms.

The first form was usually to break Jewish nationalism

(i.e., the Jewish people's relationship to the Land of
Israel).

When this failed, the Jewish spirit (based on the

Oral Law tradition) ,was then attacked, and when the Jewish
presence obstinately refused to capitulate, total annihilation
remained the only viable alternative.
This Jewish stiffnecked effrontery was documented
by Josephus in the first century of the Common Era when Jews
were being relentlessly persecuted by the great Roman empire.
He wrote:
• • • they have a passion for liberty that is almost
unconquerable, since they are convinced that G-d alone
is their leader and master. They think little of submitting to death in unusual forms and permitting vengeance
to fall on kinsmen and friends, if only they may avoid
calling any man master (Perlmutter, 1982, p. 54).

243

Or again, poignantly expressed by Adolf Hitler some
1900 years later:
It is true we are barbarians that is an honored title
to us. I free humanity from the shackles of the soul,
from the degrading suffering caused by the false vision
called conscience and ethics. The Jews have inflicted
two wounds on mankind; circumcision on its body and "conscience" on its soul. They are Jewish inventions. The
war for domination of the world is waged only between
the two of us, between these two camps alone; the Germans
and the Jews. Everything else is but deception (Scherman,
1985, p. xiv).
This self-motivated distinctiveness appears to have
been the cause or catalyst of anti-Jewish discrimination
and persecution throughout history.

If Jews would have

totally assimilated into the majority culture like most other
conquered people (who had the chance to do so) then by definition, they would not have suffered as a minority group.
Other discriminated-against groups (e.g., women, Blacks under
Arab, and White dominion, American Indians, etc.) were not
as fortunate as the Jews for they lacked the capacity to
physically mingle without being detected.

These groups, in

light of their distinct physical characteristics were forced
to remain, to some extent, separate.

The Jews, in contrast,

could have totally integrated (i.e., by accepting the ruling
powers' laws, customs and religions as subjugated people
throughout history have done) without being thereafter detected.

The Jewish threat was that they, logically speak-

ing, could have totally assimilated into all of the above
societies (see Chapter I) and yet, irrespective of their
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vast cultural interaction, refused to totally disavow their
Jewish identity.

This unusually adamant refusal to be one

with the ruling or majority population inevitably created
seemingly unwarranted intergroup competition, which brought
in its wake untold Jewish suffering.
As Huzafer Sherif (1966), based on much experimentation and analyses of intergroup processes put it:
• • • intergroup conflict has shown that neither
cultural, physical, nor economic differences are necessary
for the rise of intergroup conflict, hostile attitudes,
and stereotyped images of out-groups. Nor are maladjusted, neurotic, or unstable tendencies necessary conditions for the appearance of intergroup prejudice and
stereotypes.
The sufficient condition for the rise of hostile
and aggressive deeds • • • was the existence of two groups
competing for goals that only one group could attain,
to the dismay and frustration of the other group. (p. 85)
The glaring lesson to be learned from Professor Sherif (which
Jews have seemingly failed to learn throughout millennia) is
that positive human interaction is based on commonalities
and similarities and where possible (especially in areas as
highly sensitive as religion) differences should be kept to
a bare minimum.

The non-Jewish world throughout hi story

has understood this reality and has, in consequence, allowed
itself to be fully integrated into the majority or ruling
culture.

The Jews, in contrast, have failed to learn what

seems so obvious to everyone else that when you are not forced
to be distinct or separate, don't.
The Jewish threat was that, historically, Jews were
unwilling to call any man or deity (except their own), G-d.
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They were not willing to fully accept any ruling power whose
acceptance meant the abandonment of their perceived incorporeal, indivisible, omniscient, omnipresent, and universal
G-d.

In essence, the psychological intimidating character-

istic of the Jew which has been felt throughout four millennia
seems to have been, as Josephus put it, the Jewish "passion
for liberty that is almost unconquerable, since they are
convinced that G-d alone is their leader and master" (Perlmutter, 1982). It was appears that it was this distinctive,
competitive Jewish threat which was the primary cause of
anti-Jewish hostility.

In addition, it has not been any

random variation of Jews throughout history who have consistently presented this competitive threat, but rather, only
one group (i.e., Oral Law Judaism) which has been the only
Jewish group to have stubbornly survived.

Therefore, it

seemed logical in the present study to designate Oral Law
Judaism as a true representation of Judaism.
One way to test empirically the above historical
analysis was to locate a group whose legitimacy appears psychologically threatened by present-day Oral Law Judaism (i.e.,
Orthodox Judaism)

and to see if this movement (i.e., the

leaders) has fostered or is fostering (whether implicitly
or explicitly) the severance of the Jewish people from the
(1) Land, (2) the Law, or (3) an attempt to destroy the Jewish
collec~ive

body, each strategy by itself or in combination.

Ironically, two present day Jewish groups · (i.e.,
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Reform and Conservative Judaism) were depicted as competing
with Oral Law Judaism for the Jewish people's allegiance.
It was this competitive factor which placed these groups
conceptually on par with other anti-Jewish (anti-Jewish in
the sense that an attack was made on, at least, one of the
three integral Jewish components) groups throughout history.
The competitive nature of these Jewish groups was not obvious,
for their claim at their inception was not to aggressively
displace Oral Law Judaism (as other anti-Jewish movements
throughout history have declared) but rather to provide for
the Jewish people, particularly in America, a viable and
adaptable modern type of Judaism.

Their objective was os-

tensibly not to usurp traditional Judaism, but rather to
provide a positive spiritual experience for Twentieth Century
American Jewry who could "obviously" not adapt Oral Law Judaism to the American scene.

Therefore, there was superficially

no conflict of interests and no real competition, for these
modern movements were allegedly not competing with Oral Law
Judaism but rather attempting to save those millions of Jews
who without a viable alternative would have left Judaism
completely.
According to their respective platforms, these movements could not be portrayed as competitive Jewish movements
whose goals conflicted with Oral Law Judaism.

Rather (accord-

ing to_ their claims) they were not competitive but complementary.

Although this is what they promulgated, the dubious
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nature of their assertions was outlined at the end of Chapter
1.

In brief, the three arguments which seem to seriously

challenge the sincerity of their assertions were:
(1) Historically in contradiction to their claim of

unadaptability (as delineated throughout Chapter I) the only
Jewish movement to ever adapt to all kinds of societies
throughout history was the same "unadaptable" Oral Law tradition.

Therefore, either the Reform and Conservative leaders

were ignorant of Jewish history, or else the claim was an
excuse used to favorably rationalize the Jewish people's
break with tradition.
(2) Even if we do credit the Reform and Conservative
early leaders with an abysmal ignorance of Jewish history,
the question still needed to be asked is how much of an effort
was made, and how many generations of Jews in America had
passed before these leaders concluded that traditional Oral
Law Judaism was unadaptable?
questions is nil.

In essence, the answer to both

The attempt to adapt Oral Law Judaism

to the lifestyle of America was never really given a chance
by the leaders of these movements.

This was seen by the

fact that first generation-born American Jews, who in the
vast majority of cases started raising families of their
own immediately preceding and following World War II, followed
faithfully, en masse, the Reform and Conservative leaders'
religious assertions.

This was the first generation of Jews

in America who had the opportunity to test Oral Law Judaism's
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resilience (German Jews who had arrived earlier came, already,
with a Reform orientation), but instead accepted their mentors' ahistorical and non-empirical assertions.
(3)

The denial of the divine origin of the Oral

Law (and to a lesser extent the Written Law)

implies:

(a)

that the redactors of the Talmud lied (whether knowingly or
unknowingly) when they declared that the Oral Law was given
by G-d, and that many places in the Pentateuch where it states
that G-d communicated with the Jewish people, Moses, etc.,
is a canard, and (b) that the millions of innocent Jews who
have been brutally massacred throughout history only because
they believed in the divinity of the Oral and Written laws,
terribly erred for themselves and posterity.

It was the

present author's belief that Reform and Conservative Judaism
did not need to deviate so substantively from tradition if
thefr real objective was only to prevent American Jewry from
totally assimilating.
sever the Jews'

However,

in order to intentionally

traditional relationship to the Oral Law

this ideological strategy was sorely needed.
The first empirical analysis was to pit the Reform
and Conservative claims against the arguments presented
above.

Very simply if their assertions are accurate, then

the present young adult genera ti on of American-born Jews
(i.e., ages 21 to 40) should support their claim.

In essence,

the yo_ung adult generation of American-born Orthodox Jews
should have significantly abandoned this "outmoded" and "un-
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adaptable" form of Judaism.

In contrast, following from

the three arguments above, Oral Law Judaism may very well
be maintaining itself.

In addition, if these two Jewish

movements are truly complementary forms of Judaism only interested in saving Jews who seemingly cannot adapt Orthodoxy
to the American scene, then they themselves should be growing
(or at least maintaining themselves).

In contrast, according

to the present theoretical analysis, if these movements are
not complementary, but rather competing for Jewish supremacy
in which their original objective was more to wean Jews from
the Oral Law than to create something spiritually positive,
then their movements should have had difficulty in maintaining
themselves (i.e., lack of real spirituality should produce
a lack of commitment among their Jewish constituencies).
Obviously the mere finding that Oral Law Judaism
has maintained itself over the last generation is not conclusive proof that the other movements had ulterior motives
when declaring the unadaptability of Oral Law Judaism (which,
in effect, created a need for a more "adaptable" form of Judaism).

However, the present hypothesized outcome taken into

conjunction with the above three arguments (expressed more
fully in Chapter I) would seem to support the theory, which
posits the Reform and Conservative movements as competing
and not complementary forms of Judaism.

In contrast, results

substantially corroborating their claim as to the unadaptability of Oral Law Judaism would significantly challenge
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the present theoretical analysis.

In addition, the extent

of the Reform and Conservative' s accretion or diminution
over the last generation is admittedly inconclusive in and
of itself, but when combined with the above arguments and
data, may help to more fully support or refute the present
theoretical analysis.
Before discussing the present results, which theoretically pertain to the primary cause of anti-Jewish hostility, it is important to mention the discontinuity which exists
between the study' s theory and the methodology used to examine
the theory.

According to the theory the primary impetus of

anti-Jewish hostility is attributed to the leaders of various
movements, who, historically have been "threatened" by Jewish
distinctiveness and have attacked accordingly.

However,

the present study does not directly measure leaders' attitudes
and behavior, but rather knowledge, attitudes, and behavior
of followers, which are interpreted as indirectly representing
the attitudes and behavior of their leaders.

This gap be-

tween theory and methodology attenuates the confirmatory
strength of the present study, for it does not rule out alternati ve conceptual analyses which will be discussed below.
According to the results, Oral Law Judaism in Chicago
seems to have maintained itself over the last generation,
and when birthrate is taken into consideration has grown by
13

per~ent.

In contrast, Reform and Conservative constitu-

encies in Chicago have decreased approximately 68 percent,
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and 57 percent respectively, over the last generation.

The

results fail to refute the present theory and, in effect,
lend support to the theory that Reform and Conservative Judaism are competing forms of Judaism and could therefore, in
the present context, be described as competitive religious
movements whose thrust should be to uproot one or more of
the three distinctly Jewish components, in an at tempt to
firmly establish their own legitimacy.
The above results in conjunction with the above three
arguments seem to imply that the original objectives of Reform
and Conservative Judaism were more of a competitive rather
than complementary nature.

Therefore, according to the pres-

ent theoretical analysis, these movements should be psychologically pressured to attack and uproot the essence of traditional Judaism as represented by

(1)

the Jewish relationship

to the Land, (2) the Jewish relationship to the Torah, and/or
(3) the Jewish collective body.

The Reform and Conservative

movements would logically not strike out against the Jewish
collective body (for they would be reducing their own numbers
in the process), but by significantly severing the people's
relationship to the Land and/or to the Torah would be substantially reducing the historical Jewish "threat."
Notwithstanding the Reform and Conserva tivemovements'
claim concerning their indisoluable relationship to the Land
of Israel, the present analysis expected to find a significantly weaker relationship among adherents of Reform and
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conservative Judaism than among their Oral Law counterparts.
Results implied, as hypothesized, that the Reform and Conservative movements are failing in their "attempt" to foster
a strong and tangible relationship between their constituencies and the Land of/ Israel.

Not only was the Orthodox

group substantially more attached to the Land, but these
two groups failed to significantly differentiate themselves
from Jews who are not affiliated with any synagogue or temple.
In light of the large discrepancy between what the
Reform and Conservative movements officially say and what
they have accomplished (i.e., in light of the discrepancy
between themselves and Orthodoxy in conjunction with the
insignificant differences recorded between themselves and
the Non-Affiliated group),

it appears that their failure

is more systematic than fortuitous.

When these results are

combined with the above three arguments (which seriously
question their original sincerity), and in conjunction with
the dissertation's historical analysis which predicted these
results on an a priori basis, a case can be made that these
two movements (like other anti-Jewish movements throughout
hi story) have at tempted (whether consciously or unconsciously)
to attenuate the historical relationship between the Jewish
people and the Jewish land in light of this relationship's
intimidating

characteristic.

A solid Jewish education is another area where the
official platforms of all three Jewish movements positively
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converge.

Officially, they all consider a strong fundamental

Jewish education highly important.

Although formally they

encourage Jewish education, according to the present theory,
this should not be realized in practice.

In short, the re-

sults did demonstrate a disastrous failure on the part of
the Reform and Conservative movements to educate their constituencies on the basics of Judaism.

In these analyses

there was an extremely large discrepancy in scores between
the Orthodox group and the other three.

Although, statis-

tically speaking, there appeared to be a significant difference between the Conservative and Non-Affiliated group, this
difference (mean scores of .33 and .23 respectively) on a
practical level was trivial.

For example, their mean scores

imply that the Conservative group received an average of
approximately three items (per 10-item scale) corrrect while
the Non-Affiliated group averaged approximately two items
correct.

In real terms, the abysmal ignorance reflected in

the scores of the three groups on the Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale is substantially more revealing (based on the
present theory) than the trivial one-answer difference between
the Conservative and Non-Affiliated groups.

This point is

further corroborated by the fact that the Reform Group (mean

=

.28) failed to differentiate itself from either the Con-

servative or Non-Affiliated group.
theor~tical

According to the present

analysis this failure may be seen as a result

of attempting to displace the traditional Jewish spirit,
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which historically, has been based on knowledge of the Written
and Oral Law.
In brief, the relationship between non-Jewish antiJewish movements and the present hypothesized Jewish antiJewish movements is not readily apparent.

However, it is

the opinion of the author that once this surface dissimilarity
is broken down, the underlying dynamics appear quite comparable.

As hypothesized, the first stage posits a compet-

itive conflict which makes it virtually impossible for the
The second

two groups to live ideologically in harmony.

stage is to create lies (see the three arguments above which
call into question the claims of Reform and Conservative
Judaism)

which would legitimize the activity of uprooting

the traditional Jewish presence.

And the third and final

stage is to motivate the masses (wh,ether non-Jewish or Jewish)
at a psychologically and/or socially vulnerable period in
history.
Limitations of the Above Analyses
The first limitation of the above analyses which
would affect all three variables (i.e., [l] intergroup movement,

[2]

knowledge)

relationship to the Land, and

(3]

basic Jewish

is the restriction in population from which the

sample was selected.

The sample was drawn from a Jewish

population living in Chicago proper, who have commonly Jewish
names,· and who are listed in the Chicago telephone book.
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The last two restrictions (i.e., common Jewish names and
being listed in telephone book) do not appear to be too severe
for most (metropolitan or national) polls of Jewish populations are equally or more circumscribed than the present
population.
However, selecting individuals exclusively from
Chicago proper presents two major problems.

(1) Suburban

Jews might be signifcantly different from city Jews on the
above variables, and (2) Jews living in New York or conversely
in small cities and towns throughout the United States may
be distinctly different from those in the Chicago area.
Although it does not seem logical to postulate that suburban
Reform and/or Conservative Jews are different from their
city counterparts concerning their relationship to the Land
of Israel or to the Torah, it is possible that suburban Jews
id en ti fy more with the Reform and Conservative movements
(as opposed to being Non-Affiliated or Orthodox)
Jews in the city.

than do

The reason is that suburbia usually at-

tracts families with children as opposed to single individuals.

Many Jewish parents (even today) like to give their

children some sort of religious identification and in many
cases the child's religious education, perforce, creates a
temporary bond between parents and the educational institution (i.e., the synagogue or temple).
synago~ues

In addition, most

in suburbia are not Orthodox (primarily because
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of the distances involved in driving on the Sabbath which
orthodoxy prohibits).
Correspondingly, Jews living in other geographical
areas of the United States (other than the Midwest) may have
had different religious experiences than have Jews in Chicago.

Jewish experiences in the New York area where there

are over two million Jews, or the Jewish "experience" in
the south or west (excluding Florida and California) where
there are relatively few Jews, may be quite different than
those experienced by Chicago Jews who are surrounded by a
substantial number of other corel ig ionists, but who still
represent a trivial proportion of the total population.
These demographic differences may be reflected on the above
variables, but the fact that Chicago does represent a balance
between large concentrated areas of Jews and its opposite
appears to make Chicago an ideal place to sample from, if
resources and time are limited (as they were in the present
study) •
A further limitation of the above analyses is that
the variables of Relationship to the Land could have been
more thorougly explored.

One tangible expression of Jews'

relationship to the Land of Israel which was not investigated
was the amount of money given or invested in Israel.

The

reason this variable was not investigated was that the author
felt that the greater proportion of investment or charity,
per income, obviously favored Orthodoxy, and was therefore
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a foregone conclusion.

Afterwards he discovered that many

Reform and Conservative Jews do not share the same opinion.
For example, Reform and Conservative adherents cite figures
from large Jewish organizations (e.g., J.U.F.) which show
that the vast majority of money is donated by non-Orthodox
Jews.

However, these individuals forget that (1) there are

many times more non-Orthodox Jews in Chicago than there are
Orthodox,

(2)

the wealth is primarily in the hands of the

non-Orthodox, and (3) many Orthodox households give directly
to Torah institutions and the poor in Israel, which these
large Jewish organizations tend, for the most part, to ignore.
Another limitation of the above analyses concerns
the Jewish Knowledge Scale.

This scale was constructed by

Orthodox rabbis and teachers, and it is possible (though
improbable) that a fundamental Jewish knowledge scale when
constructed by Reform or Conservative rabbis or teachers
would produce significantly different results than those
obtained in the present study.
The final limitation of the above analysis concerns
the time frame or cross sectional nature of the study.

Ac-

cording to the present analysis it is difficult to discern
whether the vast majority of original adherents to Reform
and Conservative Judaism (i.e., anywhere between 30 to 60
years ago) were less committed to the Land and/or to basic
Jewish knowledge than were their Orthodox counterparts, or
whether the discrepancy found in the present study is really
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(as hypothesized) a function of the movements themselves.
If archival data of this type were present the above dilemma
would be resolved, but given that these types of data cannot
be obtained, a longitudinal study measuring the above variables on new members of the three movements over a period
of several years, would apparently help to resolve the above
problem.

A major difficulty here may be to obtain a sizable

sample of newly involved Reform and Conservative constituents
who will remain affiliated for more than just a few years (in
the present study these groups do not seem to be attracting
many new members) •

In addition, it is generally accepted

today that the differences in overall Jewish religious perspective between the adherents of all three movements some
40 years ago, was considerably less polarized than it is
today.

Therefore, any longitudinal study initiated today

may be of little help in interpreting the results obtained
in the present study.
Alternative Interpretations
The most obvious interpretation of the above results
is, plainly speaking, that the Reform and Conservative movements have just failed.

Not that they had any original in-

tention of competing with or displacing Oral Law Judaism,
but rather that their purely "complementary" nature proved
unsuccessful.

Without the above historical analysis and a

Priori· predictions following therefrom, together with the
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above three arguments which make their orig in al claims highly
suspect, in conjunction with the present results which depict
a ca ta strophic failing on the part of both Reform and Conservative Judaism, the innocuous claim of "just failing"
could be accepted.

However, when the above is taken into

consideration the dissertation's theoretical analysis appears
to be the more valid of the two interpretations.
Another alternative interpretation asks; why would
a significant difference Qetween Oral Law Judaism and the
other American Jewish movements, concerning Jewish education
and the Land of Israel, imply that these movements have deliberately attempted to uproot these traditional Jewish components?

Is it not possible that the Jews who have flocked

to these movements have different lifestyles, different attitudes, and different experiences than their Oral Law counterparts, and that it is these very differences among group
adherents, which makes for differences concerning the above
core components and not necessarily the movements themselves?
In response, it may be argued that most social-psychological
differences seen today between the groups are perfectly confounded with group classification.

In other words, the basic

factor differentiating Oral Law adherents from others, on
various social-psychological indices, may be considered their
very allegiance to the Oral Law tradition.

Judaism in its

tradit_ional (Oral Law) form is not merely a system of beliefs
and rituals, but rather an elaborate societal blueprint which
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carefully delineates the everyday pragmatic laws by which
Jews historically have patterned their behavior and attitudes
on both the individual and collective levels.

Therefore in

the present comparison, most behavioral-attitudinal differences presently existing between Oral Law adherents and others
may be considered attributed to the ideological and legislative differences among the movements rather than differences
in the people themselves.

Correspondingly, when the groups'

official platforms and ideologies do converge on various
Jewish issues (e.g., Jewish education and the Jewish relationship to the Land of Israel) no significant discrepancy
among groups should logically be found.
In essence, the present data are inconclusive concerning whether it was the movements themselves which affected the present findings, or whether it was the original
differences in commitment among the various types of adherents.

In other words, was it the lack of Jewish commitment

(which should have been general, taking into account all aspects of Jewish life)

among the different constituencies,

or was it primarily the Reform and Conservative movements
themselves who promoted this lack of religious commitment?
If Reform and Conservative Judaism have, indeed, been the
primary agents affecting religious commitment (or better
Put, lack of it), then their adherents' lack of elementary
Jewish knowledge and tangible relationship to the Land should
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be seriously questioned in light of their official platforms
which substantively advocate both activities.
In truth, the real cause probably 1 ies somewhere
in-between the two arguments, and therefore the most appropriate question would not be if the movements themselves
have produced a lack of commitment among their constituencies,
but rather; how much of this lack of commitment can be attributed to the movements, and how much to the original differences among the adherents themselves?

However, it should

be emphasized again that in light of the historical analysis
presented on Chapter I with its a priori hypotheses following
therefrom, together with the above three arguments (which
cast the Reform and Conservative movements in a more competitive than complementary light) in conjunction with the present
data, the present theoretical claim that Reform and Conservative, Judaism have unofficially attempted to sever the Jewish
people's relationship to the Land and to the Torah should not
be taken lightly.
A further interpretation of the above results, specifically concerning the variables of Relationship to the Land,
and Fundamental Jewish Knowledge, has to do with these variables inherent relationship to the three movements.

It may

be a~gued that since adherence to the Oral Law means adherence, by definition, to the Torah and to the Land of Israel,
then

c~mparing

these apparently inherent relationships with

the same relationships which are seemingly not inherent among
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other groups would, by definition, produce group differences.
In response, the author believes that the relationships between Reform and Conservative Jews with the above
two variables should be no less "inherent" than that of their
Oral Law counterparts for two major reasons.

(1) Reform

and Conservative Judaism did not spring out of a vacuum but
rather (as they rightly declare) were outgrowths of traditional (Oral Law) Judaism which have the same history, Bible,
and the same Talmud as their Oral Law kin.

The only things

not inherently Oral-Law in these movements is where they
themselves decided to deviate (e.g., disbelief in the divinity of the Oral Law and abrogation of many Laws which
they felt were outmoded), but in areas where they officially
did not deviate (e.g., relationship to the Land and, fundamental Jewish education), these areas should be considered
as inherently Jewish to them as they are to Orthodoxy.

(2)

Even if we could say that Reform and Conservative Judaism are
distinctly different representations of Jewish spirituality,
the fact that their official platforms call for a strong
relationship to the Land of Israel and basic Jewish knowledge,
would seem to make these variables as inherent for them, as
does the Orthodox platform for its adherents.
Two examples of historical groups to support this
second point.are the Kutheans and Christians.

The Kutheans,

better known as the Samaritans came from Assyria and after
the explulsion of the 10 tribes (approximately 722 B.C.E.)
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occupied the vacant cities in the northern part of Israel,
and became half assimilated with the remaining native Israelites.

Although they worshipped the G-d of Israel and kept

many of the commandments they also clung to their idols
(Isaacs, 1975).

It is about these very people which the

Talmud

lOA)

(Gittin,

Kutheans kept

states "Whatever commandments the

(i.e., officially observed)

diligently than the Israel is themselves."

they kept more

(Translation mine)

Christianity is another case in point where according
to the above contention it may be argued, that being that
Christianity is a direct offshoot from Oral Law Judaism,
and being that the precepts of

~'

compassion, and humility

were originally Oral Law concepts, only later adopted by the
Christian faith, then Oral Law adherents should be significantly more loving, compassionate, and humble than Christians
because these concepts were originally and therefore inherently Oral Law commandments.

Without belaboring the issue

it is assumed that many intelligent people would argue
vociferously against the above contention.

Accordingly, the

argument that the relationship to the Land and to the Torah
is more inherent in Orthodox Judaism (in light of their established precedent in time)

than they are to Reform and Con-

servative Judaism is serously rebutted by the above two examples.
The final alternative interpretation of the present
data (which superficially seems to refute the entire t.heoreti-
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cal analysis concerning the Reform and Conservative movements)
contends that the fact that Reform and Conservative Judaism
are not drawing substantial numbers away from the Orthodox
movement and vice versa implies that these movements are
truly complementary.

Notwithstanding a more detailed rebuttal

of this argument (which follows immediately)

it should be

noted, that according to this logic the Non-Affiliated group
is the most competitive (and therefore, potentially antiJewish) movement of them all!
There appears to be little doubt that if Reform and
Conservative Judaism are indeed competitive movements, that
they would seriously attempt to attract Oral Law adherents.
However, their success or failure in such a venture is irrespective of their competitive or complementary nature.
In short, they may be attempting to attract current Oral
Law adherents, but are failing in the process.

Hence, their

competitive or complementary nature must be investigated
according to the parameters extant (as in the present analysis where their claims and constituencies could be examined)
and not according to hypotheticals of what would have happened, if they would have succeeded.
Conversely, the fact that Orthodox Jewry is not attracting large numbers from the other three groups (although
over 10 percent of both the Non-Affiliated and Conservative
group

~ave

come over to Orthodoxy within the last generation)

says little concerning the present theoretical analysis.
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Although in the present analysis Reform and Conservative
Judaism are depicted as ideologically threatened by Orthodoxy,
orthodoxy is not seen as threatened by either movement as
was the case throughout history.

Orthodox Judaism would

certainly like to see all Jews observing the Oral Law, but
not because it is psychologically pressured to delegitimize
the other movements.

Oral Law Judaism's self worth or legiti-

macy has never been and is not currently psychologically
threatened by other Jewish movements, and therefore Orthodoxy's competitive or complementary nature was never considered in the present dissertation a theoretical issue.
Significance of the Findings
Besides helping to support the present theory concerning the primary origins and common processes of antiJewish hostility throughout history, the above findings may
also provide pragmatic benefit in the following five ways.
Stated briefly, starting from the more seemingly trivial
and proceeding to the more important the five perceived benefits are:
1. To Refute Arab Propaganda:
a~anda

One of the many prop-

themes circulated by Arabs throughout the world is

that Zionism or the resettlement of the Jewish people in
the Middle East has nothing to do with Judaism, but is rather
an outgrowth of secular European imperial ism.

Notwithstanding

the non-reality represented in the above contention based

266

on the activities of modern Zionism since 1880 in conjunction
with historical Judaism, the present study adds an extra
dimension by showing clearly that the concept of Zionism
(i.e.,

the living and being in Zion, a name used by the

Prophets some 2, 700 years ago in reference to the Land of
Israel and/or Jerusalem) in Chicago, at least, is an almost
exclusively Oral-Law religious concept and phenomenon far
removed from secular European imperialism.
2. To Foster a Sense of Historical Ethics:

For over

three thousand years, literally millions of Jews have been
pillaged, raped, tortured, and mercilessly massacred because
they would not renounce their Jewish nationalism or Torah,
and yet according to the present findings (and extrapolating
to the entire United States) literally millions of Jews have
sign,ificantly relinquished both their national ism and. Torah
within one (at maximum two) generations in the name of Judaism
itself!

The present study indicates that Jews in America

have been led into abandoning their rich cultural and spiritual heritage without being fully cognizant of their abandonment.

Jews (like all other groups) deserve the right for

their own sake, and for the sake of their ancestors to £.2!!::..
sc iously choose to abandon their traditions without being
implicitly pressured into doing so while unaware of what is
truly transpiring (i.e., by remaining ignorant of Judaism
and believing, without doubt, in the legitimacy of the Reform
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and Conservative movements, the Jewish masses are perforce
prevented from making any well thought out decision regarding
their abandonment of traditional Judaism).
3. To Protect Young and Naive Spiritual-Seeking Jews:
An inordinate amount of young American Jews (i.e.,many times
over their proportion in the general American population)
who had reached adolescence in the 1960s and 70s have been
recruited over the last twenty years into religious cults
such as the Moonies, Hare Krishna, or imported to America
eastern religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism in their
search for spirituality (whether the cult or religion is
intellectually gratifying is immaterial)

(Fisch, 1984).

These Jewish youth seeking sincere religious experiences
are not products of Orthodoxy, but rather (in the vast majority _of cases) from families who have had some sort of affiliation with the Reform or Conservative movements
1984).

(Fisch,

All the while Reform and Conservative Judaism are

depicted as legitimate forms of true Judaism these youth
will never return to their indigenous culture, and other
Jewish youth will inevitably follow their lead.

Their sincere

response is simply "We know all about Judaism (i.e., Reform
and Conservative) for we grew up in it and found it devoid
of any true meaning, and therefore we are looking elsewhere."
Without exposing Reform and Conservative Judaism for what
they appear to be according to the present study' s historical
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and empirical analyses, many other Jewish youth will probably
become emotionally entangled in these and other various religious cults.

(Although the adoption of Hinduism or Buddism

would seem as legitimate as converting to any established
age-old religion, the fact is that when these religions are
imported to America by various Hindu Gurus or Zen Buddhists
they take.on a cult-like appearance which tends to disorient
young American Jews and create serious familial problems
[Fisch, 1984].)
4. To Attenuate Jewish Suffering:

According to the

historical analysis in Chapter I the primary factor responsible for anti-Jewish hostility is the Jewish people's selfproclaimed distinctiveness.

This distinctiveness can be

looked at as a blessing or as a curse, but concerning Reform
and _Conservative Judaism can only be regarded as a curse.
Jewish distinctiveness can have its origins in only one of
two ways.

Either G-d wants the Jewish people to remain dis-

tinct and therefore, perforce, they will continue to remain
distinct, or else this distinctiveness is a man-made artifact
obstinately displayed by the Jewish people which has no real
historical precedent or imitation thereafter.
If the latter is true, then all Jewish people holding
on presumptously to their Jewish identity, in one manner or
form, have indirectly generated their own suffering and the
suffering of succeeding generations.

Conversely, .if the
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former is true then we need only look at the blessings and
curses outlined in two books of the Bible (i.e., Leviticus
and Deuteronomy).

In these Biblical passages it states very

clearly that when Jews collectively are acting according to
the Law they will be blessed, and cursed when they are not.
Reform and Conservative adherents do little of what
is required of them according to Jewish Law (this fact is
widely known, and was corroborated in the present study when
questions of religious observance were asked).

Therefore,

without pulling punches, the Reform and Conservative leaders
and adherents could be literally described

(whatever the

reason may be for Jewish distinctiveness) as being the primary
agents of their own suffering.

In other words, whichever

position one takes, Reform and Conservative Jews are responsible for their own suffering.

If Judaism is a man-made phe-

nomenon, then by obstinately retaining their Jewish identity
instead of completely assimilating like most other national
and religious groups (who had the opportunity)

have done

throughout history, their obstinance (and arguably arrogance)
has, and probably will, continue to cause them great suffering.

Inversely, if the Torah is accurate they are also (as

is clear from the Bible) sowing the seeds of affliction (this
point will be more fully elaborated on in the last Section
of the present chapter).

· s.

To Promote Universal Peace and Brotherhood:

Tra-
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ditional Judaism may have pragmatic and workable answers for
world peace, but as long as Reform and Conservative Judaism
are allowed to dominate American Jewry these insights, prophecies, and knowledge will probably never reach a large mass
audience.

For instance, if the world knew (or at least the

American public) the vivid descriptions of what the world will
be like before the coming of the Messiah according to the
Jewish Prophets, the Talmud, and the Zohar (i.e., Jewish
mysticism) and its unusual correspondence with present-day
happenings, the entire world (according to Jewish theology)
may be spared untold grief and suffering if the proper preventive measures are taken accordingly.
Although the above may appear to many as hollow
platitudes for other groups, as well, claim similar benefits
if everyone would adopt their brand of religion or ideology,
there are, at least, two substantive differences between
traditional Jewish claims and others.

(1) Traditional Juda-

ism, in contrast to most other major national or international
movements, does not demand or even suggest that the world's
population turn Jewish, but rather that the Jewish people
follow their many Laws in order that the peoples of the world
may reap the benefits.

(2) Jewish prophecy via many various

prophets has concretely materialized over a period of approximately 1,000 years (our present knowledge comes from recorded
history accepted by most of the "civilized" world today,
and the historical validity of these records has been cor-
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roborated by literally hundreds of archaeological finds over
the last century).
above assertions.

No other movement can compete with the
Therefore in light of Judaism's unusually

accurate prophetical track record (which is theologically
based on G-d' s active presence in the world) , prophecies
which seem to describe the present era should not be taken
lightly.
The present author is not denying the fact that
wonderful values can be learned from all religions, but rather
that if traditional Jewish theology goes tangibly beyond
the worldly

(as its accurate prophesy seems to indicate)

then its predictions and advice concerning the present era
demands further scrutiny.
Direction for Future Investigation
The direction for future investigation corresponds
to the present study's limitations which are:
1.

Suburban as well as city dwellers should be sampled.

2.

Other areas of the country should be sampled.

3.

The variable "Amount of Money Invested or Donated to
the Land of Israel" and others (e.g., investment of
time) should be included in examining the Jews' relationship to the Land.

4.

Reform and Conservative leaders should be recruited
in the development of a "Fundamental Jewish Knowledge
Scale."

5.

A longitudinal study spanning several years should
be undertaken to measure the above variables in relation to the movements' new members.
In doing so,
the experiementer should effectively obtain a base
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rate for all participants (something missing in the
present analysis).
6.

To more conclusively determine whether the Reform
and Conservative movements are s igni f ican tly directing
Jewish commitment among their constituencies, or
if their constituencies' original commitment remains
primarily unchanged. To accomplish this, other var iables which the Reform and Conservative movements
officialy advocate, and which theoretically would
not be considered psychologically threatening should
be investigated. If there were no differences between
these groups and Orthodoxy, or if substantial differences were found between them and the Non-Affiliated
[in conjunction with the present findings which show
the groups differing on what they should (i.e., religious observance)] the claim that these movements
are significantly effecting the present results would
be greatly enhanced.

7.

Although brief comparisons between Judaism and other
social movements were made sporadically throughout
Chapter I, a more thorough investigation via arc hi val
and/or contemporary research on group ideology and
conflict would be appropriate.
It appears highly
relevant to the historical analysis in Chapter I to
compare and contrast (in a more complete manner)
other social movements, their ideologies, their activities, their history, and their sources of conflict
(both internal and external) with Juda·ism.

and,

Chapter II Conclusions
The historical analysis in Chapter I attempted to
explain the root cause of anti-Jewish hostility but it failed
to explain why the masses have so vehemently attacked the
Jews throughout millennia.

In Chapter II it was theorized

that the savage attacks of the masses were primarily motivated
by constant propagation of misinformation and slander about
Jews and Judaism.

The primary catalyst remained the d istinc-

tive Jewish threat but the dissemination of vile slander
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was required in order to drive the masses into action.

The

defamation of Jews and Judaism was then postulated as the
secondary cause of anti-Jewish hostility which, historically,
has been manipulated to foster Jew-hatred on a mass scale.
It was theorized that without the assistance of the common
individual, anti-Jewish hostility would have remained more
a potential threat than an actuality.
Although the Western world would like to believe
that vile propaganda against Jews is a thing of the past, a
new wave of virulent propaganda is again today directed
against the Jews. , Today the aspersions are directed against
the Jews of Israel, a group depicted by Communist and ArabMuslim propagandists alike, as brutally subduing and attempting to eradicate an entire "Arab-Palestinian nation."
Arab propaganda directed against the Jewish state
has 'achieved a new level of sophistication and credibility
in the West today.

It was the opinion of the author in Chap-

ter II that accusations and counter arguments by pro-Arab
and pro-Israel factions respectively are, in the long run,
only to Israel's detriment.

The reason being, that it creates

an image of mutual culpability that will become increasingly
more difficult to change as time goes on.

This symmetry of

culpability in the context of a virtually inexhaustible supply
of Arab petrodollars, continued Western dependency on Arab
oil,

a~d

the threat of World War III erupting from tension

in the Middle East favors the Communist-Arab strategy which
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aims to seriously weaken the relationship between America
and Israel.

It was postulated (at the end of Chapter II)

that unless pro-Israel advocates begin to offensively initiate
research, and programs following therefrom, to effectively
disseminate the pro-Jewish version of the conflict, Israel
may find itself isolated among nations in the not too distant
future.

The following analyses and conclusions were aimed

specifically at providing research, which would help prevent
the above hypothetical consequences from occurring.
Although according to the historical analysis in
Chapter I which depicted the attack on Jewish nationalism
as an integral aspect of anti-Jewish hostility, a more empirical measure which would correlate attitudes towards Jews
with attitudes towards the Jewish state was deemed necessary.
In essence, if attitudes towards Jews were not related to
attftudes towards Israel the above theory which postulates
the integral relationship between the two would be considered
by some, equivocal at best.

Inversely, if a relationship

is detected then reactions and activity towards Israel cannot
be portrayed as reactions toward just another political entity, but rather towards something specifically Jewish in
nature.
The results Cr= .57) supported the hypothesis that
attitudes towards Israel are a characteristically Jewish
phenomenon, where the state of Israel and American Jews are
(in the minds of the American public) closely intertwined.
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In addition, the correlates of both attitude scales considerably converged.

For example, of the fifteen major variables

examined in the present study six were significantly related
(i.e., p < .005)

to both scales, six were found unrelated

to either scale, and only three proved to be related to one
of the attitude scales without being significantly related
to the other.
fold:

The significance of this finding appears two-

(1) In attempting to counter anti-Israeli propaganda

the presentation of historical facts concerning the conflict
is incomplete without a concommitant elucidation of historical
anti-Jewish slander.

Without the later presentation the

former will probably be held suspect, at best, or considered
fraudulent propaganda at worst.
( 2) The American government's and/or the American
public's hypothetical antagonism towards Israel (most probably
created by a seemingly objective news media) could have dire
consequences for American Jews.

The relationship appears

strong enough to suggest that a future oil embargo or protracted tension involving the killing or kidnapping of nonJewish Americans by Arab terrorists may have the unwarranted
effect of creating heightened animosity against American
Jews in general.
Knowledge and Perception of Israel and
the Mideast Conflict
A second objective following from Chapter II was to
measure the American public's general perception of the state
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of Israel, their general knowledge of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to correlate the two.

It was reasoned, that in

order to educate the public, it is first necessary to recognize what people do and do not know.

The author found that

much money is allocated yearly by Jewish organizations to
ascertain the public's perception of Israel, but was unable
to find one study which measured the public's level of knowledge concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.
In light of the news media's seemingly anti-Israeli
stance (which is usually rationalized as an evenhandedness,
irrespective of who the murderer and who the victim are)
which was discussed in Chapter II

(and will be elaborated

below) the author expected to find that the American public
knows 1 i ttle concerning several fundamental and crucial Middle
East issues.

The results, based on responses to the 8-Item

Mideast Knowledge Scale, supported this hypothesis and showed
that despite the barrage of Mideast news coverage over the
last several years, very little is actually known about the
area and the history of the conflict.
An area (as discussed above) where Jewish organizations funnel much money into, is the area of polling public
opinion concerning Israel.

For instance, over the last ten

years the Gallup Poll has been commissioned to gauge the
American public's sympathy for Israel as opposed to their
sympa~hy

for the Arabs.

Consistently, over the last ten

years, when the public is asked "In the Middle East situation,
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are your sympathies more with Israel or the Arab nations?" the
public has sided four to seven times more with Israel than
with the Arabs (Kessler et al., 1984).

These results cor-

respond somewhat with the present study's findings
on the Israel Attitude Scale)

(based

which found that 70 percent

of the public appeared pro-Israel.
However, the above general findings are misleading
and when the Israel Attitude Scale is factor analyzed two
conceptually distinct factors become apparent.

The fir st

factor deals promarily with Arab-Communist propaganda themes
currently being disseminated in the West (Goot

&

Rosen, 1983),

and the second factor deals with themes particularly interesting to Jewish and Israeli advocates, but considerably
ignored by Arab and Communist propagandists.

For instance,

Arab propaganda over the last three years has emphasized
strongly (1) the Arab-Palestian plight, (2) the "belligerent"
Israeli war machine,

(3)

Israel's "brutality" in Lebanon,

and (4) Israel's "imperialistic" tendencies (e.g., the military administration of the so-called West Bank).

These themes

are the very topics which the public seemed to have mixed
feelings about (i.e., 50 percent positive and 50 percent
·negative).

In contrast, when general topics which Arab prop-

agandists rarely touch upon were asked, such as (1) Israeli
People are hard working, (2) I respect the State of Israel,
and (3 >. Israel must be military strong, then the public proved
overwhelmingly pro-Israel

(i.e.,

87 percent positive, 13
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percent negative).

The above findings imply that the Arab-

backed propaganda process is highly effective, possibly without even Israel or the American Jewish public consciously
aware of it (i.e., its efficiency).
Correlation Between Knowledge
and Attitudes
The complete Israel Attitude Scale was then correlated
with the Mideast Knowledge Scale in which a significant correlation of .26 was generated.

However, in light of the low

reliability coefficient (. 55) of the Mideast Knowledge Scale,
the actual strength of the relationship is unclear.

The"refore

in order to more fully examine the relationship between knowledge and perceptions of Mideast happenings with attitudes
towards Israel, individual items were examined separately.
In the 8-item Mideast Knowledge Scale 4 items correlated
significantly (i.e., p < .005) with the Israel Attitude
Scale.

Three of the items have a very important historical

bent, while the fourth bespeaks total ignorance of Mideast
happenings (which apparently plays right into the hands of
Arab and Communist propagandists).
The first significantly correlated item (r

=

.22)

was:
Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over the
last 300 years until the creation of Israel.
Is this
true or false?
Seventy-three percent of all respondents failed to
know that the correct answer to this question was False (if
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they would have guessed, approximately 23% more would have
scored correctly).

Factually speaking, there never was a

separate Arab state in Palestine and there never was a separate Palestinian Arab nation.

Palestinian Arab nationalism

was a post-World War I (British Mandate) phenomenon.
tinian Arabs were never, at any time, autonomous.

Pales-

They never

created their own self contained unit nor any semblance of
separate political or social identity (Davis, 1984) until
1948 when masses of them left or fled the Land following
the War of Independence, which they and their Arab brethren
initiated.

In essence, only after 1948 (primarily in the

refugee camps)

was a distinct Arab-Palestinian "national

character" created.
In the author's opinion the above information is a
mandatory prerequisite for properly understanding the ArabIsraeli conflict.

To understand present day Palestinian

"nationalism" in the context of a hostile response to an
independent Jewish state, as opposed to a hi st or ical positive
entity in and of itself, sheds light on the subject which
should have (and according to the correlation apparently
does have) far-reaching ramifications.

On an ethical level,

this difference in understanding should make a substantive
difference regarding whether to support Israel's claim for
secure defensible borders, or Arab claims for a second Palestinian state ·(Jordan being the first).
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The second significantly correlated item (r

= • 24)

was:
From the time many Jews started arr1v1ng in Palestine
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948,
thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the
Jewish settlers. Is this true of false?
Sixty-eight percent of the respondents failed to know
that the correct answer was false.

Not only were Arabs not

kicked out of the land but according to British census figures [which failed to take into account the myriad of Arabs
who with the help of the British succeeded in entering the
land illegally (Peters, 1984)), the Arab population in Palestine during the British mandate period rose by 75.2% as compared with a 25% increase in relatively fecund Egypt.

Most

importantly, the Arab increase was greatest in areas of intensive Jewish development.

For example, the Arab population

in Haifa increased by 216%, and in Jaffa and Jerusalem by
134% and 90% respectively.

In contrast, when there was an

absence of Jewish development the Arab population increased
substantially less.

For example, in Nablus, Jenin, and Beth-

lehem increases over the same period of time were 42%, 40%,
and 32% respectively (Gottheil, 1975; and Palestine Royal
Commission Report, 1937).
The third item (r

= .24)

was:

Arab hostility towards Jews began with the start of Jewish
nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true or false?
. Si x t y- four percent o f a 11 participants responded
incorrectly.

In light of the historical relationship between
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Arab-Muslims and Jews delineated in Chapter I, the participants inaccuracy requires little further corroborating evidence to poignantly depict the public's mis perception of
this highly important Mideast issue.
The fourth item discussed in which 52% of all respondents answered incorrectly (though more answered correctly
on this item than on any other) was:
Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that
it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle
East enemies put together. Is this true or false?
Just taking into account Israel• s more active and
verbal enemies in the Middle East (e.g., Iraq, Jordan, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran) the present land area ratio
is more than 250 to 1, to the disadvantage of "imperialistic"
Israel.

The importance of this datum is that despite relent-

less and detailed American News coverage concerning almost
every apparent Israeli blemish, the ignorance of facts, which
apparently makes a substantive difference in the public's
perception of Israel is abysmal.
In conjunction with and corroborating the above relationship between the public's misconceptions of historical
Mideast issues and attitudes towards Israel were the relationships found between the four Arab-Palestinian Issue Items
and the Israel Attitude Scale.

These questions did not ask

for knowledge, but rather for the respondent• s opinion (which
is

'

pre~umably

based on his/her perception of the situation)

on various Arab-Palestinian Issues.

All four questions

f

•
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(though not phrased as questions on history)

requested an

opinion based perforce on a particular historical perspective.

All four items, as expected, were signficantly (p <

.005) correlated with attitudes towards Israel.

In other

words, participants whose historical perceptions appeared
accurate were significantly more pro-Israel than those whose
perceptions were not.
The significance of the above findings which revealed
the public's unawareness of broader issues in the Arab-Israeli
conflict with its relationship to attitudes towards Israel,
in conjunction with the apparent efficacy of Arab propaganda
(which appear·s to be successfully molding perceptions of
Israel) should not be taken lightly.

Hypothetically speaking,

in times of crisis this anti-Israel propaganda (which appears
rather innocuous at present) could be the very foundation for
rationalizing the abandomnent of Israel, and possibly for
even attacking American Jews.

Unless Israeli, Jewish, or

even non-Jewish organizations aggressively begin to educate
the American public on basic Mideast issues, the above hypothesized consequences, following from an American crisis, are
not too fantastic to actually occur.
Effects of the Media
Democracy in the United States is based on the faith
that the individual's best thinking will emerge if he/she
is adeq.uately informed of the facts affecting the world around
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him/her.

"Informed people will be more likely to decide on

reasonably practical, just, and humanitarian policies because
in the long run it is in their interest and their countries
to do so" (Cirino, 1974).

Today's local, national, and in-

ternational news is obtained by most people in the public
marketplace of the mass media.

It was estimated in 1974

that over 90 percent of the people in America depended exclusively for their information on magazines (e.g., Time,
Newsweek), daily newspapers, radio, and television (Epstein,
1974).
is,

If the basic purpose of disseminating news information

in the words of the Federal Communications Commission

"the right of the public to be informed, rather than any
right on the part of the government, any broadcasting 1 icense
or any individual members of the public to
own particular views on the matter"

broa~cast

his

(Epstein, 1974), then

the transmitting of factual, unbiased, and historically accurate news is an indispensable element seemingly inherent
in news coverage.
Unfortunately, concerning the media's coverage of
Israel over the last three years, this idea has rarely been
met.

Much non-factual reporting and slanted opinions con-

cerning the Israeli invasion into Lebanon was promulgated
by the most

respected and influential news media of today

(Muravchik, 1983).

In addition, it is the opinion of the

present author that the American news media in general has
focused the public's attention on non-representative scenarios
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concerning the more general Arab-Israeli conflict.

In light

of at 1 east the last forty years of hi story, sympathetic
stereotypic scenarios of the Palestinian plight,

and the

"friendly moderate" Arab States taken together with the "belligerent" State of Israel appears to be a distortion of facts
at best.
In light of the role slanderous material and misinformation has played historically in both the express ion
and cause

(secondary in nature)

of anti-Jewish hosti 1 i ty,

the content and perceptual effects of four news periodicals
we r e ex am in ed •

Periodicals representing American, Arab,

Jewish Secular, and Jewish Religious orientations were content
analyzed with regards to their portrayal of the Arab-Palestinian refuge problem.

Subsequently, the perceptual effect

these seemingly different periodicals had on the Chicago
public were compared.
It was predicted that the periodical representing
mainstream America, together with the Arab periodical, given
a latitude of var ia ti on, would be significantly less proIsrael than the Jewish religious periodical.

In addition,

it was predicted that the Jewish secular magazine, depicted
as indirectly echoing the ideology of Reform and Conservative
Judaism, would show no less hostility towards Israel, nor
less sympathy towards the Arab-Palestinians than its American
counterpart.
Results supported the above predictions that the
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Jewish religious periodical would present the Arab-Palestinian
problem in a significantly more pro-Israel perspective than
the other three magazines, and would likewise produce a significantly more pro-Israel cognitive effect than the others.
The surprising and troubling (i.e., to pro-Israel advocates)
aspect of this analysis is that, after content analysis,
when the periodicals' paragraphs were categorized on a proIsrael vs. pro-Arab scale regarding the Arab-Palestinian
problem, it was found that the American and Jewish secular
(which can be conceptualized as implicitly espousing the
Reform and Conservative philosophy) magazines were respectively 89 and 85 percent pro-Arab.

The Arab magazine proved

96 percent pro-Arab, and in contrast, the Jewish religious
magazine was 92 percent pro-Israel.
The above results are very disturbing for people
who believe in the Jewish version of the Arab-Palestinian
problem, for they imply that during the times of international
pressure and condemnation the general American and AmericanJewish secular media will most probably take (whether voluntarily or not) pro-Arab positions.

Potentially this could

lead an economically independent Israel into doing what it
did in 1973 (the Yorn Kippur war).
ligence reports

~n

Although receiving intel-

full that Egypt and Syria were about to

attack, the Israeli government opted

~to

make a pre-emptive

strike, for fear of world-wide condemnation (Sachar, 1980).
This irresponsible move on the part of the Israeli government
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cost the state of Israel thousands of Jewish lives.
In the opinion of the author, Israel's primary propaganda foe is not the Arabs (i.e., the explicit and avowed
enemies of Israel can be dealt with) but rather the American
and American-Jewish secular media.

Their

danger is that

while displaying a guise of objectivity (and even pro-Jewish
concern) these media, as depicted in the above analysis (which
was investigated during a time of international crisis, seven
months following the initial Lebanese invasion) , appear
latently pro-Arab.

The peril involved is that the American

public (both non-Jew and Jew alike) most probably accept
their Middle-East scenarios in light of their seemingly objective (or pro-Israel) positions.
These results are representative of the news media
in general during the first several months of Israel's invasi'on into Lebanon (Muravchik, 1983; Chafets, 1985).

In

the following discussion five reasons are given to explain
the news media's seemingly latent anti-Israeli position.
It is important to bear in mind that these reasons are not
mutually exclusive.
1. Arab Monies:

Granted the present author has little

support for the present claim, but based on Arab pocketbook
power in conjunction with their "special" relationship with
many large American corporations, the possibility that the
major American (not Jewish) news media are to some. extent
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cooperating with the Arabs appears not totally slanderous.
For example, according to a 1974 report of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, the
ARAMCO consortium (Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and SOCAL) attempted
to block America's emergency airlift to Israel in 1973 during
exceedingly desperate times (in the beginning of the Yom
Kippur War).

During the same war these companies also coop-

erated closely with Saudi Arabia to deny oil and fuel to
the United States Navy (Davis et al., 1982).
2. Latent Anti-Jewish Hostility:

This latent hos-

tility could derive from a myriad of sources.

Some of the

more salient sources could be jealousy of American-Jewish
success, negative past experiences with Jews whether vicarious
or real, and/or negative religious orientations concerning
Jews and Judaism.
3. Intimidation: The physical intimidation constantly
present while covering Mideast happenings in Arab lands was
described in Chapter II.
4. The Liberal Media's Identification with the Left:
Many Jews are aware that they are not the only group reviled
and condemned, but fewer are aware that they are the only
group against whom discrimination has been officially sanctioned by both the Far Right and Far Left (Perlmutter, 1982).
An incisive essay, written by Jack Newfield a liberal journal-
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ist in a Leftist periodical The Village Voice sums up the
present-day American Leftist movement's relationship with
Jews and

Israel.

It is this leftwing ideological thrust

which the American and Jewish secular news media, in general,
identify with:

//
/,,//

The tlllng that troubles me about a part of the American left doesn't have an official sociological name.
It's more than anti-Zionism, and different from traditional anti-Semitism.
Its impact is often in omissions
--the injustice not mentioned, the article not written,
the petition not signed.
It is often communicated in
code words.
~ut it is essentially a series of dual
standards.
It is a dual standard for the human rights
of Jews in certain countries.
It is a dual standard
that questions Israel's right to exist by denying to
Zionism the same moral legitimacy that is granted to
every other expression of nationalism in the world.
And it is an amnesia of conscience about the creation
of Israel, and about the Holocaust, symbolized by Noam
Chomsky writing an introduction to an insane, anti-Semi tic
book that alleges the Holocaust is a Zionist hoax. And
by Jesse Jackson saying he is sick and tired of hearing about the Holocaust.
(Perlmutter, 1982, p. 137).

s.

Jewish Self-Hate:

It is known that a large num-

ber of Jews hold very important and influential positions
in the major American news media (Chafets, 1984).

Therefore

the question is asked "Why would Jews (both in the American
and Jewish secular media)
people?"

blatantly misrepresent their own

Answers to this perplexing question may possibly

be found in Satre's (1976) Anti-Semite and Jew in which Satre
presents a psychological exposition of the assimilated Jew.
He writes:
He (the assimilated Jew) has allowed himself to be
persuaded by the anti-Semites, he is the first victim
of their propaganda. He admits with them that, if there
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is a Jew, he must have the characteristics with which
popular malevolence endows him, and his effort is to
constitute himself a martyr, in the proper sense of the
term, that is, to prove in his person that there
are no Jews• (pp. 94-95)
They (assimilated Jews) have allowed themselves to
be poisoned by the stereotype that others have of them,
and they 1 i ve in fear that their acts wi 11 correspond
to this stereotype • • • • Thus many inauthentic Jews play
at not being Jews. • • • (pp. 95-96)
The Jew who encounters another Jew in the drawing
room of a Christian is a little like a Frenchman who
meets a compatriot abroad.
Yet the Frenchman derives
pleasure from asserting to the world that he is a Frenchman, whereas the Jew, even if he were the only Israelite
in a non-Jewish company, would force himself not to feel
that he was a Jew. When there is another Jew with him,
he feels himself endangered before the others, and he
who a moment before could not even see the ethnic characteristics of his son or his nephew now looks at his
coreligionist with the eyes of an anti-Semite, spying
out with a mixture of fear and fatalism the objective
signs of their common origin • • • •
He is so afraid of the discoveries the Christians
are going to make that he hastens to give them warning,
he becomes himself an anti-Semite by impatience and for
the sake of others. Each Jewish trait he detects is
like a dagger thrust, for it seems to him that he finds
it in himself, but out of reach, objective, incurable,
and published to the world. • • • (pp. 102-3)
,
• • • in anti-Semitism he (the Jew) denies his race
in order to be no more than a pure individual, a man
without blemish in the midst of other men. (p. 109)
Accordingly, many Jews in the news media could be
depicted as bending-over-backwards in an attempt to sympathetically portray the Arab position for fear of being accused
of partisan reporting, and in effect the fear of being publicly exposed as Jewish (something they had tried so desperately in the past to escape).
The above points are disturbing to pro-Israel advocates, for they imply that during times of international
pressure and condemnation the general American and American
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Jewish secular news media will most probably adopt pro-Arab
positions.

To repeat, the primary propaganda antagonist of

Israel does not appear to be the Arabs, but rather the Amer ican and American Jewish secular news media.

Their dire threat

is that while ostensibly displaying a guise of objectivity,
these media are latently pro-Arab (or more appropriately
anti-Israel).

The grave danger involved is that the American

public will most probably accept their news coverage as fact,
in light of their apparently evenhanded political stance.
Limitations of Analyses and Directions
for Future Study
Some major limitations will be talked about in the
following discussion.
1.

In the present study a total of 400 people were

randomly sampled from the city of Chicago proper.
ti on,

In addi-

the only sizable racial groups in the sample were Whites

and Blacks.

Orientals and Hispanics were conspicuously miss-

ing and Jews and Arabs were screened out initially in order
to prevent their biasing effects (i.e., In light of limited
financial resources which precluded sufficiently large samples
of Jews and Arabs for individual group comparisons, it was
felt that Jews and Arabs would be inordinately pro-Jewish
or pro-Arab respectively, and that their biases when combined
indiscriminately with the general Christian population would
introduce undesired extra variance into the analysis).
In future studies it will be important to measure
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attitudes and knowledge from other geographical locations
other than the Midwest, and to sample from suburban and rural
areas as well as the big city (the population sampled in
the present study
cing).

was~limited

in light of insufficient finan-

It will also be important to obtain sizable samples

of Orientals, Hispanics, Arabs, and Jews to determine both
geographical and group differences.
2.

The Mideast Knowledge Scale was not a particularly

reliable instrument (reliability coefficient

=

.SS).

One

reason given above for its relative unreliability was that
responses were of a True-False-Don't Know nature which left
ample room for guesswork.

In order to deal effectively with

this confound, it would be wise in the future to create a
new Mideast Knowledge Scale whose questions would be openended.
3.

In the. above content analyses and contrasts,

only the news media of magazines were empirically compared.
Based on these comparisons results were generalized to other
news media.

This extrapolation is not necessarily correct

or even logical.

Accordingly, it is important in future

experimentation to content analyze other forms of news media
(e.g., television, newspapers, radio) and, like the above,
to examine the effects these media forms have on the American
public.
4.

In the present study the link between news media

content and attitudes towards Israel was only indirect (i.e.,

292

via content analysis).

Future studies should explore the

relationship more directly.

For example, magazine or news-

paper articles may be read by subjects and subsequently their
attitudes, perceptions, and knowledge may be tapped.

In

addition, radio or television news broadcasts may be played
to participants and afterwards their attitudes and perception
measured.

By implementing it directly, the problem of cre-

ating a highly valid representation (e.g., via content analysis) of the particular news media under investigation is
eliminated.
5.

Another area unexplored in the present study

(yet very important for practical application purposes) deals
with the public's exposure to and acceptance of news reports
via the mass media.

In essence, if the news media cannot

be pressured to refrain from biased reporting concerning
Israel, then people's trust (pending there is some)

in the

"evenhandedness" and "objectivity" of the news media may be
mitigated.

In other words, if the mass news media refuses

to change (which it almost certainly will) a strategy can
theoretically be devised to sensitize the public to the news
media's implicit bias against Israel.
In the author's opinion a potent way to sensitize
the American population would be to expose publicly the
media's bias, and their exploitative play on the emotions of
the public.

By vividly delineating the news media's selective

processing procedures in conjunciton with a brief background

293
sketch of what is actually happening (and has happened)

in

the reg ion, the American public should get an idea of how
they have been emotionally manipulated, and consequently
should become more difficult to sell in the future.
The above strategy corresponds to "i nocula ti on theory"
(McGuire, 1964).

McGuire suggested that people could be

made more resistant to a persuasive message by inoculating
their initial attitudes.

According to Petty and Cacioppo

(1981):
The inoculation treatment consists of exposing people
to a few pieces of counter-attitudinal propaganda prior
to exposure to the threatening message and showing them
how to refute this initial discrepant information. The
presentation of refuted weak counter-arguments presumably
produces resistance to subsequent stronger attacks, because the inoculation poses a threat that motivates people
to develop bolstering arguments for their somewhat weakened attitude, and it helps them counter-argue the attacking message. (p. 230)
Accordingly, exposing to the American public how they have
been perceptually manipulated regarding happenings in the
Middle East may enable the public to produce their own
counter-arguments when faced with similar reporting in the
future.
6.

The origins of any news media bias should be more

fully investigated.

In the above discussion several reasons

were given why the news media might promote a pro-Arab slant
(in light of recent history any balance of blame showed to
both the Arab and Israeli camps is itself considered poignantly pro-Arab) but the discussion was overly simplistic.
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Therefore, in future studies these overly superficial guidelines (as well as others) should be more thoroughly examined
(e.g., via archival data, content analyses, personal interviewing of media personnel, etc.).
Chapter III Conclusions
The following discourse will be divided ito two sections (Demographic and Psychological variables) • Afterwards,
the 1 imitations of the analyses and directions for future
study will be discussed.
Demographics
In the subsequent discourse only the variables of
educational level, age, and race in their relationship to
attitudes towards Jews and Israel will be discussed.

The

reason is, that these variables produced significant differences (i.e., p < .005) on, at least, one of the two attitude
scales.
Educational Level
The significant correlation obtained between Educational Level and attitudes towards both Jews and Israel suggests that the more educated a person is the more pro-Jewish
and pro-Israel he/she is likely to be.

However, after a

multiple regression analysis was implemented in which both
Jewish and Israel attitude scales were simultaneously regressed on Education only the Jewish scale's partialed cor-
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relation proved significant (Partialed Corelations were:
Jewish Scale
.OS).

=

.22, p < .001; and Israel Scale

=

.04, p >

This implies that the relationship between Education

and Attitudes towards Israel is primarily an artifact of
the relationship between Attitudes towards Jews with Attitudes
towards Israel.
Quinley and Glock (1983) suggest,ed three general
reasons why educational level may be related to attitudes
towards Jews:

(1) education enables individuals to develop

their rational abilities and to think critically and independently, (2) attending school is a social phenomenon.

It

exposes individuals to environments which are more liberal
and tolerant than most others, and (3) education is one way
of purchasing a ticket of admission into middle class society.

It may favorably influence attitudes towards Jews by

placing individuals in settings where prejudice is less acceptable or less likely.
Although it seems highly illogical to push for the
education of the masses with the intent of attenuating
anti-Jewish hostility (even if the total American population could be "fully" educated there will always be a lower
and lower-middle socio-economic class in America regardless
of the educational level of its people), the clue that less
educated people are more potentially hostile towards Jews
and

in~irectly

towards Israel is an important finding.

Its

importance lies in the observation that any educational cam-
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paign waged to counter anti-Jewish and/or anti-Israel propaganda must not be monolithic but varied in its instructive
strategies, in order to reach individuals of diverse intellectual and socio-economic strata.

Quinley and Glock (1983)

in their book Anti-Semitism in America have presented several
strategies for combatting anti-Jewish prejudice, of which
three appear to have special application in the present discussion.

They are:

1.

• •• instruction should deal with minority group stereotypes both openly and directly. That anti-Semitic beliefs
exist should be acknowledged • • • • Pointing out the
distortions in such beliefs will serve to expose factual
errors • • • and should expose the ideological character
of anti-Semitic thinking. (p. 201)

2.

To teach people how to use the rules of logic and inference and to understand what can or cannot be said about
group differences • • • • Instruction is also needed to
assist people to look beyond surface characteristics and
easy explanations and to discover the more subtle and
important reasons for human behavior. (p. 201)

and,
3.

• • • special instruction is needed about how group differences came about. This involves instruction in the
historical background of different religious, ethnic,
and racial groups in America, the unique cultural heritage
and values of these groups, and the social and economic
positions they have come to occupy in society. (p. 202)
Race
The significant correlation between

*~

and atti-

tudes towards both Jews and Israel suggests that Whites are
*The variable Race after being par ti a led by the var iables Age, Education, and Gender remained significantly correlated with both the Jewish Scale (p < .007) and the Israel
Attitude Scale (p = .001).
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more likely to be pro-Jewish and pro-Israel than their Black
counterparts.

However, like Education, after a multiple

regression analysis was implemented in which both Jewish and
Israel Attitude Scales were simultaneously regressed on

~,

only the Jewish Scale's partialed correlation proved significant (Partialed Correlations were:

Jewish Scale= .17, p <

.008; and Israel Scale• .06, p > .OS).

This implies that

the relationship between Race and Attitudes towards Israel
is primarily a function of the relationship between Attitudes
towards Jews and Attitudes towards Israel.
Quinley and Glock (1983) interpeted this relationship
in economic terms.

They cite the fact that Blacks who have

more dependent economic contacts with Jews via patronizing
Jewish-owned stores, working for Jewish employers, or having
Jewish landlords have considerably more negative attitudes
towards Jews than Blacks that do not.

In other words, un-

equal-status-contact between Blacks and Jews seems to be
the primary variable in accounting for anti-Jewish prejudice
among Blacks.
To counter Black anti-Jewish attitudes it is important
to know the source of this potentially hostile mindset.
Is it directed specifically towards Jews or is it more a
reaction to overall White-American society?

Black Americans

may not be responding to having a Jew as a landlord or boss
per se, but rather in experiencing a White person in a position of superiority over them.
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Selznick and Steinberg's (1969)

findings suggest

that most Blacks see little difference between having a Jew
or having another White as an employer, store owner, or landlord.

The authors found a close correspondence between Black

respondents' positions on a White (non-Jewish) attitude scale
and on their Jewish attitude scale.

In total, only 4 percent

of city-dwelling Blacks scored as anti-Semitic but not antiWhite (non-Jewish White), while another 4 percent were antiWhite but not anti-Semitic.
Although the above may be comforting to some (i.e.,
misery loves company) it is disconcerting to others for to
break Black hos ti 1 i ty towards White America (and consequently
towards Jews) appears to be an unusually formidable task.
In addition, because Jews (in the minds of Blacks) seem to
represent the "exploiting" White race, and in addition present
a highly vulnerable minority group, they could easily become
the stimuli upon which Blacks may someday actively vent their
hostilities.
In light of the Jews' particularly precarious situation vis-a-vis Blacks it behooves Jewish leaders and organizations to aggressively remind Blacks that it was not Jews
who enslaved them for hundreds of years in Christi an and
Moslem lands.

In fact, it would be hard to find another

group in America who have taken such an active role in the
civil-rights movement, in the nourishment of the infant NAACP
and the Urban League as the Jewish people have done in hehalf
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of American Blacks.

It is these facts which need to be con-

sistently communicated to the Black population and not the
"facts" of Jesse Jackson and Louis Farahkan.
In addition, if Blacks knew the real relationship
of moderen Zionism to their own cause vis a vis Arab sujugation of Blacks, their sympathies in the Middle East would
probably be reversed and very few would probably adopt for
themselves the religion of Islam.

For example, modern secular

Zionism's founder Theodore Herzl wrote in 1902 in his book
Old-New Land:
• • • There is still one other question ar1s1ng out
of the disaster of the nations which remains unsolved
to this day, and whose profound tragedy only a Jew can
comprehend.
This is the African question.
Just call
to mind all those terrible episodes of the slave trade,
of human beings who, merely because they were black,
were stolen like cattle, taken prisoner, captured and
sold. Their children grew up in strange lands, the objects of contempt and hostility because their complexions
were different.
I am not ashamed to say, though I may
expose myself to ridicule in saying so, that once I have
witnessed the redemption of the Jews, my people, I wish
also to assist in the redemption of the Africans. (Perlmutter, 1982, p. 186)
In contrast to the above, it is interesting to note
Arab-Muslim's historical treatment of Blacks (whom a significant number of Black Americans today identify with, in the
. Arab's ongoing war with Israel).

The following excerpts

are taken from Davis (1985):
The Arabs, who ran the world's black slave markets
for centuries, continue to engage in the slave trade
among themselves.
Recent incidents of chattel slavery have been cited
in· Saudi Arabia--which "abolished" it years ago--and in
Mauritania, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, and Sudan, ac-
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cording to British correspondents and observers.
Britain's Anti-Slavery Society notes that slavery
was legal in much of the Arab world until 1962 and that
vestiges of the practice survive today.
In the case of Mauritania, however, the Anti-Slavery
Society charges that slavery still flourishes openly to
this day.
In late 1981, the society accused the Arab
League members of maintaining "at least 100,000 slaves
and 300,000 semi-slaves." although the Mauritanian goverrnnent decreed the abolition of slavery in July 1980,
the British anti-slavery group labelled the decree a
maneuver to improve Mauritania's international standing.
Former Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver, who
returned to the United States in 1975 from exile in Algeria, reported in The Boston Herald in January 1977,
that "having lived intimately for several years among
the Arabs, I know them to be amongst the most racist
people on earth.
This is particularly true of their
attitude toward black people • • • • Many Arab families
that can afford it keep one or two black slaves to do
their menial labor. Sometimes they own an entire family.
I have seen such slaves with my own eyes."
(pp. 13940)

It is the present author's opinion that if the above
type of information was intelligently disseminated among
American Blacks, Israel would most probably have a staunch
ally, in the Black community of America, and this positive
relationship would invariably carry over to attitudes towards
Jews in general.
Age
A slight but significant relationship was found between the variables Age and Attitudes Towards Israel.

The

direction of the relationship suggests that the older a person
is the more pro-Israel he/she is likely to be.
This relationship may be a function of the Arab's
public'relations metamorphosis following their 1967 defeat
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in the 6-Day War.

This change in Arab propaganda, which

shifted from proclamations calling for the eradication of
Israel to sympathetic rhetoric in behalf of their Palestinian
"brothers" can conceptually be understood to have affected
the younger generation more than the older.

It may affect

the younger generation more because they know and viscerally
perceive little of what was explicit before 1967, but only
implicit thereafter, and therefore have been more effectively
manipulated by Arab- and Communist-backed propaganda.

Young

America has seemingly only perceived Israel in the role of
"Goliath" whereas the older generation (irrespective of their
lack of fact)

have in person witnessed the Holocaust and

the subsequent miraculous birth of a Jewish state.
Already in 1977, Marvin Feuerwerger wrote:
For much of today's younger Congress • • • the Holocaust
is a vague memory and the creation of Israel is not recalled as a meaningful and vivid realization of an urgent
Jewish need nor as the near-miraculous redemption of a
persecuted people. (p. 24)
He went on to quote from a former Administration
official who stated:
• • • younger members • • • haven• t experienced the Holocaust personally or seen the newsreels depicting the
death camps or watched the Nuremberg trials. These members don't have a vivid image of the war, and they don't
understand what the State of Israel means. (pp. 24-25)
The younger generation (e.g., between the ages 18-40)
are the future members of Congress, the future State and
Defense Department officials, future members of the mass
media, and the mainstream American constituency in the not
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too distant future.

Unless a concerted effort is made to

educate the younger generation (both Gentile and Jew alike),
the Jewish state of Israel will probably meet stiff American
opposition in the future.

In the author's opinion the younger

generation should not only be educated regarding the more
salient facts of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but concomitantly
should be presented with historical anti-Jewish slander and
hostility.

Just as the older generation are seemingly able

to connect both cognitively and emotionally the Holocaust
with the birth of a Jewish nation, so should the younger
generation be educated on contemporary anti-Israeli propaganda
in light of historical anti-Jewish propaganda.
Another interpretation concerning the discrepancy
among age groups may be the general political alignment which
generally varies across age groups.

The older generation

tends to be more conservative (the Right) while the. younger
generation tends to be more liberal (the Left), oftentimes
indiscriminately (Keniston, 1971).

In light of the fact

that Israel superficially represents the "establishment,"
or conservative Right, its image alone may repel a good many
emotionally sincere, but cognitively shallow young Americans.
A further interpretation of the above data may reflect
the emphasis and placement of Arab propaganda over the last
twenty years, which has become increasingly more powerful
and sophisticated.

Already in 1955, Eleanor Roosevelt noted:
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"Arab propaganda on American college campuses across the
country is beyond the wildest imagination" (Drayer & Kanner,
1983, p. 27).
In October, 1964 a Near East Report special survey
of the anti-Israel campus campaign cautioned that:
Arab propagandists have recognized the possibilities
for affecting American public opinion at the college
level. College newspapers resound with their pronouncements. College lecterns shake with the force of their
oratory. As the Arab approach becomes more sophisticated, Arab distortion of history becomes more palatable
to young Americans. (p.4)
In recent years anti-Israel propagandists in the
United States have made college campuses a still higher priority (Kessler & Schwaber, 1984).

When Harten Husseini (the

PLO's Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations) was
interviewed by the Saudi Report in 1982, he was asked if he
spoke on many college campuses.

He retorted that he had

lectured "to some colleges" (Halsell, 1982).

But the truth

of the matter was that 17 of the 20 speeches Husseini de1 ivered in the prior six month period had been on college
campuses.

In fact, 85 percent of Husseini's lectures from

1980 to 1984 have been on American college campuses, though
college students in America comprise less than 1 percent of
all Americans (Kessler & Schwaber, 1984).
According to the above discussion the present results
may reflect Arab propaganda over the last twenty years, which
has targeted (and seemingly succeeded)
younger generation of Americans.

to influence the

In conclusion, the above
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three interpretations are by no means mutually exclusive,
and the possibility that there exists a strong relationship
between the three should not be precluded in preparing educational campaigns.

Following therefrom, pro-Israel informa-

tion campaigns should probably be prepared to deal with each
of the three interpretations separately and in combination.

Psychological Variables
Social scientists and historians who refrain from
mentioning the relationship between psychological maladjustment and attitudes towards Jews shun a tremendous amount of
literature which supports this relationship (e.g., Adorno
et al., 1980; Bettelheim et al., 1964; Saenger, 1969).

How-

ever, social scientists who focus almost exclusively on this
relationship promote little more than pessimism.

In theory,

if psychological maladjustment is the exclusive cause of
anti-Jewish hostility as some writers imply, then by definiton, the only way to stamp out anti-Jewish hostility would
be to eliminate international crises, mental illness, and
overly frustrating experiences (or conversely to educate
the masses on how to effectively cope with, at least, international crises and overly frustrating experiences).

As

long as the world remains as we perceive it today, the elimination of societal and individual maladies appears virtually
impossible.

Correspondingly, an attempt to arouse Jewish
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optimism by the "reasoning" that a significant drop in collective and individual suffering would considerably alleviate
anti-Jewish hostility is analogous to passifying a frightened
child on a ten-drop roller-coaster by informing him/her after
the first drop, that things are getting progressively better.
In essence, if anti-Jewish hostility was primarily
dependent on these psycho-social illnesses, the prognosis
for future Jewish suffering would be grim indeed.

In the

present theoretical analysis psychological variables are
not overlooked, but are depicted as only indirectly related
to anti-Jewish hostility.

By positing various psychological

variables as tertiary in nature the present author is not
eschewing the empirical realities mentioned above, but is
able to avoid describing a bleak seemingly uncontrollable
phenomenon which could ironically cause more pessimism and
worry than good.

In fact, the constant anxiety involved in

thinking about which individuals are maladjusted (and therefore according to the other theories are prone to anti-Jewish
hostility) would most likely present serious cognitive and
emotional discomfort.
In contrast, the present theory posits that the Jewish
people themselves are capable of attenuating anti-Jewish
hostility.

From making an authentic decision to remain Jewish

or not (see Discussion in Chapter I)
the

pr~liferation

to fighting against

of anti-Jewish propaganda (see Discussion

in Chapter II) to organizing educational campaigns to reach
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those groups most susceptible to anti-Jewish and/or antiIsrael i propaganda

the present theory (and action following

therefrom) is by no means pessimistic, as opposed to other
theories which posit the etiology of anti-Jewish prejudice
as primarily pathological in nature.
The primary reasons for bringing these psychological
variables into the present study (even though they, by themselves, lead to little positive application) was twofold,
(1) to provide a comprehensive theory of anti-Jewish hostility
which is consistent with other empirical findings, and (2)
to further test several of these empirical findings in an
attempt to detect the more salient sources of fear, frustration, and/or pain which when the primary and secondary causes
of anti-Jewish hostility are operative, would be considered
the catalyst needed to produce further discrimination and
persecution of Jews.
Two variables found to correlate significantly with
Attitudes Towards Jews both in bivariate and multivariate
analyses were the Anomie Scale, and the Abridged Purpose in
Life Scale.

The Anomie Scale corresponds to the disintegra-

tion of societal structure and values in times of rapid social
change.

The progressively heightened pace of American society

(or, in fact, the world in general) with its concommitant
weakening of traditional values, in an atmosphere of "living
for

t~day"

for fear of future happenings should logically

create a heightened degree of anomie.

Accordingly, the lack
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of a structured and predictable social environment should
only exacerbate anti-Jewish hostility all the while misinformation of Jews, Judaism, and Israel is believed.
The Abridged Purpose in Life Scale corresponds to
the lack of meaning and purpose the individual may experience
in life.

Although any prognostication must be considerably

tempered by the instrument's relatively low reliability coefficient (.56), the fact that an optimistic future outlook
may appear to many people today as highly unrealistic, the
relationship of the above two variables is logically consistent, and therefore if left unchecked should increasingly
become more intense in the future.
The Opinion-Fear Rating Scale was found to correlate
significantly with Attitudes Towards Jews and with Attitudes
Towards Israel in both bivariate and multivariate regression
analyses.

However, the relationship between Attitudes To-

wards Jews and the Opinion-Fear Crises Scale was understood
as a corollary of the latter scale's relationship to Attitudes
Towards Israel.

Conceptually, perceptions of an impending

national catastrophe or crisis places the individual in a
state of helplessness.

In this disturbing state of mind

the individual may (1) stoically resign himself/herself to
getting-on-with-life despite the many obstacles, (2) become
depressed, or (3) strike out at a tangible and vulnerable
entity .whose direct actions have little to do with the ongoing
crisis.
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A case in point is the recent hijacking (June of
'85) of a T.W.A. airline, with many American citizens on
board, by Arab terrorists.

The main demand of the terrorists

was the release of over 700 Arabs from Israeli detainee
camps.

These detainees were taken as prisoners while Israel

was in the process of expeditiously departing from Lebanon,
in an effort to ward off any more terrorist attacks (which
were consistently taking place) against Israeli soldiers,
who were very visibly making their way out.

At the outset,

the Israeli government made it clear that these detainees
would be released once Israel had fully retreated, and once
there was relative calm on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

In

fact, before the hijacking took place Israel had already
begun releasing prisoners.

Despite the above scenario, public

opinion towards Israel, when the hostages' fate was as yet
unde,cided, dropped to an all-time low.
Following from the above, it does not require too
much imagination to understand what could be the American
people's reaction to future Mideast outbreaks, where quantitatively and qualitatively the crisis may be more intense than
the above episode.

Although the above scenario is not a

pleasant one (for all parties concerned), it is believed that
had the American news media not shown implicit sympathy for
the terrorists (in the Mideast in general and in Lebanon in
particular the word terrorist can be applied to a large network of individuals and political entities all working towards
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a common goal), and had not been previously inclined to provide for the terrorists a platform for influencing the American public, the hijacking probably never would have occurred.
In fact, future terrorist attacks against American targets
throughout the world would probably have been significantly
reduced.
Another interpretation of the relationship between
the apprehension or anticipation of an impending national
crisis and attitudes towards Israel can be described on a
cognitive level (as opposed to an emotional level discussed
above).

Theoretically, the association between anticipation

of crisis and attitudes specifically towards Israel may be
seen as manipulated by Arab and Communist propagandists and
further buttressed by the American news media.
The general message (as discussed in Chapter II)
rece'ived in the West (via our own news media) is that the
Palestinian problem lies at the heart of Middle East instability.

According to the message, once this problem is re-

solved (via an abrogation of the Jewish state, or the granting
of a second Arab-Palestinian state on the west Bank) there
should be peace in the region, and the

u.s.

which is often

the target of Arab hostility will then enjoy a stable and
enduring alliance with the Arab world.

Conversely, another

Arab-Israeli war could produce an economic er i sis in the
Western world (as it was seen to have done in 1973) which
could have serious political ramifications.

In addition,
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the superpowers could get drawn into the action.
Portraying Mideast tension almost exclusively in terms
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while simultaneously casting
blame on Israel for creating or at least exacerbating the
situation, depicts Israel, at best, as the perennial troublemaker, and at worst, as humanity's arch adversary.

Accord-

ingly, it is possible that the above misrepresented stereotype
of Israel vis a vis Mideast instability may have significantly
helped to produce the present statistical relationship.

As

Benjamin Netanyahu (1983), Israel's present ambassador to
the U.N. wrote, this portrayal of the Mideast conflict fails
to correspond with many other realities in the region:
In the last 30 years, virtually every Arab state has
been at war or on the verge of war with at least one of
its Arab neighbors • • • • In North Africa, Libya has
cl ashed with Egypt and Tunisia, threatened Sudan and
financed efforts to topple other Arab regimes.
Egypt
under Nasser invaded Yemen and now trades threats with
·ouadhafi. Algeria has waged surrogate warfare against
Morocco using the Polisario forces in the Sahara.
In the Arabian peninsula, the two Yemens have been
warring intermittently for years. Saudi Arabia, while
trying to buy off all potential enemies in the Arab world
in turn seeks to dominate the smaller states of the Gulf
and has pressed territorial claims against all of them.
Kuwait frets over Saudi encroachment on its territory,
but worries even more about Iraq, which claims Kuwait
in its entirety. And in the heart of the Middle East,
Syria has attacked Jordan, jostles with Iraq and has
made a shambles of Lebanon in seven years of ruthless
occupation • • • •
The Arab world is littered with broken agreements.
At the first sign of a neighbor's vulnerability, aggression erupts against the potential victim, to be checked
only by the perception or presence of countervailing
power. Thus when Saadam Hussein of Iraq perceived postrevolutionary Iran as weak and ripe for plunder, he
sw1 ftly revoked the border agreement he had signed five
years earlier with the Shah and invaded Iran's oil-rich

311
provinces. As early as 1928, T. E. Lawrence characterized
the Arab regimes as "tyrannies cemented with blood" and
said that "it will be generations before any two Arab
states join voluntarily." Fifty-five years later nothing
has changed • • • •
None of these conflicts has anything to do with Israel. None of this violence has Israel as its target.
Yet most of the discussions about achieving "peace" in
the Middle East focus exclusively on the Arab-Israeli
conflict and ignore the pervasive violence that characterizes the Arab world.
Irrespective of the above, it may also be argued that
people who are generally apprehensive may also be generally
prejudiced.

In other words the above relationship may not

be Israel-specific, but rather prejudice-specific which may
target any arbitrary out-group regardless of race, creed,
activity, or region.

This latter interpretation is also

consistent with the theoretical tertiary nature of prejudice
discussed above (in the present chapter and in Chapter III).
Limitations of the Analyses and Directions
for Future Study
1.

Although the variable Age proved to be signif-

icantly correlated with Attitudes towards Israel it is hypothesized that this relationship would be even stronger if
a broader range of age groups were more thoroughly sampled.
For example, in the present study only adults 25 years of
age and older were sampled (the author initially did not
want to mix college students who generally live in a more
isolated and sheltered environment with the general working
population).

In addition, only 19 percent of the respondents

were 55 years of age and older while 49 percent were between
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25 and 40.

In future studies a broader and more proportional

cross section of the population should be required.
2.

In the present analyses two of the psychological

scales, The Abridged Purpose in Life Scale, and the EgoStrength Scale produced relatively low reliability coefficients (.56 and .40 respectively) which made their relationship with the Jewish and Israel Attitude Scales suspect.
Therefore, it is important to develop or adopt other psychological scales (or revised versions of the present ones)
which measure comparable constructs in order to more fully
investigate their true relationship.
3.

In the present study respondents were asked all

questions orally over the telephone.

It is highly possible

that respondents consciously refrained from portraying themselves in a negative light to the study's anonymous interviewers (irrespective of the interviewer's claim that they
were calling for Loyola University of Chicago).

In essence,

the relationships between the several psychological variables
and attitudes towards Jews and Israel may in actuality be
significantly greater than the present results showed, but
because of the stigma (albeit justified) involved in candidly
revealing oneself to a stranger, the real correlations may
have been substantively diminished. Therefore, future studies
should attempt to gather this information in a less threatening manner (e.g., via in-person interviews, mail, or group
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sit-down administrations) and then only correlate the data
with attitudes towards Jews and Israel.
4.

A major limitation of the present study is the

amount of variance in both the Jewish and Israel attitude
scales unaccounted for.

After simultaneously regressing

most of the variables in the present study on both the Jewish
and Israel scales, over 50% of the Israel scale's variance
and approximately 70% of the Jewish scale's variance remained
unaccounted for.

The following points attempt to explain

where some of the unaccounted for variance may be:
A.

According to the Jewish and Israel scales' fre-

quency count they both are considerably skewed (negatively).
The skewness may reflect the actual population distribution
or it may be an artifact of the instruments themselves.

In

either case, the skewness may have significantly attenuated
the 'strength of the relationship between many of the independent variables and the two scales.

Further research should

attempt to discern the approximate population distribution
of the two constructs, and if one or more truly approximates
the ·normal distribution a more valid instrument should subsequently
B.

be de- signed.
There are several variables that may have produced

significant relationships (e.g., social mobility, authoritarian personality type, general index of prejudice, media
believ~bility,

etc.), but because the data of one of the

original variables (i.e., social mobility) was l'ost, others
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discounted because of limited interviewing time, and still
others were only thought of post-hoc, these potential relationships were not examined.

It seems fairly certain that

had the above variables and others been more rigorously measured in the present study, the variance of both scales would
probably have been substantially affected.

However, in 1 ight

of the limitations of a telephone survey in conjunction with
the novel nature of the present study (i.e., there was 1 i ttle
literature direction for choosing the most appropriate variables for the present theoretical scheme) several important
variables were inadvertently missing.

c.

There were certain variables in the study which

although theorized to be significantly related to anti-Jewish
hostility were not found to be significant (i.e., Ego-Strength
Scale, Life Satisfaction Scale).

Although these scales were

checked for their reliability and/or validity before the
study was implemented, the fact that most of the psychological
scales implemented in the present study were previously tested
as self-administering scales, but in the present study were
used in a telephone interviewing situation may have considerably damaged their construct validity (i.e., they were operationalized as self-administering scales and not as telephone interviewing scales).

Even those scales which obtained

significance (e.g., Anomie, Purpose in Life) may have been
signif~cantly

hampered by the interviewing situation, which
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may have substantially 1 imi ted the amount of variance these
variables were actually capable of accounting for.

In future

analyses of this type, all variables under investigation
should be tested in the same setting as their eventual implemen ta ti on.
D.

Certain theories or approaches to prejudice do

not lend themselves to inclusion in cross-sectional, limited
geographical area survey methods.

This is especially true

of theories which are historical in nature.

For example,

two approaches to prejudice discusssed above (i.e., historical, and socio-cultural type theories) demand, in most part,
longitudinal or post-hoc archival type methodologies to adequately deal with their inherent historical nature.

In light

of the present di sser ta ti on' s emphasis on hi story, these types
of variables are seen as highly relevant components of the
over.all anti-Jewish scheme, and conceptually may account
for a substantial proportion of the total variance.
Broader Implications
The present discussion will endeavor to go beyond
the overall theoretical analysis heretofore presented.

This

will be attempted by using the dissertation's comprehensive
analysis as a base from which to theoretically explore solutions to the ever-spreading cancerous anti-Jewish phenomenon.
In 1 ight of the limitations of space usually allotted to
this concluding section the following discourse will,· per-
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force, be superficial. A more thorough discussion would necessitate a second dissertation, as will become evident in the
forthcoming discussion.
Twenty to forty years ago major interpreters of the
anti-Jewish phenomenon (e.g., Adorno, et al., 1950; Allport,
1954; and Bettelhe im, et al., 1964) depicted the etiology
of the problem primarily in terms of psychological maladjustment and/or unfortunate social circumstances.

The primary

problem with these types of theories (as already discussed
in the present chapter) was that they were inherently pessimistic.

Pessimistic in the sense, that the anti-Jewish phe-

nomenon was seen as primarily dependent on individual and
social well being, and if history be our guide, a world or
nation relatively free (for any extended period of time)
from considerable social and psychological disease is extremely unlikely.

In fact, an argument may be made that

despite the money and human energy devoted to social and
individual ills over the last twenty-five years in Western
countries (particularly America), the proportion of collective
suffering is on the increase.
Over the last twenty years the cognitive (phenomenological) approach to understanding the origins of anti-Jewish
prejudice (e.g., Quinley et al., 1983; Selznick et al., 1969)
has superceded the above pathological-type theories.

Accord-

ing to these authors, the solution to the problem is not some
elusive strategy to prevent or alleviate universal illness
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(and presumably curtailing the anti-Jewish cancer in the
process), but rather the concrete implementation of mass
educational campaigns to directly combat the phenomenon.
If hostility and prejudice towards Jews is primarily a cognitive phenomenon, then a reeducation program, en masse,
concerning Jews and Judaism would seem to be the logical solution.
Unfortunately, these last theorists and experimenters
who spent many years (and absorbed .$500,000 of Jewish organizational money in the process) investigating the anti-Jewish
phenomenon in America, failed to see the shallowness of their
half-million dollar solution.

In the process of teaching

us "all" about anti-Jewish hostility and prejudice in America,
th.ese authors themselves failed to research the problem adequately.

If they would have investigated the phenomenon

hist'orically, they would have discovered

(as seen in the

present dissertation) that the vile slander and misinformation historically disseminated about Jews, which consequently
resulted in untold suffering was primarily generated, augmented, and fervently pursued by the ruling national or international power.

If these ruling powers had not been preoc-

cupied in condemning Jews and Judaism the residual anti-Jewish
Prejudice (i.e., the carry-over effect from preceding antiJewish epochs) would have been relatively innocuous.
quentl}".,

in non-anti-Jewish environments

Conse-

(i.e., when the

ruling power is not psychologically threatened by the Jewish
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presence) where the problem is of a relatively minor nature
(i.e., a residual nature) a mass reeducation program can
(as the above authors suggest) be implemented.

However, in

an anti-Jewish environment (where this educational process
would be of utmost necessity) any effort to benevolently
educate the masses would logically be thwarted from its inception.

In other words, the very places where these educa-

tional programs would be truly needed are the very places
where they could never be realized in practice!
An Evolving Solution
According to the analysis in Chapter I the primary
cause of anti-Jewish hostility is Jewish distinctiveness
(with its corollary psychological threat represented by three
core components).

Historically, this Jewish "threat" has

been the catalyst for the most severe persecution (both in
terms of its extensiveness and intensity) of any one group
throughout recorded history.

Correspondingly, in the present

discourse the onus of change is seen devolving on the Jews
themselves (expecting competitive-type movements or groups
to refrain from discriminating or persecuting Jews is, according to the present analysis, a psychological impossibility).

Therefore, in order to free themselves and posterity

from further psychological and physical torment, Jews should
relinquish their distinctive Jewish identity.

Just as Jews

historically have obstinately and consciously made every
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effort to salvage their distinctiveness

(when logically

speaking, no immutable difference was apparent) so must they
now in the enlightened latter part of the twentieth century
make every effort possible to disband and become one with
the majority.
Jews in general (as visible to all), are not a cognitively and psychologically fixated people.

They are in-

herently a dynamic, intellectual, adaptable, and even pacesetting minority group functioning exceptionally well in
every society where they reside (or have resided).

They

quickly learn the laws, customs, language, dialect, and even
begin to look like the majority population in an unusually
short period of time.

In other words, their intellect, sim-

ilar physical characteristics, and adaptable psychology should
present little problem in totally assimilating with the respective majority population wherein they reside.

The Jewish

culture could remain in the form of historical archives (as
is the case with every great culture [e.g., Egyptian, Greek,
Roman, etc.]) where all humanity could unabashedly learn,
without the unpleasant consequences of being different, from
traditional Jewish culture.

In order to live unmolested

and without fear in the real world Jews must make a concerted
organized effort to totally disband and become one with the
respective majority population wherein they, at present reside.
Although the above strategy may seem outlandish to
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some, the truth of the matter is that it is currently taking
place.

(Therefore the present author is not espousing some-

thing fantastic, but is rather granting intellectual legitimacy to the ongoing process.)

This process can be seen

worldwide.

For example, there are roughly thirteen million

Jews today.

Approximately six million reside in the United

States where intermarriage is rampant (i.e., anywhere from
40 to 60 percent of all American Jews today are marrying
non-Jews).

Of these intermarriages only a small minority of

non-Jewish spouses convert to Judaism.

(In the present study

42 percent of all Non-Affiliated Jews were intermarried where
the spouse did not convert.)

In Russia where approximately

two and one half million Jews live, Jewish culture, for all
practical purposes is banned.

The younger generation, for

the most part knows little to nothing of its Jewish roots.
In such circumstances (over a period of another generation
or two), in both America and Russia, the identifiable Jewish
community should, naturally speaking, be reduced to a small
number of diehards, which according to the present perspective
would save literally millions of Jews from future suffering.
In France, where a quarter of a million Jews reside there
is approximately a 70 percent intermarriage rate today.
In other regions throughout the world (excluding Israel)
there appears to be a similar assimilation process as the
one

des~r

ibed above taking place.

Oral Law Jews will probably

not assimilate, but world Jewry is approximately 90 percent
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non-Oral Law, and therefore the multitude of Jews to be saved
in the process is potentially and realistically immense (in
the present context there appears to be no solution for Oral
Law adherents, but then again, they are a small minority).
In Israel the picture is not as bleak as it may first
appear.

Hundreds of thousands of Jews are emmigrating from

Israel to the lands of opportunity and will probably assimilate (given an extra generation or so) like their more indigenous Jewish kin.

Jews remaining in Israel could en masse

convert to Islam which would most probably redefine the "illegitimate" nature of the state.

Such a strategy is not

too farfetched for the founder of modern Zionism, Theodore
Herzl, after ruminating on Jewish suffering originally suggested that all Jews convert to Christianity.

Only after

realizing that a Jewish state was more palatable to the Jewish
masses than conversion did Herzl vigorously and tenaciously
beg in advocating mass return to the Jewish homeland.

The

-

present author is of the belief that had Herzl known that a
Jewish state would bring more (not less) Jewish suffering
in its wake, he would probably have persevered in his original
strategy.

Today in light of the serious Jewish situation

in Israel and in the spirit of Theodore Herzl the founder
and father of modern-day secular Zionism, it follows that all
secularists should aggressively pursue the alleviation of
Jewish suffering via the mass conversion (of remaining
Israelis) to Islam.

In conclusion, it is the author's opinion
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that educational campaigns, instead of targeting non-Jewish
populations, should target Jewish populations with the same
amount of money, organization, and energy in an effort to
influence and educate world Jewry on the dire need for total
assimilation.
The Historical Paradox
Notwithstanding the above, an unusual phenomenon which
appears to militate against the above strategy pertains to
the inconsistent policy non-Jewish national or international
powers have had, historically, towards Jews.

This incon-

sistency does not find a place in most (if any)
analyses of anti-Jewish hostility.

scholarly

The inconsistency (or

more properly termed paradox) is that although anti-Jewish
powers throughout history have always fervently attempted
to completely assimilate the Jews into their respective empires, and have most often been met by intransigence, the
various periods in history (e.g., late medieval Spain, Russia
during the late nineteen th and early twentieth centuries,
and nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany) when large
Jewish populations were visibly in the process of relinquishing their Jewish identity (and logically speaking, within a
generation or two there would have been few Jews left) they
were met by unprecedented persecution. In fact, the unbridled
contempt for Jews during those trying times was aimed pr imar ily. at those assimilated Jews, which only by a stretch
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of the imagination could still be considered Jews.
in these periods of assimilation

ill

Although

Jews suffered

(i.e.,

both the assimilated and unassimilated ones) the prime focus
of attack was specifically those Jews who so fervently desired
to be one with their non-Jewish compatriots, and who for
many years prior (in those very lands) were the primary targets for assimilation.
The special import of this phenomenon rests in its
ability to counter the claim that Jewish suffering is a direct
consequence of the Jews' historical stiff-necked and obstinate
refusal to assimilate.

Ironically, the very forces which

so incessantly tried to assimilate Jews were now the chief
antagonists obstructing the rampant assimilation process,
and creating an incisive division between Jew and non-Jew
which even Jewish separatism, in its most extreme form, could
not compare with.
The importance of this historical paradox is that
it seriously challenges the claim that Jewish suffering is
a direct consequence of the Jews'
arrogant refusal to assimilate.

stiff-necked and almost

In the opinion of the present

author, the above paradoxical phenomenon is as historically
unprecedented as Jewish longevity.

As with Jewish longevity,

the claim could be made that this paradox is just coincidence,
a quirk of fate, serendipity which just happened to befall
the Jewish people, or one could transcend secular social,
psychological, and political theory (which is predicated on
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commonalities and consistencies among individuals, groups,
and political entities)

to the realm of theology which has

its own peculiar interpretations of Jewish suffering.
An important general approach to anti-Jewish prejudice
that Gordon Allport (1954) did

~

speak of in his classic

work The Nature of Prejudice is the theological approach.
Three major religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) all
have well-defined but divergent opinions concerning the antiJewish phenomenon.
The Quran
the Jews'

(the Moslem Scripture)

explains that by

unwillingness to accept Allah's revelations, as

communicated by his prophet Muhammad, were cursed for all
time to live an existence of "humiliation and wretchedness"
(Prager, et al., 1983).

The curse is obvioulsy not binding

once the Jew converts to Islam (Grosser et al., 1978).
Christianity's interpretation of Jewish suffering
was officially enunciated by St. John Chrysostom and St.
Augustine in the fourth century.

Both envisaged for the

Jew, an endless state of misery for their role in the crucifixion of Christ.

This "rejection and dispersion" by G-d

would only be terminated by an acceptance of Jesus (Flannery,
1965).
Both Islam and Christian interpretations appear inadequate for at least two major reasons.

One, Jewish dis-

cr imin?tion, persecution, and expulsion (from the Land of
Israel) predates both Islam and Christianity by several hun-
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dred years.

Two, from the inception of both Islam and Chris-

tianity up to the twentieth century, the vast majority of
discrimination and persecution has been meted out in the
name of these two religions themselves.

This point is not

meant to deprecate or discredit the teachings or beliefs of
the two religions, but rather to indicate that their interpretations of the anti-Jewish phenomenon appear inadequate.
The Jewish Theory
Why were Jews so different from other groups and
nations who stayed together (in both a national and religious
sense) only while in the majority or in the capacity of
rulers, but quickly disbanded (if given the opportunity)
after being conquered (and certainly after being dispersed).
The Jews not only remained separate in such circumstances,
but amidst the most brutal persecution and multiple expulsions
over an extraordinarily long period of time tenaciously maintained a separate identity and lifestyle (while a good deal
Of the time becoming an integral part of the larger society).
A traditional Jewish explanation which accounts for the Jews
continued existence (and contradictory and paradoxical status
vis a vis the ruling power) is expressed in traditional Jewish
literature, which to a great extent, is the foundation of
traditonal Christianity and Islam as well.

The following

are examples of traditional Jewish literature which (according to.these sources) seem to explain both the Jewish secret
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of longevity, and their apparent incapacity to totally assimilate.
1.

In the Hebrew Bible written over 3, 000 years

ago, G-d promised that the descendants of Abraham,

Isaac,

and Jacob would never be completely abandoned (Exodus 32:13)
even if they transgressed his Torah (Law)
2.

(Leviticus 26:44).

In the Jerusalem Talmud (Tractate Taanith 2: 6)

redacted some 1,500 years ago, but having its origin 1,700
years prior (Talmud-Ber akoth SA) states that Jacob's (his name
later to be changed to Israel) offspring would always survive
as a distinctive group.
3.

In Leviticus (20:26) "I have set you apart from

all other peoples" (translation Kaplan, 1979).
4.

In Isaiah

(54:17)

against you shall be sucessful.

"No weapon that is raised
Every tongue that sh al 1

rise against you in judgment shall be condemned by you.
This is the heritage of G-d's servants, and their reward from
Me" (translation Kaplan, 1979).

s.

Isaiah

(60: 15)

"Although you have been hated

and foresaken, so that no man is concerned with you, I will
make you an object of eternal pride and never-ending joy."
6.

Despite the Jewish people's backslidings G-d

promised that they would always continue to exist as a nation
as is written in Isaiah 54:10:

"The mountains may depart,and

the hills may be removed, but My kindness will not depart
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from you, neither will My covenant of peace be removed"
(translation Kaplan, 1969).
7.

The non-Jewish prophet Bilam prophesized concern-

ing the people of Israel "They are a people who will dwell
separately and among the nations of the world will not be
counted" (Numbers 23:9) (translation Kaplan, 1979).
The before-the-fact (some thousands of years before)
predictions above seem to explain the secret behind Jewish
longevity.

According to these traditional Jewish sources
I

the secret force accounting for Jewish longevity and their
paradoxical circumstances (vis a vis the non-Jew)

is the

G-d of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who is considered G-d of
the entire universe, but has chosen Jacob's sons and their
descendents (and anyone else who has seriously adopted Judaism)

in a mutual covenant for all time to create a model

society in their own land.

This model civilization is to

be based on G-d' s many commandments from which all non-Jewish
nations, throughout the world, may learn and derive benefit.
Jewish Suffering
A question which needs to be asked at this time is:
If Jews are supposedly so intimately conected to G-d (as
expressed via Biblical and Talmudic sources) how and why have
they been so savagely treated throughout history?

The tra-

ditional Jewish source for interpreting Jewish suffering is
derived from the Jewish Bible (the Old Testament).

In the
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five Books of Moses written some 3,200 years ago (Bieberfeld,
1948), the concept of future Jewish suffering plays a prominent role.

Jewish suffering is predicted and elaborated

on in the books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and throughout
the Old Testament Books of the Prophets and Holy Writings.
Suffering is said to be contingent on the actions of the
Jewish people collectively.

Benedictions are to be forth-

coming for following the Torah (The Law), and maledictions
for acting to the contrary.

The covenant of G-d with the

Jewish people is understood as irreversible, obligating the
Jewish nation to remain separate among the nations of the
world via adherence to the Mosaic Law, or conversely (i.e.,
they will perforce remain separate) through severe suffering.
According to Rabbi Sh'muel Eliezer (one of the leading
Talmudic scholars in Poland during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and better known as the Maharsha) this severe
suffering does not emanate from G-d for only goodness emanates
from G-d.

Rather, it is the Jewish people's unwillingness

to keep G-d' s commandments which causes Divine protection
to depart from the Jewish people, and consequently leaves
them highly vulnerable vis a vis their most ruthless adversaries (Maharsha, Talmud Baba Kama 60B).

Unfortunately for

the Jews, in light of their unique situation which has created
a people fated to be distinct (according to the above Biblical
sources), this means that when they collectively (i.e., a
considerable proportion) ignore the Commandments, they (all
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of them)

are inevitably and inadvertently pitted against

any and all totalitarian-like (and therefore psychologically
threatened by the Jewish presence) hostile (i.e., towards
outsiders) nations and international movements.
The following Biblical excerpts (transcribed over
3,000 years ago) present a taste of Jewish prophesy (which
can be found throughout traditonal Jewish literature) whose
unprecedented validity (i.e., the total range of prophesy
and not just the following) can be attested to by anyone
who possesses a solid knowledge of Jewish history.
In the third book of the Pentateuch (Leviticus) Chapter 26 it states:
If you follow My laws and are careful to keep My
commandments, I will provide you with rain at the right
time, so that the land will bear its crops and the trees
of the field will provide fruit. [You will have so much
that] your threshing season will last until your grape
harvest, and your grape harvest will last until the time
you plant. You will have your fill of food, and [you
will] live securely in the land.
I will grant peace in the land so that you will sleep
without fear. I will rid the land of dangerous animals,
and the sword will not pass through your land. You will
chase away your enemies, and they will fall before your
sword. Five of you will be able to chase away a hundred,
and a hundred of you will defeat ten thousand, as ,your
enemies fall before your sword.
I will turn to you, making you fertile and numerous,
thus keeping My covenant with you.
You will continue eating the previous year's crops
long after their time, and you will eventually have to
clear out the old crops because of the new.

. . .[But. .this
. . is. .what
. . will
. . .happen]
. . . .if. you
. . do. .not
. . listen
....

to Me, and do not keep all these commandments. If you
come to denigrate My decrees, and grow tired of My laws,
• • • I will then do the same to you. I will bring upon
you feelings of anxiety, along with depression and ex-
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citement, destroying your outlook and making life hopeless.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
You will plant your crop in vain, because your enemies
will eat it.
I will direct My anger against you, so
that you will be defeated by your foes, and your enemies
will dominate you. You will flee even when no one is
chasing you.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
If this is not enough to discipline you, and you
are still indifferent to Me, then I will also be indifferent to you, but I will again increase the punishment
for your sins sevenfold. I will bring a vengeful sword
against you to avenge [Hy] covenant, so that you will
huddle in your cities. I will send the plague against
you, and give you over to your enemies.

. . .I will
. . .thus
. . have
. . grown
. . . .tired
. . .of. you.
. . . .I .will
. . let
. . your
..

cities fall into ruins, and make your sanctuaries desolate. No longer will I accept the appeasing fragrance
[of your sacrifices]. I will make the land so desolate
that [even] your enemies who live there will be astonished.
I will scatter you among the nations, and keep
the sword drawn against you. Your land will remain desolate, and your cities in ruins.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I will bring such insecurity upon those of you who
survive in your enemies' land that the sound of a rustling
leaf will make them flee from the sword. They will fall
with no one chasing them. They will fall over one another
'as if [chased] by the sword, even when there is no one
pursuing. You will have no means of standing up before
your ·foes.
You will thus be destroyed among the nations. The
land of your enemies will consume you.
The few of you who survive in your enemies' lands
will [realize that] your survival is threatened as a
result of your nonobservance.
[These few] will also
[realize] that their survival has been threatened because
of the nonobservance of their fathers. They will then
confess their sins and the sins of their fathers for
being false and remaining indifferent to He.
[It was
for this] that I also remained indifferent to them, and
brought them into their enemies' land.
But when the time finally comes that their stubborn
spirit is humbled, I will forgive their sin.
I will
remember My covenant with Jacob as well as Hy covenant
with Isaac and Hy covenant with Abraham. I will remember
the land.
[For] the land will have been left behind by
them, and will have enjoyed its sabbaths while it lay
in desolation without them. The sin [they had committed]
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by denigrating My laws and growing tired of My decrees,
will [also] have been expiated.
Thus, even when they are in their enemies' land, I
will not grow so disgusted with them nor so tired of them
that I would destroy them and break My covenant with them,
since I am God their Lord.
I will therefore remember
the covenant with their original ancestors whom I brought
out of Egypt in the sight of the nations, so as to be a
God to them. I am God. (translation Kaplan, 1985)
In Deuteronomy Chapters 28-30 it further says:
If you obey God your Lord, carefully keeping all
His commandments as I am prescribing them to you today,
then God will make you highest of all the nations on
earth. As long as you listen to God your Lord, all these
blessings will come to bear on you.
Blessed will you be in the city, and blessed in the
field.
Blessed will be the fruit of your womb, the fruit
of your soil, and the fruit of your livestock, the calves
of your herds and the lambs of your flock.
Blessed will be your food basket and your kneading
bowl.
Blessed will you be when you come and blessed when
you go.
If any enemies attack you, God will make them flee
from you in panic. They may march against you on one
road, but they will flee from you in seven directions.
God will grant a blessing in your granaries and all
your [other] endeavors. He will bless you in the land
that He, God your Lord, is giving you.
If only you keep the commandments of God your Lord
and walk in His paths, God will establish you as His
holy nation, as He promised you. All the nations of
the world will realize that God's name is associated with
you, and they will be in awe of you.
God will grant you good surplus in the fruit of your
womb, the fruit of your livestock, and the fruit of your
land.
[You will thus flourish] on the good land that
God promised your ancestors to give you. God will open
His good treasury in heaven to give your land rain at
precisely the right time, and to bless everything you
do. You will lend many nations, but you will not have
to borrow.
God wi 11 make you a leader and never a follower.
You will be on the top and never on the bottom.
You
must merely obey the commandments of God your Lord, as
I am prescribing them to you today, carefully keeping
them.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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If you do not obey God your Lord and do not carefully
keep all His commandments and decrees as I am prescribing
them for you today, then all these curses will come to
bear on you.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
God will send misfortune, confusion and frustration
against you in all you undertake. It will destroy you
and make you rapidly vanish because of your evil ways
in forsaking my [teachings].
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
The skies above you will be like brass, and the earth
below you like iron. God will turn your rain into powder
and dust, and it wi 11 come down from the skies to destroy
you.
God will make you panic before your enemies. You
will march out in one column, but flee from them in
seven. You will become a terrifying example to all the
world's kingdoms.
Your corpses will be food for all
the birds of the sky and beasts of the land, and no one
will chase them away.

. . When
. . . you
. . betroth
. . . . a. .woman,
. . . .another
. . . .man
. . .will
. . .sleep
..

with her. When you build a house, you will not live in
it. When you plant a vineyard, you will not enjoy its
fruit.
Your ox will be slaughtered before your eyes,
but you will not eat from it. Your donkey will be stolen
right in front of you, but you will not be able to get
it back. Your sheep will be given to your enemies, and
no one will come to your aid.
Your sons and daughters will be given to a foreign
nation. You will see it happening with your own eyes,
and will long for them all day long, but you will be
powerless. A strange nation will consume the fruit of
your land and all your toil. You will be constantly
cheated and crushed.
You will go insane from what you will have to witness • • • •

. . . . . . . . . . ........... ........

• • • You will be an object of horror, a by-word and an
abject lesson among all the nations where God will lead
you.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
You will have sons and daughters, but they will not
remain yours, since they will be taken into captivity.

. . The
. alien among you will

rise higher and higher over
you, while you will descend lower and lower. He will
make loans to you, but you will not be able to lend him
anything. He will become the master, while you will be
the vassal.
All these curses will thus have come upon you, pur-
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suing you and catching you so as to destroy you, all
because you did not obey God your Lord, and [did not]
keep the commandments and decrees that He prescribed to
you.
[These curses] will be a sign and proof to you and
your children forever.
When you had plenty of everything, you would not
serve God your Lord with happiness and a glad heart.
You will therefore serve your enemies when God sends
them against you, and it will be in hunger, thirst, nakedness and universal want.
[Your enemy] will place an
iron yoke on your neck so as to destroy you.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Where you were once as numerous as the stars of the
sky, the survivors among you will be few in number, all
because you did not obey God your Lord. As happy as
God was to be good to you and increase you, so will He
be happy to exile you and destroy you. You will be torn
up from the land which you are about to occupy.
God will scatter you among the nations, from one
end of the earth to the other. There you will serve
idol a tors who worship gods of wood and stone, unknown
to you and your fathers. Among those nations you will
feel insecure, and there will be no place for your foot
to rest. There God will make you cowardly, destroying
your outlook and making life hopeless.
Your life will hang in suspense.; Day and night,
you will be so terrified that you will not believe that
you are alive • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
A future generation, consisting of your descendants,
who rise up after you, along with the foreigner from a
distant land, shall see the punishment directed against
that land, and the plague with which God has struck it,
and they will say, "Sulphur and salt has burned all its
oil. Nothing can be planted and nothing can grow--not
even grass can grow on it. It is like the destruction
of Sodom, Gomorrah, Adma and Tzevoyim, [the cities] that
God overturned in His anger and rage."
All the nations will ask, "Why did God do this to
the land? what was the reason for this great display
of anger?"
They shall answer, "It is because they abandoned
the covenant that God, Lord of their fathers, made with
them when He brought them out of Egypt • • • • God displayed anger against this nation, bringing upon it the
entire curse written in this book. God drove them from
their land with anger, rage and great fury, and He exiled
them to another land, where they remain even today."
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
There shall come a time when you shall experience
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all the words of blessing and curse that I have presented
to you.
There, among the nations where God will have
banished you, you will reflect on the situation.
You
will then return to God your Lord, and you will obey
Him, doing everything that I am commanding you today.
You and your children [will repent] with all your heart
and with all your soul.
God will then bring back your remnants and have mercy
on you.
God your Lord will once again gather you from
among all the nations where He scattered you. Even if
your diaspora is at the ends of the heavens, God your Lord
will gather you up from there and He will take you back.
God your Lord will then bring you to the land that
your ancestors occupied, and you too will occupy it.
God will be good to you and make you flourish even more
than your ancestors. God will remove the barriers from
your hearts and from the hearts of your descendants,
so that you will love God your Lord with all your heart
and soul. Thus will you survive.
God will then direct all these curses against your
enemies and against the foes who pursued you.
You will repent and obey God, keeping all His commandments, as I prescribe them to you today.
God will
then grant you a good surplus in all the work of your
hands, in the fruit of your womb, the fruit of your livestock, and the fruit of your land. God will once again
rejoice in you for good, just as He rejoiced in your
fathers.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
This mandate that I am prescribing to you today is
not too mysterious or remote from you.
It is not in
heaven, so [that you should] say, "Who shall go up to
heaven and bring it to us so that we can hear it and
keep it?" It is not over the sea so [that you should]
say, "Who will cross the sea and get it for us, so that
we will be able to hear it and keep it?" It is something
that is very close to you • • • •
Seel
Today I have set be fore you [a free choice]
between life and good [on one side], and death and evil
[on the other].
I have commanded you today to love God your Lord,
to walk in His paths, and to keep His commandments, decrees and laws.
You will then surv'ive and flourish,
and God your Lord will bless you in the land that you
are about to occupy.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
I call heaven and earth as witnesses! Before you I
have placed life and death, the blessing and the curse.
You must choose life, so that you and your descendants
wiil survive. (translation Kaplan, 1985)
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The correspondence between ancient Hebrew prophesy
and events which ensued over the following 3,200 years was
expressed by one Jewish traditionalist, Simcha Meiri (1984):
Try to imagine how amazed we would be if we were to
uncover an ancient papyrus thousands of years old which
describes events that actually occurred generations later,
or even in modern times.
It would be that much more
astounding if those events were of an extraordinary
nature, as were those recorded in Jewish history. But
such a manuscript does exist, in fact several do--the
books of the Scriptures, which are unquestionably older
than the events they describe, and although these events
could not have been anticipated as they run counter to
all accepted laws of history, they did, in fact, occur
just as the prophets foretold (as corroborated by hundreds
of archeological finds over the last hundred years)
[p. 104].

The Academic Bias
If the above is so obvious why have contemporary
hi st or ians and social sc ien ti sts so conspicuously "failed"
to see the qualitatively unique aspects of the anti-Jewish
phen.omenon (as discussed throughout the present dissertation).

In the author's opinion the answer to this question

lies specifically in the almost inevitable implications of
the analysis.
Jewish history seems to run counter to the laws of
hi story, which every other nation throughout history has
·fallen prey to.
Where "Might Is

According to the historic laws of nations
~ight"

only the Hebrew nation has conspicu-

ously survived as an extreme deviation from the rule.

(Chris-

tianity and Islam are religious belief systems which have
no national origin, and by their own definitions are universal
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in doctrine and perspective.

In addition, their ability to

grow [and even to survive] had depended almost exclusively
on their majority status.)

Jews have not only survived under

the most insurmountable odds, but amid their generally hostile
and predatory type environments have managed to create societies which have grown intellectually, spiritually, and when
allowed economically throughout millenia (Grayzel, 1968).
Just as the odds against a random Big Bang cosmic
phenomenon creating the universe, or spontaneous formation
of a living cell from inanimate matter are astronomically
fantastic (Levi, 1983), so does the continued existence of
the Jewish people, their paradoxical status in non-Jewish
lands, the realization of their millenia-old prophesies,
and other anomalous characteristics (too lengthy to be discussed in the present dissertation) seem to defy the natural
(or consistent)

laws of history.

And just as the physical

science community accepts almost religiously the above physical theories (and many would argue laws) of evolution despite
much evidence to the contrary (e.g., Etkin, 1978; Goldman,
1978; Gross, 1978; Marcell, 1978; Rifkin, 1983; Simon, 1978;
Spetner, 1978) without ever positing the possibility of a
Prime Creator, so have the social science and historical
comm uni ties "explained" unfl inc hi ngly the Jewish phenomenon
without having to acknowledge the possible involvement of
the

su~er

physical (and certainly not a Jewish One!).

William Etkin

(1978), explains the philosophical
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origins of the scientific perspective today which many contemporary academicians unwittingly accept as truth.
To the intellectual of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries the rationality of nature attested to the rationality of the Creator • • • • Thus the Argument From
Design reconciled science with the belief in a G-d.
• • •

Darwinism, the concept of evolution by natural selection, turned the Argument From Design upside down to
reverse the conclusion. • • • Types of thinking and behavior that were not consistent with nature were eliminated in the course of human evolution and what was
left is then, of course, a method of thinking called
rational which is consonant with the way nature is constructed.
Reason, then, mirrors nature, and not the
other way around • • • • Like them, its success testifies
not to the mind and intention of the Creator but to the
efficiency of natural selection. (pp. 31-32)
Elkin then cogently demonstrates that progress of
contemporary science has forced an overturning of the Darwinian view in much the same way that Darwinism had reversed
the previous outlook.
"ope~ates

He explains how much of science today

on the basis of a self-confidence in the ability

of the human mind to transcend common-sense rat ion al i ty"
which parallels the mode of thinking that lies at the foundation of religious faith.

Accordingly, in interpreting anti-

Jewish hostility (and indirectly the phenomenal continuity
of the Jewish people), a rationale based on the natural laws
of history appears schizophrenic.
Another reason why many scientists may shy away from
theological support is that secular academia, predicated on
the ideals and objectives of the Enlightenment, represents
in its.original form a severance from the dogmatism.of or-

338

ganized religion.

Although a severance seemed to be in order

in light of the many barbarous activities legitimized in
the name of G-d, an academia (based on the scientific method)
ostensibly seeking truth which blatantly avoids the psychological, social, political, and historical ramifications of
a religious perspective (i.e., from an absolute perspective
as well as a ·relative one) is itself dogmatically ignoring
a most popularly accepted phenomenon.

The present author

is not, by any means, espousing that scientists accept religious dogma, but rather, that various religious perspectives
need to be investigated objectively (i.e.

1

as best we are

able), for whether we like it or not, the social ramifications
of religious dogma are still the most powerful motivating
soc ia 1 forces known to man.

Par ad ox ically, contemporary

social scientists (following their physical science counterparts'

lead)

may feel great professional and/or personal

pressure to "justify" their obsessive non-theological stance
concerning the Jewish phenomenon in the name of good science
itself l
Universal Interests
"Rabbi Yochanan said:
something

woe to the non-Jews who lost

(extremely important)

what they lost.

and are not even aware of

When the Beit Hamikdash (the Temple in Jeru-

salem) was standing it would atone (and bring good fortune)
for them and now who (or what) atones for them?" (Talmud,
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succah SSB) (translation mine).

According to Rabbi Sh'muel

Eliezer (The Maharsha) based on the Midrash, the non-Jewish
loss should be considered even greater than the Jewish one.
Not all of Jewish prophesies have been fulfilled.
The last and most important (for both Jew and non-Jew alike)
prophesies concerning the End of Days has yet to be realized:
"And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain
of the Lord's house shall be established on the top of the
mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all
the nations shall flow unto it" (Isaiah 2: 2).
According to traditional Jewish literature the Final
Redemption for all humanity is assured, but the process of
getting there (i.e., via worldwide destruction or supernal
benevolence) is dependent primarily on the collective actions
of the Jewish people.
98A)~

For instance, in the Talmud (Sanhedrin

it states:

The son of Levi cites a contradiction, in the prophet
Isaiah it is written "in its time" (i.e., the Final Redemption will come in its time) and it is also written
there "I will hurry it up" (i.e., G-d will bring the Final
Redemption before its appointed time)? (The Talmud explains) If they (the Jews) merit I (G-d) will hurry it
up, if they do not merit, it will come in its prescribed
time. (translation mine)
The Maharsha explains:

If the Jews merit by repenting and

coming back to G-d's Torah, G-d will have compassion on them
(and indirectly on the entire world), but if they do not
return to the Torah (i.e., do not merit) G-d will delay the
Redemption until the prescribed final period in history,
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and will only then redeem them (admidst great destruction
and suffering for them and the non-Jewish world, as will be
seen in the following pages) even if they are not repentant.
In the Zohar (Acharey Mot, p. 66), which is the primary classic of Jewish mysticism attributed to the school
of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (approximately 120 C.E.), it is
written:
We learned that all the time Israel (i.e., the people
of Israel) are in exile, if they merit G-d will have compassion and take them out of exile, and if they do not
merit (G-d) will delay them until the prescribed time.
If the time comes and they are not fit to be redeemed,
then G-d in the honor of His own Name will not forget
them completely. (translation mine)
It should be emphasized from the beginning that it
is not the Jews per se who are held responsible for the
prophesized great destruction (to be discussed in the forthcoming pages)

before the "End of Days" (or better known as

the pre-Messianic era)

if it comes in its prescribed time.

However, they are seen as having the potential of preventing
The Oral Law tradition gives many signs of what life will

it.

be like before (the term "before" is used loosely ,and may
represent a period of one year or one hundred years depending
on one's personal understanding of the following signs) the
Messianic age, if the Final redemption comes in its prescribed
time.
1.

For example:
In the future the sons of Ishmael (i.e., the Muslims,
for Mohammad claimed to be a direct descendent of
Abraham's first son Ishmael) will ,rule in the holy

341
land while it is a wasteland for a prolonged period
of time, and will hinder Israel from returning to
their (i.e., Israel's) land (Zohar, Vaara, p. 32).
2.

There is no surer sign for the "immediate" coming
of the Messianic era than when the land of Israel
becomes fertile again for the Jewish people (Talmud,
Sanhedrin 98A) •

3.

If you see a period of time where constant and frightful sorrow confronts the Jewish people, anticipate
the arrival of the son (i.e., descendent) of King
David (who according to tradition is said to be the
Messiah)

4.

(Sanhedrin, 98A).

Before the "immediate" coming of the Messiah all
the peoples of the earth will be frightened and dismayed by the excess of ongoing wars and tension between nations (Midrash, Bereshet raba 42; and Midrash Yalkut Shemoni, Isaiah 60).

5.

In the future G-d will pay heed to the people of
Israel's sorrow from what the sons of Ishmael will
attempt to do to them (Midrash, Pirkey Rabbi Eliezer,
32).

6.

The Talmud Sotah (49B) enumerates various happenings
that will occur "immediately" before the Messianic
era, some of them are:
A.

The Jewish government will be run by non-Oral
Law adherents.
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B.

The wisdom of the Rabbis will be laughed at.

c.
o.

Pious Jews will be scorned.
There will be great inflation.

E.

This inflation will not be on account of lack
of supply,

and,
F.

Truth will be conspicuously missing.

In addition, the wars predicted to occur immediately
before the Messianic era (i.e., if the Redemption comes in
its prescribed time) are briefly reviewed in the following:
1.

"The son of (King) Dav id (i.e., the Messiah) wi 11
not appear until the 'Roman• nation spreads out over
the entire world" (Talmud Yoma, lOA).

2.

According to the prophet Daniel (7:23-24) ten nations
will spring forth from the fourth empire

(Rome),

and the last of the ten will be different from the
others.
3.

According to the Talmud (Yoma, lOA), it is this last
nation from Rome who will eventually spread out and
consume the entire world.

4.

According to the prophet Ezekiel (38: 2) this tenth
nation from Rome will come from the land of Magog.

s.

According to Josephus (Book of Antiquities), who 1 ived
during the first century C.E., the land of Magog is
Scythia.

("According to the ancient Greeks [Scythia

was] a vast, undefined region lying north and east
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of the Black and Caspian Seas" [i.e., present day
Russia]) (Brittanica World Language, 1954).
6.

The Jerusalem Talmud (Megilla 1: 9) says that the
land of Magog is Gothia (Goth).
According to the Encyclopaedia Brittanica (1954) the

Goths (first century C.E.) inhabited the middle part of the
basin of the Vistula River (i.e., central to eastern Poland),
but under their sixth king (who was more contemporary in
time with the redaction of the Talmud) migrated into Scythia
(i.e., present day Russia).
After the destruction of the Western Roman Empire
by the Teutons, only Constantinople remained as the capital
of the (Eastern) Roman Empire (i.e., the Byzantine empire).
And from the day the Russian king (Ivan III) betrothed the
only niece (Sophia) of the last Byzantine emperor (Constantine
Palaeologus), the Russian autocrats considered themselves
the successors of the Byzantine emperors.

In addition, the

Russian aristocracy claimed that since the Greeks had been
punished for their apostasy, their succession had to pass
to the third Rome (Constantinople was the second) which was
Moscow (Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 1954).

The Russians also

carried on their flag the double eagle sign of the Byzantine
(Roman) empire (Eisenberg, 1970).
7.

According to the Zohar (Vaara, p.

32) the mechanics

of the final war (again if the Redemption comes in
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its prescribed time) will proceed in the following
manner:
A.

The sons of Ishmael (the Muslims) will attempt
to keep Israel from returning to their homeland.

B.

The Sons of Ishmael (Muslims) will effect fierce
wars in the world, and Rome (Russia) will wage
war against them in order to take over their
land and the land of Israel.

C.

Rome (Russia) will succeed in taking over Muslim
lands but the land of Israel will not be taken
over.

D.

One nation at the end of the world together with
many other nations will come to fight Russia,
but these nations after a period of three months,
will eventually fall to Russia.

E.

After all the nations have fallen, then will
Russia attempt an all out concerted attack against
Israel.

At that time G-d will defend Israel,

and Russia together with her allies will fall.
The Final Resolution
The upshot of the present dissertation is that the
primary responsibility for ameliorating or conversely, exacerbating anti-Jewish hostility devolves primarily on the
Jews themselves.

If G-d did not give the Jewish people in

particular, special commandments to follow, then why be dis-
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tinctly Jewish?

(To suggest that G-d chose the Jewish people

to be a model for mankind without instructing them on how
to create that model is absurd and borders on racism.)

Why

in the name of some man-made ideology (which most Jews desist
from following in any case) or historical identity (which
most conquered nations, who have the opportunity, eventually
relinquish) should individuals allow themselves and posterity
to be hated, discriminated against, persecuted, and even
slain?

Hust Jews continue to make the same errors as their

forefathers who for reasons of ignorance, obstinacy, arrogance
or others preferred poverty, torture, and murder to fraternity
and opportunity?

If the only reason for sticking together

is to promote the most hated man-made ideology and lifestyle
in history, then Jews must immediately disband.
However, if G-d, indeed, gave the Torah with its multiple commandments specifically to the Jewish people, then
by abandoning their responsibilities (regardless of whether
they remain Jews in name or not)

they are again creating

their own misfortune and indirectly the misfortune of the
non-Jew.

Just as some 2,700 years ago Alijah the prophet

(Kings I, 18:21) said to the Jewish people "How long will
you waver between two opinions?

if the Lord be G-d, follow

Him; but if (you believe in) Baal (the most popular form of
idol worship at the time), follow him" so must contemporary
Jewish leaders demand no less from the Jewish people today
(if the people are truly their first concern).
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From a purely social-psychological perspective both
Christianity and Islam do not need to be true in order to
defend their constituencies, for in their respective regions
they are the majority and most powerful force.

Christian

and Moslem masses are less obligated (via external forces)
to come to terms with their religious convictions in light
of their majority status.

Jews, both in the diaspora and in

Israel (in light of Israel's externally inflicted isolation),
are not as fortunate, and must be more intellectually and emotionally honest with themselves.

They cannot straddle between

two opinions (and remain undisturbed), but must categorically
decide for their own sake, the sake of their children, and
possibly for all of mankind what they truly believe (i.e.,
after intelligent investigation) and to follow accordingly.
In conclusion, it is highly ironic (although irony
when concerning Jews appears more the rule)

that the very

people (i.e., the Jews) whom Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) so often
cites as representing the proverbial inauthentic existence,
are the very people whose authenticity has in the past and
continues to be in the present so thoroughly tested.
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APPENDIX A
MISCELLANEOUS STATISTICS FOR STUDY NO. 1
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Study No. 1
Reliability Coefficients for All Scales Used in the Following Analyses:
A.

Jewish Religious 10-Item Observance Scale
(N=546), .91 Kuder-Richardson 20.

B.

Abridged Jewish Religious 3-Item Observance Scale
(N=800), .93 Kuder-Richardson 20.
(Items 2, 3,
and 7).

c.

Elementary Jewish Knowledge Scale
(N=637), .92 Kuder-Richardson 26.

D.

Israel Attitude Scale
(N=637), .72 Cronbach Alpha.

E.

Israel Attitude Positive-Items Scale
(N=64 7) , • 51 Cronbach Alpha.
(I terns 2, 4, S, and
9) •

F.

Israel Attitude Negative-Item Scale
(N=647), .71 Cronbach Alpha.
(Items 1, 2, 6, 7,
8) •

G.

Middle-East Information Scale
(N=637), .47 Kuder-Richardson 20.

Abbreviation and Directional Key for All Variables
Used in the Following Analyses:
A.

TS = Type of Synagogue Affiliation:
l"°= Non-Affiliated, 2 = Reform, 3 = Conservative,
4 = Orthodox.

B.

PA = Parents Affiliations:
1"°= Non-Affiliated, 2 = Reform, 3 = Conservative,
4 = Orthodox.

C.

C = Number of Children

D.

MS = Marital Status:
r-= Married, 2 = Widowed, 3
4 = Single.

E.

= Separated

OA = Jewish Organization Membership:
No, 2 = Yes.

r-=

or Divorced
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F.

G.

SR

= Spouses'

Religion:
Non-Jewish Spouse, 2
Spouse.

Y-=

= Born

or Converted Jewish

= Last Year of Formal Education
SCR = Jewish Religious Observance
E

Completed.

H.

Scale (10 items).
The higher the scaled score the more observant.

I.

SCR 2 = Abridged Jewish Religious Observance Scale
(3 i terns) •
The higher the scaled score the more observant.
(Items 2, 3, and 7).

J.

r-=

II

= Intention
No, 2

to Settle in Israel

= Yes.

= Number
= Israel

K.

NVI

L.

SCI
Attitude Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.

M.

SCIP = Israel Attitude Positive-Items Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.
(Items 2, 4, S, and 9.)

N.

SCIN = Israel Attitude Negative-Items Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.
(Items 1, 3, 6, 7, 8.)

o.

SCRK

of Visits to Israel.

= Elementary

Jewish Knowledge Scale.

~higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable

the respondent.
P.

SCK = Middle East Knowledge Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable
the respondent.

~orrerat1ona1

**
TS

PA

c
SCK

OA
*SR

TS

PA

c

SCI<

OA

*SR

.4Z

.37

.Zl

.46

.ZS

.27

.14

.32

.18

Matr1x and S1gn1f1cance Levels (n • 676)

SCR

SCRZ

II

NVI

SCI

SCIP

SCIN

SCRK

-.06
p>.05

.79

•79

.4Z

.zz

.36

.13
p•.001

.37

.66

.24

-.14

.48

.43

.24

.14

.33

.23

.30

.39

.38

.20

-.12
p•.001

.38

.39

.15

.20

.25

.05
p>.05

.28

.37

.20

.19

.23

.22

.23

.21

.21

.35

.13
p•.001

.37

.39

.26

.08
p•.05

• 43

.40

.19

.22

.33

.23

.29

.34

-.13
p•.003

.34

-.23

-.16

.12
p•.007

.35

.17

.34

.21

-.09
p•.02

-.02.
p>.05

.01
p>.05

.01
p>.05

-.03
p>.05

-.06
p>.05

.oo

.19

p>.05

.90

.51

.23

.36

.16

.36

.73

.54

.24

.29

.06
p•.04

.32

.77

.20

.21

.05
p>.05

.23

.53

.16

.05
p>.05

.17

.26

.61

.94

.31

.31

.02
p>.05

E

E

SCR
SCR2
II

NYI
SCI
SCIP
SCIN
SCRK
*The correlations of SR are based on a n of 501.
**When significance-level probability is missing p(:OOl.

°'""'
N

.37
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Midwest Knowledge Scale
(N=80)
R

1.

(N=324)
NA

17%
74%
10%

18%
71%
11%

7%
86%
7%

17%
74%
10%

6%
89%
10%

11%
84%
5%

4%
90%
6%

12%
80%
8%

24%
48%
29%

26%
51%
23%

31%
57%
12%

24%
54%
22%

Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State
of Israel have spent over three times the amount of
money in military equipment than Israel has.
Is this
true or false?
True
False
DK

5.

0

Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of
Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this true
or false?
True
False
DK

4.

(N=231)

From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in 1948,
thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land by the
Jewish settlers.
Is this true or false?
True
False
DK

3.

c

Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over
the last 300 years until the creation of Israel.
Is
this ~rue or false?
True
False
Don't Know

2.

(N=ll4)

56%
16%
28%

60%
13%
27%

76%
5%
19%

53%
17%
30%

Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting record
in the United Nations has shown a strong connection
between itself and the United Startes. Is this true
or false?
True
False
DK

33%
44%
24%

27%
46%
27%

20%
56%
24%

28%
42%
30%

364
(N=80)
R

6.

DK

(N=231)
0

(N=324)

NA

5%
90%
5%

6%
90%
4%

4%
94%
2%

4%
88%
9%

Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been openly
dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is this true
or false?
True
False
DK

8.

c

Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that
it now almost equals in size the area of all its Middle-E9st enemies put together. Is this true or false?
True
False

7.

(N=ll4)

65%
25%
10%

73%
15%
12%

78%
14%
9%

63%
24%
13%

In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth of
the land identified by the League of Nations as Palestine. Is this true or false?
True
False
DK

63%
10%
28%

57%
13%
30%

60%
11%
29%

57%
12%
31%
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Israel Attitude Scale
(N=78)
R

1.

Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

1%
8%
18%
73%

2%
4%
17%
79%

Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

88%
12%
0%
0%

84%
15%
1%
1%

The State of Israel is too warlike.

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
4.

(N=225)

(N=309)
NA

0

1%
1%
9%
89%

3%
9%
23%
66%

The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working
people. Do you • • •

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
3.

c

The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of
IsLael's warlike behavior. Do you • • •

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
2.

(N=l08)

The

Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

u.s.

5%
20%
35%
39%

5%
15%
19%
62%

85%
12%
2%
1%

79%
18%
2%
1%

Do you

..

2%
6%
19%
73%

•

9%
21%
29%
42%

needs to continue to support Israel.

Do you

• • •

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
5.

Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

91%
8%
1%
0%

92%
7%
1%
0%

94%
4%
1%
1%

I greatly respect the State of Israel.

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly

Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

84%
13%
1%
3%

92%
8%
0%
0%

82%
13%
3%
2%

87%
11%
1%
2%
Do you

.•.
77%
21%
2%
1%

366
(N=78)
R

6.

(N=309)
NA

0

Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

7%
22%
32%
39%

7%
11%
23%
59%

3%
3%
19%
75%

Do

11%
20%
25%
44%

The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the ArabIsrael conflict. Do you • • •
Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

11%
15%
31%
43%

10%
17%
28%
44%

14%
22%
24%
39%

7%
10%
24%
58%

Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its
Arab neighbors. Do you
• •

.

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
9.

(N=225)

.

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
8.

c

Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon.
you • •

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
7.

(N=l08)

Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

1%
13%
17%
69%

5%
4%
16%
76%

1%
2%
11%
86%

4%
8%
20%
68%

The State of Israel must be militarily strong because
of all its hostile neighbors. Do you • •

Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly

.

Agree
Agree
Disagree
Disagree

90%
8%
1%
1%

90%
10%
0%
0%

96%
4%
0%
0%

86%
11%
1%
2%
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Jewish Religious Knowledge Scale
(N=80)

(N=ll2)

c

R

(N=231)

(N=323)

0

NA

1. Could you tell me the name of the Jewish New Year?
Correct
Incorrect

80%
20%

80%
20%

96%
4%

76%
24%

2. On what date was the 1st and 2nd Temple in Jerusalem
(The Beit Hamikdosh) destroyed?
Correct
Incorrect

16%
84%

21%
79%

78%
22%

10%
90%

3. On which Jewish holiday do some Jews wave around a palm
branch (A Lulav)?
Correct
Incorrect

55%
45%

61%
39%

95%
5%

36%
64%

4. What were the names of the three Jewish Patriarchs?
Correct
Incorrect

47%
53%

45%
55%

89%
11%

33%
67%

5. Could you give me an example of what is meant in the

,Bible by an Eye For an Eye?
Correct
Incorrect

3%
98%

8%
92%

59%
41%

7%
93%

6. Who brought the Jewish people into the Land of Canaan
after they had left Egypt?
Correct
Incorrect

14%
86%

17%
83%

66%
34%

13%
87%

21%
80%

69%
31%

14%
86%

7. What is the Oral Law?
Correct
Incorrect

17%
84%

8. What is the name of the morning prayer?
Correct
Incorrect

11%
89%

28%
72%

88%
12%

10%
90%

368
(N=80)
R

(N=ll2)

c

(N=231)
0

(N=323)
NA

9. Could you tell me who the chief commentator of the Talmud

is whose commentary is found on the same page as the
Talmud itself?
Correct
Incorrect

11%
89%

26%
74%

74%
26%

12%
88%

10. And finally, could you spell for me the word Shabbat

in Hebrew?
Correct
Incorrect

22%
79%

29%
71%

83%
17%

19%
81%
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Formal Education Level (N = 785)
Last Grade Completed
Freg,uenc:i::

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
*6.

12 and under
Some College or Vocational School
Bachelors Degree
Some Graduate School
Masters Degree
Doctorate Degree

18%
23%
23%
8%
16%
12%

Reform (N = 78)

Non-Affiliated (N = 318)

1
18%
2
17%
28%
3
4
12%
5
17%
6
9%
Mean = 3.19

1
2
3
4
5
6
Mean = 3.25

20%
21%
20%
8%
18%
14%

*A Law Degree was considered a doctorate degree in the study.
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Conservative (N =
1
2
3
4

5
6
Mean =
F

=

112~

Orthodox (ti
1
2
3

18%
28%
19%
10%
8%
18%
3.16

.29, df (3,733), p

4

5
6
Mean = 3.12

>

.05.

= 229)
15%
25%
27%
8%
18%
8%

APPENDIX B
MISCELLANEOUS STATISTICS FOR STUDY NO. 2
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II.

Abbreviation and Directional Key for Variables Used in
the Following Analyses
A. Scale K = Middle-East Knowledge Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more knowledgeable
the respondent.
B. Scale J = Jewish Attitude Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.

c.

Scale I = Israel Attitude Scale.
The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.

D. Scale Ips = Israel Positive-Items Attitude Scale.
(Items 2, 4, 5, and 9).
The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.
E. Scale Ing = Israel Negative-Items Attitude Scale.
(Items 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8).
The higher the scaled score the more positive the
attitude.
F. Scale P = Abridged and Modified Purpose in Life Scale.
The higher the score the more positive the attitude.
G. Scale An = Anomie Scale.
The higher the score the more positive the attitude.
H. Scale ES = Ego-Strength Scale.
The higher the score the more positive the attitude.
I. Scale CF =Combination Opinion-Fear Crises Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
J. Scale CO =Crises Opinion Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
K. Scale F = Crises Fear Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
L. Scale CFl = Nuclear War Crisis Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
M. Scale CF2 = Economic Crisis Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
N. Scale CF3 = Political Crisis Scale.
The higher the score the more negative the attitude.
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o.

G = Gender
Male • l; Female

= 2.

P. E = Education
Last year of formal education completed.

Q. Inc

= Individual Income
= Life Satisfaction

for 1984.

R. SAT
Scale.
The higher the score the more positive the attitude.

374
*Correlation and Level of Significance
Scale
K
Scale K
Scale J

Scale
I

Scale
Ips

Scale
Ing

.256

.209

• 227

.189

.ooo

.ooo

.189

1.000
• 999

.ooo

.ooo

1.000
.999

.ooo

.ooo

1.000
.999

.ooo

.256

.ooo

Scale Ips

J

= 360)

1.000
.999

.ooo

Scale I

Scale

(N

.209

.ooo

.565

.ooo
.402

.ooo

• 565

.741

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.492

.402

.ooo

.741

.861

• 323

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.323

1. 000
.999

Scale AN

-.037
.483

.ooo

.253

.140
.008

.067
.202

.133
.011

Scale EP

.089
• 092

.ooo

.218

.153
• 004

.101
.055

.166
.002

Scale ES

.113
.033

.064
.226

.118
.025

.080
.129

.104
• 049

Scale CF

-.006
• 906

-.173
.001

-.219

-.090
.088

-.259

Scale

co

.006
.905

-.168
.001

-.213

.ooo

-.082
.119

-.255

Scale

F

-.013
.000

-.132
.012

-.173
.001

-.082
.120

-.197

-.059
.295

.038
.496

-.143
.011

-.066
.236

-.173
.002

**Age

.047
.401

-.009
.867

.168
.003

.193
.001

.083
.140

**E

.176
.002

.ooo

.265

.183
.001

.050
.375

.ooo

**Inc

.146
.009

.126
.024

.177
.001

.114
.042

.182
.001

Scale Ing

**G

.227

.492

.861

.ooo

.ooo
.ooo

.ooo

*All correlations appear twice in the present matrix.
**N=320 for all correlations involving this variable.

.227

375

Scale

Scale
EP

Scale
ES

Scale
CF

Scale

co

Scale
F

-.037
.483

.089
.092

.113
• 033

-.006
• 906

.006
• 905

-.013
.800

.253
.000

.ooo

.218

.064
.226

-.173
.001

-.168
.001

-.132
.012

.140
.008

.153
.004

.118
.025

-.219

-.213

.ooo

-.173
.001

.067
.202

.101
.055

.080
.129

-.090
.088

-.082
.119

-.082
.120

.133
• 011

.166
.002

.104
.049

-.259

-.255

-.197

1.000
.999

.ooo

.ooo

• 231

-.240

-.245

.ooo

-.182
.001

.263

1. 000
.999

.ooo

.330

-.132
.012

-.099
.062

-.126
.017

AN

.ooo

.163

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.330

1.000
.999

-.133
.011

-.075
.156

-.150
• 004

-.240

.ooo

-.132
.012

-.133
.011

1.000
.999

• 867
• 000

.ooo

-.245

.ooo

-.099
.062

-.075
.156

.ooo

• 867

1.000
.999

.ooo

-.182
.001

-.126
.017

-.150
.004

.ooo

.ooo

• 527

1.000
.999

.100
.075

.097
.085

-.132
.018

.ooo

.208

.158
.005

.ooo

-.013
.822

.121
.030

.278
• 000

-.121
.030

-.086
.123

-.127
.023

.233

-.246

-.266

-.206

.202

-.153
.006

-.131
• 019

-.136
.015

.231

.350

.208

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.173
.002

.147
.008

.ooo

• 879

.ooo

.ooo

.879
• 527

• 210

.ooo
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Continued
Scale

Scale

K

J

*Scale CFl

-.012
.830

*Scale CF2

Scale
I

Scale
Ips

Scale
Ing

-.127
.023

-.198

.ooo

-.107
.056

-.208

.030
.591

-.129
.021

-.154
.006

-.084
.132

-.166
.003

*Scale CF3

.025
.657

-.193
.001

-.221
• 000

-.066
.242

-.276

*SAT

.001
• 991

.061
.280

.051
.361

.ooo

.087
.122

* N

=

.999

.ooo

.ooo

320 for all correlations involving this variable.
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Scale

p

Scale
ES

Scale
CF

-.166
.003

-.056
• 320

-.187
.001

• 797

-.219

-.085
.128

-.064
.254

.ooo

-.032
.563

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.260

-.137
.014

-.127
.023

-.113
• 043

AN

.ooo

-.262

Scale

.ooo

-.082
.144

.181
.001

.416
• 000

.ooo

.ooo

• 848

.764

Scale

co

• 641

.ooo
• 727

.ooo

• 713

Scale
F
• 749

.ooo

• 74 7

.ooo

.630

378

Continued
Scale Scale Scale
CFl
CF2
CF3 SAT

Age

E

-.059
.295

.047
.401

.176
.002

.146 -.012
.009
.830

.025
.657

.001
.991

J

.038
.496

-.009
.867

.265

.ooo

.126 -.127 -.129 -.193
.001
.024
.023
.021

.061
.280

Scale I

-.143
.011

.168
.003

.183
.001

.177
.001

-.198

-.154 -.221
.006
.ooo

.052
.361

Scale Ip;

-.066
.236

.193
.001

.050
.375

.114
.042

-.107 -.084
.132
.056

.066
.242

.ooo

-.173
.002

0.83
.140

.ooo

.227

.182
.001

-.208 -.166
.ooo .003

-.276

.ooo

.087
.122

Scale An

.100 -.013
.075
.822

.350

.ooo

.173 -.166
.002
.003

-.219 -.262

.181
.001

Scale P

.097
.085

.121
.030

.ooo

.208

.147 -.0-56 -.085
.320
.128
.008

Scale ES

-.132
.018

.ooo

G

Scale K
Scale

Scale Ing

Scale CF
Scale a>
Scale F

• 764

-.137
.014

• 713

-.127
.023

.ooo

.630

-.113
.043

.129
.021

.186
.001

-.027
.624

-.081
.147

-.1029
.610

.076
.175

-.283

.ooo

.181
.001

1.000 -.157 -.102 -.113
.067
.044
.999
.005

.097
.082

.158
.005

-.086 -.226 -.131
.123
.ooo .019

.ooo

.ooo

.210

-.127 -.206 -.136
.023
.ooo .015

• 749
.001

.ooo

.182
.001

-.099 -.249
.ooo
.078

.641

.012
.827

1.000
.999

-.131
.019

.040 -.172
.480
.002

E

-.099
.078

-.131
.019

1.000
.999

.354

Inc

-.249

.040
.480

.354

.ooo

.ooo

.416

.ooo

.ooo

• 797

.012
.827

Age

-.082

.260

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

.999

-.032
.563

.202

-.246 -.153
.ooo .006

.121
.030

.ooo

1.000
.999

G

.ooo

-.187
.001

.208

.233

.ooo

.030
.591

.ooo

.ooo

.278

Inc

.ooo

-.064
.254
.848

.ooo

• 727

• 747

-.149 -.170
.002
.008

.ooo

.ooo
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G

Age

Scale CFl

.182
.001

Scale CF2

.129 -.081
.021
.147

Scale CF3

.186
.001

SAT

-.027
.624

-.172
.002

E

Inc

Scale Scale
CF2 CF3

SAT

.149 -.157 1.000
.008
.999
.005

.542

.364

.ooo

-.107
.055

.ooo

.542

1.000
.999

.ooo

.501

-.155
.006

.364

.501

-.170
.002

-.102
.067

-.029 -.283
.ooo
.610

-.113
.044

.181
.001

.097
.082

.076
.175

Scale
CFl

.ooo

.ooo

.ooo

1.000 -.064
.999
.255

-.107 -.155 -.064 1.000
.999
.255
.055
.006
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Israel Attitude Scale
N = 378
*Frequency
Strong Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Positive Attitudes
Strong Positive Attitudes

=

2%

= 28%
= 57%

= 13%

*A scaled score based on the mean of all nine items in the
scale produced a range of 3 (minimum = 1, maximum = 4).
The individual mean scores were then rounded to the nearest
integer which resulted in the following ranges for each of
the above categories.
Strong Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Positive Attitudes
Strong Positive Attitudes

= 1.00
= 1.50
= 2.50
= 3.50

to
to
to
to

1.49
2.49
3.49

4.00

The same categorization process was done for the Jewish attitude scale.
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1. The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's
war-like behavior. Do you
(N=332)

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 14%
= 25%
= 36%

= 25%

2.
The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working
people. Do you
(N=348)

3.

= 62%

= 31%
= 5%
= 2%

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

Do you

= 31%
• 26%
23%
= 21%

=

The U.S. needs to continue to support Israel.
(N=350)

5.

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

The State of Israel is too war-like.
(N=348)

4.

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 35%
= 26%
= 19%

• 19%

I greatly respect the State of Israel.
(N=345)

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

Do you

Do you

= 37%
= 39%
= 15%
10%

=

6.
Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon.
you
(N=316)

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 26%
= 30%
= 25%
= 19%

Do
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7. The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the ArabIsrael conflict. Do you
(N=316)

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 27%
• 29%
=

26%
• 18%

8.
Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its
Arab neighbors.
Do you
(N=334)

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 25%
= 23%
= 27%
= 26%

9. The State of Israel must be militarily strong because
of all its hostile neighbors. Do you
(N=348)

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 57%
= 26%

• 10%

=

7%
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Jewish Attitude Scale
(N = 388)
Frequency:
Strong Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Negative Attitudes
Somewhat Positive Attitudes
Strong Positive Attitudes

= 3%
= 17%

= 49%
= 31%
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1.

Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices
to get ahead. Do you
(N=365)

2.

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 10%
8%
• 32%
= 50%

=

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 19%
= 11%
= 27%
= 42%

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 44%
= 36%
= 13%
= 7%

Jews may have moral standards which they apply in their
dealings with other Jews, but with Christians they are
ruthless. Do you
(N=350)

6.

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

Jews take the proper interest in community problems and
good government. Do you
(N=360)

5.

13%
13%
33%
42%

When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews
will choose money. Do you
(N=354)

4.

•
•
•
•

Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own
kind. Do you
(N=373)

3.

STRONGLY AGREE
SOMEWHAT AGREE
SOMEWHAT DISAGREE
STRONGLY DIS~GREE

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 11%

= 12%

= 33%
= 45%

A major fault of the Jews is their conceit and overbearing
pride. Do you
(N=357)

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 16%
= 18%
= 30%
= 36%
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7.

Jews are a revengeful people.
(N=350)

8.

= 13%
• 11%
= 29%
= 47%

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

= 10%

= 16%

= 31%

= 43%

Jews have too much power in the United States today.
Do you
(N=363)

10.

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

In general, Jews are a people filled with prejudice.
Do you
(N=364)

9.

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

Do you

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

== 17%

= 10%
• 32%
= 41%

Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America.
(N=339)

STRONGLY
SOMEWHAT
SOMEWHAT
STRONGLY

AGREE
AGREE
DISAGREE
DISAGREE

a

20%

= 15%

= 32%
= 33%

Do you
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Comparison of the Three-Item Scale Administered Immediately
After the Respective Readings, with the Identical Scale
Administered at the Completion of the Interview

Reliabilit~

Coefficients

Means
Variances
Inter-Item Correlation Mens
SeEarate Item Means
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3

..
:

(N=230)
After
Magazine
Readin2s
.47
1.55
.24
• 23
1.47
1. 51
1.67

..
I

;'

(N=l65)
At
Completion of
Interview
.47
1. 70

.21

;

• 22

;
;
;

1.65
1.70
1.74
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Factor Analysis on the Eight Questions Following the
Readings, After Varimax Rotation
Factor 1
Version
Version
Version
Version
Version
Version
Version
Versio'n

Question
Question
Question
Question
Question
Question
Question
Question

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

• 76

:-15

:-26
.22
.49

:7I"

.09
-.01

Factor 2
.24
.23
.66
.45
.22
-.06
• 52

--:-76

The eight questions were then broken down into two
scales based on the above analysis and a Kuder-Richardson20 reliability coefficient was obtained for each, as shown
below.
Factor 1
(Questions 1, 2, 5, & 6)
with (N=l 72) =
.66

Factor 2
(Questions 3, 4, 7, & 8)
with (N=l72) =

22.
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Correlation Matrix (N=335)
Israel
Attitude
Scale
Israel
Attitude
Scale
Questions
(Complete)
(8 I terns)
Questions
(Factor 1)
Questions
(Factor 2)

Questions
(Complete)
(8 I terns)
p

.22
.001

<

Questions Questions
(Factor 1) (Factor 2)

<

p

.23
.001

=

p

< .001

p

< .001

.as

p

<

.001

.15
.007

p

• 82

.42
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Correlations between 8-item scale and
A) Jewish Attitude Scale (Scale J)
B) M.E. Knowledge Scale (Scale K)
C) Israel Attitude Scale (Scale I)
Respondents receiving
1) Arab Version (N=-89)
B-Item Scale

Scale J Scale K Scale I -

.00, p
.00, p
.20, p

> .os
> .os
> .os

Respondents receiving
2) American Version (n=84)
8-Item Scale
Scale J Scale K Scale I -

-.03. p
.01, p
.13, p

> .os
> .os
> .os

Respondents receiving
3) Jewish Secular Version
8-Item Scale

Scale J Scale K Scale I -

-.13, p >
.04, p >
-.06, p >

~N=821

.os
.os
.os

Respondents receiving
4) Jewish Religious Version (N=921
8-Item Scale
Scale J Scale K Scale I -

.35, p = .001

.os,

p > .os
• 42' p < • 001

APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY NO. 1
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INTRODUCTION
He 11 o , is th is

?

~~~~---~~~~~~-

name is
, and I'm calling for the Jewish
Social Research Center of Chicago. We're conducting a survey of Chicago
area residents' opinions concerning issues in the Middle East. All answers
will be confidential and participation is voluntary.

My

For this survey, I need to speak with a man or woman over 21 who is Jewish
or of Jewish descent. Does anyone in your household fit this category?

[IF ABOVE CRITERIA ARE NOT MET, POLITELY TERMINATE]
[IF ELIGIBLE PERSON IS NOT HOME, DETERMINE WHEN TO CALL BACK]
Ql. GENDER:

MA.LE •• .••..•.•• • 1

FEMALE ............ 2

[CONTINUE WHEN SPEAKING TO ELIGIBLE PERSON; REPEAT INTRO IF NECESSARY]
In addition to questions about issues in the Middle East, throughout the
survey I'll also be asking you some background questions.
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STARTING TIME-----Q2.

What is your primary source of news about international affairs?
Is it •••
Radio ...................... 1

Television ........•.••.•... 2
Newspapers ................. 3
Magazines, or .•.•......•.•. 4
Some other source ••.•..•••. 5 (Specify- - - - - - )
DK • ••••••••••••.••••••••.•• 9

Q3.

What is your primary source of news about the Middle East?
Radio ...................... 1

Television •••...•...•••.•.• 2
Newspapers .....•....•.•.... 3
Magazines, or •....•..••.••• 4
Some other source ...•.•.•.. 5 (Specify- - - - - - )
DK • •••.•••••••••.••.••••.•• 9

Q4.

What are your two most widely read Jewish magazines or newspapers?

Q5.

Of these two, which one would you say is more widely read?

I

(
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During the past 30 years, Americans have heard a lot about the Arab-Israeli
conflict. It's important for us to learn what people know about the history
of the conflict. For each statement I read, please tell me if it's true,
false, or if you don't know. If you don't hear or understand the question
completely, I'll be happy to repeat it for you.

Q6.

Q7.

T

F

DK

Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over
the last 300 years until the creation of Israel.
Is this true or false? .........•..•.•....•.............•

1

2

9

From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in
1948, thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land
by the Jewish settlers. Is this true or false? .........

1

2

9

1

2

9

this true or false? .....................................

1

2

9

Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia's voting
record in the United Nations has shown a strong
connection between itself and the United States.
Is this true or false? •.••........•.•.•.•....•....•.....

1

2

9

true or false? ..........................................

1

2

9

Over the last ten years, Saudi Arabia has been
openly dedicated to the destruction of Israel.
Is this true or false? •...•....•.•......•.•.•..••.......

1

2

9

In 1948, Israel took control of less than one-fifth
of the land identified by the League of Nations as
Palestine. Is this true or false? .•...•.•..............

1

2

9

QB. Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of
Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is this
true or false? ..........................................

Q9.

QlO.

Qll.

Ql2.

Ql3.

Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State
of Israel have spent over three times the amount of
money in military equipment than Israel has. Is

Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so
that it now almost equals in size the area of all
its Middle-East enemies put together. Is this
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I now need to read some statements with which some people agree and others
disagree. There are no right or wrong answers. For each one, please tell
me if you agree or disagree.
Ql4A.

The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's war-like
behavior. Do you ..•
Agree, or ............ l
Disagree ..•..••...... 2
Don't Know .•.•••.•..• 9 [Skip to Q15A]

Ql4B.

Strongly {dis)agree or somewhat {dis)agree?
STRONGLY ..•.•.•••..•. !
SOMEWHAT .•.•••...•..• 2

Q15A.

The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working people.
Agree, or .••.••...•.. l
Disagree ............. 2
Don't Know •.•••.•.... 9 [Skip to Ql6A]

Q15B.

Strongly {dis)agree or somewhat {dis)agree?
STRONGLY •.•.•........ !
SOMEWHAT ..•...•...... 2

Q16A.

The State of Israel is too war-like.

Do you •.•

Agree, or .......... .. 1

Disagree •.•.......... 2
Don't Know .......•... 9 [Skip to Q17A]

Ql6B.

Strongly {dis)agree or somewhat {dis)agree?
STRONGLY ••.•...•..•.. !
SOMEWHAT •.•.•......•. 2

Q17A.

The U. S. needs to continue to support Israel.

Do you ...

Agree, or •.•.....•... 1
Disagree ..•...•.••.•. 2
Don't Know •......•.•. 9 [Skip to Ql8A]
Q17B.

Strongly {dis)agree or somewhat {dis)agree?
STRONGLY •.•..••••.••• !
SOMEWHAT •......••.•.• 2

Do you ..•

Q18A.

I greatly respect the State of Israel.

Do you •••

Agree, or ............ 1

Disagree •.•.•.••••••. 2
Don't Know •••••.•.••. 9 [Skip to Q19A]

Q18B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ..•.•...•.•.. !
SOMEWHAT •••••.•..••.• 2
Q19A.

Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon.

Do you ..•

Agree, or •.•.•...•••• 1
Disagree .•.•••.•.•.•• 2
Don't Know ••••.•.•.•. 9 [Skip to Q20A]
Q19B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY •..•••..•..•. 1
SOMEWHAT •...•..•.••.. 2
Q20A.

The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Do you •••
Agree, or .•.•.•...•.. 1
Disagree ....•...•.•.. 2
Don't Know ..•.•.•...• 9 [Skip to Q21A]

Q20B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY .•.•.•...•... 1
SOMEWHAT •............ 2
Q21A.

Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its Arab neighbors.
Do you •.•
Agree, or •.••.•...... 1
Disagree ........••... 2
Don't Know •.•.•..•... 9 [Skip to Q22A]

Q21B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ......•..•..• !
SOMEWHAT ........•.... 2
Q22A.

The State of Israel must be militarily strong because of all its
hostile neighbors. Do you .•.
Agree, or •.•.•....••• 1
Disagree •..•••..•.••• 2
Don't Know .•.•..•.•.•. 9 [Skip to Q23]

Q22B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ••••.•.•.•.•. 1
SOMEWHAT •••.•.•.•..•• 2
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I now am going to ask you some questions about several religious activities
which some Jewish people do and some Jewish people do not do.

YES

NO

NA

Do you refrain from eating bread and bread
products on Passover? ••.••.•...•....•••.•••.••..•

1

2

8

Q24.

Do you refrain from driving on Saturday? •.••...•.

1

2

8

Q25.

Do you keep Kosher? . ..•....................•...•.

1

2

8

Q26.

Do you believe in G-d? ....••••...•......•.•..••..

1

2

8

Q27.

Do you fast on Yorn Kippur? .•••...•....•.•..•..•..

1

2

8

Q28.

Do you eat pork? . ............................... .

1

2

8

Q29A. Do you Fast on Tish Abav? ••.......•.•...•.•......

1

2

8

Q29B. Do you believe in a "world to come" after
one dies in this world? ........................ ..

1

2

8

to the Jews by G-d? . ............................ .

1

2

8

Do you attend Synagogue services weekly? •.•..•...

1

2

8

.1

2

8

1

2

8

[NA MEANS NO ANSWER, REFUSED, OR DON'T KNOW]
Q23.

Q30.
Q31.

Do you believe that the Bible was given

[FOR MEN ONLY]
Q32A. Do you put on Tefillin daily? •....•.•...•..•.....

[FOR WOMEN ONLY]
Q32B. Do you light Sabath candles? .•......•...•.••.•...
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Now I'd like to finish by asking some background questions to help analyze
the data.

Q33.

Have you had some type of formal Jewish education?
Yes •••••. ..• . 1

No ...••....•. 2 [SKIP TO Q36]

Q34A.

What type of Jewish education was it?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Q34B.

Was this educational institution affiliated with the Reform,
Conservative, Orthodox, or some other Jewish movement?

Q35.

How many years of this education did you have?- - - - - -

Q36.

Do you presently belong to a synagogue?
Yes • ..••.••• • 1

No •.•.••.•••. 2 [SKIP TO Q38]
Q37.

Is your synagogue Reform, Conservative, Traditional, or Orthodox?
REFORM • •••••.•.••.•• • 1

CONSERVATIVE ...••.•.• 2
TRADITIONAL •.•••.••.• 3
ORTHODOX •..•.•.....•. 4
OTHER .....•....•..••. 5 [SPECIFY- - - - - - -]
NOTHING ......•.•.•... 6
REFUSED .••.•.•.•...•. 8
Q38.

Would you consider yourself Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or nonaffil iated?
[IF RESPONDENT SAYS TRADITIONAL, ASK: Would you say you are
closer to Conservative or Orthodox?]
REFORM ...••.•.•...••• 1
CONSERVATIVE •.•.•.•.• 2
ORTHODOX .•.••.•••.•.• 3
OTHER ................ 4 [SPECIFY
- - - - - - -]
NON-AFFILIATED •.•.•.• 5
REFUSED •..•.....•.•.• 8

Q39.

Are or were your parents Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or nonAffil iated?
REFORM ...•...•.•..... 1
CONSERVATIVE ...•.•... 2
ORTHODOX ....••.•••.•. 3
NON-AFFILIATED .•.•..• 4
OTHER ...... ~ ......... 5 [SPECIFY- - - - - - -]
REFUSED ...••..••.•... 8
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Q40.

Are or were your grandparents Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, or
Non-Affiliated?
REFORM • ••••••••••••• • 1

CONSERVATIVE •••....•. 2
ORTHODOX •.......•..•. 3
NON-AFFILIATED •....•. 4
OTHER •.......••.•.... 5 [SPECIFY- - - - - - -]
REFUSED .•.....•.•.... 8
Q41.

Do you belong to a Jewish organization aside from a
synagogue-related group?

synago~ue

Yes •.....••..•.•..•.. 1 [SPECIFY
No ................... 2 {no more than two)

or
]

Refused . ............. 8

Q42.

Are you presently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have
you never been married? ·
MARRIED .....•........ 1
WIDOWED .............. 2
DIVORCED ............. 3
SEPARATED ............ 4
NEVER MARRIED •....... 5 [SKIP TO Q58]
REFUSED .•............ 8 [SKIP TO Q58]

Q43.

Is (was) your spouse Jewish or of Jewish descent?
Yes . .........•...... . 1
NQ • •••••••••••••••••• 2

Convert .......••.•... 3 [SPECIFY BY WHOM]- - - - Refused .............. 8
Q44.

How many children do you have?

Q45.

What are your children's ages?

[IF NO CHILDREN 21 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER, SKIP TO Q58]
Q46.

Do your children who are 21 years of age or older belong to a synagogue
or attend synagogue services regularly?
[SPECIFY FOR EACH CHILD OVER 21]
[IF NONE BELONG OR ATTEND, SKIP TO Q48]
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Q47.

What type of synagogue do these children belong to or attend?
Is it .••
Reform . .....•.••..•.... . 1

Conservative ..•.••.••... 2
Traditional, or ....•..•• 3
Orthodox •..•..••..•.•.•. 4
Other .•.•.•.•.•••.•....• 5 [Specify_ _ _ _ _ _]
Ref used . •............... 8

Q48.

Do your children 21 and over belong to a Jewish organization aside
from a synagogue or synagogue-related group?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q49.

Are your children presently married, widowed, divorced, separated,
or have they never been married?

[IF NONE HAVE EVER BEEN MARRIED, SKIP TO Q58]
[SPECIFY FOR EACH]
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QSO.

Of your children who are, or were married. are or were their spouses
Jewish or non-Jewish?
[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q51.

Do your married children have children of their own?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH CHILD AND OBTAIN SPECIFIC AGES OF GRANDCHILDREN]
[IF NONE, SKIP TO Q58]
[IF NONE 21 OR OLDER, SKIP TO Q58]

952.

Do your grandchildren 21 years of age or older belong to a synagogue
or attend synagogue services regularly?

[SPECIFY YES OR NO FOR EACH]
[IF NONE BELONG OR ATTEND, SKIP TO Q54]
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Q53.

What type of synagogue do these grandchildren belong to or attend?
Is it ..•
Reform . ........... ·• .... • 1

Conservative •...•...•.•. 2
Traditional, or ••.•.•••• 3
Orthodox ••••...••••••... 4

OTHER ..•.........•..... 5 [SPECIFY_ _ _ _ _.]
REFUSED ........•......•. 8

Q54.

Do your grandchildren 21 and over belong to a Jewish organization
aside from a synagogue or synagogue-related group?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q55.

Are your grandchildren presently married, widowed, divorced,
separated, or have they never been married?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]
[IF NONE HAVE EVER BEEN MARRIED, SKIP TO Q58]
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Q56.

Of your grandchildren who are or were married, are or were their
spouses Jewish or non-Jewish?

[SPECIFY FOR EACH]

Q57.

Do your grandchildren have any children of their own?
NO • • • • • • · • • • • • 1
YES· •••••.•.•.• 2

[SPECIFY FOR EACH GRANDCHILD AND OBTAIN AGES]
j

Q58.

In what year were you born?- - - -

REFUSEQ. .•...... 88

Q59.

Were you born in the United States?

YES ............•. l [SKIP TO Q62]
NO . ..•.•.•.•..... 2

Q60.

In what country were you born?
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Q61.

What was the highest grade or year of school you completed?
NONE . ....•••.•.•••.•.••.•..••......•.• ·•• 00
ELEMENTARY~.01 .• 02 •• 03 •• 04 .. 05 •. 06 .. 07 •. 08
HIGH SCHOOL ..•.•.•.•........ 09 .• 10 .• 11 .. 12

SOME COLLEGE ••••.•••••.•.••.•.••••.•.•• . 13

VOCATIONAL SCHOOL •..••....•.•••..•.•.... 14
BACHELOR DEGREE. ...•.•.•••.••.•......... 15
SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL .•.•....••..•..•.... 16
MASTER DEGREE. ..•....••.....•........... 17
DOCTORATE DEGREE. •.•...•....•.•...•.•... 18
REFUSED • •••••••••••••.•.•••••••••••••••. 88

_j
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Finally to conclude this survey, I need to ask you some questions about
Zionism and Judaism.

Q62.

Have you ever visited Israel?
YES . ••••••••••••.•.•••.. 1

N0 •••••••••••••••••••••• 2 [SKIP TO Q64]

REFUSED .....•....•...... 8

Q63.

How many times have you visited Israel?

Q64.

If things in the U. S. remain as they are, do you have any real
intention of ever settling in Israel?
YES •.••••..•••.••••••• • 1
NO • •.•.•••.••••.•••••••• 2

REFUSED ................. 8
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Q65.

Could you tell me the name of the Jewish New Year?

Q66.

On what date was the lst and 2nd Temple in Jerusalem (The Beit
Hamikdosh) destroyed?

Q67.

On which Jewish holiday do some Jews wave around a palm branch
(A Lulav)?

Q68.

What were the names of the three Jewish Patriarchs?

Q69.

Could you give me an example of what is meant in the Bible by an
Eye·For an Eye?

Q70.

Who brought the Jewish people into the Land of Canaan after they
had left Egypt?

Q71.

What is the Oral

Q72.

What is the name of the morning prayer?

Q73.

Could you tell me who the chief commentator of the Talmud is whose
commentary is found on the same page as the Talmud itself?

Law?

Q74. And finally, could you spell for me the word Shabbat in Hebrew?

Thank you, that completes the survey.

FINISHING TIME- - - - -

Thanks very much for your cooperation.

APPENDIX D
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY NO. 2
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SURVEY INTRODUCTION
Hello• is this _ _ _ _ _ _ _?

[VERIFY TELEPHONE NUMBER]

My name is
• and I'm calling for Loyola University of
Chicago. We are conducting a survey concerning Chicago residents' opinions
about international affairs, and specifically concerning issues in the Middle
East. All answers will be confidential and participation is voluntary.
For this survey, I need to speak with a man [woman] 25 years of age or older.
Does anyone in your household fit into this category?
[IF MAN (WOMAN) IN HOUSEHOLD IS NOT 25 YEARS OR OLDER, POLITELY TERMINATE]
[IF ELIGIBLE MALE (FEMALE) IS NOT HOME, DETERMINE 'WHEN TO CALL BACK]
[IF TOLD NO MAN (WOMAN) LIVES IN HOUSEHOLD, POLITELY TERMINATE]

*****************************************************************************
Sl.

GENDER:

MALE •••••••••••••••• 1
FDIA.LE ••••••••••••• 2

[CONTINUE WHEN SPEAKING TO ELIGIBLE MALE (FEMALE), REPEAT INTRO IF NECESSARY:]
In addition to questions about international affairs and the Middle East,
throughout the survey I will also be asking you some questions about yourself.
Now I'll begin by asking you three short background questions.
S2.

What is your racial background?

Are you •••

Asian •••••••••••••••••••••••• 1
Black •••••••••••••••••••••••• 2
Hispanic, or ••••••••••••••••• 3
'Wllite? .•.•••.•••••••••••••••• 4

OTHER • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 5
REFUSED • ••••••••••••••••••••• 8

S3.

[POLITELY TERMINATE]
[POLITELY TERMINATE]
[POLITELY TERMINATE]

Are you of Arabic or Jewish decent?
YES •••••••••••••••••••••••••• l
NO • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2

REFUSED •••••••••••••••••••••• 8
S4.

[POLITELY TERMINATE]

What is your religious preference?

[POLITELY TERMINATE]
[POLITELY TERMINATE]

Are you •••

Ca tho lie . ....................•.•.•.. . 1

Protestant ••••••••••••••••••••••••.•• 2
Jewish, or ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3
Something else? (specify
4
REFUSED •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8

[POLITELY TERMINATE]
[POLITELY TERMINATE]
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STARTING TIME

-----

During the past 30 years, Americans have heard a lot about the Arab~Israeli
conflict. It's important for us to ·learn what people know about the history
of the conflict. For each statement I read, please tell me if it's true,
false, or if you don't know. If you don't hear or understand the question
completely, I'll be happy to repeat it for you.

Ql.

Q2.

Q3.

T

F

DK

Is that true or false? ••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••.••••

1

2

9

From the time many Jews started arriving in Palestine
in the late 1800s until the creation of Israel in
1948, thousands of Arabs were kicked out of the land
by the Jewish settler~. Is that trµe or false? ••••••••

l

2

9

Palestine was an independent Palestinian State over
the last 300 years until the creation of Israel.

Arab hostility toward Jews began with the start of
Jewish nationalism in the late 1800s. Is that true
or false? ... .......................................... .

Q4.

2

9

-r.

2

9

1

2

9

true or false? ........................................ .

1

2

9

In 1948 Israel took control of less than one-fifth
of the land identified by the League of Nations as
Palestine. Is that true or false? •.•••••••••••••••••••

1

2

9

Over the last ten years Saudi Arabia's voting record
in the United Nations has shown a strong connection
between itself and the United States. Is that true
or false? .............................................. .

Q6.

QB.

1 '

Israel's past actions have expanded its borders so that
it now almost equals in size the area of all its
Middle-East enemies put together. Is that true or
false? ................................................ .

Q7.

9

Middle-East Arab nations openly hostile to the State
of Israel have spent over three times the amount of
money in military equipment than Israel has. Is that
true or false? ........................ ................ .

Q5.

1

Over the last ten years Saudi Arabia has been openly
dedicated to the destruction of Israel. Is that
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Now I'll read some statements that describe the way some people feel about
themselves. For each statement, please tell me how true they are for you.

Q9.

"No one cares much about what happens to me."
is that •••

Thinking about yourself,

very true ....................... 1

pretty true, or ••••••••••••••••• 2
not true at all ••••••••••••••••• 3
DON ' T KNOW • • • • •••••••••••••••••• 9
QlO.

"I often wish that people would listen to me more."

Is that •••

very true . ..................... . 1

pretty true, or •••••••••••••••• \_2
not true at all ••••••••••••••••• 3
DON ' T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Qll. "I often wish that people liked me more than they do."

Is that •••

very true ....................... 1

pretty true, or ••••••••••••••••• 2
not true at all ••••••••••••••••• ~
DON ' T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9
Ql2.

"These days I really don't know who I can count on for help."
very true ...................... ~1

pretty true, or •••••••••••••••• ,2
not true.at all ••••••••••••••••• 3
DON I T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Is that •••
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Now I'm going to read some statements about how people are spending their
lives these days. Please tell me how these statements apply to you.

Ql3. lalen thinking about your life, do you more often wonder why you exist, or
do you more of ten see a reason for being here?

. .. .. . - •
.
.. .. ... .. .. . . .. .. .. ... •.. •• ....

M'.>NDER YIY • • • • •
SEE A REASON • • • •
RF•
DK.

• 1

• • • • 2

• 8
• 9

Ql4 •. Would you say your life is • • •
empty, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
somewhat empty, or • • • • • • • ~· 2
not at al 1 empty? • • • • • • • . . ~l

......

R.F. • • • .. .. • .. • • • • • • .. • 8
• • 9

.DIC • • • • • • • •

Ql5. Is facing your daily tasks more often a source of pleasure and
satisfaction, or is it more often a painful and boring experience.
PLEASURE/SATISFACTION • • • • • ~.. 1
PAINFUL/ B:>RING •
• • • • • • • 2
RF • . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 8
DK.
• • • • • • • • • • • ,. "9

Ql6. If you should die today, would you feel that your life has been •••
very worthwhile, • • • • • • • • • 3
somewhat worthwhile, or • • • • • 2
not at all worthwhile? • • • • • • 1
DON IT KNOW. • • • • • • • • • • • 9

*****************************************************************************~

Ql7. In general, how satisfying do you find the way you 're spending your life
these days? Would you call it • • •
completely satisfying, • • • • • • 3.
pretty satisfying, or • • • • • • 2
not very satisfying? • • • • • • • 1
DK. • • • • • • • .. •

.....• 9

411

[VERSION PPP]
I now need to read you a group of sentences and
then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only on your
understanding of these sentences.
The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular
political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily
represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it.

[READ SENTENCES:]
A Jewish professor stated that the Israeli army has committed atrocities
against the Palestinian people.
The racist character of Zionism is amply manifested in Israel's imperialistic
and settler-state policies.
During Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli army trampled on its victims
destroying everything in its path and unleashed on Beirut a rain of death
and destruction.
The Palestinians have been victims of extermination, persecution, and indifference since 1948.
Most of the world's governments today have come to reeognize that the
Palestinian problem is the root-cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Jews have displaced the Palestinians from their land via abominations.
Jews have no real Biblical justiciation for building a Jewish State in
Palestine.
The polls have shown that the American people think that the Palestinian
struggle to return to their land is justified.

Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat
the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.)
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{VERSION JRP]
Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of sentences
and then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only
on your understanding of these sentences.
The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular
political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily
represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it.

[READ SENTENCES:]
The State of Israel is the historic homeland of the Jews.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, is an unprincipled terrorist
organization.
The PLO has vied for the total liquidation of Israel.
PLO operations in Lebanon up to 1982
worldwide.

~as

the center for international terrorism

Up until 1982, Israel's northern border has been consistently bombed by PLO
terrorists.
Since June of 1981 to December of 1982, a total of 150 terrorist attacks
have been made against Israel by the PLO.
The President of Lebanon said, in Paris, that Arafat, the leader of the PLO,
is the cause of the Palestinian's problems.
Jordan is the key obstructionist in settling the Palestinian refugee problem
by not admitting that his state is actually Palestine.

Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat
the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.)
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[VERSION JSMP]
Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of se~tences
and then ask you a few questions which you are asked to answer based only
on your understanding of these sentences.
The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular
political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily
represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it.

[READ SENTENCES:]
Israel will never obtain the security it wants by using force.
The Israeli government has tried to destroy the Arab political elite in the
occupied territories by ousting mayors, closing universities, and restricting
the circulation of literature in the Arab-dominated areas •.
Many governments throughout the world have held Israel responsible for the
massacre of Palestinian civilians in the Palestinian refugee camps.
According to the U. s. State Department, there are 4,300,000 Palestinians
scattered around the world.
The European Parliament Assembly has expressed solidarity with the Palestinian
people.
The Arabs call for a Palestinian State represented by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, the PLO.
The moderate Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, are troubled by
the Palestinian plight.
A PLO leader who surrendered to the Israelis said that he was ashamed of
its terrorist tactics.

Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat
the sentences one more time? {IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.)

[VERSION ASMP]
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Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read you a group of sentences
and then ask you a few questions'which you are asked to answer based only
on your understanding of these sentenc~s.
The sentences you will hear come from an actual magazine with a particular
political point of view. The information in the sentences does not necessarily
represent the real situation, but only this magazine's way of explaining it.

[READ SENTENCES:]
President carter said that the continued deprivation of Palestinian rights
by the Israelis is con.t.;rary to moral and ethical principles of both the U.
and Israel.

s.

The Israelis arranged for the Christian militiamen to enter the Palestinian
refugee camps in 1982 where there were very bloody consequences.
Senior American officials feel the necessity for solving the Palestinian
plight on the West· Bank.
Israeli victory in Lebanon did not settle the issue of a place for the
Palestinians to live.

An

Because the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PLO, suffered defeat in
Lebanon, the moderate policies of Yasser Arafat may be rejected for more
ruthless tactics.
The Arab .leaders of the Middle-East have called for the creation of an
independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital.
The leader of the PLO Yasser Arafat has unflagging energy and absolute
determination to regain a homeland for his people.
The Lebanese President stated that the Palestinians should be allowed to
live in peace and freedom with self-determination in their land.

Now, before I ask you the final set of questions, would you like me to repeat
the sentences one more time? (IF NOT, GO RIGHT TO QUESTIONS.)
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Now, please remember, base your answers only on the sentences you have Just
heard and not on any prior knowledge or attitudes you might have.
Ql8.

According to what you just heard, who is to blame for causing the
Palestinian refugee problem? Is it •••
Israel, or . ................... . 1

The Arabs? •.•.•.•.••••••••.•••• 2
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3

NEITHER • •••••.••••••••••.••••• • 4

DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5
DON ' T KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9

Ql9.

According to what you heard, who is to blame for the continuing
Palestinian refugee problem. Is it •••
Israel, or ••.•.••••••••.•.••••• l
Th.e Arabs? • •••••••••••••••••••• 2
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3

NEITHER • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4
DON 'T KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9

DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5

Q20.

Who are the rightful inhabitants of the land which today is called
Israel and before 1948 was called Palestine? Is it •••
The Jews, or ................... 1
The Arabs? ••••••• •••••.•••••••• 2
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3

NEITHER ••• ••••••••••••••.••••• • 4
DON IT KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9
DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5

Q21.

Who is responsible for the Jewish refugee problem from the Arab lands?
The Arabs, or . ........•....... . 1
The Jews? • ••••••••••••••••••••• 2
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3

NEITHER • •••••••••••••••••.••.•• 4
DON'T KN'OW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9
DIDN'T SAY •..•.•.•.••••.•..•••. 5

Q22.

Who is to blame for the harsh treatment of the Palestinian Arabs?
ls it •••
The Israelis, or .•••••••••••••• l
The Arabs? •••••.•.•••••••..•• • 2

BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••.•••••• 3
NEITHER • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4
DON 'T KNOW • •••••••.••••••••••••• 9

DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5
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Q23.

Who is to blame for Palestinian Arab assaults on Israeli civilians?
Is it •••
The Arabs, or ••••.••••••••••••• l
The Israelis? •••••••••••••••••• 2
BOTH • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3

NEITHER • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4
DON ' T KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9

DIDN'T SAY ••••••••••••••••••••• 5

Q24.

The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would be
.resettlement in •••
Israel ••••••••••••••••••••••••• !
Jordan. or . .......•......•...•. 2

Some other place? •••••••••••••• 3
BOTH PLACES •••••••••••••••••••• 4
NO RESETTLEMENT •••••••••••••••• 5
DON ' T KNOW ••••••••••••••••••••• 9

DIDN'T SAY • ••••••.••••••••••••• 6

Q25.

Love for the land once called Palestine and presently called Israel
has been traditionally expressed most by •••
The Palestinian Arabs, or •••••• 1
The Jewish People? ••••••••••••• 2
DON ' T KNOW • •••••••••••••••••••• 9
DIDN'T SA.Y •••••••••••••••· .••••• 3
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Now I'm going to ask you some questions about where you get your news about
world affairs.
Q26.

What is your primary source of news about international affairs.
Is it •••
Radio . ......•........•.•••. 1

Television ••••••••••••••••• 2
Newspapers ••••••••••••••••• 3
Magazines, or •••••••••••••• 4
Some other source •••••••••• 5
DK • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Q27.

Now after
[READ ABOVE SOURCE]
, what's your next main source
of news about international aff ai-rs-?~RADIO •••••••••••••••••••••• 1

TELEVISION ••••••••••••••••• 2
NEWSPAPERS ••••••••••••••••• 3
MAGAZINES, or •••••••••••••• 4
SOME OTHER SOURCE? ••••••••• 5
DK • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Q28.

What is your primary source of news about the Middle East?
&adio •••••••••••••••••••••• l
Television ••••••••••••••••• 2
Newspapers ••••••••••••••••• 3
Magazines, or •••••••••••••• 4
Some other source •••••••••• 5

Is it •••

[Skip to Q30A]

[Skip
[Skip
[Skip
DK ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 [Skip

to
to
to
to

Q31A]
Q32A]
Q33 ]
Q34, PAGE9]

Q29A. From which local channel do you get most of your international news
and information? (PROBE FOR ONLY ONE CHANNEL).
CHANNEL 2
CHANNEL 5
CHANNEL 7
CHANNEL 9
CHANNEL 11

(WBBM) ••••••••••• l
(WMAQ) ••••••••••• 2
(WLS) •••••••••••• J
(WGN) •••••••••••• 4
(WTTW) ••••••••••• 5

OTHER • •••••••••••••••••••• • 6
DK • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 7

Q29B. What time of the day do you usually watch international news on that
channel?

---AM
Q29C

PM (Circle one)

From which TV news person do you get your largest amount of international
news?

[SKIP To Q34]
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Q30A.

From which radio station do you get most of your international news?

Q30B.

From which radio news person do you get your largest amount of
international news?

[SKIP TO Q34]
Q31A·

From which newspaper do you get most of your international news?

Q31B.

From which columnist or section of the paper do you get your largest
amount of international news?

[SKIP TO Q34]

QJ2A.

From which magazine do you get most of your international news?

Q32B.

From which columnist or section of the magazine do you get your
largest amount of international news?

[SKIP TO Q34]
Q33.

Where do you get most of your news about the Middle East?
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Now, please tell me if the following are True or False for you.
T

F

DK

Q34.

I have very definite established goals in life
which I intend to pursue at all cost •••••••••••••••••••• 1 •••• 2 •••• 9

Q35.

Of ten I find myself doing and saying things that turn
out to be things that shouldn't have been done or said •• !. .•. 2 •••• 9

Q36.
Q37.
Q38.
Q39.
Q40.

Sometimes I don't care whether I get anywhere in
life or not ............................................. 1 .... 2 .... 9

There are odd moments now and then when I suspect
I might go to pieces ..................................... 1 .... 2 .... 9

Every now and then I lose my temper when
things go wrong . ........................................ .. 1 . ... 2 . ... 9

Every now and then I can't seem to make up my
mind about things .. •..••..•.................•.......••... 1 . ..• 2 . ..• 9
I am one who never gets excited when things
go wrong . •.•....•......•...•....•...........•....•...... 1 .•.• 2 ..•• 9
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The following are statements about Jewish people with which some people agree
and others disagree. There are no right or wrong answers.
For each one,
please tell me if you agree or disagree.
Q41A.

Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get
ahead. Do you •••
Agree, or . .......•... . 1

Disagree •••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW ••.•••.••••• 9
Q41B.

[Skip toQ42A)

Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?
STRONGLY •••••••••••.••• 1
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2

Q42A

Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind.

Do you •••

Agree, or .. .......... . 1
Disagree •.•.....••.•.• 2

DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q43A].
Q42B.

Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l

SOMEWHAT ..•.•........• 2

Q43A.

When it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will
choose money. Do you •••
Agree, or ............. 1

Disagree •••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW •••.•.•••••• 9
Q43B.

(Skip toQ44A)

Do you strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• 1
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2

Q44A.

Jews take the proper interest in community problems and good
govenment. Do you •••
Agree, or •...•..•.•.•. 1
Disagree ••••••.••••••• 2

DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q45A]
Q44B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• !
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2
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Q45A.

Jews may have moral standards which they apply in their dealings with
other Jews. but with Christians they are ruthless. Do you •••
Agree, or •••.•.••••••• l
Disagree ••...•.•...••• 2

Q45B~

DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q46A]
Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• !
SOMEWHA.T • ••••••••••••• 2

Q46A.

A major fault of the Jews is their conceit and overbearing pride.
Do you •••
Agree, or ........•.... 1
Disagree •••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q47A]

Q46B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2

Q47A.

Jews are a revengeful people.

Do you •••

Agree, or . •.......... . 1

Disagree •••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q48A]
Q47B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2

Q48A.

In general, Jews are a people filled with prejudice.

Do you •••

Agree, or ....... , ..... 1

Disagree •••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9
Q48B.

[Skip to Q49A]

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l
SOMEWHAT .•...•.•....•. 2

Q49A.

Jews have too much power in the United States today.

Do you •••

Agree, or •••.•.•.••••. 1

Disagree •••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW ••••.••••••• 9
Q49B.

[Skip to Q&>A)

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ••••.••••••••• l
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••••• 2

QSOA.

Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America.

Do you •••

Agree, or ............. 1

Disagree •••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW •••••••••••• 9
Q50B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?
STRONGLY •••••••••••••• l
SOMEWHAT •.•.•.•..•.•.. 2

[Ski P to Q51]
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Q51.

In your opinion, how likely is it that the United States will
experience a nuclear war by the year 2000? Is it •••
Very likely •.•..•.•.•••••••••••••• l
Somewhat likely, or ••••••••••••••• 2
Very unlikely? •••••••••••••••••••• !
DON ' T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Q52.

How likely is it that the U. S. economy will become much worse in the
near future? Is it •••
Very 1 ikely . ...................... 3

Somewhat likely, or ••••••••••••••• 2
Very unlikely? •••••••••••••••••••• !
I>C>N ' T KNOW. • • • • • • . • ••••••••••••••• 9

Q53.

With the large political differences in the U. S. today, how likely
is it that extreme political changes will occur in the near future?
Is it •••
Very likely ....................... 3

Somewhat likely, or ••••••••••••••• 2
Very unlikely? •••••••••••••••••••• !
OON I T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Q54.

How fearful are you of the possibility of nuclear war in your lifetime? Are you •••
Quite fearful . .................... 3

Somewhat fearful, or ••••••••.••••• 2
Not at all fearful? ••••••••••••••• !
DON ' T KNOW • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Q55.

How fearful are you of the possibility of a serious economic crisis
in the U. S. in your lifetime? Are you •••
Quite fearful . .................... J

Somewhat fearful, or •••••••••••••• 2
Not at all fearful? ••••••••••••••• !
DON ' T KNOW. • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••••••• 9

Q56.

How fearful are you of the possibility of an extreme political change
in the U. S. in your lifetime? Are you •••
Quite fearful ••••••••••••••••••••• 3
Somewhat fearful, or .••••••••••••• 2
Not at all fearful? ••••••••••••••• !
DON ' T KNOW • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9
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Now I'd like to finish by asking some background questions to help analyze
the data.
Q57.

In what year were you born?
Refused ••••••••••• 8888

Q58.

Are you presently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you
never been married?
MARRIED ••••••••••.••••••••.••• 5
WIDOWED ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4
DIVORCED •••••••••••••••••••••• 3
SEPA.RATED •••••••••••••• ·••••••• 2

NEVER MARRIED •.•••••••••••••••• 1
RF •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8

Q59.

Are you a U. S. citizen?
YES ••••••••••••••••••••.•••••• l

[Skip to Q61]

NO •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2

Q60.

What is your country of citizenship?

[SKIP TO Q62]
Q61.

•

Were you born in the United States?
YES ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• l

(Skip tOQ63]

NO •••••••••••••••••••••••••• ·• • 2

Q62.

In what country were you born?

[IF BLACK, SKIP TO Q64]
Q63.

Which country do your ancestors come from?

[IF MORE THAN ONE, PROBE: "Of these, with which group do you
most identify with?"]
Q64.

What was the highest grade or year of school you completed?
NONE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 00

ELEMENTARY: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
HIGH SCHOOL ••••••• ·•• • • • 09 10 11 12
SOME COLLEGE •••••••••••.••••••••• 13
VOCATIONAL SCHOOL •••••••••••••••• 14
BACHELOR DEGREE •••••••••••••••••• 15
SOME GRADUATE SCHOOL ••••••••••••• 16
MASTER DEGREE •••••••••••••••••••• 17
DOCTORATE DEGREE ••••.•.•••••••••• 18
RF ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 88
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Q65.

Are you employed full time, part time, unemployed, retired, a student
or something else?
•
EMPLOYED FULL TIME •••••••••••••••• 6
EMPLOYED PART TIME •••••••••••••••• 5
UN:mfPLOYED • ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4 [Skip
RETIRED ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3 [SKIP

to 67]

TO
STUDENT • •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2 [SKIP TO
SOMETHING ELSE •••••••••••••••••••• 1 [SKIP TO
RF •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 [SKIP TO

67]
67]
67]
67]

Q66.

What do you presently do to support yourself?

Qli?.

In 1984, is your own personal income before taxes [NOT HOUSEHOLD
INCOME] going to be more than •••
$10,000? ••••••• NO •••.••••••••••••• 2
$15 • 000? • •••••• NO • •••••••••••••••• 3
$20,000? •••• ·••• NO ••••••••••••••••• 4

$30,0001 •.•.••• No •.•••••••.••••.•. s
$~0,000?

••••••• NO ••••••••••••••••• 6

YES ••••••••••••••••• 7
REFUSED •••• ••••••••••••• 8

DON'T KNOW ••••••••••••••••• 9

Q68.

What did you do five years ago, in 1979, to support yourself?

[IF RETIRED, ASK OCCUPATION BEFORE TIME OF RETIREMENT]
(FOR MALE RESPONDENTS)

Q69A.

What does or did your father do for a living?

[IF RETIRED, ASK FATHER'S OCCUPATION AT TIME OF RETIREMENT]
(FOR FEMALE RESPONDENTS)

Q69B.

What is or was your mother's ·occupation?

425

Finally, to conclude this survey, I need to read some statements with which
some people agree and others disagree. There are no right or wrong answers.
For each one, please tell me if you agree or disagree.
Q70A.

The Palestinian refugee problem is the result of Israel's war-like
behavior • Do you. • •
·
Agree. or ••••••.•••.• 1

Disagree ••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9
Q70B.

[Skip to Q71A]

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ••••••••••••• !
SOMEWHAT ••••••••••••• 2
Q71A.

The people of Israel are dedicated and hard-working people.
Do you •••
Agree, or •.•...•..•.• 1

Disagree ••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9 [Skip to
Q71B.

Q72A]

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ••••••••••••• 1
SOMEWHAT ••••••••••••• 2
Q72A.

The State of Israel is too war-like.

Do

you •••

Agree, or •••••••••••• l
Disagree ••••••••••••. 2
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••. 9 [Skip to
Q72B.

Q73A]

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY •••••••.••••• 1
SOMEWHAT ..•.•.•.•.•.. 2
Q73A.

The U. S. needs to continue to support Israel.

Do you •••

Agree, or .. ...•...•. . 1

Disagree ••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9
Q73B.

[Skip to Q74A]

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ••••••••••••• l
SOMEWHAT •••••••••• • •• 2

Q74A.

I greatly respect the State of

Israel~

Do you •••

Agree, or ............ 1

Disagree ••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9 (Skip to Q75A]
Q74B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ••••••••••••• !
SOMEWHAT •••••••••••.• 2
Q75A.

Israel showed its brutality in its war in Lebanon.

Do you •••

Agree, ·or •••••••••••• 1
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW ••••••••••• 9 [Skip to Q76A]
Q75B.

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ••••••••••.•. !
SOMEWHAT •........•... 2
Q76A.

The Palestinian refugee problem is the core of the Arab-Israel
conflict. Do you •••
Agree, or •••••••••••• 1
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2
DON'T. KNOW ••••••••••• 9

Q76B.

[Skip to Q77A]

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY ••••••••••••• 1
SOMEWHAT ••••••••••••• 2

Q77A.

Israel's military goal is to gain extra land from its Arab neighbors.
Do you •••
Agree, or .. ......... . 1

Disagree ••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW •••••••.••• 9
Q77B.

[Skip to Q78A]

Strongly (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY •••••••••••.• 1
SOMEWHAT •..•......•.• 2

Q78A.

The State of Israel must be militarily strong because of all its
hostile neighbors. Do you •••
Agree, or ••• ~········l
Disagree ••••••••••••• 2
DON'T KNOW ••••••••.•• 9

Q78B.

[Skip to Q79A]

Strongiy (dis)agree or somewhat (dis)agree?

STRONGLY •••.••••••••• l
SOMEWHAT ....•.•.•.••• 2
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Q79.

In your opinion, who is to blame for causing the Palestinian refugee
problem? Is it •••

Israel, or ••.•.•.•••.•.••••...•• l
Tlle Arabs? ••••••••• •'• ••••••••••• 2
BOTH • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3
NEITHER • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 4

DON'T KNOW ••.•.•••...•.•.•••..•. 9
Q80.

In your opinion, who are the rightful inhabitants of the land which
today is called Israel and before 1948 was called Palestine? Are
the rightful inhabitants •••
The Arabs, or • .........•...•... . 1
Tlle Jews? •••••••••.••••••••••••• 2
BOTH • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3

NEITHER • •••••••••••••••••••••••• 4
DON ' T KNOW •••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Q81.

The fairest solution for the Palestinian Arab refugees would be
resettlement in •••
Israel •••••••••••••••••••••••••• l
Jordan, or . ............•......•. 2

Some other place? ••••••••••••••• 3
NO RESETTLEMENT ••••••••••••••••• 4
DON 'T KN'OW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Q82.

In your opinion, is the Palestinian Refugee Problem the underlying
and central problem in the Arab-Israel conflict?
YES • •.••••••••••••••••••••••.•• • 1
NO • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2

DON ' T KN"OW • ••••••••••••••••••••• 9

Thank you, that completes the survey.
and have a good evening.

FINISHING TIME

~~~~~~~~~~

Thanks very much for your cooperation,
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